


# REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN VALUES

HONOURING LOEK HALMAN'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY

*Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben (Eds)*

European Values Series  
VOLUME 2



# REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN VALUES

HONOURING LOEK HALMAN'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY

---

*Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben (Eds)*

# FOREWORD

A BOOK MADE BY FRIENDS,  
A BOOK ABOUT VALUES,  
A BOOK ON LOEK

---

The book before you is dedicated as a *Festschrift* to Loek Halman on the occasion of his retirement from our university. The rich and varied contributions it contains were written by many researchers involved in the European Values Study (EVS), some from its very inception. Loek's farewell coincides with the presentation of the new edition of the *Atlas of European Values*. It marks a new phase, for Loek personally, but also for this important project that the academic community at Tilburg University is rightly proud of.

Every page of this book reflects the friendship and respect that Loek inspires and also the great commitment to that important study into values over the past decades: European values, first and foremost, but as the study will show, closely linked to values elsewhere in the world, the World Values.

This moment also coincides with tensions rising in Europe and the world at large. It is becoming increasingly clear, also thanks to this study, that underlying what appear to be economic conflicts are actually, deeply and essentially, tensions between values. Dominique Moïsi's *The Geopolitics of Emotion* seems to be rooted in the geopolitics of values.

The new *Atlas*, Loek's last, is published at a moment when many people will understand these values differently from what they thought about them only a few months ago. At the moment that I am writing this foreword, a terrible war is raging, the ramifications of which for Europe and its values we can only guess at. Values, Europe, values of and within Europe: they continue to be a truly essential subject of research.

It is an honour for me to be invited to write the foreword to this book. I will resist the temptation to relate the history of the EVS, which I have been following with more than ordinary interest since the 1990s. The opening chapter, prepared by the editors of this book, will adequately demonstrate that this history has largely coincided with Loek Halman's academic as well as his personal commitment to this project. In it, he is described as a quiet, somewhat introverted person. I can partially agree with that: as I remember Loek, he was firm, outspoken, and clear when it came to protecting the quality of a project against the increasingly frequent and urgent requests for snap judgements on those European values. Quietly waiting for the research to be completely finished, because completeness, diligence and integrity came first. He was in fact able to communicate that in a quite extraverted way. And not only when he was on a plane ...

That firmness also came over him in meetings with people who had sometimes backed this project with funding and other forms of support for decades. Loek tirelessly and at the same time tactfully proffered suggestions for new opportunities.

That unstoppable engagement was inspired by great motivation for the continuation of this study: it was as if Loek could still feel the encouragement of Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moor, two colleagues who are no longer with us, but

whose great stimulus of Loek's passionate dedication was also perceptible to those who did not know them.

He spoke about them with great love and respect, and also about the initial years of the project, which often required pioneering efforts in various ways. With many anecdotes – sometimes he told them more than once – you knew when he was going to finish them with a somewhat affable smile or a stifled laugh. He could tell great stories about the collaboration with the World Values Survey, in particular with Ron Inglehart. This will undoubtedly have been the case the other way around as well, because Loek was not easily put out by anything: he skillfully defended the nuances and the ambiguity in and reflected by the research results, almost as if that was a European value in itself, against the, in his opinion, rather strong conclusions presented Anglo-American style. It was great to discuss them with Loek. He would sit at his desk shaking with laughter sometimes. I have fond memories of these times.

Loek's efforts and commitment were nothing short of crucial at moments when future or essential funding was in the balance: he often was the quietly reliable and amiable ambassador whose tireless work inspired many colleagues to go canvassing once more. Make a few additional phone calls.

I know from my own experience that he was a very helpful mentor. As a datasets expert *par excellence*, he liked to contribute ideas based on the input they provided, offered suggestions for opportunities not yet exploited and, smiling broadly, would share with you the usually beautiful results that they yielded.

When you read the contributions to this *Festschrift* compiled for you, Loek, you will yourself experience in others that great commitment to EVS, for which Tilburg University is so infinitely grateful to you. In this new phase in your life, you will see how you have been a co-builder of a kind of cathedral. You helped build a project that transcends generations and which can be added to in new ways with every new phase. Building cathedrals: that is typically European too, in a firm belief that values change, but also provide foundations. Maybe for that very reason.

All the best to you!

Wim van de Donk

Rector Magnificus and President of the Tilburg University Executive Board



# SERIES EDITORS

## PREFACE

.....

This book is the second volume in the European Values book Series, published at Open Press TiU, Tilburg University, right after the first volume, a new edition of the *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times* by Loek Halman, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben, and Marga van Zundert. Both volumes are special projects. Based on academic insights into the study of European values and based on data from the European Values Study project, they hope to reach a wide audience, beyond academia. The *Atlas of European Values* does so by offering the readership visually attractive maps, graphs, and charts, accompanied by short texts on social science theories and interviews with values scholars to explain the findings. The second volume is a *Liber Amicorum* to honour the work of Loek Halman, and his immense contribution to the European Values Study, a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal research project on values in Europe.

Both volumes thus fit the main purpose of the European Values Series to publish scholarly work on European values. The Series is a leading platform for the comparative study of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. It primarily publishes values research that seeks to uncover patterns and trends in important life domains, such as politics, religion and morale, family and gender, migration, work, welfare etc., and that adopts a comparative perspective on values such as cross-national comparisons, a longitudinal perspective, comparisons across social groups. The Series is grounded in work from the social sciences, although contributions from other disciplines such as philosophy and history are welcome as well. In this way, the Series hopes to contribute to the academic and public debate on European values. To facilitate this, the European Values Series is published open access at Open Press TiU, Tilburg University.

This second volume *Reflections on European Values. Honouring Loek Halman's Contribution to the European Values Study* was edited by Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens, and Inge Sieben, with a preface by prof. dr. Wim van de Donk, Rector Magnificus and President of the Tilburg University Executive Board. The book contains more than thirty contributions on the study of European values and deals with theoretical and methodological reflections on the European Values Study, the sociology of religion, comparative studies into European values, research on values in the Netherlands, and provides values insights from national case studies. All these topics reflect Loek Halman's research interests and paint a detailed values landscape of Europe. We hope that this volume, and the books to follow, will inspire many scholars studying European values.

*Inge Sieben and Vera Lomazzi*  
*Editors European Values Series*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Preface</b>	4
<i>Wim van de Donk</i>	
<b>Series Editors Preface</b>	8
<i>Inge Sieben, Vera Lomazzi</i>	
<b>Table of Contents</b>	10
1. Turning a Page in the History of European Values Research	14
<i>Ruud Luijkx, Inge Sieben, Tim Reeskens</i>	
<b>Theoretical and Methodological Reflections on the European Values Study</b>	
2. EVS and Grand Theory: A Fruitful Alliance	30
<i>Wil Arts</i>	
3. Conflicts of European Values in Times of Turbulence	44
<i>Georgy Fotev</i>	
4. Beware! Surveys Are Not Universal Tools	56
<i>Ole Preben Riis</i>	
5. The Data of the European Values Study from 1981 towards 2026: Achievements, Synergies, Impact and Future	68
<i>Ruud Luijkx, Angelica M. Maineri, Giovanni Borghesan</i>	
6. Challenges for Comparative Surveys in Europe: Five Theses	84
<i>Dominique Joye, Christof Wolf</i>	
7. What Do Changes in the EVS Questionnaire Reveal?	100
<i>Pierre Bréchon</i>	
8. Does Within-Country Agreement on Beliefs matter for Ranking Countries on Values Dimensions? Evidence from the European Values Study 2017	114
<i>John Gelissen</i>	
<b>Sociology of Religion</b>	
9. Modernization and Secularization in Spain: Evidence from Values Surveys	134
<i>María Silvestre Cabrera, Edurne Bartolomé Peral, Javier Elzo Imaz</i>	
10. Saints, Scholars, Sceptics and Secularists: The Changing Faith of	
<b>REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN VALUES</b>	<b>11</b>

Religious Practice in Ireland, 1981-2020 <i>Michael J. Breen, Ross Macmillan</i>	150	22. Income Inequality and Acceptance of Corrupt Acts <i>Ioana Pop, Caroline Dewilde</i>	334
11. The Transmission of Religious Values <i>David Voas, Ingrid Storm</i>	166	23. Income, Values and Subjective Wellbeing in Europe: Results From the EVS 1999-2017 Data <i>Ruud Muffels</i>	348
12. Between Romania and Hungary: Religiosity among Hungarians in Transylvania <i>Dénes Kiss, Gergely Rosta, Bogdan Voicu</i>	178	24. Is Political Protest in Western Europe Becoming Less of a Prerogative of the Young and of the Left? <i>Paul Dekker, Andries van den Broek</i>	362
13. Secularization and Values: Exploring Changes in the Religious Factor in Preferences for Obedience and Autonomy <i>Inge Sieben, Katya Ivanova</i>	196	<b>Research on Values in The Netherlands</b>	
14. The Impact of the Child Abuse Scandals on Trust in the Church: Empirical Evidence from Belgium <i>Koen Abts, Bart Meuleman</i>	208	25. Same Old, Same Old? Value Change and Stability in the Netherlands <i>Erwin Gielens, Quita Muis</i>	376
15. The Rise of the Nones in Iceland <i>Gudbjorg Andrea Jonsdottir, Inga Run Saemundsdottir, Gudny Bergthora Tryggvadottir</i>	222	26. You Can Look (But You Better Not Touch): Who Justifies Casual Sex Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic? <i>Tim Reeskens, Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld</i>	388
16. Trust Thy Neighbour. Contextualizing the Relationship Between Non-Religiosity and Tolerance <i>Peter Achterberg, Christof Van Mol</i>	236	27. Conditionality of Solidarity in The Netherlands: An Analysis of Three Waves of the European Values Study <i>Wim van Oorschot, Erwin Gielens, Femke Roosma</i>	404
17. Populism and Religion: Effects of Religious Affiliation on Populist Attitudes <i>Yilmaz Esmer</i>	248	<b>Values Insights from National Case Studies</b>	
<b>Comparative Studies into European Values</b>		28. The Nordic Exceptionalism Revisited <i>Susanne Wallman Lundåsen</i>	420
18. Living Arrangement and Values of Young Adults in 1990 and 2017: Bridging Generations <i>Guy Moors</i>	264	29. Danish Values: How Special Are They? <i>Morten Frederiksen, Peter Gundelach</i>	434
19. Gender Equality Values and Cultural Orientations <i>Vera Lomazzi</i>	282	30. Traditional and Post-Materialist Values About Family and Marriage in Greece <i>Penny Panaqiotopoulou, Aikaterini Gari, Anastassios Emvalotis</i>	448
20. Are Childrearing Values' Preferences in Europe Associated to Socioeconomic Development and Social Inequalities? <i>Alice Ramos, Jorge Vala</i>	300	31. Gender Role Attitudes in the Macedonian Sociocultural Context <i>Mihajlo Popovski, Antoanela Petkovska, Ilo Trajkovski, Konstantin Minoski</i>	462
21. Changes in Work Values Under the Influence of International Migration <i>Bogdan Voicu</i>	320	32. Transformation of Values in Croatia in Democratic Times <i>Josip Baloban</i>	474
		<b>Contributors</b>	<b>488</b>
		<b>European Values Series</b>	<b>504</b>
		<b>Colophon</b>	<b>506</b>

# 1. TURNING A PAGE IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN VALUES RESEARCH

---

*Ruud Luijkx*

*Tim Reeskens*

*Inge Sieben*

## **1.1 Honouring Mister EVS**

This book *Reflections on European Values* is a *Liber Amicorum* to honour Loek Halman's contribution to the European Values Study (EVS). Before we present you with an overview of the contributions in this volume, we will first bring you back to the beginning of the EVS; we will start this itinerary in 1978 and end with present day developments, highlighting the crucial role Loek played all along.

At the end of the 1970s, at a time when European integration was intensifying, a group of scholars witnessed a gradual decline in the dominance of Christianity. From this observation, they were interested in the following substantial questions: (1) Do Europeans share common values? (2) Are values changing in Europe and, if so, in what directions? (3) Do Christian values continue to permeate European life and culture? (4) Is a coherent alternative meaning system replacing Christianity? (5) What are the implications of these developments for European unity? To address these questions, the European Value Systems



Study Group (EVSSG) was founded in 1978; in tandem, a Foundation and a Steering Committee were established. Under the leadership of Ruud de Moor (Tilburg University) and Jan Kerkhofs (KU Leuven), the EVSSG aimed at designing and conducting a ground-breaking empirical study into the moral and social values underlying European social and political institutions.

After intense theoretical and methodological discussions, the first wave was carried out in ten European countries in 1981. All surveyed countries were member states of the then European Community except Greece, yet, the sample included Spain, as well as Norway, Canada, and the US. At this start of what would ultimately become the longest cross-national survey project into moral and social values, there was no sign of Loek Halman in the EVS, as he was still pursuing Master studies, which he completed in the mid-1980s. In 1984, he became the secretary of the Steering Committee (which later turned into the Executive Committee) of EVS. Loek held this position until 2013, after which he became the Chair of the Executive Committee. He held this position until 2020, when he stepped down and Ruud Luijkx was elected to succeed Loek.

Loek's scholarly interest lay in the study of values, so he was involved in the analysis of EVS data from the first wave onwards. One of his first publications regarded an edited volume on tradition, secularisation, and individualisation in the Netherlands within the European context (Halman, Heunks, De Moor & Zanders, 1987). He defended his doctoral dissertation, supervised by Ruud de Moor and Jacques Hagenaars, in 1991. His dissertation was published (in Dutch) as a monograph *Values in the Western World: An International Exploration of Values in Western Society* (Halman, 1991). In this study, Loek describes the differences and similarities of several relevant values in the countries surveyed in the first wave of the EVS, fuelling a discussion about Western societies between tradition and modernity. The study also put forward clear positions on the definition of 'values', and elaborated on problems when conducting comparative research on this topic. Loek's PhD dissertation used analysis techniques that were very innovative at the time, such as latent class analysis. Using this technique, Loek, together with Jacques Hagenaars, published results on ideal types in the *European Sociological Review* (Hagenaars & Halman, 1989).

In the meanwhile, the Steering Committee prepared the second wave of EVS data collection. From the beginning, the idea was to have a survey every ten years. Because the first wave was in 1981 and the second in 1990, this was changed into nine-year intervals; this strategy satisfied the Age-Period-Cohort specialists in the team. The late 1980s was an exciting period in European history with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall. The collapse of the Soviet Empire offered the opportunity to further extend the geographical coverage of the project to Central and Eastern European countries. The questionnaire of the second EVS wave was more or less a replication of the first wave; the survey was fielded in 27 countries. During this wave of data collection there was close cooperation with Ronald Inglehart. Inglehart organized and coordinated surveys in countries not participating in the EVS. This combined effort generated the World Values Survey (WVS) in the mid-1990s.

After the collection of the second wave of EVS data, Loek wanted to advance the study of Europe's moral landscape. Together with Peter Ester and Ruud de Moor, he edited a volume on value change in Europe and North America (Ester, Halman & De Moor, 1993). Having two EVS waves completed, this yielded the opportunity to look more into changes over time, but also between cohorts. Numerous publications were written, many of them covering the role of religion in a secularising society (e.g., Halman & Riis, 1999) and individualisation (Halman, 1996).

In the 1990s, EVS expanded further and included 33 countries in the third wave of data collection. The Founding Fathers of the EVS became less active by the end of the 1990s: Ruud de Moor passed away in 2001, Jan Kerkhofs in 2015. Besides being the National Programme Director for the Netherlands, Loek became the Secretary of the EVS Foundation in this period and the Programme Director of EVS fieldwork. In these functions, Loek coordinated the third EVS wave from Tilburg University, in close cooperation with GESIS (Cologne) and the Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information Services (NIWI, now part of DANS). To make the fieldwork of 1999 successful, Loek travelled to all corners of Europe to visit national EVS teams. The questionnaire of this third EVS wave took into account several new topics, including solidarity (e.g., with elderly, disabled, immigrants), social capital (networks, trust, civism), democracy, and work ethos.

The third wave of the EVS generated a lot of scientific output; many books and articles were published. Together with Wil Arts and Jacques Hagenaaers, Loek published *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study* (Arts, Hagenaaers & Halman, 2003) which asked the question whether cultural unity or diversity will prevail in Europe. With Wil Arts, Loek wrote *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*, responding to questions on cross-national differences and similarities in values (Arts & Halman, 2004). These books were published in the very successful European Values Study book series at Brill Publishers in Leiden. Loek was co-editor of the EVS Series, first together with Wil Arts (2003-2007), and later with Koen van Eijck (2007-2010) and Paul de Graaf (2007-2022), and he was its driving force: along with being the Series co-editor, Loek was (co)editor of no fewer than 13 out of the 18 volumes in the EVS Series.

From this third wave of EVS data onwards, Loek took the initiative to produce an *Atlas of European Values* as part of the EVS Series. The first one was published in 2005 and presented in the Hague to Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende in the presence of members of the *corps diplomatique* (Halman, Luijkx & Van Zundert, 2005). The *Atlas of European Values* summarised the results of the EVS project for a general audience by presenting the values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of Europeans at the turn of the millennium through visuals, first and foremost in maps, but also in relevant graphs and charts. The second *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century* (Halman, Sieben & Van Zundert, 2011), was based on the fourth wave of data collection, and was presented to Luuk van Middelaar, member of the Cabinet of Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council. The most recent *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times* (Halman, Reeskens, Sieben & Van Zundert, 2022) is based on the fifth and last wave of data collection and is introduced at the European Values Conference 2022 in Brussels.

Another important initiative that was initiated from the third EVS wave onwards, was the publication of sourcebooks. These sourcebooks are of great value to policy makers and journalists, because they give easy albeit basic access to the data. After a sourcebook for the third wave (Halman, 2001), there

were also sourcebooks jointly with WVS: one concerned the EVS and WVS surveys around 2000 (Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-Medrano & Halman, 2004), the other displayed trends based on the value surveys since 1981 (Halman, Inglehart, Díez-Medrano, Luijkx, Moreno & Basáñez, 2008). After the fourth wave, a sourcebook was published of the trends within EVS from wave 1 to 4 (Luijkx, Halman, Sieben, Brislinger & Quandt, 2017).

The fieldwork for the fourth EVS wave was initiated in 2008. To allow for the study of over-time changes, the questionnaire was largely identical to the one of the third wave. New quality improvements in sampling and translation were reached. In the meanwhile, Paul de Graaf took over as Chair of the EVS Executive Committee, with Loek as Secretary. Loek was very active in fundraising for the fourth wave and with great success. In the end the survey was fielded in 47 countries, making EVS the survey *par excellence* with the largest geographical coverage in Europe. Besides the already mentioned *Atlas of European Values*, two important publications were co-authored by Loek. With Wil Arts, Loek edited the volume *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe* (Arts & Halman, 2014) on cross-national differences and similarities in values across Europe, aimed at an international audience. For a local audience, Loek and Inge Sieben published the book *Respect Man!* (Halman & Sieben, 2011), for which they invited several colleagues to discuss values in the Netherlands.

At the EVS meeting in Bar (Montenegro) in 2013, new officials were elected: Loek became the Chair of the Executive Committee, Malina Voicu the Secretary (later followed-up by Vera Lomazzi), David Voas the Chair of the Theory Group, and Ruud Luijkx the Chair of the Methodology Groups. The process of creating the questionnaire and preparing the fieldwork for the fifth wave started during this meeting. Many meetings of the General Assembly, the Executive Committee, the Theory Group and the Methodology Group followed in Milan, Bilbao, Vienna, Warsaw, Athens, Cologne, Ljubljana, and Tblisi, always under the inspiring leadership of Loek. Actually, there is a story to tell about these meetings. The authors of this introductory chapter in Loek's *Liber Amicorum* know Loek as a quiet and somewhat introverted person. While going on these international journeys, a kind of transformation happened to him in the airplane. When landing approached, he would insert his earplugs, troubled by

the changing air pressure. Upon arrival at these international destinations, Loek was transformed into Mister EVS: excitedly and in a hurry, he ran off the airplane, eager to explore the visiting country and ready to see his friends and colleagues of EVS. At the same time, he preferred very early breakfasts, so as not to be confronted with EVS questions and issues too early in the morning.

At this very moment, the fieldwork of the fifth wave of the EVS is concluded. Again, a lot of effort was put in by Loek and the EVS Foundation to raise money for fieldwork in those countries where no funds were available. There was success, but the amount raised this time was not enough to cover the whole of Europe and the number of countries in the final dataset will most likely be 39. The first version of the integrated data file contains most countries and is publicly available, already leading to a number of country studies (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Netherlands, and Spain). Loek and the Executive Committee strengthened the ties with WVS in the prelude to this wave. This led to a very close cooperation, where EVS took the lead in Europe, and WVS in the rest of the world. In the questionnaires, there was a common core for both WVS and EVS data collections. Results of their fieldwork are available as Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2021 Dataset.

The comparative study of values, using the EVS waves, was also the core of Loek Halman's teaching activities at Tilburg University. He passed on his passion to combine both theoretical and empirical value research to future generations, as students had to write scientific papers using EVS data in his courses on Values in Europe (Bachelor's programme in sociology), National and Regional Identities (Bachelor's and Premaster's programme in Sociology, together with Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld) and in the course Learning Project: Values and Civil Society in Europe (Bachelor's programme in the major social sciences of Liberal Arts and Sciences, together with Paul Dekker). In addition, he supervised theses of numerous students in the Bachelor's and Master's programmes in Sociology, as well as from Liberal Arts and Sciences, and was the organizer of the December Student Research Symposium, where students presented their work. In this way, he introduced several cohorts of students to the work of EVS and its scholars.

Loek retired from Tilburg University in September 2021. Anticipating this major moment in his professional life, Loek decided to step down from the Executive Committee in October 2020 and from the EVS Foundation in the summer of 2021. The European Values Study is preparing for its sixth wave of data collection taking place in 2026, as well as future horizons for values research. Present days are exciting and worrying times with outside threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To maintain a long-term comparative survey programme such as EVS requires vision and intensive cooperation with many partners inside and outside the EVS. The EVS community is grateful for the way Loek shaped all this in the last decades and we will continue his work in the future.

## 1.2 Outline of this Volume

For this *Liber Amicorum*, a 'book of friends', we invited two groups of colleagues to write a contribution. On the one hand, we approached several EVS National Programme Directors (NPD). Having been the Secretary, and later the Chair of the Executive Committee of the EVS, Loek established and maintained solid relationships with these NPDs throughout the years. On the other hand, we got in touch with current and former colleagues, co-authors, and *compagnons de route* of Loek Halman. These scholars either have been inspired by the work of Loek, or inspired Loek by joint work on the study of relevant moral and social values, attitudes or behaviour, often in a comparative perspective. The fact that this volume combines 31 different chapters underscores how well-respected and loved Loek was and is among his peers.

We asked the authors to write a chapter of approximately 3,000 words each. Even though we did not impose topical restrictions to authors, evidently, the only demand was to relate to the EVS in whatever way possible. The result is this monograph that can be summarized in the motto of the European Union "United in Diversity". This motto was frequently used by Loek to reflect upon findings from the EVS to describe values similarities and differences across European countries. To provide coherence in this book, we have grouped the chapters in five themes that also reflect Loek's research interests, namely theo-

retical and methodological reflections on the European Values Study, chapters on the sociology of religion, comparative studies, studies on the Netherlands, and additional country case studies.

The section *Theoretical and Methodological Reflections on the European Values Study* is kicked off by Wil Arts (Chapter 2). In his contribution, Arts reflects on the use of grand theories *vis-a-vis* partial middle-range theories to explain value differences and values change. Georgy Fotev (Chapter 3) dedicates his chapter to the relevance of values in current turbulent times. He shows that value prioritisation is a valid way of managing tensions between values. To make the transition from theory to empirical research, Ole Preben Riis (Chapter 4) discusses common limitations inherent in the use of social surveys for social science research, including the coverage of the sample frame, the extent to which interviews can be leading, and the diagnosis that abstract concepts are not always easy to measure using standardized questionnaires. Ruud Luijkx, Angelica Maineri and Giovanni Borghesan (Chapter 5) present an overview of the EVS fieldwork over time. The authors review the coverage of countries, innovations in methodology used, and look ahead to the next wave of data collection in 2026. From their year-long experience as members of, respectively, the EVS Methods and Theory Groups, Dominique Joye and Christof Wolf (Chapter 6) discuss the challenges that the EVS is facing, thereby reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the EVS in comparison to other cross-national research projects, including the European Social Survey and the International Social Survey Programme. Continuing on methodological reflections is Pierre Bréchon's contribution (Chapter 7), which shines a light on the changes in EVS questions over time: as is well known, some items in the EVS have known a long history, while some items are very recent. The choice of items, as Bréchon argues, reflects societal transformations, political agendas, and strategies among EVS scholars. The final methodological chapter is written by John Ge-lissen (Chapter 8) and reviews limitations in the use of country averages of values if these averages do not account for variation within countries.

The second section of this book are contributions on the *Sociology of Religion*. The sizeable number of submissions on this topic not only relates to the topical interest of the EVS community, but also reflects Loek Halman's theoreti-

cal approach into the cross-national study of values using the EVS. One of the main theoretical models is the secularisation thesis, which forms the theoretical basis in the contribution by María Silvestre Cabrera, Edurne Bartolomé Peral, and Javier Elzo Imaz (Chapter 9). The authors demonstrate that in Spain, the process of secularisation is discernible, albeit with clear differences in this process among different sociodemographic groups. Studying the Irish case, Michael Breen and Ross Macmillan (Chapter 10) show a gradual decline in religiosity between 1981 to the COVID-19 era. This volume then proceeds with some underlying mechanisms for the secularisation thesis. David Voas and Ingrid Storm (Chapter 11) write on religious socialisation by parents. While they find that individuals who see religion as important are more committed to religious socialisation, they do not find different effects between more secular or more religious countries. Related to the study of socialisation is the interest of Dénes Kiss, Gergely Rosta and Bogdan Voicu (Chapter 12) in the religiosity of the Hungarian minority in the Romanian region of Transylvania. The authors show that the Hungarian minority resembles Romanian society more than the Hungarian one. Continuing on the study of socialisation of values, Inge Sieben and Katya Ivanova (Chapter 13) assess the extent to which religiosity plays a role in parental values, departing from the question whether religious people value obedience more and autonomy less in the upbringing of children. Koen Abts and Bart Meuleman (Chapter 14) focus on trust in the Church in Belgium. Applying an innovative panel design based on the fourth wave of the EVS, they show that the handling of the child abuse cases has eroded trust in the Church among churchgoers. Further expanding on trust in the Church, Gudbjorg Andrea Jonsdottir, Inga Run Saemundsdottir, and Gudny Bergthora Tryggvadottir (Chapter 15) demonstrate that in Iceland, a continuous decline in trust in the Church explains a rise of the so-called 'nones': people who do not belong to any religious denomination. In two contributions, the link between religion and out-group attitudes is investigated. First, Peter Achterberg and Christof van Mol (Chapter 16) study whether religious Europeans or the so-called 'religious nones' are more tolerant towards immigrants. They observe that although tolerance is higher in secularised societies, the non-religious are less tolerant towards immigrants in secular countries. Second, Yilmaz Esmer (Chapter 17) asks the question whether religiosity is related to populist attitudes. Based on a scale that taps into feelings of institutional distrust and apathy towards out-

groups, Esmer argues that adherents of Islam display more populist attitudes than Protestants.

The third section of this volume deals with *Comparative Studies into European Values*. Loek has extensively studied values in cross-national perspective, justifying this distinct section in his *Liber Amicorum*. A first contribution in this section is written by Guy Moors (Chapter 18), who replicates his earlier work on the Second Demographic Transition using most recent EVS data. Moors shows that differences in young people's living arrangements re-emerge in the generation surveyed in 2017. Vera Lomazzi (Chapter 19) studies whether the measurement of gender equality attitudes in the European Values Study passes cross-national validity. After finding confirmation for equivalent measurement, Lomazzi shows that gender attitudes are firmly embedded in cultural traditions. Subsequently, Alice Ramos and Jorge Vala (Chapter 20) question whether childrearing values are related to socioeconomic development and social inequality. They demonstrate that autonomy is valued more while authoritarianism is valued less in wealthy societies. Bogdan Voicu (Chapter 21) focuses on the subjective importance of work, as he notices a decreased salience of it over time. He shows that the host society has a strong imprint on the importance of work among immigrants. In their chapter, Ioana Pop and Caroline Dewilde (Chapter 22) replicate earlier research on income inequality and the acceptance of corrupt acts, combining several EVS waves. They show that although changes in income inequality do not explain justifying corruption, persistent differences across European countries in the acceptance of corrupt acts exist. Ruud Muffels (Chapter 23) also touches upon the consequences of living in unequal societies, as well as the relevance of values in explaining subjective wellbeing. He shows that subjective wellbeing is higher in countries where people have trust in each other, and where intrinsic work values are high and extrinsic work values are low. Last but not least, in one of the few contributions that focus on behaviour instead of values or attitudes, Paul Dekker and Andries van den Broek (Chapter 24) study generational differences in protest behaviour. The authors show that a normalisation in protest proneness is taking place, i.e., political protest is no longer a prerogative of the young, but occurs across the entire life-span.

A fourth section of this book concerns *Research on Values in the Netherlands* and is an introduction to the other national case studies. Even though this section is not sizeable, we are of the opinion that the Netherlands deserves a special spot in this volume, because Loek for a long time was the National Programme Director for the European Values Study Netherlands and advanced the study of values in the Netherlands. Erwin Gielens and Quita Muis (Chapter 25) question the extent to which some value orientations have shifted drastically, while others have remained rather stable. An analysis of Dutch longitudinal EVS data shows that while conservatism and religiosity have declined, there is a stronger priority of materialist value orientations. In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, Tim Reeskens and Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld (Chapter 26) study justifying casual sex before and during the coronavirus crisis. Their analysis shows that people concerned by the virus are justifying casual sex less compared to those not concerned about COVID-19. In the last chapter on the Netherlands, Wim van Oorschot, Erwin Gielens, and Femke Roosma (Chapter 27) study changes in the conditionality of solidarity. They show that conditionality is higher in 2008, when economic uncertainty was at its highest.

The fifth and final section involves *Values Insights from National Case Studies*, emphasizing Loek's continuous endeavour to reach out to many European countries for a detailed moral landscape of Europe. This section is initiated by two studies on Nordic Exceptionalism. First, Susanne Wallman Lundåsen (Chapter 28) focuses on the development of social trust in the Nordic countries, showing that trust increases in response to educational expansion and well-functioning governmental institutions. Second, Morten Frederiksen and Peter Gundelach (Chapter 29) zoom in on Denmark by asking whether Danish values are special. The authors review the Denmark Canon and use the EVS to inquire whether the values represented in this Canon are unique to Denmark – spoiler alert: the answer is no. We continue our European journey to the south of Europe. Penny Panagiotopoulou, Aikaterini Gari and Anastassios Emvalotis (Chapter 30) study changes between 2008 and 2019 in values related to family and marriage in Greece. Their study shows the continuous importance of the family and faithfulness in marriage among Greek respondents. In a chapter on Macedonia, Mihajlo Popovski, Antoanela Petkovska, Ilo Trajkovski and Konstantin Minoski (Chapter 31) look at gender role attitudes. The authors uncover

that variations in gender role attitudes among Macedonians reveal a gradual replacement of traditional values by more modern ones. A similar conclusion is made in Josip Baloban's contribution (Chapter 32), which concerns the transformation of values in Croatia. Combining theoretical reflections and empirical evidence, Baloban shows that Croatia is moving towards post-modernisation.

### 1.3 Some Final Remarks

This *Liber Amicorum* to honour Loek Halman's legacy at and contribution to the European Values Study also marks some transitions ongoing in the wider EVS project. One of the changes is that this 'book of friends' is being published by Open Press TiU. This edited volume is, after the *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times*, the second publication in the European Values Series that is published in an Open Access format, thereby having the potential to reach more audiences, both scholarly and outside academia, interested in European values, than ever before. In this transition to an Open Access format, we would like to thank Daan Rutten from Open Press TiU for his enthusiasm to prepare and guide us in this journey of Open Access publishing. We are also indebted to Joep Cleven in the assistance of copyediting the submitted chapters, as well to Lori Lenssinck to facilitate the design of the new European Values Series. Last but not least, we thank the European Values Study Foundation and the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University for the financial support to make this *Liber Amicorum* possible.

### List of References

- Arts, W., Hageaars, J., & Halman, L. (2003). *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study*. Leiden: Brill.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2004). *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*. Leiden: Brill.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2014). *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe*. Leiden: Brill
- Ester, P., Halman, L., & De Moor, R. (1993). *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North America*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Hageaars, J., & Halman, L. (1989). Searching for Ideal Types: The Potentialities of Latent Class Analysis. *European Sociological Review*, 5(1), 81-96.
- Halman, L. (1991). *Waarden in de Westerse wereld. Een internationale exploratie van de waarden in de Westerse samenleving. [Values in the Western World: An International Exploration of Values in Western Society]* Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. (1996). Individualism in Individualized Society? *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 37(3-4), 196-214.
- Halman, L. (2001). *The European Values Study: A Third Wave*. Tilburg: WORC.
- Halman, L., Heunks, F., De Moor, R., & Zanders, H. (1987). *Traditie, secularisatie en individualisering. Een onderzoek naar de waarden van de Nederlanders in een Europese context*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., Inglehart, R., Díez-Medrano, J., Luijkx, R., Moreno, A., & Basáñez, M. (2008). *Changing Values and Beliefs in 85 countries. Trends from the Values Surveys from 1981 to 2004*. Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & Van Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European Values*. Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., & Riis, O. (1999). *Religion in a Secularizing Society. The European's Religion at the End of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., Reeskens, T., Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2022). *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times*. Tilburg: Open Press TiU.
- Halman, L., & Sieben, I. (2011). *Respect man! Tolerantie, solidariteit en andere moderne waarden. [Respect, Man! Tolerance, Solidarity and Other Modern Values]*. Amersfoort: Celsus.
- Halman, L., Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2011). *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century*. Leiden: Brill.
- Inglehart, R., Basáñez, M., Díez-Medrano, & Halman L. (2004). *Human Beliefs and Values. A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI
- Luijkx, R., Halman, L., Sieben, I., Brislinger, E., & Quandt, M. (2017). *European Values in Numbers: Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century*. Leiden: Brill.

THEORETICAL AND  
METHODOLOGICAL  
REFLECTIONS ON THE  
EUROPEAN VALUES  
STUDY

---

## 2. THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY AND GRAND THEORY:

A FRUITFUL ALLIANCE?

---

*Wil Arts*

### **Abstract**

*Within the European Values Study (EVS) a discussion has been going on for decades on the strategic question of whether it is better to use a grand theory to make sense of the findings of its cross-national surveys or whether the researchers should instead use partial or middle-range theories. This chapter attempts to make an assessment of this debate. In the 1990's several EVS-researchers opted for a rather simple and parsimonious theoretical model to explain cross-national value differences and value changes. This model they derived from modernization theory. However, after some initial success the model proved to be too simple. In the following decades it made place for a much more complex one, although modernization theory remained to be the hard core of the model. Some value researchers persevered despite half-hearted successes. Others dropped out and admitted themselves to the camp of the middle-range theories enthusiasts. This raises the additional question of what the virtues and vices of grand theories and middle-range theories are. This question too is examined in this chapter. Finally, an alternative grand theory is proposed as a possible viable alternative, cognitivist rational choice theory.*



## 2.1 Introduction

In the early days of the European Values Study (EVS), from its founding in 1978 till sometime after the first cross-national survey in 1981, its goals were highly descriptive and of an applied nature. However, pretty soon it appeared to the researchers involved that several important things were lacking. It turned out that to give direction to the choice of items to be included in the questionnaire explicit social-scientific research questions were urgently needed. What was also missing were theoretical notions that could help to interpret or even explain the empirical findings. It is on these theoretical notions that this chapter is dedicated.

In 1984, Loek Halman made an appearance in the EVS community. At first as the data analyst of the Dutch group, but soon he became the indispensable secretary of EVS' steering committee. After he finished his PhD thesis in 1990, his position within the project became increasingly a pivotal one. He was the key figure in designing the questionnaire, in keeping everybody informed, in data analyses, and in publishing books and book series. In the corridors of EVS conferences and workshops, he was affectionally called Mr. European Values. As such he had a dream: to have a grand theory that could explain all or at least most of the outcomes of the different waves of EVS. At first, his favorite grand theory, modernization theory, seemed to be rather successful. However, soon the odds turned.

Halman, however, did not want to give up his dream so easily and persevered. At this point, I have to admit my complicity. Somewhere in the second half of the 1990's, I became chair of EVS' Theory Group. He and I have several times cooperated in an endeavor to reconstruct and test more sophisticated versions of modernization theory in order to make his dream come true. Now Halman is retiring it seems to me high time to take up stock of our endeavors. Did we succeed? If not, should EVS then satisfy itself with only middle range theories? Or is there perhaps an alternative grand theory available that can successfully replace modernization theory?

## 2.2 Modernization Theory

In Halman's earliest publications (Halman et al., 1987; Halman, 1987, 1991), modernization theory already appeared on the scene. It seemed to him an ideal grand theory for EVS because it provided insights regarding the transformation of traditional societies into modern ones. Not only as far as structural changes such as industrialization and market formation and expansion are concerned, but also or particularly with regard to its effects on cultural phenomena, i.e., a tendency that traditional and religious norms and values are replaced by more secular, instrumental and individualized ones. In a chapter in Halman et al. (1987), he and his co-authors Dorenbosch and Heuks (Dorenbosch et al., 1987) reconstructed modernization theory and empirically tested hypotheses derived from it. Without mentioning Ockham's razor, they applied its law of parsimony that states that the simplest explanation is usually the right one. Their first hypothesis was apparently as a precaution formulated in probabilistic terms: 'Structural modernization will be positively correlated with cultural modernization'. However, they realized that this was a too simple hypothesis. To refine it, they used some auxiliary theories, more specifically insights from cultural lag theory and social diffusion theory. The second hypothesis stated that structural modernization is after some delay followed by cultural modernization in such a way that it starts in the industrially and technologically most advanced centre of the modernizing world and then spreads with still more delay to its less developed periphery. Both hypotheses found ample support in the macro-level analysis of the data of the 1981 wave of EVS. Nevertheless, in a chapter in the same volume Halman (1987) seemed to realize that not only the explanatory model but also the empirical test they used was a too crude one because it based itself only on central tendencies in the country samples. Therefore, he also looked at the variation at the individual level. He found that, at least in the Netherlands, individuals too could be distinguished according to their degree of modernity.

In his PhD thesis, Halman (1991) addressed the question of whether and, if so, to what degree in the Western world a compartmentalization of values had taken place. In the meantime, the survey had also been fielded in the USA and Canada. From the structural-functionalist version of modernization theory, he

derived the hypothesis that in countries in which the structural modernization of society has progressed further, people's values in the different domains are less interconnected than in countries in which the process has not gone so far yet. He tested whether this hypothesis made empirical sense. He concluded that the result was at best mixed. As expected, in advanced modern countries, religious values appeared to be less important for the values on other life domains than in less advanced ones. However, this does not mean that a country being structurally more modern implies that the interconnectedness of value domains is lower there than in less structurally modern countries. Halman also concluded that there are big differences in value preferences in the different countries. It is not a simple task to explain these cultural differences by referring only to their degree of modernization, he argued (Halman, 1991).

In 1990, a second wave of the EVS survey was fielded. Now the possibility arose to subject hypotheses not only to cross-national tests but also to longitudinal ones. The Dutch team did exactly that, they analysed the dynamics of value change between 1981 and 1990 in the West and published their results in a book (Ester et al., 1994). Once again, the grand theory used was modernization theory. In a chapter co-authored with Ruud de Moor (Halman & de Moor, 1994), one of the questions addressed was whether the populations of modernizing societies showed a shift from traditional towards individualized values. The authors concluded that modernization did not lead to a uniform replacement of traditional values by individualized ones in all domains of social life. In an epilogue to the book, his co-author Ruud de Moor (1994), one of the founding fathers of EVS and chair of the steering committee, concluded that most hypotheses derived from modernization theory and tested in their book were not supported by the data. In his opinion, instead of grand theories, like modernization theory, empirically founded partial theories were needed. *Roma locuta causa finita*, one might assume. Exit modernization theory?

The answer is in the negative. In the 1990's, modernization theory made a remarkable comeback. Several social theorists such as Beck, Giddens and Inglehart argued that the relatively simple modernity of industrial societies had in the meantime been replaced by a different kind of modernity. This led to amendments to modernization theory. Arts and Halman (2002, 2004) used

their suggestions as a heuristic device for formulating a number of hypotheses pertaining to the supposed effect of late or post modernization on decreasing control over life, diminished interpersonal and institutional trust, and the rise of post-materialist values. Now institutionalism was used as an auxiliary theory, at least as far as the institutional arrangements of welfare regimes were concerned. We could profit not only of the data of the first two waves of EVS but also of the third wave of 2000. Post-materialism appeared not to be on the rise in the countries investigated, nor did the analyses unequivocally support the idea that differences in trust and control over life are based in differences in welfare state regimes.

In 2008, the fourth wave of EVS followed. Arts and Halman (2011, 2014) did one more attempt to save modernization theory from oblivion. The EVS-dataset now offered an opportunity to test Inglehart's various amendments to modernization theory that had led to a much more complex and sophisticated version of this grand theory (e.g., Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Inglehart suggested why there is a time lag between technological innovation and economic growth on the one hand and value changes on the other. He argued that value changes most of the time take place through intergenerational population replacement, i.e., younger birth cohorts replace older ones in the population. This is, by its very nature, a slow process. He assumed that people's basic values are largely fixed when they reach adulthood, and remain more or less stable thereafter. He also assumed in the so-called socialization hypothesis, that people's basic values to a large extent reflect the conditions that prevailed during their pre-adult years. From these two assumptions followed that intergenerational change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations. Another assumption Inglehart made was that not only long-term developments such as technological innovation and economic growth, but also short-term changes, such as different phases of the business cycle, and short-term events, such as wars and revolutions, have an impact on people's values. This assumption is connected with the so-called scarcity hypothesis, which states that people tend to attach the greatest value to the most pressing needs of the moment. These hypotheses can be tested by looking for age, period, and cohort effects. Inglehart also argued that value patterns are

the products of not only modernization processes but also of country-specific patterns of the past, in other words, of cultural traditions. Historical value patterns are therefore interwoven with modern and post-modern ones. Thus, not only do technology and economy matter, but history does as well. Why cultural traditions are persistent, is explained by the theoretical notion of path dependence, which is the idea that cultural traditions create forces to sustain themselves even though the circumstances that gave rise to and reinforced them in the past may now no longer be relevant.

If we look at a more sophisticated version of Ockham's razor that says that explanations should be not only as simple as possible, but also as complex as necessary, we have to conclude that the simplicity of the original modernization theoretical explanation of cross-national value differences and value changes had made place for a much more complex one. The pressing question that could be asked was for us whether modernization theory was still a progressive research program or sooner had become a degenerating one. Had it not become top-heavy because of the introduction of all kinds of auxiliary assumptions and hypotheses?

In 2019, Halman wrote a state-of-the-art article that looked like his EVS swan song (Halman & Gelissen, 2019). At last, he seemed to have woken up from his beautiful dream about grand theory. The conclusion is hard and straightforward. Modernization theory falls short when it comes to explaining the often considerable differences in value orientations between populations in various countries. There is more needed than economic growth and technological innovations to explain these differences. Institutions, culture, history, policies, all appear to affect people's values. Nevertheless, context is not enough. It is essential to include individual-level characteristics, at least as controls. Quite often, individual attributes appear differently distributed in different countries, which may be the main reason why differences in value orientations between countries remain. Multi-level analysis is the appropriate tool for separating such composition effects from true contextual effects and multi-level theories are needed to explain what is going on with regard to cross-country value differences and value changes.

### 2.3 Middle-Range Theories

When Ruud de Moor (1994) concluded that modernization theory was far too general to explain the findings of EVS, he avoided the term middle-range theories. Why this was the case is not entirely clear. Perhaps to prevent that he would get bogged down in a long, drawn-out debate in sociology about the concept of theory. The discussion about grand versus middle-range theory started at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1947 dedicated to a stocktaking of the discipline. As chairman of the section on theory, Talcott Parsons delivered a paper on *The Position of Sociological Theory* and Robert Merton was his discussant. These papers were published in the next year (Parsons, 1948; Merton, 1948). Parsons returned to this discussion in his presidential address on *The Prospects of Sociological Theory* to the annual meeting of the same society in 1949 and in the meantime Merton (1949) had elaborated on his short discussion paper. Parsons' address was published in the following year (Parsons, 1950). He argued that we need theory among other things to make in empirical research a selection among the enormous number of possible variables. Whereas Parsons emphasized the importance of high levels of generality in constructing sociological theories, Merton defended theories of the middle range: theories that lie between working hypotheses and a unified theory that tries to explain all the observed uniformities of social life. Twenty years later, Merton (1968) looked back at how the discussion proceeded. He noted that the responses to his plea were polarized. Many empirical sociologists gave assent to a middle-range theoretical strategy because this was what they already practiced. Many theorists, however, found it a retreat from properly high aspirations. The third response was a combination of the two others. An emphasis on middle-range theories does not mean exclusive attention to this kind of theorizing. Instead, it sees the development of more comprehensive theory as coming about through consolidations of middle-range theories rather than emerging, all at once, from the work of individual theorists on the grand scale.

If we look at the many publications generated by EVS and its daughter, the World Values Survey, it becomes clear that the overwhelming majority of them falls within the limits of the second and third response noticed by Merton.

Loek Halman and I belonged to the few who persevered and tried for a long time to save grand theory within EVS from oblivion following the methodological guideline that one must treat budding theoretical research programs leniently. It may take decades before they get off the ground and become empirically progressive. However, later on, we gave up and resigned in our defeat (Arts, 2011; Halman & Gelissen, 2019).

## 2.4 Cognitivist Rational Choice Theory

One could wonder whether this was too soon. To answer this question, we should perhaps look at the work of Raymond Boudon. Looking back at the debate about grand theory versus middle-range theories, Boudon (1991) concluded that what sociologists mean by the term ‘theory’ is not always clear. On the one hand you have ‘broad theory’ that tries to determine the overarching independent variable that would operate in all social processes, or to determine the essential feature of social structure, or to find out the two, three, or four concepts that would be sufficient to analyze all social phenomena. This is according to the advocates of middle-range theory a hopeless and even quixotic enterprise. On the other hand, you have sociologists who defend middle-range theories. This does not refer to a specific kind of theory, but is rather an approach to theory construction. Sociological theories, like all scientific theories, should aim to consolidate otherwise segregated hypotheses and empirical regularities. They should help explain puzzling phenomena and create new solid knowledge about the aspects of the world it is traditionally concerned with. One could argue that modernization theory is a mixed form of both types of sociological theory, partly bad partly good theorizing.

More important, however, is that Boudon refers positively to a middle-range theory that he himself developed and which he originally called subjective rationality theory and later cognitivist rational choice theory (Boudon, 1989, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2009). He elaborated this theory choosing the notion of subjective or bounded rationality that Herbert Simon coined, as a starting point. In simple situations, individuals often act according to what rational choice theory predicts: they maximize utility. Confronted with ambiguous and com-

plex situations, they, however, appeal to theoretical notions, heuristic devices and moral principles to master these situations. Rational choice theory is therefore a powerful theory when applied to some types of social phenomena, but it appears to be powerless when confronted with many other types. Boudon identified three of these latter types: 1) All human actions are dictated by descriptive or cognitive beliefs. Sometimes they are commonplace and need no further attention, but some other times they are non-commonplace. Then it is crucial to investigate and evaluate the beliefs upon which they rest to explain the actions involved. 2) Some human actions are based on non-consequential prescriptive or moral beliefs. These actions are not intended to generate some outcome, but to endorse a moral principle. 3) Some other actions cannot in any sensible way assume to be dictated by self-interest. Sociologists often find themselves confronted with this latter kind of phenomenon, since social actors are regularly called upon to evaluate situations in which they are not personally implicated.

Boudon (1995, 1999, 2001) published around the turn of the millennium several books in which he dealt with especially the second type of phenomena. He gave a general overview of philosophical and sociological theories concerned with the sense of values that people have and their origin. He made a distinction between culturalist theories on the one hand and naturalist ones on the other. The first group considers values as cultural features that are endorsed or rejected by people because they have been socialized to them. The second group assumes that our moral principles are innate, i.e., derived from human nature. Both groups of theories can and have been rightly criticized. The first group cannot explain why there are some values that nearly everybody seems to share and the second one cannot explain the variability of values over time and space. Boudon’s objective was to defend and illustrate that the universal and contextual sides of values cannot be theorized independently from one another and returned to his cognitivist rational choice theory. He started from Weber’s distinction between instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) and non-instrumental or axiological rationality (*Wertrationalität*). People do not so much endorse values because of considerations of self-interest, but sooner because they have strong reasons why they accept some values and not others. When individuals think that ‘x is good’, they have good reasons for thinking so

and they think so because of these reasons. Nevertheless, strong reasons here and now are not necessarily strong reasons there and then. A strong system of reasons can become weak and the other way round. Therefore, Boudon's theory is both contextual and historical.

The pivotal orienting statement at the core of Boudon's theory goes as follows: If individuals subscribe to a value statement, then they have most of the time good, or strong, or acceptable reasons for believing in it. Reasons can therefore be seen as causes. There, however, are not only rational causes of an axiological or instrumental nature, but also irrational ones such as emotions and traditions. Explanations with irrational forces can be often legitimately replaced by explanations with reasons. Opp (2014) has argued that Boudon's theory is strikingly simple and has the advantage that it contributes to the explanation of both micro and macro phenomena and that it is testable. According to him, there, however, are also disadvantages, such as that the explanatory power is very low. A selection or relevance criterion for the kind of reasons and irrational factors that are causes for the explananda is lacking. Another disadvantage Opp (2014) sees is that the empirical validity is questionable. The theory not only proposes to explain why people subscribe to normative beliefs, but also to descriptive beliefs, attitudes, preferences, and behavior. Is it possible to explain the wide range of phenomena that Boudon's cognitive rational choice theory tries to explain with a single theory? For proponents of grand theory, the answer is in the affirmative. Perhaps this is the overarching theoretical system people such as Loek Halman have dreamt of, although proponents of middle-range theories will be skeptical towards the validity of such a claim.

## 2.5 Concluding Remarks

Forty years ago, the first cross-national EVS-survey was fielded. Four more waves followed with an interval of nine years. Surprisingly enough, it turns out that after so long a lapse of time it is still not so easy to give an unambiguous answer to the question of whether the alliance between EVS and grand theory has been a fruitful one. Modernization theory, once the favourite grand theory within EVS, could not pass the empirical tests satisfactorily in spite of ever

more complex sophisticated versions. These more complex and sophisticated versions did, however, lead to much more sophisticated data analyses. Although Loek and I (Arts, 2011; Halman & Gelissen, 2019) gave up on developing and testing new versions of modernization theory, others did not. Ronald Inglehart (2018), for example, recently presented the first full statement of his evolutionary modernization theory and the empirical findings that it generated.

In the meantime, the majority of EVS-researchers heeded de Moor's call and decided to restrict themselves to use middle-range theories to explain and test more specific phenomena. They realized that not only modernization matters, but that history, culture, institutions and so on and so forth also do. Loek Halman did not only dream, but he also accomplished a lot by co-editing a great number of books in which their papers have been published.

So far so good, but the question remains whether there is an alternative grand theory available that can successfully replace modernization theory. The answer is yes. Boudon's cognitivist rational choice theory could come handy in this respect, because it is based on methodological individualism, which means that the theory is supposed to contribute to the explanation of both micro and macro social phenomena. De Graaf (2008) drew our attention to this theory in his inaugural lecture. Following his lead, we (Arts & Halman, 2014) avowed that EVS researchers should put much more attention to values that nearly all Europeans seem to share instead of only focusing on differences within and between European countries in this respect. It seems worthwhile to give Boudon's theory more attention within EVS, although I realize that neither Halman nor I will be the ones that will accomplish this feat. It is up to a new generation of EVS researchers. Nevertheless, they could profit from the work of several sociologists who have criticized and tried to elaborate on Boudon's theory such as Hamlin (2004) and Opp (2014).



## List of References

- Arts, W.A. (2011). Explaining European value patterns: Problems and solutions. *Studia UBB Sociologia*, 56, 7-31.
- Arts, W., & L. Halman. (2002). Risk and trust. Value change in the second age of modernity. In P. Chiemelski, T. Krause, & W. Wesolowski (Eds.), *Kultura, Osobowość, Polityka* (pp. 321-348). Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2004). European value changes in the second age of modernity. W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.) In *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium* (pp. 25-53). Brill.
- Arts, W., & L. Halman. (2011). Value research and transformation in Europe. In R. Polak (Ed.), *Zukunft. Werte. Europa. Die Europäische Wertestudie 1990-2010: Österreich im Vergleich*. (pp. 79-99). Böhläü.
- Arts, W., & L. Halman. (2014). Cross-national values in Europe today: Facts and explanations. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe. Painting Europe's moral landscapes* (pp. 1-17). Brill.
- Boudon, R. (1989). Subjective rationality and the explanation of social behavior. *Rationality and Society*, 1, 173-196.
- Boudon, R. (1991). What middle-range theories are. *Contemporary Sociology*, 20, 519-522.
- Boudon, R. (1995). *Le juste et le vrai*. Fayard/Seuil.
- Boudon, R. (1996). The cognitivist model: A generalized 'rational choice model'. *Rationality and Society*, 8, 123-150.
- Boudon, R. (1998). Limitations of rational choice theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104, 817-828.
- Boudon, R. (1999). *Le sens des valeurs*. Presses Universitaires de France.
- Boudon, R. (2001). *The Origins of Values. Philosophy and Sociology of Beliefs*. Transaction Publishers.
- Boudon, R. (2003). Beyond rational choice theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29, 1-21.
- Boudon, R. (2009). Rational choice theory. In B.S. Turner (Ed.), *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory* (pp. 179-195). Wiley-Blackwell.
- Dorenbos, J., Halman, L., & Heunks, F., (1987). Modernisering in West-Europa: Een tweedeling? In L. Halman, F. Heunks, R. de Moor, & H. Zanders, *Traditie, Secularisatie en Individualisering* (pp. 234-254). Tilburg University Press.
- Graaf, P. de. (2008). *Waarden die ertoe doen: De European Values Study in de 21<sup>ste</sup> eeuw*. Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. (1987). Op zoek naar typen in de Nederlandse cultuur. In Halman, L., Heunks, F., de Moor R. & Zanders, H. (1987). *Traditie, Secularisatie en Individualisering* (pp. 220-233). Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. (1991). *Waarden in de Westerse Wereld*. Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. & de Moor, R. (1994). Value patterns and modernity. In Ester, P., Halman L., & de Moor, R. (Eds.), *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North-America* (pp. 155-161). Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., & Gelissen, J. (2019). Values in life domains in a cross-national perspective. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 71 (Suppl. 1), 519-543.
- Hamlin, D. (2004). *Beyond Relativism. Raymond Boudon, cognitive rationality and critical realism*. Routledge.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2018). *Cultural Evolution. People's motivations are changing, and reshaping the world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. (2000). Modernization, cultural change and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review* 65, 19-51.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Merton, R.K. (1947). Discussion of Parsons' 'The position of sociological theory'. *American Sociological Review*, 13, 164-168.
- Merton, R.K. (1949). On sociological theories of the middle range. In Merton R.K., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (pp. 448-459). Simon & Schuster-Free Press.
- Merton, R.K. (1968). On sociological theories of the middle range. In R.K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Enlarged edition, (pp. 39-72). Free Press.
- Moor, R. de. (1994). Epilogue. In Ester, P., Halman L., & de Moor R. (Eds.), *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North-America*. Tilburg University Press.
- Opp, K-D. (2014). The explanation of everything. A critical assessment of Raymond Boudon's theory explaining descriptive and normative beliefs, attitudes, preferences and behavior. *Revista de Sociologia*, 99, 481-514.
- Parsons, T. (1947). The position of sociological theory. *American Sociological Review*, 13, 156-171.
- Parsons, T. (1949). The prospects of sociological theory. *American Sociological Review*, 15, 3-16.

### 3. CONFLICTS OF EUROPEAN VALUES IN TIMES OF TURBULENCE

---

*Georgy Fotev*

#### **Abstract**

*The values that function in today's Europe have a twofold genealogy: a) fundamental values whose homeland is Europe; b) values imported from other cultures and civilizations. Heterogeneous values always give rise to latent or manifested tensions and conflicts, but they are the basis of European prosperity. Europe has been going through unprecedented turbulence for the last 3-4 decades. In such a context, there are sharp conflicts of values and it is difficult to strike a balance between unity and diversity. Social transformations are conditioned by a revaluation of values. Values perceived as positive are considered as a result of changes in negative (depreciated). Value reorientations are registered by EVS's longitudinal data regarding family and marriage, in relation to new forms of family life (unmarried family), in relation to national and ethnic identity, relations between religious denominations, etc. Waves of immigrants test fundamental European values. The growing complexity raises tensions between the principles of democracy and the new meritocracy. In periods of turbulence, the need for knowledge about the real functioning values and the conflicts between them is exacerbated. EVS gives a positive answer to this need. People see what they know and it is crucial what and how they see the changing world.*

### 3.1 European Values as Ambiguous in Terms of Their Genealogy

The term 'European values' is ambiguous in terms of their genealogy. One meaning refers to the values that define European civilization, European culture, the spiritual form of Europe. The homeland (genealogy) of these values is Europe. The other meaning refers to values *functioning* in modern Europe, including values transferred through migration from other civilizations and cultures (genealogy). Some European values in the substantial sense of the term have become universal. The universalization of European values has always and in many places met with resistance, and today in many parts of the world there is fierce resistance. In general, the same cannot be said of the transfer of values from outside Europe. Europe's openness to others is determined by a number of factors, among which such fundamental European values as tolerance, pluralism, democracy, multiculturalism that are of key importance.

Taken in themselves, values in general, like numbers, are imaginary and a priori. From the point of view of the philosophy of values, there are positive and negative values: good-evil, beautiful-ugly, etc. The values functioning in society, studied by empirical sciences such as sociology, are positive or negative depending on their perception. For example, after the implosion of the totalitarian-communist system in Bulgaria, the values previously considered positive are considered negative. This is the case with every crisis of values and their reevaluation (Fotev 1999a; Fotev 1999b; Fotev, 2012). Empirical sciences such as sociology take values as a prerequisite or a given issues that philosophy and especially axiology deal with. An empirical science of values does not provide answers to philosophical questions and does not solve such problems, just as philosophical axiology is dangerous and harmful when it enters the value field of empirical science.

The philosophy of values has a long and fruitful tradition in Europe, but this is not the case with the empirical study of the values functioning in European societies. EVS is an unprecedented project. The success of this project is due to the fruitful collaboration of researchers from all European countries involved in EVS. Everyone is grateful to the distinguished scholar and researcher, our

dear friend Loek Halman, who has dedicated several decades to EVS. His name is well known and respected among academics in my country.

The theory (theoretical model) of values for the empirical study is of paramount importance. Empirical social science in its theoretical part is in dialogue with philosophy. Inevitably, two different perspectives intersect. The present analysis and in-depth interpretation of EVS data on conflicts of values implies the necessary intersection of the two disparate perspectives.

There are different heterogeneous value spheres, which are in an irreconcilable struggle with each other. "And we know that something can be beautiful not just although it is not good but even in the very aspect that lacks goodness" (Weber 2004: 22). Values are self-founded, as are the gods. "These goods and their struggles are ruled over by fate, and certainly not by 'science'" (Weber 2004: 23). The heterogeneous spheres of values and their conflicts, which are latent and manifested, are dominated by fate, not by one science or another. But if values are not chosen by people, they are fictions, and in that sense neither destiny nor science has anything to do with them. However, when a value is chosen and functions in the life world of people, in society, it determines the real social actions (individual or collective). People of flesh and blood, individual members of society, groups, communities and nations make valuable choices in every social action. The choice is a conscious or unconscious conflict or tension between values. The big problem is managing conflicts and tensions between values.

The in-depth interpretation of the empirical data on conflicts between values functioning in the European society is revealing the context of the registered differentiated value choice of the respondents, representing the general aggregates of the separate studied European societies. It is a question of *the boundaries of context* and, in this sense, of *the depth of interpretation*. In principle, depth is bottomless, and therefore interpretation as illuminating the context has a rational limitation. Beyond our borders is destiny. And from the inner side of the border are the possibilities of managing tensions and conflicts between heterogeneous values.



### 3.2 The Difficult Balance Between Unity and Diversity

EVS embraces the values that function in European society. The concept of European society has cognitive legitimacy because national societies within Europe's geographical borders are not closed but open to each other, and within the European Union there is even greater reason to talk about *European society*. The field of EVS are differentiated national societies, which provides opportunities for comparative research of data from each wave, as well as in longitudinal terms. This format of the study includes value tensions and conflicts in the different societies between the main European positive and negative values regarding the integration and diversification in the European society.

European integration is fundamentally a value issue, but not just concerning values. At the heart of the complex question is whether integration is identified with *homogenization* or whether integration is based on *cultural diversity*, preservation and strengthening of the value identity of national societies, traditions and autopoiesis. These two views and policies, respectively, are two different orders of values. Europe is divided into several regions, which differ typologically in their appearance as European countries with specific characteristics and features, incl. of value order (Dyson, Sepos 2012: 83 ff; 215 ff). Europe's cultural unity and diversity is multidimensional and historically determined. "To gain insight into the unity of European cultural diversity and the diversity of European unity we need to attain a good understanding of the complex history of shifting fault lines. Such an understanding is also crucial for understanding the results of the European Values Study surveys (...). The most obvious dividing line is the one that separates Western Europe from Eastern Europe, with a wide transitional zone, sometimes called Central Europe, stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans. Yet one has to insist that the West-East division has never been fixed or permanent. Probably the most durable is the line between Catholic (Latin) Christianity and Orthodox (Greek) Christianity" (Arts, Hagedaars, Halman 2003: 81). Diversity without tolerance, pluralism and other related fundamental values is becoming a source of constant latent or manifested value tensions and conflicts, as are well known in Europe. "The division of Europe into two opposing halves, therefore, is not

entirely fanciful. It rides, however, roughshod over many other lines of division of equal importance. It ignores serious differences both within the West and within the East and it ignores the strong historic division between North and South" (Arts, Hagedaars, Halman 2003: 81). The quoted book also points out the divisions related to the confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism. "Taking the full range of factors into consideration one can only conclude that to see Europe's cultural fault lines one should not divide Europe into two regions, but at least into four or five overlapping ones. Despite their differences all the regions of Europe still hold a great deal in common. (...) Despite their own antagonisms, they share fears and anxieties about influences from outside – whether from America, from Africa, or from Asia. Fundamental unity is no less obvious than manifest diversity" (Arts, Hagedaars, Halman. 2003: 82). Different pictures of European values are possible, some of which are sustainable and others much more volatile. The disturbed balance between unity and diversity creates turbulence. The metaphor of turbulence is in many cases closer to what Schumpeter calls *creative destruction*. Unlike a crisis in turbulence, when a crisis is not included, it is clear from the beginning what values a part of society is focused on and there is no search for a way out of the chaos (crisis), which is typical for the crisis.

### 3.3 Driving Forces of Values' Tensions

Every significant social change (transformation) is value-conditioned and leads to a change in the constellation of values functioning in European society. The five waves of EVS register the connection between values and social change. When changes are large-scale and radical or epochal, value problems become visible to all, as a war rages between heterogeneous values, there are clashes between forces which are for a reassessment of values and those that are for the status quo. Particular to society, which is for the established order of values, sees the revaluation as the destruction of the values and foundations of society. Such a radical and, in a sense, unprecedented transformation was the implosion of the totalitarian-communist system and the transition of the former communist countries to democracy and a market economy. *The implosion of the totalitarian-communist system* is an unprecedented event. Radical social

change can always be the result of an explosion (wars, including civil wars, bloodshed, violence, etc.) rather than a “Velvet Revolution”. The time has come for a dramatic reassessment of values. The totalitarian-communist system is falling apart and its values are considered negative (Fotev 2009b: 1115). Wars of values are the result of social and existential turbulence and generate turbulence. Europe and the world are nowadays in turbulence and seem to be in a crisis of values. The issue that concerns all Europeans is the next Europe.

European society has a central place and importance for globalization, which has certain values as driving forces, but globalization itself has no final values and goals, which gives an answer to the related value disorder. *Globalization* is fuelling sharp conflicts of values, and the end of this war seems hopeless. “The new world in which we now live is giving many citizens much to fear, including the uprooting of many previously stable sources of identity and security. Where change is most rapid, widening disparities in the distribution of income are a key concern. It is indeed an age of turbulence, and it would be imprudent and immoral to minimize the human cost of its disruptions” (Greenspan, 2007:18). In the context of globalization, every order of values is shaken to its foundations and there is a disorder or feverish rearrangement of values, which naturally passes through conflicts between values. Globalization means an enormous intensification of international contacts and this also evokes resistance. As a reflex against globalization, people turn to their own familiar culture and values. The threat that globalization gives rise to mobilizes the protection of and desire for one’s own culture, traditions, rites and way of life. Regretfully, it also results in opposition to immigrants and foreigners. This trend of anti-globalisation is very strong; I think that if you assess the European values today, you will witness the inclination towards tradition clearly. People have become more traditional, more conservative“ (Arts, Hagenaars, Halman. 2003: 61). When an in-depth interpretation of individual EVS data sets is performed, the meanings in relation to the global context take place.

Aren’t the global media fundamentally changing a new self-determination of man’s place in the world? Norris and Inglehart (2009) shed a lot of light on these multidimensional and contradictory processes: by analysing and interpreting data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS).

The fourth industrial revolution, also called *the digital revolution*, transformed European society and gave rise to *a new constellation of European values*. „People living in contemporary European society are not only believed to be more autonomous and free to decide for themselves, they are also assumed to experience a wide variety of influences from other parts of the world“ (Arts, Hagenaars, Halman. 2003: 378). *Social reality becomes dualistic* as virtual or online social reality occupies most of the time budget and in many cases almost all the waking time of the day for large groups of society, for a huge number of professions. EVS covers the real social world, the reality offline. In the future, it is necessary to take into account the online social world, as well as the interactions of social workers with intelligent machines and non-humans.

*The family* is not a basic cell of society, as Auguste Comte believed, but it is the center of the most sensitive aspects of human life. Basic values of the family undergo a radical reassessment. Accepted as socially valid, enshrined in moral norms *positive values become negative*, and considered negative values are tacitly or openly *accepted as positive*. In addition to data from the third and fifth waves of EVS, one in five Europeans considers marriage to be an outdated institution. Of course, there are differences in the shares across countries, such as in some countries, which consider marriage as a residual institution between 20% and 30%, for others between 30% and 40%, which are not complete pictures, as indicated and often considered in different countries (Halman 2001:129; EVS, GESIS (2020).”The claim that the concept of a normal family has become redundant is not to say that heterosexual, parent-child families with traditional gender roles have vanished. Rather, it is claimed that this particular family type now co-exists with a diverse range of living arrangements. This diversification of lifestyles and values means that perceptions of what is ‘normal’ are becoming relativized“ (Ester, Braun, Mohle 2006: 61). Since each norm is a socially required value, the refusal to accept a norm as socially valid is a matter of revaluation of value.

*Growing complexity* is a characteristic trend of late modern European society. The European of any nationality, ethnicity, religion, social status, is involved in more and more *anonymous relations*, which calls into question the traditional grounds of trust as a fundamental social value. In total, more than 40% of Europeans, according to the Fifth Wave of EVS, which covers 37 countries, trust

the EU, and 38% rather do not trust and almost 17% do not trust at all (EVS, GESIS (2020)). More and more citizens of EU member states express public dissatisfaction with the so-called “Brussels bureaucracy”. However, it must be borne in mind that negative judgments about the Brussels bureaucracy are, among other things, *a non-reflective expression of the crisis of modern democracy*.

In total, almost 89% of the citizens of the 37 countries covered by the fifth wave of EVS indicate a democratic system as a desirable system of governance. At the same time, more than 76% of citizens of European countries distrust political parties in their countries. The main democratic institution of democracy, the parliament has a distrust of over 62%, and in some countries such as Bulgaria, Slovenia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the distrust is over 80%; in other countries the distrust is very close to such high values (EVS, GESIS (2020)). A comparative in-depth interpretation of the data would reveal common but also different grounds for negative value judgments. Reconciliation with such facts is perceived as fate, which is a sign of melancholy attitude to the political process. Another conflicting value issue is *the relationship between democracy and the new meritocracy*. On the scale of the fifth wave, more than half of European citizens, and in Albania, Croatia and other countries more than 80% or so, think that it is good for their countries to have collective, binding management decisions on experts, and the rest reject this opinion (EVS, GESIS, 2020). These are tendencies towards a vaguely understood meritocracy.

*Immigration waves* are causing extremely complex and multidimensional conflicts between a number of fundamental European values. The management of these conflicts needs virtuosity, in the sense of Hannah Arendt’s political term. It is not possible to discuss in more detail here today’s European situation, which hides many unknowns. The neglect of European and, within its framework, other collective identities, inevitably leads to a crisis of individual identity, and seems to foreshadow the threshold of post-human society. We need to listen to the following conclusion: “The results of our analyses seem to suggest that there is no unique trajectory of value change. (...) Value orientations appear dependent upon specific national contexts and a nation’s historical development” (Arts, Hagedaars, Halman 2003: 47-48). The unity of differences is an endless task of European reason.

### 3.4 Prioritization as a Way of Managing Values’ Tensions: The Case of COVID-19 Pandemic

To round up, a clear example of a conflict between fundamental values, such as freedom and life, arose during the COVID-19 pandemic. The only way to limit the spread of this dangerous infection are strict measures that restrict human freedoms. In the public sphere, two polarly opposite value orientations are clearly distinguished. Freedom and life are not in conflict when the situation does not require *a choice either-or*. However, there are situations when the value choice is made through a hierarchy of values and in such cases priority is used. Hierarchy and prioritization are ways of managing tensions and conflicts between values and heterogeneous orders (spheres) of values. With good conflict management, one value can reinforce and make full sense of another value. In the conditions of new turbulences and uncertainties, the relevance of Inglehart’s (2018) conclusions from his analysis of evolutionary modernization and cultural evolution sharpen.

#### List of References

- Arts, W., Hagedaars, J., Halman, L. (Eds.). 2003. The cultural diversity of European unity: findings, explanations and reflections from the European values study. Brill, Leiden.
- Arts, W., Hagedaars J., Halman, L. (Eds.) 2004. European values at the turn of the millennium. Brill, Leiden.
- Arts, W., Halman, L. 2014. Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe. Painting Europe’s Moral Landscapes. Brill, Leiden.
- Dyson, D., Sepos, A. 2012. Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration. Palgrave Macmillan, London, New York.
- Ester, P., Braun, M., Mohle, P. (Eds.). 2006. Globalization, value change, and generations: a cross-national and intergenerational perspective. Brill NV, Leiden.
- EVS, GESIS 2020 EVS 2017 - Variable Report – Integrated Datasets (ZA7500, ZA7502). GESIS-Variable Reports 2020/16. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne.
- Fotev, G. 1986. Social Reality and Imagination. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, Sofia. (In Bulg.).
- Fotev, G. 1999a. Crisis of Legitimacy. Sofia University Press “St Kliment Ohridski”, Sofia. (In Bulg.).
- Fotev, G. 1999b. Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics. Academic Publishing House “Marin Drinov”, Sofia,

- Fotev, G. (Ed.). 2009b. European Values in Today's Bulgarian Society. Sofia University Press "St Kliment Ohridski", Sofia, (In Bulg.).
- Fotev, G. 2009. Values against Disorder. Iztok-Zapad Publishing House, Sofia, (In Bulg.).
- Fotev, G. 2012. Spheres of Values. New Bulgarian University Press, Sofia, (In Bulg.).
- Fotev, G. (Ed.). 2019. European Values. The New Constellation. New Bulgarian University Press, Sofia, (In Bulg.).
- Greenspan, A. 2007. The age of turbulence : adventures in a new world. Penguin Group, New York, Toronto, London etc.
- Halman, L. 2001. European Values Study: A Third Wave. Source book of the 1999/2000 surveys. EVS, WORC, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
- Halman, L., Inglehart, R., Díez-Medrano, J., Luijckx, R.. 2007. Changing Values and Beliefs in 85 Countries. Trends from the Values Surveys from 1981 to 2004. Brill, Leiden.
- Halman, L., Riis, O. 1999. Religion in secularizing society. The European's religion at the end of the 20th century. Brill, Leiden.
- Inglehart, R. F. 2018. Cultural Evolution. People's Motivations Are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, etc.
- Luijckx, R., Halman, L., Sieben, I., Brislinger, E., Quandt, M. 2016. European Values in Numbers. Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century. Brill, Leiden.
- Norris, P., Inglehart, R. 2009. Cosmopolitan Communications. Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo
- Weber, M. 2004. The vocation lectures. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

# 4. BEWARE! SURVEYS ARE NOT UNIVERSAL TOOLS

---

*Ole Preben Riis*

## **Abstract**

*Comparative surveys, such as the European Value Survey, are sources for relevant and important information about the formation and distribution of opinions and values in our contemporary societies. However, the data should not be regarded as given entities which are just to be collected and fed to the computers. They are products of a well-planned, comprehensive, and meticulous process, which involves reflections about how respondents interpret the items. This contribution aims to stress the importance of the preliminary work behind the surveys, and the reflections behind it. It is the conscientious work of coordinators, like Loek Halman, which elevates survey data to sociologically meaningful indicators. Furthermore, this contribution also points out that the challenges of survey studies cannot be answered by more sophisticated statistical models. Supplementary qualitative analyses are also called for. Thus, the quantitative data analyses may become more valid and meaningful by reflections based qualitative studies of the sociohistorical context and the practical language of the respondents.*

## 4.1 Introduction

International survey data are a product of a long-term collaboration within a scattered team of researchers. Users of these data sets hardly recognize the challenges of harmonizing the task among contributors from different academic cultures. However, Loek Halman has proven to be a master conductor of the EVS team. When the EVS was launched, it was met by a wide-spread scepticism, especially among humanistic intellectuals and theologians. There are some issues to beware of in survey studies. The points presented in this chapter are common-sense among serious values researchers. Empirical articles tend to focus on the findings resulting from quantitative analysis rather than its underlying assumptions. Textbooks tend to present an idealized procedure rather than the actual working process. Surveys on social values are valuable tools provided you recognize what you must beware of when you read such analyses.

## 4.2 The Survey Sample as a Social Formation

The sample is supposed to be a kind of micro version of society. If the sampling is performed correctly, and if there is no systematic loss of sampled informants, then the composition of the sample will probably correspond with that of the population. However, the obtained sample does not form an interacting group. Whereas social groups are characterized by interaction, communication and cooperation, the sample only interacts indirectly, by the media of the questionnaire and the interviewers. In a normal, social group, individuals who are subject to questions about social values, will take up discussions with others, and their eventual answers will be influenced by special persons, who are assumed to know about the issues, so-called 'opinion leaders'. For instance, when laypersons are asked about their religious beliefs, they may refer to people, they ascribe with authority on the matter. Grace Davie (2000) describes such a religiosity as 'vicarious'. This is, however, a special case of a well-known general pattern of opinion forming (Lazarsfeld 1957). Respondents will often answer with their opinion leadership in mind. The values survey is situated in media res by prompting an immediate answer to abstract questions. These

questions may be addressed in societal discourses, and the debate may end with a referendum. However, the result of the referendum will probably differ from the findings of the survey, due to the social discourses which follow from the initial questioning to the final and collective answer. This reservation does not mean that the survey results are invalid provided we acknowledge that they just depict the initial individual position, before the issue has been subject to a collective process of deciding.

## 4.3 Interviewing as Measurement

By asking a sample of respondents the same questions and register their responses by standardized categories, comparisons are made possible and observer-induced bias is minimized.

The influence of the interviewer is only erroneous if the situation is regarded as an exact measurement of a fixed position. We may instead interpret the answers as expressions of how they would like to present themselves to others. For instance, when respondents over-report their church attendance, they tell us about what they would like to do and how they would like to be seen. The answers are truthful, if we understand what they refer to. The measurement problem only arises from researchers' interpretation of the response. In order to clarify whether this is the case, we ideally need to supplement the survey with open interviews, asking some types of respondents how they understand the question and what they meant by their answers.

One major study of how questionnaires are perceived is by Henning Olsen (1998). He approached the issue by involving a large group of people in first responding to a questionnaire and then to reconsider their answers in a laboratory. He observed that a fifth of the participants changed their answers on second thought. The change was mostly moderate and was also directed towards moderation. He further noticed that measurement issues were more noticeable at questions which used nouns with a wide semantic range. Surveys on social values often use such nouns in the questionnaire, such as religion, independence, tolerance or democracy.

Olsen's study (1998) was not based on the EVS questionnaire, but it is relevant for interpreting responses to it. Social values are referred to by abstract concepts with a wide semantic range. An abstract question about values may invoke a complex set of associations. Therefore, values are often operationalized by referring to specific issues or acts. This calls for reflections about whether the selected issues are typical and central for the meaning of the concept. For instance, Inglehart's (1977) well-known index of values operationalizes economic values by referring to fighting rising prices. This operationalization is only relevant in societies which have experienced inflation recently. Other economic issues may be more salient in some contexts, such as unemployment.

Validation of a measurement calls for a meticulous reflection on the meaning of the theoretical concept, its focus, scope, and range, and how it relates to people's practical life-world. As the theoretical concept typically is quite abstract, it is needed to consider the adequacy of efforts to make it more concrete. For instance, attendance at ritual services does not always point to church affiliation; e.g., members of a choir attend services regularly.

An evaluation of a measurement calls for theoretical and methodological reflections. For instance, when we ask people about their 'religion', some associate it with the established 'public' institution while others associate it with their 'private' beliefs. The methodological dilemma cannot be solved by putting a set of data into the computer, since no algorithm can identify what people thought as they answered the questions. A scientific argument must be based on connection between theoretical reflections on the one hand and information about how the respondents associate the questions with their life-world on the other. Knowledge about this calls for in-depth interviews. When a sociological analysis points to different responses between social groups, we need to consider the possibility that the question evoked different associations between the groups.

A methodological distinction can be made between four basic types of responses to survey items. The first type includes 'conformist' responses; these responses adhere to ideas which are historically rooted and expressed by well-known concepts, and which are supposed to be shared by a majority in society.

To confirm a conformist position does not call for a self-critical reflection. It affirms embeddedness in the local history and belonging to the community. To express support for a position which is novel or alien in the context calls for a critical reflection. We may label such a position as 'innovative'. Such a position must be stated in novel terms, and they are therefore difficult to communicate to people who take the common language for granted. A third type comprises attitudes which doubt or reject the traditional position, but remain undecided in the search for a firm answer. We may label such a position as 'seekers'. They may be offered to respond by 'don't know'; but that answer does not represent their position. They positively know that they reject the traditional position and they have also rejected some alternatives. They may even know in which direction their search goes, but they have not found a firm answer, and hence they are not able to identify their present position. A further type consists of 'sceptics', who do not seek, since they believe that it is futile. Philosophers and psychologists may argue that scepticism is a precarious position. However, this does not preclude scepticism to be empirically present in a population. A wide-spread state of scepticism may indicate a state of anomie which forms an overture for an emotionally charged rebellion. This makes it even more important for sociologists to identify the prevalence of a general scepticism.

These four types can be traced in the question about beliefs in the European Values Study. The option of 'a personal God' conforms with the historical tenets of the Christian churches. Belief in 'a spiritual force' typically represents an innovative type of religiosity in a European context. 'I don't believe in any kind of spiritual force or personal God' represents scepticism. However, the option 'I don't know what I believe in' does not necessarily indicate seekership. The questionnaire for the survey on "Religious and Moral Pluralism" (Dobbe-laere & Riis 2002) added a question about spirituality: "I believe that God is something within each person rather than something out there". This formulation also points towards an innovative tendency. It caught a rather wide affirmation. The decline of the personal image of God proclaimed by the churches has not led to a corresponding increase in scepticism, but rather to a spiritually oriented transformation.

Surveys focused on ideas and terms which people recognize. Therefore, they

are better able to identify the status of conformist attitudes and their decline. In order to present innovative attitudes, the questions need to be comprehensible to the respondents. By using fixed questions, which most respondents can understand and relate to, surveys are thereby inherently better able to indicate how established ideas and values recede, than to trace the growth of new ideas and values. Thus, surveys are better at providing indications of a decline of established type of practices and beliefs, such as service attendance or belief in the Christian dogma proclaimed by the churches, while they are less able to illuminate innovative ideas and practices. This may explain why research based on surveys tend to focus on secularization, in the sense of decline in established practices and belief, rather than to produce indicators for religious innovations, such as the emergence of new types of spirituality. It is, of course, interesting to indicate whether the membership foundation of the established churches erodes, and surveys studies are adequate tools for this. However, they ought to be supplemented by other research designs in order to complete the picture of religious and spiritual transformations in our time.

#### 4.4 Surveys as Measurements

The exact natural sciences are empirically based on measurements, referring to objective standards. In the era of Positivistic predominance, the social sciences attempted to construct similar measurements for human attitudes and social values. Obviously, it is not possible to produce such measurements in an objective sense. Such reflections led to a broad criticism of survey methods from defenders of a qualitative research design. Thus, Aaron Cicourel (1964, p. 244) therefore argued: "Conventional measurement systems may have a moderate correspondence with the institutional features of everyday life." This critique kicks in an open door. It is well-known to empirical researchers that the interpretation of the data depends on a hermeneutic reflection. This is acknowledged when we construct the questionnaires and try to make sense of the answers. However, in the final reports, this hermeneutical reflection is mostly under-reported.

Surveys on social values do not produce measurements in an objective sense. Their operation of assigning numbers to certain expressions should provide a

structurally true depiction of the phenomenon. This basic preliminary reflection is, however, often skipped, in the drive to get into the practical analysis.

The statistical measurement models developed by Georg Rasch (1968) is based on an attempt to specify a 'specific objectivity' which allows comparisons of the items (response patterns) in a manner which is statistically independent from the composition of the respondents. The probability that a participant can solve a task depends on both that person's ability and the difficulty of the task. Rasch's solution assumes a 'local statistical independence', which implies that all variation among responses to an item is accounted for by the variable  $x$ ; so for a given  $x$ , there is no further relationship among responses.

This approach allows to indicate whether a set of responses to a questionnaire can be regarded as fulfilling a measurement or not in Rasch's sense. This type of insight is of great interest since it warns against a naïve assumption of measurability. When a series of proposed value scales were tested at University of Copenhagen, they did not identify the same scaling patterns across socio-economic groups, and thus did not fulfil Rasch's criterion (Gundelach 2002 p. 39).

#### 4.5 Causality Problems in Surveys

Survey studies are inherently fixed in time, while causal explanations necessitate analyses of the conditions and mechanisms which influence a process. Cross-sectional analyses of survey studies are based on causal hypotheses which may be refuted but cannot be proven by them. Regression analyses depend on a set of assumptions about boundary conditions, such as about the relations of dependence or independence between the variables. The resulting coefficients are only meaningful provided that these assumptions are correct. Many researchers recognize this and therefore study supplementary sources about the processes relating to their problem. Nevertheless, many reports from survey studies skip the preliminary reflections.

It is necessary to consider the logic of the analyses. They do not prove the causal mechanisms, but rests on causal hypotheses. If these assumptions are cor-



rect, then the regression coefficient indicates how much the relative degree of change of the dependent factor as the independent factor changes with one unit. The analysis does not observe this change. The causal status of the independent variables must be clarified. An independent variable may indeed identify an assumed cause, as a mechanism or hindrance. Thus, distance to the nearest church may influence church attendance in a causal sense. However, independent variables are often used in regression models without considerations about their causal status. Thus, surveys of patterns of religiosity have identified three determining indicators: gender, generation, and geography (Halman & Riis 2003). The causal assumptions behind these indicators are seldom made explicit. Sociologists do not assume that religiosity is stimulated by chromosomes or hormones. Gender as an indicator points back to patterns of socialization and social roles. In a similar manner, generation is affiliated with changing patterns of socialization and socio-economic and cultural fluctuations, rather than with age. Geography indicates located clusters of religious values, for instance in rural districts. The analysis may point out relevant indicators, but it does not reveal the causal mechanisms and hindrances. In order to identify how social values emerge and how they influence social life, we need to include both operative and latent causal mechanisms.

#### **4.6 Including the Actor in Survey Data**

Schutz (1953, p. 32) criticized social scientists of reducing social actors to puppets, created and directed by the scientists themselves: “Yet these models of actors are not human beings living within their biographical situation in their social world of everyday life.” This critique could either be read as confronting all analytical reductions made by social science. It could also be read as an appeal to include considerations about the life-world of the social agents.

Social surveys may, in fact, provide an opening to this perspective. Surveys result in a data-matrix. It is normally read from a structural perspective, seen from the variable angle. However, the data may also be read from a respondent perspective. We may focus on a particular respondent, identify the background data about gender, age, location, education, et cetera and then trace

the answers to the posed questions. Of course, it is not possible to perform this kind of reading for all the thousand respondents and try to find some significant patterns. However, the survey aids us to provide an overview of the population, which enables to identify some types of respondents which have a theoretical significance. Our theory may identify types of social agents, such as firm believers, atheists, spiritual seekers and so forth. We may then pick out respondents which conform to the type and read through their responses to the other questions. This may provide a supplement to the structural analyses which make the covariations comprehensible in human terms.

#### **4.7 Surveys as a Tool for Selecting Cases**

According to Andrew Sayer (1992), surveys represent an ‘extensive’ research design; it analyses formal relations of similarity, based on ‘taxonomic groups’. He contrasts it with an ‘intensive’ research design, which analyses substantial relations of connection based on ‘causal groups’. This distinction is not identical with the common contrasting of quantitative and qualitative methods, or with broad versus deep studies. Extensive designs are descriptively oriented while intensive designs are causally oriented (Sayer, 1992, p. 243).

The proper function of surveys is to provide an overview of a population. A survey may point out typical or special cases which call for further analyses. The intensive case studies enable us to investigate whether the statistical correlations between attitudinal variable also corresponds with associations in people’s minds. The intensive case studies could further inform about specific processes, their conditions, time sequence, operative mechanisms and hindrances. Such information may qualify regression analyses by indicating how the independent variables made the dependent variable change. Mixed designs have been criticized epistemologically for disregarding the philosophical opposition between positivism versus hermeneutics, but such designs are permissible according to both critical realism and pragmatism (Riis, 2001).

## 4.8 To Conclude: From Positivism to Pragmatism?

Whereas the early survey studies were based on positivism, they follow a more pragmatic line today. However, this opens for a new challenge; namely to identify the pragmatic criteria of research. When can we affirm that a procedure is fruitful and useable? We risk being caught into a tautological web, where our use of a procedure affirms its usefulness. With a pragmatic perspective in mind, the social function of surveys on social values is two-sided: These studies could either support commodification, manipulation of opinions, or a technocratisation, or become tools for democratization, social mobilization and emancipation (Habermas 1977). We, as social researchers, have an influence on the outcome by our dissemination of the studies and our presentation of the findings. The dissemination of our studies can inspire a public discourse about whether the societal structures enable or restrict the realization of people's values.

### List of References

- Cicourel, A. (1964): *Method and Measurement in Sociology*. The Free Press.
- Gundelach P. (ed.) (2002): *Danskernes Værdier 1981-1999*. Hans Reitzels Forlag: Copenhagen.
- Davie, G. (2000): *Religion in Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Dobbelaere, K. & Riis, O. (2002). Religious and moral pluralism: theories, research, questions and design. *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion*, 13, 159-171.
- Habermas, J. (1977): *Knowledge and Human Interest*. Heineman: London.
- Halman, L. & Riis, O. (eds.) (2003): *Religion in Secularizing Society: The European's Religion at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. Brill: Tilburg.
- Inglehart, R. (1977): *The Silent Revolution*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
- Inglehart, R. (1990): *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
- Lazarsfeld, P. (1957) in E. Katz (ed.): *Public Opinion*. Free Press: New York.
- Kreiner, S (1996): *An informal introduction to graphic modelling*. In: H.C. Knudsen and G. Thornicroft (eds.) *Mental Health Service Evaluation*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Olsen, H. (1998): *Tallenes Talende Tavshed. Måleproblemer i surveyundersøgelser*. Akademisk Forlag: Copenhagen.
- Rasch, G. (1968): "A Mathematical Theory of Objectivity and its Consequences of Model Construction" Statistisk Institut, Copenhagen.
- Riis, O. (2001): *Metoder på Tværs*. DJØF Forlag: Copenhagen.
- Sayer, A. (1992): *Method in Social Science, a Realist Approach*. Routledge: London.
- Schutz, A. (1953): *Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of human action*. *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, vol. 14.

# 5. THE DATA OF THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY FROM 1981 TOWARDS 2026:

ACHIEVEMENTS, SYNERGIES,  
IMPACT, AND FUTURE

---

*Ruud Luijkx*

*Angelica M. Maineri*

*Giovanni Borghesan*

## **Abstract**

*During the last four decades, Loek Halman became from a master assistant to Ruud de Moor a driving force of the European Values Study. This chapter is a tribute from the ‘Tilburg team’ that together with the team from the GESIS Data Archive facilitated all the steps from the questionnaire to the available datasets. We present the innovations made in the fifth and last wave with respect to translation, sampling, harmonization of cross-national measurement, and mixed mode and web surveys. Also, the collaborations of EVS with other European and global research infrastructures that will lead us into the future are highlighted.*

## 5.1 Introduction

The history of the European Values Study (EVS) project and how this history is connected with the academic life of Loek Halman was already presented in the Introduction to this *Liber Amicorum*. In this chapter, we will concentrate on the different aspects of the EVS data, how they were gathered in the five waves since 1981 with an emphasis on the last wave, and the innovations made during these four decades.

Social survey methodology strengthened a lot in the last decades and this, together with the available datasets and the different ways the EVS had impact, will be presented in this chapter. Attention will be paid to the synergetic cooperation with other research infrastructures, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), that developed from EVS in the early 1990s and with whom EVS collaborated ever since. The fifth wave was a close collaboration where EVS took the lead in Europe and WVS in the rest of the world.

In the coming years, we will (hopefully) see a further consolidation of close cooperation between the different survey programs and a development towards a solid infrastructure to keep the social sciences at the core of a developing World (and Europe).

## 5.2 The Five EVS Waves

The European Values Study was initiated at the end of the 1970s to address political and social issues that were pressing at that time, e.g., the centrality of Christian values for Europeans and its implication for the cultural unity of Europe itself. In terms of organization, the EVS is managed by the Council of Program Directors, which includes representatives of all countries/regions participating in EVS. The program is steered by an Executive Committee, for a long period led by Loek Halman, a Methodology Group, and a Theory Group. The central operations are mostly carried out at Tilburg University and at the GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, in constant communication with the national EVS teams. The EVS is primarily funded by its participating

members' institutions, such as universities, research institutes, national science foundations, and private sponsors. The European Values Foundation, established in the late 1970s and of which Loek Halman was a member for a long time, played an important role in the gathering of funds, especially to make the surveys possible in Eastern Europe.

The EVS questionnaire, which has undergone improvements and changes throughout the years, generally revolves around the measurement of values and attitudes in several domains of life: family, work, religion and morale, politics and society, environment, as well as national identity, tolerance, and social solidarity. EVS data has been used to investigate important societal trends and changes, such as secularization (see, e.g., Halman & van Ingen, 2015), modernization (see, e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000), social inequalities (see, e.g., Hertel & Groh-Samberg, 2019), demographic behaviours (see, e.g., Arpino et al., 2015) – and the list could continue.

The first wave of the EVS was conducted in 1981 and collected data from almost 20,000 individuals spread over 16 countries. Since then, the EVS was carried out every 9 years (1990, 1999, 2008, 2017) and expanded tremendously, reaching up to 47 countries/regions in 2008 (see the geographical coverage in Figure 5.1), and interviewing over 225,000 individuals throughout the waves (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Countries that participated in the different waves with their sample sizes.


Country	Wave 1 (1981)	Wave 2 (1990)	Wave 3 (1999)	Wave 4 (2008)	Wave 5 (2017)
Albania	-	-	-	1534	1435
Armenia	-	-	-	1500	1500
Austria	-	1460	1522	1510	1644
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	1800
Belarus	-	-	1000	1500	1548
Belgium	1145	2792	1912	1509	
Bosnia Herzegovina	-	-	-	1512	1724
Bulgaria	-	1034	1000	1500	1558

Canada	1254	1730	-	-	-
Croatia	-	-	1003	1525	1487
Cyprus	-	-	-	1000	-
Czechia	-	2109	1908	1821	1811
Denmark	1182	1030	1023	1507	3362*
Estonia	-	1008	1005	1518	1304
Finland	-	588	1038	1134	1199*
France	1200	1002	1615	1501	1870
Georgia	-	-	-	1500	2194
Germany	1305	3437	2036	2075	5407*
Great Britain	1167	1484	1000	1561	1788
Greece	-	-	1142	1500	3892**
Hungary	-	999	1000	1513	1514
Iceland	927	702	968	808	2511*
Ireland	1217	1000	1012	1013	-
Italy	1348	2018	2000	1519	2277
Kosovo	-	-	-	1601	-
Latvia	-	903	1013	1506	To be included
Lithuania	-	1000	1018	1500	1448
Luxemburg	-	-	1211	1610	-
Malta	467	393	1002	1500	-
Moldova	-	-	-	1551	-
Montenegro	-	-	-	1516	1003
Netherlands	1221	1017	1003	1554	2739*
North Macedonia	-	-	-	1500	1117
Northern Cyprus	-	-	-	500	-
Northern Ireland	312	304	1000	500	-
Norway	1051	1239	-	1090	1122
Poland	-	982	1095	1510	1352
Portugal	-	1185	1000	1553	1215
Romania	-	1103	1146	1489	1613
Russian Federation	-	-	2500	1504	1825
Serbia	-	-	-	1512	1499
Slovakia	-	1136	1331	1509	1432
Slovenia	-	1035	1006	1366	1075
Spain	2303	2637	1200	1500	1209

Sweden	954	1047	1015	1187	1194
Switzerland	-	-	-	1272	3660*
Turkey	-	-	1206	2384	-
Ukraine	-	-	1195	1507	1612
United States	2325	1839	-	-	-
Total	19378	38213	41125	66281	64201

\* Mixed-mode data collection; \*\* only web survey

Figure 5.1 Geographical coverage of EVS waves 1-5



The EVS relies on probability-based sampling, and there is a strong commitment to ensure comparability over time and across countries. Similarly to other large-scale population surveys, the EVS had to adapt its methodology to a changing survey research landscape. While the EVS is traditionally carried out as an interviewer-administered face-to-face (F2F) survey, in the latest wave, a mixed-mode design was implemented in six countries (see Luijkx et al., 2021) so as to better respond to the decreasing response rates and increasing survey costs (Wolf et al., 2021). The main features and improvements in the EVS methodology are outlined in the next section.

### **5.3 Strengthening Methodology in the EVS 2017**

In this section, we will discuss the sampling, the construction of weights, and the mixed mode surveys with the matrix design. In addition, the translation process and the harmonization of cross-national measurements are presented, as well as the improvements of the project management and the level and transparency of the documentation.

#### **Sampling**

Sampling is a crucial aspect in the design of a general population survey, with strong implications on the quality of the collected data. The EVS has relied on probability-based samples since the start, although different sampling methods and sampling frames have been used (see, e.g., Scherpenzeel et al., 2017). Also thanks to the work undertaken in SERISS (the Synergies for Europe's Research Infrastructures in the Social Sciences, Horizon 2020-project), in the EVS 2017 more attention has been paid to the use of population-registers as sampling frames, and clearer guidelines have been written to aid national teams in their sampling procedures (EVS, 2020a). Sampling design forms have been adopted to identify a suitable sample size in each country, conditional on the sampling method available. This allowed for more control over the sampling design phase, ensuring higher quality overall.

#### **Weights**

The EVS also includes survey weights. In the EVS 2017, three sets of weights are provided. First, population size weights that correct for differences in the ratio sample/population in each country and should be used when producing aggregate statistics. Second, calibration weights were computed by the EVS central team in consultancy with a team of statisticians at GESIS, to adjust the characteristics of the samples to the characteristics of the population (age, gender, educational level, and region). Finally, design weights – which are only available for a selected number of countries – allow to correct for the unequal inclusion probabilities of individuals in the samples. More information on the weighting procedure can be found in EVS (2020b).

#### **Mixed Mode – Matrix design**

While the EVS has traditionally been conducted face-to-face, changes in the survey climate are pushing towards mixed-modes, and the EVS has taken up that challenge. In this respect, the EVS was the first large-scale cross-national survey program to officially approve mixed-mode data collection, hence providing pioneering insights. Six countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) complemented the traditional face-to-face survey with self-administered surveys, either web surveys or postal surveys. The questionnaire has been adapted accordingly, with item batteries split into multiple single items and some changes in wording. Due to the length of the questionnaire, four of these countries (Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) decided to adopt a matrix design, slicing the questionnaire into smaller modules and administering only some of the modules to a larger pool of respondents. In Iceland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, respondents were also contacted again to administer the modules that were skipped in the first round.

The article by Luijkx et al. (2021) explains the mixed-mode strategy in larger detail, and attempts to assess the outcomes. Overall, the strategy is considered successful, with significant cost reduction and good outcomes, even in the long, one-hour version. In Iceland and Germany, the self-administered mode

yielded better outcome rates than the traditional face-to-face. The paper version, as a complement of the web survey, was particularly important for some segments of the population. The main drawbacks of the strategy are the complexity of the resulting data file structure – especially with the matrix design, and the stronger representation bias in the self-administered mode. All in all, however, the data quality results are acceptable, and recent studies looking at the comparability of the measurements across modes yield promising results (Cernat, 2021; Lomazzi, 2022)

### **Translation**

Translating the questionnaire preserving comparability across countries but also over time is a key aspect of a cross-national longitudinal survey project like the EVS, and also in this respect the EVS has improved its standard. The questionnaire, designed by the Theory Group and approved by the Council of Program directors, is written in English, and later adapted by each national team to their own language(s) and contexts. In principle, languages spoken by 5% or more of the population in a country are included. In the EVS 2017, a thorough review of existing translations has been conducted, whereas new questions have been translated using state-of-the-art standards, and most notably the Translation, Review, Adjudication, Pretest and Documentation (TRAPD) procedure (see Mohler et al., 2016).

The Translation Management Tool (TMT), developed by Centerdata under the SERISS funding, has been adopted by EVS to assist its national teams in the translation process. Among the many functionalities of the TMT, the re-use of the translation of repeated elements has improved the efficiency during the translation process, whereas the possibility to document changes and doubts in notes attached to survey items has smoothly flowed into translation notes in the survey's variable report (EVS, 2020c). TMT is now available as TranslationCTRL – see <http://tmt.centerdata.nl/>.

### **Harmonization of cross-national measurements**

Alongside translation, another cornerstone of comparative research is the harmonization of measurements, such as national classifications (e.g. educational attainment, political parties, income categories), which allows to make meaningful comparisons across contexts. On the one hand, the EVS adopts the international standards, e.g., ISCED for education, ISCO for occupation, ISO-3166 for countries and regions, which are widely used in social surveys and increase the interoperability of diverse data sources. On the other hand, the EVS is also committed to aid the development of new classification schemas. In the EVS 2017, thanks to SERISS, the EVS has adopted the ES-ISCED classification (Schneider, 2009), enhancing the links to ESS. In the framework of enriching SurveyCodings (<https://www.surveycodings.org/>), an online tool to foster the (re)use of multilingual classifications developed under SERISS and SSHOC (Martens & Tjeldens, 2021), the EVS has expanded a coding classification to harmonize religious denominations building on the ONBound project (<https://www.gesis.org/en/services/processing-and-analyzing-data/data-harmonization/onbound>). Moving beyond the harmonization of national classifications, in the ESS-SUSTAIN-2 project, the EVS and the ESS have started a comparison of substantive items to establish whether they can be harmonized, potentially allowing to pool the two data sources and unlocking new research opportunities for comparative researchers and survey methodologists.

### **Project management**

Organizing and monitoring the work of dozens of different teams is a cumbersome task, and when it comes to a survey, poor project management can negatively affect the data quality. At the onset of EVS, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a lot of the alignment and coordination work had to happen face-to-face, with members of the central teams travelling across Europe to meet and work with the national teams. Face-to-face meetings continue to be important in such a large cross-national program; for instance, the yearly General Assembly still takes place preferably in person. However, for the daily tasks, the process has improved through the years, mainly thanks to technological developments which make it more efficient to organize the work, and coordinate with

partners spread all over the continent. In 2017, the EVS adopted myEVS, a new online Survey Project Management Platform – SMAP, developed under SERISS and tailored to the needs of a large-scale survey project (Brislinger et al., 2019). MyEVS facilitated access to guidelines and templates, and enabled a smoother communication between national and central teams.

### More documentation and transparency

In addition to the methodological improvements hereby outlined, over the years the EVS has taken significant steps into improving transparency and providing more survey documentation. A large array of documents is provided alongside the latest data release, including standard survey reports (e.g., the codebook, the method report) but also an in-depth explanation of the matrix design data set, the script to compute the calibration weights, and the full set of methodological guidelines as defined prior to the data collection.

EVS data and documentation are stored in the GESIS data archive, a Core Trust Seal Repository. Several steps are undertaken by the archive to maximize compliance with the FAIR data principles (Wilkinson et al., 2016), including assigning globally unique persistent identifiers to the datasets (doi) and adopting internally-recognized metadata standards (e.g. DataCite, DDI).

## 5.4 Overview of Datasets Available

Official EVS data and documentation is available free of charge for research purposes from the GESIS Data archive upon registration. An overview of the available datasets and relative persistent identifier is included in Table 5.2.

Integrated datasets are available for each wave, constituting the preferred source for cross-sectional cross-national analyses. For time-series analyses, the EVS Trend File includes data collected over almost 40 years. Comparisons can also be expanded globally thanks to the Joint EVS-WVS dataset and the Integrated Values Surveys dataset – for which scripts and info are provided and not the compiled dataset –, which covers 115 countries/territories globally over 40 years.

Table 5.2 Overview of available EVS datasets.

Dataset	Years of data collection	Countries included	With WVS	Doi
EVS1981: Integrated Dataset <sup>a</sup>	1981-1984	16		10.4232/1.10791
EVS1990: Integrated Dataset <sup>a</sup>	1989-1993	29		10.4232/1.10790
EVS1999: Integrated Dataset <sup>a</sup>	1999-2001	33		10.4232/1.10789
EVS2008: Integrated Dataset <sup>a,b</sup>	2008-2010	46		10.4232/1.12458
EVS2017: Finland – Swedish minority	2018-2019	1		10.4232/1.13513
EVS2017: Greece	2018-2019	1		10.4232/1.13512
EVS2017: Integrated Dataset – Matrix Design	2017-2019	4		10.4232/1.13561
EVS2017: Integrated Dataset <sup>b</sup>	2017-2020	34		10.4232/1.13560
EVS2017: Romania – Hungarian minority	2019-2020	1		10.4232/1.13562
EVS2017: Ukraine	2020	1		10.4232/1.13714
EVS Trend File 1981-2017 <sup>b</sup>	1981-2020	49		10.4232/1.13736
Integrated Values Surveys (IVS) 1981-2021 <sup>c</sup>	1981-2021	115	Yes	
Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2021 Dataset	2017-2021	81	Yes	10.4232/1.13737

<sup>a</sup> Single-country datasets also available; <sup>b</sup> Sensitive data version also available, under stricter conditions; <sup>c</sup> Not a dataset, but steps to construct it can be found on <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/integrated-values-surveys-ivs-1981-2021/data-and-documentation-ivs-1981-2021/>

## 5.5 Synergetic Cooperation with Research Infrastructures

The EVS has thrived also thanks to its cooperation with other survey programs and initiatives.

### Cooperation with WVS

In the early 1990s, the World Values Survey (WVS, see [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)) originated from the EVS and expanded the investigations on a global scale. The two projects have been cooperating ever since, releasing joint files to enable global analyses of values and value change.



## European projects

Through the participation in European projects funded via Horizon 2020, the EVS collaborated with other large-scale cross-national survey programs to strengthen the methodology of social surveys. The Synergies for Europe's Research Infrastructures in the Social Sciences (SERISS) project, operational from 2015 to 2019, allowed establishing a cooperation with the Consortium of European Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA ERIC, <https://www.cessda.eu/>), the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE ERIC, <http://www.share-project.org/>), the European Social Survey (ESS ERIC, <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>), WageIndicator (<https://wageindicator.org/>) and the Gender and Generation Programme (GGP, <https://www.ggp-i.org/>). Tools developed under SERISS and piloted by EVS include the project management platform myEVS and the translation management tool (TMT, developed by Centerdata).

Collaboration between the survey programs has continued and expanded to other domains through another project, the Social Sciences & Humanities Open Cloud (SSHOC, <https://sshopencloud.eu/>), in which EVS has contributed to build a European Question Bank and to further develop SurveyCodings, a tool to foster the documentation and reuse of socio-demographic classifications.

The cooperation with the ESS has continued also via the ESS-SUSTAIN-2 project, in which the two surveys are exploring their similarities (and differences) and outlining potential scenarios of future collaboration.

## 5.6 Impact

Such a vast amount of data has inspired high quality and impactful research. Since the early 1980s, over 2,800 scientific publications have appeared which are based on the EVS data sets (<https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>), including journal articles, theses, books, and sourcebooks. A significant number of these publications is in languages different from English, showing engagement also with the local scholar communities.

Beyond the scientific impact, EVS data is also used for dissemination and training purposes. The exhibition 'United in Diversity' at the Visitors' Centre of the European Parliament, in Brussels, made use of EVS data. Three versions of the Atlas of European Values are now published (Halman et al., 2005, 2011, 2022), each time updated with new data and another focus, including informative graphs and tables which are more accessible for a non-scientific audience, therefore widening the dissemination opportunities. The new digital version of the Atlas of European Values (<https://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/>), developed in the EVALUE project, includes interactive tools and educational materials for teachers and pupils of secondary schools.

## 5.7 The Future

As a conclusion, let's look ahead towards 2026, the year when the sixth wave of EVS is due. What are our challenges?

The covid-19 pandemic made us once more aware that in case of emergencies you need a flexible, ready to go into the field infrastructure. A well-functioning web panel would be a great good in these cases. For the Netherlands, the LISS panel is such a panel, and it could be used to reinterview the 2017 respondents of EVS and observe their value changes (Reeskens et al., 2021). A Europe wide survey as follow-up on the last wave of EVS would have been ideal in this situation. In general, face-to-face surveys are becoming very costly and several surveys already took or are ready to take the decision to move to self-completion in web and mail surveys. This is a great challenge ahead, and also EVS will have to take this up. If this can lead to a common infrastructure with other social surveys that would be a great gain. Ideally this would happen on a European level with possible global outreach, but it is important to notice that good examples on the national level are already being developed and visible, e.g., ODISSEI (<https://odissei-data.nl/en/>) in the Netherlands.

In the field of survey tools, a lot of progress has been made in the last decades. Question banks have been developed that aid the translation process and have more control on comparability over time and space within surveys but also be-

tween surveys. An example is MCSQ (the multilingual corpus of survey questionnaires, <https://www.upf.edu/web/mcsq>) in which EVS takes part. A further consolidation of the coding of core demographic variables also is an important challenge ahead. With SurveyCodings, we are on a good path and we should continue and elaborate the cooperation with other social science surveys here.

Concluding, exciting times are ahead, to continue the great work started by EVS-founding fathers Ruud de Moor and Jan Kerkhofs in the late 1970s. Forty-five years later, the world of survey research changed dramatically. In the last years, Loek Halman was pivotal in keeping the EVS-train going. We are grateful for that and will continue that work in an ever-rapidly changing context.

## List of References

- Arpino, B., Esping-Andersen, G., & Pessin, L. (2015). How Do Changes in Gender Role Attitudes Towards Female Employment Influence Fertility? A Macro-Level Analysis. *European Sociological Review*, 31(3), 370–382.
- Brislinger, E., Kurti, D., Davari, M., & Quandt, M. (2019). *Survey Project Management Portal: Quick guide to the demo version of SMaP* (Deliverable 4.11 of the SERISS project funded under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme GA No: 654221).
- Cernat, A. (2021). *Transition to multimode data collection: Understanding the measurement dimension*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F54TV5wU174>
- EVS (2020a) *European Values Study (EVS) 2017: Methodological Guidelines* (Vol. 2020/13). European Values Study (EVS). <https://doi.org/10.21241/ssoar.70110>
- EVS (2020b) *European Values Study (EVS) 2017: Weighting Data* (Vol. 2020/15). European Values Study (EVS). <https://doi.org/10.21241/ssoar.70113>
- EVS (2020c) *European Values Study (EVS) 2017: Variable Report* (Vol. 2020/16). GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.
- Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & Van Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European Values*. Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2011). *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century*. Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., Reeskens, T. Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2022). *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times*. Tilburg: Open Press TIU.
- Halman, L., & van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and Changing Moral Views: European Trends in Church Attendance and Views on Homosexuality, Divorce, Abortion, and Euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5), 616–627.
- Hertel, F. R., & Groh-Samberg, O. (2019). The Relation between Inequality and Intergenerational Class Mobility in 39 Countries. *American Sociological Review*, 84(6), 1099–1133.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1), pp. 19–51.
- Lomazzi, V. (2022). Improving measurements by survey infrastructures synergies: Insights from the revised gender role attitudes scale in the European values study 2017. *Quality & Quantity*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-021-01312-6>
- Luijkx, R., Jónsdóttir, G. A., Gummer, T., Ernst Stähli, M., Frederiksen, M., Ketola, K., Reeskens, T., Brislinger, E., Christmann, P., Gunnarsson, S. Þ., Hjaltason, Á. B., Joye, D., Lomazzi, V., Maineri, A. M., Milbert, P., Ochsner, M., Pollien, A., Sapin, M., Solanes, I., Verhoeven, S., Wolf, C. (2021). The European Values Study 2017: On the Way to the Future Using Mixed-Modes. *European Sociological Review*, 37(2), 330–346.
- Martens, M., & Tijdens, K. (2021). *D3.4 Multilingual ontologies for Occupation, Industry, Regions and cities, Food items, and Religion, with use case*. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4724837>
- Mohler, P., Dorer, B., de Jong, J., & Hu, M. (2016). Translation. In *Guidelines for Best Practice in Cross-Cultural Surveys*. Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. <http://ccsg.isr.umich.edu/>.
- Reeskens, T., Muis, Q., Sieben, I., Vandecasteele, L., Luijkx, R., & Halman, L. (2021). Stability or Change of Public Opinion and Values During the Coronavirus Crisis? Exploring Dutch Longitudinal Panel Data. *European Societies*, 23(sup 1), S153–S171.
- Scherpenzeel, A., Maineri, A., Bristle, J., Pflüger, S.-M., Mindarova, I., Butt, S., Zins, S., Emery, T., & Luijkx, R. (2017). *Report on the use of sampling frames in European studies*. SERISS.
- Schneider, S. L. (2009). *Confusing credentials: The cross-nationally comparable measurement of educational attainment* [Http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text, Oxford University, UK]. <https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:15c39d54-f896-425b-aaa8-93ba5bf03529>
- Wilkinson, M. D., Dumontier, M., Aalbersberg, Ij. J., Appleton, G., Axton, M., Baak, A., Blomberg, N., Boiten, J.-W., da Silva Santos, L. B., Bourne, P. E., Bouwman, J., Brookes, A. J., Clark, T., Crosas, M., Dillo, I., Dumon, O., Edmunds, S., Evelo, C. T., Finkers, R., ... Mons, B. (2016). The FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship. *Scientific Data*, 3(1), 160018.
- Wolf, C., Christmann, P., Gummer, T., Schnaudt, C., & Verhoeven, S. (2021). Conducting General Social Surveys as Self-Administered Mixed-Mode Surveys. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 85(2), 623–648.

# 6. CHALLENGES FOR COMPARATIVE SURVEYS IN EUROPE:

FIVE THESES

---

*Dominique Joye*

*Christof Wolf*

## **Abstract**

*EVS is one of the oldest and longest operating comparative survey projects in the world. In this chapter, we argue that projects like this must strive for the highest possible methodological standards. This is true for all aspects of measurement, particularly with respect to equivalence of questions between social groups, languages and countries. Of equal importance are aspects of representation underlining the necessity of randomly selected samples. But the quest for quality must go beyond methodological considerations. Projects like the EVS can only achieve excellence when firmly integrated in the scientific community and the wider social context. To ensure the utility of the data for scientific research a continuous dialogue between users and those responsible for the surveys on their content is necessary. Additionally, it is important to ascertain the relevance of surveys to a wider audience and, specifically, to those selected to take part in them. The argument is developed through five theses that are to be considered when working in comparative survey programs.*

## 6.1 Introduction

In the landscape of comparative surveys in Europe, the European Values Study (EVS) is one of the important landmarks: ‘duration since the first round of data collection’, ‘number of countries participating’, ‘involvement of the scientific community’ are just a few important keywords that define the project. But can we derive some general lessons for comparative surveys from the comparison of EVS, the project Loek Halman was for a very long time involved in, with other similar surveys like the European Social Survey (ESS) or the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)?

We think this is possible and organize our reflections around five theses, covering a number of important dilemmas which everyone involved in implementing international comparative surveys faces. As in many text books (among others Groves et al., 2004), we will consider the “measurement” side as well as the “representation” side, but keep in mind that both are central to survey quality in general and the implementation of comparative surveys in particular.

## 6.2 The First Thesis: The Quality Quest

The first thesis that we want to propose goes as follows: *(Comparative) surveys are only useful if they are the product of a joint effort of survey specialists and those using these data for their research: The Total Research Quality quest.*

The total survey error (TSE) framework is now a widely accepted perspective in the field of survey methodology (Lyberg and Weisberg, 2016). One way to present it is to take into consideration all sources of errors potentially endangering the results of a survey and to try minimizing their impact under given constraints, e.g., the available financial budget or other resources. Parallel to the TSE, in particular by statistical offices, the concept of “Total Survey Quality” was developed, taking into account three levels of quality, namely product, process and organizational quality. Lyberg and Weisberg (2016) propose to merge TSE with the Total Survey Quality approach into a “Total Research

Quality” perspective including, for example, the discussion of the mode of research and the adequacy of survey characteristics in relation to research goals.

Why is this important for the EVS and for comparative surveys in general? There are at least two reasons. The first one is that the TSE paradigm implies that one should document all decisions on implementation and have close control over the fieldwork and document possible adaptations and deviations from central standards in each country; i.e., definition of the sample, ways to control the “randomness” of the process, as well as measurement characteristics and translation procedures. It must be emphasized that such a transparency process was put forward by the ESS since its first edition in 2002.<sup>1</sup> It was also developed for some ISSP modules (Joye, Sapin & Wolf, 2019a).

As for the second reason, when Lyberg and Weisberg (2016) mentioned the idea of Total Research Quality, they were also thinking about introducing a link between those responsible for the survey and the research community as an element of quality. A discussion about the validity and quality of a survey must, therefore, include those who will use the data in the end.

All comparative projects face the challenge to integrate scientific excellence and research interests with methodological expertise and technical know-how. While continuously involving researchers in yearly or biennial surveys like the ISSP or ESS, this is particularly challenging for a project with a nine-year cycle like EVS. Here it is almost impossible to organize a sustained debate between researchers and survey practitioners for such a long period of time for “only” one survey. Thus, the challenge is to maintain a functioning network of survey methodologists and substantive researchers from diverse scientific disciplines able to work together or, even better, researchers having substantive and methodological competences. This implies thinking about the organizational structure of a comparative survey project (de Graaf & Halman, 2013).

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the comments of Willem Saris on measurement in ESS in his blog (<https://decisions-saris-gallhofer.weebly.com/ess-and-esra.html> or <https://decisions-saris-gallhofer.weebly.com/the-start-of-the-ess.html>, consulted on 2021/2/1). More generally, the choices made for the ESS are documented on the page [https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/ess\\_methodology/source\\_questionnaire\\_source\\_questionnaire\\_development.html](https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/ess_methodology/source_questionnaire_source_questionnaire_development.html), consulted on 2021/2/1 with development in different chapters, like [https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/core\\_ess\\_questionnaire/ESS\\_core\\_questionnaire\\_overview.pdf](https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/core_ess_questionnaire/ESS_core_questionnaire_overview.pdf), consulted on 2021/2/1).

### 6.3 The Second Thesis: Surveys as Co-Creation

The second thesis we propose is: *Surveys are co-created by researchers and respondents.*

The strength of the EVS or the ISSP is the integration of different disciplines of the social sciences as well as statisticians and survey methodologists. In this way, these surveys are good examples of interdisciplinarity where we expect not only a juxtaposition of different disciplines (multidisciplinary) but a real integration of the different perspectives. One step further in this direction is to communicate to a broader public, for example, by using graphical tools like cartographic presentation (Halman, Luijkx & van Zundert, 2005, but see also <https://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/>). The idea of transdisciplinarity is taking this even further by additionally postulating that everyone participating in the process of research is contributing to its outcomes, i.e., also respondents (Hirsch Hadorn et al., 2008).

The cooperation with respondents is a crucial point for different reasons. First of all, because of the feeling of freedom and respect. For example, not accepting a “don’t know” but instead forcing an answer in an internet survey is often the cause for a break-off. Also, coercing a respondent to cooperate in a survey is not an acceptable interviewer behaviour. More generally, a respondent is not to be seen as the object of an experiment but as a partner in a knowledge production process. This idea of social exchange was already used by Dillman and colleagues (2014) in order to increase participation.

A second reason why cooperation with respondents is crucial is interest. For example, Groves, Presser and Dipko (2004) have shown a link between interest and participation. If such an effect is strong, this would influence the results because interested people may not have the same attitudes, values or demographic characteristics as others. Thus, the survey must be as interesting as possible for most respondents while the design should make sure that not only the easiest to reach respondents are selected but all sample members have a chance to participate.

Thirdly, another reason is the centrality of the concept. We know that respondents will generally give an answer to every question even if it is not central to their belief system. This phenomenon is covered in survey methodology under the heading of non-attitudes (Converse, 1974; but see also Barton, 2011). If we take this seriously, we should not only ask about the opinion that we are interested in but also about the strength of the opinion (Smith, 1984).

Fourth, reaction to language and content is crucial, too. We know that some words are problematic in some contexts: for example, “race” in a French or German speaking context. The use of such words can interfere in the relation between interviewers and interviewees. At the same time, one experiment has shown a relatively small effect of such terms (Joye et al., 2012). The recommendation is to be attentive to the choices of wording in different contexts and to have more empirical results, either qualitative or quantitative, in order to be able to make the best adjustments. This also underscores the importance of taking into account the conceptual space of an item when crafting it and not leaving this type of question to translation or adaption which is addressed at the end.

The fifth and last crucial point we propose is that the discussion about the relation with respondents can go even further. The discourse initiated by a survey may also have a mobilization effect, called a performative function in some sub-disciplines, not least because a survey typically addresses thousands of people. For example, imagine a survey insisting on the differences, largely fictitious, between group A and group B, planting the seed of division inside a country. Thus, we should choose the topics of our surveys carefully and take possible feedback effects into account when deciding about its implementation. In this way, we can defend the idea of a survey’s ethic, not limited to the scientific questions some researchers can have but considering the public debate that is implied by a sociological intervention on many thousands of individuals. Here again, detailed knowledge of the national circumstances is indispensable showing once more the importance of national survey collaborators.

In the end, a survey is not only about asking questions to respondents but also a sociological experience for all who are involved. The EVS seems to be well

positioned in this regard with a core on “values”. In any case, this should be reflected when thinking about the future of comparative survey programs.

#### 6.4 The Third Thesis: On the Organizational Structure

The third thesis we propose is: *Comparative surveys must strive for an organizational structure which balances centralized and decentralized decision making.*

The sustained involvement of methodologists and substantive researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds is only one ingredient contributing to the successful functioning of an international comparative survey. The consideration of users and respondents is another one. A further important element is the way the survey program is governed and organized. Some are advocating a centralized governance making it possible to systematically enforce common procedures and standards. Others are arguing that a more decentralized system is the best because only then will knowledge of local realities be fully utilized in order to find the most efficient implementation of the survey. This is an old debate in the organization of international surveys (Lynn, 2003).

- ESS is an example of a relatively centralized survey program with many centralized controls at each step of implementation.
- On the other end of the spectrum is the (old) Generations and Gender Survey (GGS). Here countries enjoyed a lot of freedom in sampling, fieldwork, questionnaire design etc. Some information in some countries even came from registers and not from a survey.
- ISSP is an example for a specific mix of central and decentral decision making. Basic principles of sampling or fieldwork are fixed for all members. However, these mandatory rules are not defined by a remote centre but decided jointly by all involved parties and a committee is tasked with evaluating country-specific survey designs vis-à-vis these principles. Likewise, questionnaires are based on mutual agreements but then adapted within predefined limits to national circumstances. Thus, there is a mix

of central rules that are set together combined with specified degree of freedom to adapt procedures to national conditions in order to make the survey as valid and relevant as possible.

- The EVS, at least in its last two waves, was somewhat in between ESS and ISSP, having a strong involvement of countries in the decision process but also a set of rules and procedures defined by a small central circle.

We tend to defend a mixed approach which emphasizes common standards and central evaluations of survey quality with possibilities to make adaptations on the national level. Furthermore, the capacity for innovations will be greater in a less rigid system because the involvement of national collaborators will be stronger and interplay between them will be more diverse and mobile. Finally, an organization which does not rely on a strong centre could be more resilient to unforeseen shocks. If we are correct in these assumptions, ISSP should be the most “agile” comparative survey, at least with respect to the adaptation over time and reactions to changes in the environment. The EVS could reconsider what mix of central and decentralized decision making is most suitable in its future organization. Of course, there is a price to pay for a more decentralized organization. The need to document what happens in the different countries and the implication of diverse methodological choices on the comparativeness of the data have to be acknowledged. Furthermore, considering documentation does not suffice, rather one has to find suitable ways to present it and make it accessible and meaningful to the users.

#### 6.5 The Fourth Thesis: On Sampling Frames

As fourth thesis, we propose: *Random sampling has to be mandatory for all participating countries; but the choice of sampling frame has to be based on national circumstances and choice mode.*

For some years, face-to-face surveys—the assumed gold standard for high quality surveys—have become more and more difficult to organize in many countries. There are many reasons for this trend, from long-term changes in

lifestyles to events like the COVID-19 pandemic which began at the end of 2019. In sum, these trends led to steep increases in survey costs and dwindling response rates (Wolf et al., 2021). Therefore, research on alternative modes of data collection is urgently needed keeping in mind that despite the flexibility in the survey mode, the demand for a sample of high quality remains. But what exactly is a sample of high quality?

A quality sample first of all is a random sample meaning that every element of the predefined target population has a known and non-zero probability to be selected for participation.<sup>2</sup> This definition excludes quota samples but also all methods allowing respondents to self-select into a survey. This prevents, for example, the use of internet-based access panels based on volunteer participation. But a sampling frame consisting of email addresses can also be problematic, knowing that in most countries some individuals do not have an email address and others many email addresses, without information available for researchers in order to correct these selection biases. Only random samples allow the use of statistical estimates of errors and population values. Therefore, relatively small random samples usually are far better than large non-random samples.

In some countries researchers have tried to solve this problem by using what is called a probability-based online panel: typically very carefully designed studies based on a randomly selected set of respondents which comprise the panel and are then interviewed at different occasions and on different topics. Using such a panel as sample for a comparative survey is tempting. However, one must reckon with the possibility that the panel will be more and more selective because some participants will have a higher likelihood to leave the panel than others, i.e., the panel will suffer from differential attrition. This implies that the panel sample will deviate more and more from the population. Without any further elements of design aimed at controlling for such a bias, panels are not acceptable for this type of survey where the aim is to gain knowledge about the population. However, we should emphasize that probability-based panel studies that monitor and correct for differential attrition and regularly

<sup>2</sup> This does not imply that the probability must be the same for everybody even if it is easier for use. For some estimations it could be even more efficient to have unequal selection probabilities.

add randomly drawn refreshment samples should usually satisfy the demand for a quality sample.

To fulfil the demand of a random sample, a “translation process” in which the general rule is interpreted and adapted to national circumstances is needed. This process and its results should be validated by a specialized committee which will assess the proposal balancing costs and benefits of specific decisions.

Sampling is not the only element of design for which the right balance between standardization and adaption must be found. Among others, this is also true for the choice between different data collection modes. For the ESS face-to-face survey mode is mandatory. For the ISSP, the questionnaire is drafted with a self-completion format in mind, but each country is free to opt for face to face, mail or web. Only telephone interviews are not accepted because such a mode does not allow presenting visual material during the interview. For the EVS, the model was face to face but the move to other formats was tested during the last wave, where a very ambitious methodological program was realized in parallel to the main survey (Luijkx et al., 2020).

## **6.6 The Fifth Thesis: Measurement Equivalence Across Space and Time**

The fifth and final thesis read: *Reaching measurement equivalence over time is particularly challenging and should be of central concern to comparative survey programs.*

Measurement equivalence and, more generally, the quality of questions and scales over time are challenging even more because the challenges vary by type of question and content and multiply in comparative settings (Halman & Moor, 1993; Wolf et al., 2016). More specifically, the following three issues are at play.

Firstly, it is now widely accepted that for most concepts multi-item measurement, i.e., a scale comprising different items that can be combined into a composite measure, is the path to follow because it allows for estimation of

measurement error and degree of equivalence between time points and countries. For the ESS this was an explicit part of the reasoning when launching this program. Items may change their meaning over time thereby changing the covariance structure in the scale. To be able to react to these changes and to be able to include new developments into the survey while keeping comparability over time is among the biggest challenges of survey research. In the ISSP, this challenge is met by a rule that for modules which are repeated two thirds of the items have to be replicated while up to one third of new items can be introduced. This institutionalized room for innovation is missing in the EVS.

Second, for single item measurement the choice of wording is even more sensitive than for multi-item measures and it could be problematic in two different directions at least. On the one hand, because of transferring meaning into different cultural contexts: all the work on translation shows how challenging it is to arrive at equivalent formulations (Behr & Shishido, 2016). On the other hand, because of the evolution of meaning in time: the EVS and ISSP cover nearly a forty-year time span. During this time words may well have changed their meaning (Smith, 2005). For example, up to the 1970s the term “printer” most likely was interpreted as denoting a person producing printed matter while nowadays this term would almost exclusively be seen as to refer to a machine producing printed material. But even if a term keeps its general semantic meaning its social significance may vary greatly. For example, “inflation” was a very important political issue in the 1970s in western Europe but currently is of only very little concern. Another example are gender roles which have changed a lot during the last decades. Therefore, the scales used to describe them in the 1980s are less accurate today (Walter, 2018).

Third, for socio-demographic variables the underlying nomenclatures – i.e., the administrative or societally acceptable categories – typically vary over time (Schneider, Joye & Wolf, 2016). Examples include the ISCO classification for occupations with its 1968, 1988 or 2008 variants or more recently the change in the number of genders classified with a respective question. The changes sometimes can be rather big as, for example, in the case of education where a very important work of standardization based on ISCED-11 has been developed (Schneider, 2011, but see also Ortmanns & Schneider, 2016). The result is

very satisfying for more recent editions of surveys, but older surveys cannot be made fully forward compatible with this classification. The situation is the same for EVS as well as ESS or ISSP but has, nevertheless, to be addressed, perhaps in a common way between these programs.

All these examples emphasize the importance of the translation process but, more generally, the importance to put measurement in its cultural and temporal context. To meet this challenge, we should not only rely on using teams of translators as is now the standard for all the surveys we mention here, and we should not only rely on quantitative analysis of invariance. We must also consider a more carefully guided development of items and, for example, more often employ cross-cultural cognitive interviews (Miller et al., 2011; Willis, 2015) or probing approaches (Behr et al., 2014). On the quantitative side, some ideas of “scaling” in different contexts (Mohler, Smith & Harkness, 1998; Joye, Birkelund & Lemel, 2019) using eventually auxiliary information (Clogg, 1984), seem a path to follow. In other words, a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches to ensure comparability over time and place should be developed, using and developing innovative approaches.

## **6.7 Conclusion: Toward a Future in Comparative Survey Programmes**

What consequences can we draw from these observations for the future of comparative surveys? From our point of view, three points are particularly important. First of all, to continue to closely monitor the fieldwork in each country is essential, with as much exchange as possible between the national team involved in doing the field work and the central coordination. In this respect EVS seems in a good position between the decentralization of ISSP and the centralization of the ESS. One challenge being still the documentation of the methodological choices and the way to communicate their consequence for the users.

Second, samples must remain random: for this type of survey, this is the only means to ensure quality in a comparative perspective. Furthermore, weight-



ing procedures “redressing” the sample can be problematic. First, because the variables on which weights are based, are not necessarily those mostly related to the bias and, second, the mechanisms driving bias most likely will be country-specific implying that weighting not necessarily should rely on the same variables in each country (Joye, Sapin & Wolf, 2019b). Using a strict random sample and aiming at the highest possible response rate by employing a diversity of strategies is likely the best insurance for quality, in particular a comparative perspective.

Third, to adapt the questions between cultures and, probably more important, over time, is, in our mind, the most difficult challenge for the EVS.<sup>3</sup> To meet it we will probably have to prepare an innovative research program putting together quantitative and qualitative approaches in a comparative frame. And such a research program could be at the heart of the future of the EVS.

Since the inception of the EVS, the global landscape of surveys in Europe has changed. The EVS now competes with other comparative surveys like the ESS, the ISSP, the GGS, SHARE and many more. The EVS must find its place in this new landscape and develop an infrastructure in order to support it. Or it will have to build a network platform and join forces with other comparative surveys. The SERISS project was certainly an example in this direction but a substantive research program, mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to understand better what is involved in comparative survey method is still to develop.

## List of References

- Barton, A. H. (2011). Nonattitude. In P. J. Lavrakas (Ed.) *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods* (pp. 512-513) Sage.
  - Behr, D., Braun, M., Kaczmirek, L. & Bandilla, W. (2014). Item comparability in cross-national surveys. Results from asking probing questions in cross-national web surveys about attitudes towards civil disobedience. *Quality & Quantity*, 48, 127-148.
- 3 Less for the ESS since this survey is the youngest and less for the ISSP where the structure of replication is easier to adapt. But one more reason to organize research on such a topic around the EVS project.

- Behr, D. & Sishido, K. (2016). The Translation of Measurement Instruments for Cross-cultural Surveys. In C. Wolf, D. Joye, T. W. Smith & Y. Fu (Eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Survey Methodology* (pp. 269-287). Sage.
- Clogg, C. C. (1984). Some statistical models for analyzing why survey disagree. In C. F. Turner & E. Martin (Eds.), *Surveying subjective phenomena* (Vol. 2, pp. 319-367). Russel Sage Foundation.
- Converse, P. E. (1974). Nonattitudes and American Public Opinion: Comment: The status of Nonattitudes. *The American Political Science Review*, 68, 650-660.
- Dillman, D. A., Smyth, J. D. & Christian, L. M. (2014). *Internet, Phone, Mail and Mixed-Mode Surveys: The Tailored Design Method* (4th edition). John Wiley.
- de Graaf, P., & Halman, L. (2013). An early example in the international survey landscape: The European Values Study. In B. Kleiner, I. Renschler, B. Wernli, P. Farago, & D. Joye (Eds.), *Understanding Research Infrastructures in the Social Sciences* (pp. 114-122). Seismo Press.
- Groves, R. M., Presser, S. & Dipko, S. (2004). The Role of Topic Interest in Survey Participation Decisions. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 68, 2-31.
- Groves, R. M., Fowler, F. J., Couper, M. P., Lepkowski, J. M., Singer, E. & Tourangeau, R. (Eds.) (2004). *Survey Methodology*. Wiley.
- Halman, L., & Moor, R. d. (1993). Comparative Research on Values. In P. Ester, L. Halman, & R. d. Moor (Eds.), *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North America* (2 ed., pp. 21-36). Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & van Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European Values*. Tilburg University.
- Hirsch Hadorn, G., Hoffmann-Riem, H., Biber-Klemm, S., Grossenbacher-Mansuy, W., Joye, D., Pohl, C., Wiesmann, U., Zemp, E. (Eds.) (2008) *Handbook of Transdisciplinary Research*, Springer.
- Joye, D., Ernst Stähli, M., Pollien, A. & Sapin, M. (2012). *Test, Retest and Translation* [Conference presentation] CDSI 2012 Meeting, Washington D.C., United States.
- Joye, D., Sapin, M. & Wolf, C. (2019a). *Measuring Social Networks and Social Resources: An Exploratory ISSP Survey around the World* (Schriftenreihe 22). GESIS <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62256-9>.
- Joye, D., Sapin, M. & Wolf, C. (2019b). Weights in Comparative Surveys? A Call for Opening the Black Box. *Harmonization Newsletter, Fall 2019*. <https://www.asc.ohio-state.edu/dataharmonization/harmonization-newsletter-fall-2019>, accessed 2021/01/02.
- Joye, D., Birkelund, G. E. & Lemel, Y. (2019). Traveling with Albert Gifi: Nominal, Ordinal and Interval Approaches in Comparative Studies of Social and Cultural Spaces. In J. Blasius, F. Lebaron, B. Le Roux & A. Schmitz (Eds.), *Empirical Investigations of Social Space* (pp. 393-410). Springer.
- Luijkx, R., Jónsdóttir, G. A., Gummer, T., Ernst Stähli, M., Frederiksen, M., Ketola, K., Reeskens, T., Brislinger, E., Christmann, P., Gunnarsson, S. Þ., Hjaltason, Á. B., Joye, D., Lomazzi, V., Maineri, A. M., Milbert, P., Ochsner, M., Pollien, A., Sapin, M., Solanes, I., Verhoeven, S. & Wolf, C. (2020). The European Values Study 2017: On the Way to the Future Using Mixed-Modes. *European Sociological Review*, 37, 330-346.

- Lyberg, L. & Weisberg, H. F. (2016). Total survey error: a paradigm for survey methodology. In C. Wolf, D. Joye, T. W. Smith & Y. Fu (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Survey Methodology* (pp. 27-40). Sage.
- Lynn, P. (2003). Developing quality standards for cross-national survey research: five approaches. *Int. J. Social Research Methodology*, 6, 323-336.
- Miller, K., Fitzgerald, R., Padilla, J.-L., Willson, S., Widdop, S., Caspar, R., Dimov, M., Gray, M., Nunes, C., Prüfer, P., Schöbi, N. & Schoua-Glusberg, A. (2011). Design and Analysis of Cognitive Interviews for Comparative Multinational Testing. *Field Methods*, 23, 379-396.
- Mohler, P. P., Smith, T. W. & Harkness, J. (1998). Respondents' ratings of expressions form response scales: A two country, two-language investigation on equivalence and translation. *ZUMA-Nachrichten Spezial, January*, 159-184.
- Ortmanns, V. & Schneider, S. (2016). Harmonization still failing? Inconsistency of education variables in cross-national public opinion surveys. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 28, 562-582.
- Schneider, S. (2011). Nominal comparability is not enough:(In-) equivalence of construct validity of cross-national measures of educational attainment in the European Social Survey. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 28, 343-357.
- Schneider, S., Joye, D. & Wolf, C. (2016). When Translation is not Enough: Background Variables in Comparative Survey. In C. Wolf, D. Joye, T. W. Smith & Y. Fu (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Survey Methodology* (pp. 288-307). Sage.
- Smith, T. W. (1984). Nonattitudes: A Review and Evaluation. In C. E. Turner & E. Martin (Eds.), *Surveying Subjective Phenomena*, (pp. 215-256). Russel Sage Foundation.
- Smith, T. W. (2005). The laws of studying social change. *Survey Research*, 36, 1-5.
- Walter, J. G. (2018). The adequacy of measures of gender roles attitudes: a review of current measures in omnibus surveys. *Quality and Quantity*, 52, 829-848.
- Willis, G. B. (2015). Research synthesis: The practice of Cross-Cultural Cognitive Interviewing. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 79, 359-395.
- Wolf, C., Schneider, S., Behr, D. & Joye, D. (2016). Harmonizing Survey Questions between Cultures and over Time. In C. Wolf, D. Joye, T. W. Smith & Y. Fu (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Survey Methodology* (pp. 502-524). Sage.
- Wolf, C., Christmann, P., Gummer, T., Schnaudt, C. & Verhoeven, S. (2021) Conducting General Social Surveys as Self-Administered Mixed-Mode Surveys. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 85(2), pp. 623-648.

# 7. WHAT DO CHANGES IN THE EVS QUESTIONNAIRE REVEAL?

---

*Pierre Bréchon*

## **Abstract**

*The questionnaires of barometric surveys can indirectly highlight the changes in societies as questionnaires are witnesses of what is considered important to measure at one moment of time. After briefly recalling the origins of the survey, the first part is devoted to the first wave of the survey, which by then included a number of very innovative questions. The second part discusses the evolution of the questionnaire, which is closely linked to the evolution of European societies, the rise of new concerns on the political agenda but also the strategies of academics managing the survey.*

## 7.1 Introduction

The evolution of barometric survey questionnaires can be explained by at least two phenomena. Firstly, depending on the cultural transformations of a country, certain questions may lose their interest while others, previously absent, may become essential in order to take into account new social issues. But this evolution of the questionnaires is also dependent on the way in which those in charge of the survey evaluate the social transformations. Differentiating between the two phenomena is, however, very difficult. I would like, in this book of friends in honour of Loek Halman – probably the researcher who knows best the successive questionnaires of this survey – to highlight the main changes that have been made and try to explain them in the light of the two phenomena mentioned.

## 7.2 The Origins

The EVS project was built at the end of the 1970s around academics, Catholic intellectuals and survey specialists who were part of the Eurobarometer project. The concerns of this group joined those of European bishops who, on the eve of the first European elections by direct universal suffrage (see <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/about-evs/history/>), wondered whether Europeans still shared common values and whether Christian values would continue to infuse European culture. Catholic organizations and Christian Democrat foundations therefore strongly contributed to the financing of the first and sometimes subsequent waves of inquiry (Kropp, 2017).

As the survey is international, arbitration on the questionnaires is much more difficult than for a national survey. Because of the cultural diversity between countries, the demands of the survey partners are diverse. Researchers in each country want a questionnaire adapted to what they consider to be the most salient features of their national culture. But not all of them carry equal weight in the final decision. Sometimes it has been asked whether certain questions that measure traditional values, which no longer make much sense in Western Europe, should be retained while they may remain central in Eastern or Southern parts of the continent.

## 7.3 The Very First Survey

The 1981 questionnaire (around 1 hour and 15 minutes face-to-face), which is very detailed, is imaginative enough to track down the new values that are being announced; however, it also includes some very traditional questions. It includes about 300 questions, with 36 measures in the form of a scale from 1 to 10 but also many dichotomous questions for which it is not necessarily easy to choose. The main themes concern work, leisure, perception of self and others, the meaning of life, morals, religion, family, politics.

Some questions were real pearls to measure - indirectly - certain values and many are always present in the questionnaire. This is the case, for example, with the question on the categories of people one would not want to have as neighbors: people of another race, Jews, immigrants and foreign workers, heavy drinkers, people with a criminal record, members of religious sects or cults, large families, emotionally unstable people, right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, unmarried mothers, students. Some categories have changed over the waves, but the first 4 mentioned are still part of the questionnaire.

Another very good decision was to introduce the first question of a scale developed by Maurice Rosenberg (1956) to measure trust in others or, on the contrary, to be careful with them. This is a general indicator that has been very stable over the decades - with large differences between countries - and is well correlated with many other attitudes and values, including political ones. This is an indication of sociability, which can be notably observed in the results through a fairly strong link with association membership, measured by being a member of different types of associations and doing voluntary work in them.

The questionnaire also included many other psycho-sociological questions: feeling lonely, not liking being with people different from oneself, feeling depressed or, on the contrary, feeling very optimistic. Some of these questions were dropped in 1990 and almost all the rest disappeared afterwards. But the theme of general trust in others has remained and was even extended in 2008 and 2017. There are also questions on happiness which are closely linked to an indicator of a feeling of autonomy: feeling free to make choices. These ques-

tions on happiness - which are now very often asked in surveys - show, surprisingly, that the feeling of happiness is increasing while the pessimism about societies seems to be growing.

In the large block on the meaning of work, a long battery - still partly present - concerned what is important in a job. The items correspond to two orientations, instrumental or expressive, in other words material (a good pay, not too much pressure, good job security, good chances for promotion, good hours, generous holidays) or on the contrary qualitative (pleasant people to work with, a job respected by people, an opportunity to use initiative, a useful job for society, meeting people, a job in which you feel you can achieve something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, a job that meets one's abilities). It is a way of operationalizing, at the level of work, the distinction between materialistic or post-materialistic expectations.

A very general - dichotomous - question concerned moral action: in order to know what is right and wrong, should one refer to absolutely clear guidelines or should one assess what is right or wrong according to the circumstances? Unfortunately, this question was abandoned for the last wave. However, it highlighted the rise of a relativistic morality in all European countries since only a minority of Europeans said that one should act according to intangible principles.

Among the religious questions, some were classic at the time, but one was innovative: it asked the respondent whether he or she feels "religious, non-religious or convinced atheist". These were still few in number at the time, but they are much more numerous today. The question makes it possible to distinguish people who are simply detached from religions from those who are rather anti-religious. There are also some rather innovative questions about telepathy or distance visions, contact with a deceased person, the closeness felt with a spiritual force, indicators measuring new forms of religiosity.

Belief in God is accurately measured through three questions forming a scale: a dichotomous question: believing in God (yes/no); a question with four modalities: believing in a personal God, in a kind of spirit or life force, not knowing

what to think, not believing; a 10-point scale to measure the importance of God in one's life.

In the family questions, two batteries have been maintained since 1981. The first one is about what contributes to the success of a marriage, with 11 items: fidelity, a decent income, good housing conditions, sharing household chores, having children, sharing the same religious and political opinions, being from the same social background, good sexual understanding, respecting each other, showing understanding and tolerance (the first five items mentioned are still in place). The high level of importance recorded for fidelity in all waves is very indicative of the idealization of the couple, especially among young people.

The second battery concerns qualities to be encouraged in children, asking respondents to choose five from a list of 17. Today 11 have been kept: good manners, independence, application to work, sense of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for others, thrift, determination and perseverance, religious faith, generosity, obedience. More traditional items have been abandoned. This question makes it possible, as with work, to distinguish between expectations that are more centred on conformist values and others that aim to promote individual autonomy.

As with the family, the section on politics includes questions frequently asked in electoral surveys, but also others that are more innovative. One of them, typical of EVS and WVS, concerns the measurement of materialist or post-materialist values, with the double question created by Ronald Inglehart (1977) in the Eurobarometers on a country's long-term objectives: should one give priority to maintaining order, combating price rises, increasing citizen participation in decision-making or freedom of expression? This index, often criticized (Flanagan, 1987), can be used in various forms and makes it possible to identify major trends in values. It has therefore been maintained.

One question concerns the "protest potential" of individuals. Six protest behaviours are taken into account: petition, boycott, lawful demonstration, unofficial strikes, occupying workplaces, material damage, physical violence. The measure, taken up from Barnes and Kaase (1979), counts whether the re-

spondent has done, might do or would never do. Although somewhat reduced, the question still exists.

Also innovative is a long question on confidence in institutions: church, armed forces, education system, press, labour unions, police, administration, parliament, major companies. The list has been lengthened over the waves. At a time when a crisis of political confidence seems to be worsening, it is very important to have reliable figures on the evolution of this confidence over the last 40 years. And the battery also makes it possible to prioritize trust according to the types of institutions.

Another battery looks at behaviours that the respondent feels as justified or not (in 10 positions). Although the list has been slightly modified, the following behaviours are still included in the questionnaire: claiming state benefits illegally, avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating on tax, taking drugs, accepting a bribe, homosexuality, abortion, divorce, prostitution, euthanasia, and suicide. The results show the rise of liberalism of morals and, on the contrary, the maintenance of rigorist values for the public space.

#### **7.4 Entering the 1990s**

From the 1990 wave, rather profound changes occurred in the piloting of the survey, in connection with deaths or withdrawals within the original founding group. The influence of Catholic circles weakened to the benefit of academics. The survey extended to Eastern Europe, which was in the process of emerging from communist influence.

The questionnaire begins with a question on the areas of life considered important: work, family, friends and relationships, leisure, politics, religion. It is a very good starting question, still in existence, with very stable results, allowing a sort of ranking of the main areas of life.

New questions appeared on the causes of poverty, on the commitment against pollution, on national preference in employment, on equality between men

and women in hiring or in the family, on European construction and the risk of losing national identities (question taken from Eurobarometers). All these new questions are closely linked to themes that are developing in the public debate in many European countries.

A new dimension, the evaluation of the economic opinions and values, is introduced with seven Osgood scales in 10 positions to measure judgments in economic matters: Should incomes be made more equal or individual effort more supported? Should private or government ownership of business and industries be increased? Is providing for one's needs an individual or a state responsibility? Should the unemployed have to take any job available in order to keep their unemployment benefits or have they the right to refuse it? Is competition good or dangerous? Is hard work brought a better life or is success more a matter of luck and connections? Does wealth come at the expense of others or is it good for everyone? If the last two alternatives have been removed, the others are still present to measure the economic values of Europeans.

The section on religion has been fairly significantly reworked. The list of the Bible's Ten commandments (including worshipping the Lord, not take the name of the Lord/God in vain, celebrating His weekly feast, honouring father and mother, not killing, not committing adultery, not stealing, not bear false witness against one's neighbour, not coveting one's wife and neighbour's belongings), for which the respondent had to say whether it still applies today, has fortunately been removed. It seemed particularly obsolete, since most Christians no longer refer to it.

A new battery on the meaning of life and death was introduced: does life have meaning because God exists, does it have no meaning, or would the meaning of life lie in an effort to make the best of it? Is death inevitable, is it natural, does death make sense only if God exists? Similarly, does pain only make sense if God exists? These questions give great importance to God in explaining meaning, with formulations worthy of a theologian: finding the meaning of death and suffering in the existence of God is not easy to understand for the average respondent...

New and interesting are a factual question about whether the respondent was raised religiously, a question about the importance of having a religious ceremony for birth, marriage and death, and a belief in the resurrection of the dead.

## 7.5 At the Dawn of a New Millennium

The 1999 questionnaire had been prepared at the European level by four thematic working groups (families and primary relationships, work, politics, religion and morals), which introduced a more participatory functioning than before. The future of the countries that emerged from the Soviet bloc was the strongest issue of this wave. Many wondered whether it was reasonable to integrate these countries into the European Union, fearing that their inhabitants did not share sufficiently democratic political values. It seems to have been fairly easy to find funding in the West with this type of questioning.

One question therefore concerns the evolution of democracy in the country: are we satisfied with it or not (four modalities)? Another question is about the system of government in the country: is it very bad or very good (ten positions)? And ten years earlier, how was the political system functioning: very badly or very well (ten positions)? This last question makes it possible to assess the possible rise of political pessimism and, in ex-communist countries, the existence of nostalgia for the old regime. These general questions are followed by four questions to find out which political systems are considered good or bad (four modalities): a strong man who does not have to deal with the parliament and the elections, experts who make the decisions, the army that rules, democracy. These questions, planned especially for Central and Eastern Europe, proved to be very useful everywhere. The results show the fragility of democratic values. Everyone is in favor of a democratic system but many also support other forms of regime. Only a large third of Europeans were “exclusive democrats” in 1999, with very wide variations between countries. The results are very similar two decades later.

Several new questions concern alternative religiosities: believing in telepathy,

owning a good luck charm, thinking that one can protect and help (in ten positions), consulting one’s horoscope and taking it into account in one’s life, sticking to a particular faith or experimenting with different religious traditions (in ten positions). This reveals a growing interest in the diversification and deregulation of the religious field.

## 7.6 The 2008 Questionnaire

The questionnaire for the 2008 wave was prepared by a “Theory group”. Several dimensions were developed, notably on immigration, which is increasingly at the centre of political issues. Several Osgood scales (in 10 positions) have been created: immigrants take/do not take people’s work, the culture of the country is threatened/not threatened by immigrants, they accentuate/do not accentuate crime problems, they are a burden/not a burden for the social security of the country, in the future, the number of immigrants will be a threat/not be a threat for the society, it is better that they keep/do not keep their customs and traditions. Two questions are also devoted to the number of immigrants in the country: are they too numerous or not? Do people sometimes feel themselves like a stranger in their own country due to the number of immigrants?

The forms of nationalism are also targeted, with one question, coming from the ISSP tradition, trying to measure what makes a good citizen of the country. Is it important to be born in the country, to have origins there, to respect the law, to speak the language, to have lived most of one’s life in the country.

New questions also concern Euroscepticism, through the measurement of fears about the European construction (scales in 10 positions): for social security, for national identity and culture, for the country’s expenses, for the power of the country, for employment. Another scale relates to the enlargement of Europe: should it continue, or has it gone too far?

The old questions about the environment have been replaced by a very interesting battery of ecological values, largely taken up from Riley Dunlap (2000). The respondent must agree or disagree with statements about overpopulation,

the disastrous consequences of not respecting nature, the belief in the genius of man to keep the earth livable, the idea that nature is solid to compensate for industrial damage, that man is made to dominate nature, that the world is at risk of a major ecological catastrophe. From this, a typology can be developed that makes it possible to identify an anthropocentric group, but above all the development of “ecocentrism” (Bozonnet, 2017).

The development of socio-demographic variables is important in 2008. In particular, very precise questions concern foreigners: their nationality, their year of arrival, with the same questions for the father, mother and spouse. The composition of the family and the itinerary of couples are also specified: having experienced divorce, or that of their parents or another family member; having experienced the death of a child, father or mother; at what age these events occurred. An interesting test was introduced to identify disadvantaged people: to have been unemployed for at least three months in the last five years and dependent on social assistance (same questions for the partner). The respondent’s situation at the age of 14 is analysed: was he living with both parents, one alone, neither? What was the father’s professional situation at the time? At the same age, did the mother enjoy reading books, talking politics with the respondent, following the news (same question for the father)? Did the parents have difficulty making ends meet and replacing broken things? This shows the weight of family socialization on values.

## 7.7 The Most Recent 2017 Wave

For the 2017 wave, the redesign of the questionnaire was very important for two reasons. The executive committee wanted to limit the length of the questionnaire to 50 minutes, which meant that a significant number of questions had to be dropped. In addition, a procedure for an agreement with the WVS survey also resulted in a modification of the questionnaire. Each of the two surveys integrated a number of questions from the other tradition, which meant that some questions had to be dropped.

The questions on work were greatly reduced. Thus the long battery on the meaning of work was reduced to six indicators (three rather quantitative, three rather qualitative). Questions asked only to people in paid employment were also removed: whether they are satisfied or not, what degree of freedom they have in their work. A question to know if workers must always follow instructions of their superiors or if they should only follow them when they are convinced that they are right was also removed.

The questions on religion have been significantly reduced. Admittedly, a significant corpus remains to measure membership, practices and beliefs. But the questions to count alternative religiosity to the great religions have been removed. The question about the degree of truth of religions has also been dropped (one true, many offer truths, none contain truths). This question made it possible, in particular, to distinguish between uncompromising and relativistic believers.

In comparison, the family domain, which was rather overabundant, was only modestly reduced. There were in fact deletions, but these were compensated by new questions, for example the battery of eight items to measure the roles of men and women in the family and society. The degree of agreement with the statement “Same-sex couples make as good parents as other couples” was also measured, an important addition in the context of the frequent legalization of same-sex marriage.

The political bloc experienced a fairly similar evolution. Numerous deletions have been replaced by WVS questions, especially on democracy. Thus, one question allows us to identify its essential characteristics through 9 definitions, some corresponding to representative democracy or respect for public liberties, others to an economic democracy, and still others corresponding more to features of authoritarian regimes. The following scales are used to measure expectations and disappointments regarding democracy: is it important to live in a democratically governed country? Is the country governed democratically? Is one satisfied with the functioning of the country’s political system? Eight WVS questions are also asked about the reliability of elections in the country. And three questions are introduced on the controls that the re-



spondents accept or refuse: using video surveillance in the public space, monitoring e-mails, collecting information on people without their knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

## 7.8 Epilogue

All in all, the challenge of analysing the change in the European system of values was taken up rather well, with along the time a fine adaptation of the questionnaire, for which Loek Halman was a tireless facilitator, skilfully navigating between his theoretical convictions and the necessary pragmatism of an international survey.

## List of References

- Barnes, S. H., Kaase M. (1979). *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Sage Publications.
- Belot C., Bréchon P., Gonthier F. (Eds.) (2021). Investigating forty years of French politics through the prism of value change, *French Politics*, Special issue 2-3.
- Bozonnet, J.-P. (2017). Ecocentrism in Europe. A Narrative for a Post-Industrial and Post-Religious Conception of Nature. In Bréchon P. and Gonthier F. (Eds.), *European Values. Trends and Divides Over Thirty Years*, (pp. 86-103), Brill.
- Bréchon P., Gonthier F. & Astor S. (Eds.) (2019). *La France des valeurs. Quarante ans d'évolutions*. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.
- Dunlap R. and al. (2000). Measuring Endorsement of the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revisited NEP Scale. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), 425-442.
- Flanagan, S. (1987). Value change in Industrial Societies, *American Political Science Review*, 81(4), 1301-1319.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press.
- Kropp, K. (2017). The Cases of the European Values Study and the European Social Survey: European Constellations of Social Science Knowledge Production. *Serendipities - Journal for the Sociology and History of the Social Sciences*, 2(1), 50-68.
- Rosenberg, M. (1956). Misanthropy and political ideology. *American Sociological Review*, 21(6), 690-695.

<sup>1</sup> The results of the last wave compared to the previous ones for France are analyzed in Bréchon (2019) and in Belot, Bréchon, Gonthier (2021).

# 8. DOES WITHIN-COUNTRY AGREEMENT ON BELIEFS MATTER FOR RANKING COUNTRIES ON VALUES DIMENSIONS?

EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY 2017

*John Gelissen*

## **Abstract**

*Values researchers commonly derive country-level measures of shared values constructs by aggregating scores on individual-level belief variables. However, different composition models may underlie this approach, and it remains to be seen whether consensus in beliefs between individuals from the same country is large enough to warrant aggregation. To examine these issues, I first outline a typology of composition models for specifying the functional relationship among constructs at different levels of analysis as developed by Chan (1998). Then, I show that statistical interrater agreement measures for a small selection of constructs in the 2017 wave of the European Values Study provide weak evidence for warranting aggregation of individual-level variables for deriving country-level constructs. I compare these results to the results from a response weighted mean aggregation method described by Van Bruggen et al. (2002) that incorporates the degree of agreement among respondents' responses into the calculation of the country-specific mean scores on the constructs. For three out of four constructs considered, the ranking of some countries on their position on the construct concerning changes considerably. However, the correlation between the unweighted and weighted country ranking is still high, which suggests that the position of countries can be estimated with sufficient reliability.*

## 8.1 Introduction

Loek Halman and I go way back when it comes to studying values in a cross-national context. We often discussed the workings, possibilities, and limitations of this multilevel analysis for cross-national values research, and – at times even more interesting – Loek’s enormous endeavours for making each new wave of the European Values Study (EVS) a success. From our discussions, one of the empirical issues in values research that intrigued Loek is the role of “heterogeneity” in beliefs within the context of cross-national research. Together with Veerle Draulans, he studied heterogeneity in beliefs as a country-level characteristic to be explained in a country-level analysis (Halman & Draulans, 2004). Their approach for operationally defining a central country-level construct in that contribution – as the within-country dispersion of scores – relates to the topic of current chapter: composing a group-level variable from individual-level data. However, rather than focusing on the dispersion of beliefs among inhabitants of a country, I focus on the probably more familiar and popular approach of composing contextual-level constructs from individual-level survey data by using the degree of within-group *agreement* of scores as a criterion for aggregation.

Aggregation of individual-level scores of people’s beliefs to regional and country-level plays an important descriptive role in values research, as it allows us to map the cultural diversity between populations of such higher-order units. In explanatory research, developing such group-level constructs may be of interest to values researchers because one may want to test whether a predictor has a differential effect at both levels of the hierarchy (Enders & Tofghi, 2007). Researchers commonly use the individual-level scores and the aggregated group scores (for country, region, or lower levels such as neighbourhoods) as predictors in the model. Including the predictor at multiple levels allows testing whether a predictor has a differential effect at the individual level (i.e., a composition effect) and the group level (i.e., a contextual effect). For example, Van Oorschot, Arts, and Halman (2005) included a measure of ethnocentrism both at individual and country-level as a predictor for informal solidarity. Oberwittler (2004) used a measure of violence tolerance as an individual and neighbourhood-level predictor of juvenile severe offending.

Even though the group-level predictor is an aggregate of the individual scores within each cluster, it is not necessarily true that both share the same meaning or measure the same construct (Firebaugh, 1978). Chan (1998) has argued that researchers who apply multilevel analysis should use explicit *composition models* ‘for the development and validation of constructs that specify the functional relationships among phenomena or constructs at different levels of analysis that reference essentially the same content but that are qualitatively different at different levels’ (Chan, 1998, p. 234). The idea of using composition models is that they force the researcher to precisely describe how constructs at different levels of analysis are functionally related to each other, with the benefits of conceptual precision and parsimony.

By its design, the EVS has brought forward over many decades an enormous number of descriptive and explanatory empirical studies in which aggregation of individual-level belief scores to the regional or country-level is a crucial operational procedure. These studies commonly specify a straightforward functional relationship between variables at the different levels of analysis, namely, as a simple unweighted sum or mean of the scores on the individual-level variable to represent the value on the regional or country-level variable. However, different composition models, each with their methodological requirements, may underlie this approach.

To clarify this, I will first outline a seminal typology of composition models for specifying the functional relationship among constructs at different levels of analysis as developed by Chan (1998). As we will see, conditional on the composition model used, one must examine levels of agreement within countries, and for a selection of constructs from the EVS 2017, I map the degree of within-country agreement. Then, I determine the country-specific means of these constructs using a method of estimation that explicitly incorporates the degree of agreement among citizens in these aggregated measures, and I compare these to the ‘standard’ unweighted country-mean approach. By comparing countries’ position on the agreement-unrelated measure to their position on the agreement-related measure, I determine whether accounting for the degree of agreement within countries changes the relative position of countries on the values constructs under consideration. Finally, I reflect on

the implications of the findings and usage of different composition models for empirical values research.

## 8.2 Values Research and Composition Models

Chan (1998) developed a typology of composition models that is concerned with multilevel research situations in which scores on a construct of some lower-level units (e.g., individuals) are used to generate a group-level construct that is of an aggregate or collective nature. Chan's (1998) typology distinguishes five ideal types of composition models: additive, direct consensus, referent-shift consensus, dispersion, and process composition. The additive and direct consensus model are most relevant for the current practice in which regional or country-level values constructs are developed for descriptive and explanatory values research.

When values researchers use an additive composition procedure, the meaning of a country-level construct is a summation of the individuals within a country regardless of the variance among these individuals. Importantly, in additive composition models, the variance of lower-level units is of no theoretical or operational concern for composing the individual level construct to the regional or country-level construct. In such an additive conceptualization, a values researcher assumes that all countries in the sample are characterized by a cultural climate that can be evaluated as low or high on various dimensions irrespective of the within-country individual agreement. Glick (1985, p. 605) discussed this issue for multilevel organizational research, and he pointed out that with an additive composition model approach, any within-group agreement is interpreted in terms of measurement accuracy reflecting individual-level random error and sources of bias. Consequently, values researchers average individual beliefs of citizens from different countries irrespective of the within-country variance to operationalize the country-level variable. The degree of association with other group-level constructs, using the correlation coefficient as a validity index, is used as empirical support for aggregating individual scores to the country level (see, for example, Kalmijn & Uunk, 2007; Hagenaars, Halman, & Moors, 2003). However, we have found no study in the

field of values research in which within-group agreement is used for additional evidence for the appropriateness of aggregation of individual-level data to regional or country level.

A somewhat similar model has been described by Bliese (2000), which he denotes as the pure compilation process model. In such models, individual-level responses are expected to vary within groups; however, when the data are aggregated, the aggregate variable is expected to measure some phenomenon not evident at the lower level. According to Bliese (2000), there is no theoretical need to establish agreement about the aggregated variable in such models. Consequently, when a researcher uses this model, an inspection of within-group agreement is also not used as empirical support for aggregating individual scores to the country level.

Chan's (1998) direct consensus model also uses aggregation of individual scores to the group as a typical operational procedure for establishing the group-level construct, but it is also different from the additive model in significant ways. First, whereas in the additive model variance among lower-level units is of no theoretical or operational concern, in the direct consensus model within-group agreement is considered a necessary condition for the construct validity of the group-level construct. Using this composition model demands that the researcher evaluates the values of within-group agreement indices developed in the methodological literature to establish empirical support for justifying aggregation of individual opinions and beliefs to represent scores on a country-level values construct.

Second, the fact that within-group agreement is explicitly required for aggregating individual scores to the group level has as a consequence that the meaning of the higher-level construct resides in the *consensus* among the lower-level units. Only when some cut-off level of agreement is reached on the agreement indices can the aggregation of individual responses be justified. Only then does the group-level construct represent some degree of 'sharedness' or 'consensus' among the lower-level units, which can be interpreted as a shared cultural climate characteristic. How countries included in the European Values Study perform in this respect for certain constructs is presented in the remainder of this contribution.

### 8.3 Data

To assess the degree of agreement among respondents' responses and the impact of ignoring this information on the estimation of the country means for values-orientations, I use data from the 2017 wave of the European Values Study, including 34 countries (see Table 8.1).

#### Measures

I use the following small capita selecta of constructs that are available in the 2017 EVS wave (see Hagedaars, Halman, & Moors, 2003):

*Personal sexual permissiveness* appears from the acceptability of 'homosexuality'; 'abortion'; 'divorce'; 'euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)'; 'suicide'; 'having casual sex' (1=never justified; 10= always justified).

*Self-interest permissiveness* refers to the acceptance of 'claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to'; 'cheating on tax if you have the chance'; 'lying in your own interest'; 'paying cash for services to avoid taxes' (1=never justified; 10= always justified).

*Confidence in legitimacy institutions* is indicated by the degree to which respondents have confidence in the education system, the press, trade unions, the police, parliament, civil service, the social security system, health care system, and the justice system, with response categories a great deal (=1), quite a lot (=2) not very much (=3) none at all (=4) confidence in these. The scoring of the items was reversed for ease of interpretation.

For measuring a *tolerance towards immigrants* construct, respondents were asked to what extent they would place their view on the following items: Immigrants take jobs away from [NATIONALITY] (1) - Immigrants do not take jobs away from [NATIONALITY] (10); Immigrants make crime problems worse (1) - Immigrants do not make crime problems worse (10); Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system (1) - Immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system (10); It is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions (1) - It is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions (10). The scoring of the last item was reversed.

### 8.4 Methods

#### Assessing Interrater Agreement

In the composition model of direct consensus, the conceptual definition of the higher-level construct resides in the consensus or sharedness of perceptions among lower-level units, and therefore it is necessary to assess within-group agreement to index consensus and justify aggregation (Chan, 1998: 236). Researchers have a multitude of different interrater agreement indices at their disposal, each with its benefits and drawbacks (O'Neill, 2017). Here, I report two indices:  $r_{wg(j)}$  (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) and  $a_{wg(j)}$  (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005).  $r_{wg(j)}$  is well-known and commonly used among researchers. A value of 1 indicates complete agreement, whereas a value of 0 indicates completely random responding. One drawback of this index is that it may not be directly comparable across different means of group ratings or the number of raters. Therefore, I also report  $a_{wg(j)}$  index values, which "estimates agreement as the proportion of observed agreement of the maximum disagreement possible given the observed mean rating" (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005, p. 174). A value of +1 indicates perfect agreement, given the group mean, a value of 0 indicates that the observed variance is 50 percent of the maximum variance, given the group mean, and a value of -1 indicates maximum disagreement, given the group mean. Compared to  $r_{wg(j)}$ ,  $a_{wg(j)}$  overcomes problems of sample size dependency, scale dependency, and dependence on a specific underlying null distribution (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005).

#### Response Data Aggregation

To compare the impact of the degree of agreement within populations on the estimate of the country mean scores, I apply two aggregation methods. For both the additive and the direct-consensus model (Chan, 1998), a standard approach for determining a country's position on a particular value orientation is by first averaging scores to thematically related questions in a single index score for each respondent in a sample and then averaging the individual-level index scores to yield country-level means (Welzel, Brunkert, Kruse, & Inglehart, 2021). Following Van Bruggen, Lilien, and Kacker (2002), the *unweighted*

arithmetic mean of the individual responses of group members for a variable X of group i equals

$$\text{UNWMEAN}_{xi} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n X_{ij}}{n_i}$$

with  $X_{ij}$  being the response for the value of variable X by respondent j in group i, and  $n_i$  being the number of respondents in group i. Wagner, Rau, and Lindemann (2010) point out that this method of aggregation presumes that all respondents are equally knowledgeable. Consequently, the method attaches the same weight to the responses of all respondents.

However, it may be that the true value is closer to the responses provided by agreeing respondents than to that of deviating respondents and that the response of the deviating respondents contains a larger systematic error component (Van Bruggen et al., 2002). To account for the fact that the degree of agreement among respondents' responses contains information that is important to include in an aggregate measure, Van Bruggen et al. (2002) developed an alternative aggregation method – the *response data-based weighted mean* –, which I also apply below. To compute the appropriate weights, this method first calculates the absolute distance of respondent's j's response on variable X from the unweighted mean of all responses of group I to which respondent j belongs.

$$\text{DIST}_{xij} = |X_{ij} - \text{UNWMEAN}_{xi}|$$

Then, a weight for each respondent's response is calculated:

$$\text{WEIGHT}_{xij} = \left[ \frac{\left( \sum_{j=1}^n \text{DIST}_{xij} \right)^{\alpha}}{\text{DIST}_{xij}} \right]$$

The weight of a response is inversely related to the absolute deviation of a response from the unweighted mean relative to the sum of the absolute devia-

tions of all respondents responses. The formula also contains a parameter  $\alpha$  that corrects the effect of systematic error in the respondents' responses. As  $\alpha$  approaches 1, less weight is attached to responses that are farther away from the unweighted mean (i.e., the responses from respondents whose scores are expected to contain substantial systematic error). If  $\alpha$  equals 0, the weight of all responses is identical, which results in the unweighted mean, and it is assumed that respondents' responses do not contain systematic error. Advanced procedures exist for estimating an optimal  $\alpha$  value (see Van Bruggen et al., 2002: 473-474 for details), but here I use a standard value  $\alpha = 1$  to compare the maximum difference between the unweighted (with  $\alpha = 0$ ) and weighted country means (with  $\alpha = 1$ ). Finally, the response data-based weighted mean is estimated as follows:

$$\text{WDMEAN}_{xi} = \sum_{j=1}^n \left[ \frac{\text{WEIGHT}_{xij}}{\left( \sum_{j=1}^n \text{WEIGHT}_{xij} \right)} \times X_{ij} \right]$$

Table 8.1 Unweighted Country Means and Response Data-Based Weighted Country Means, Interrater Agreement Statistics, and Rank-order (Correlations) for EVS 2017 Countries

Country	Personal-Sexual Permissiveness				Self-Interest Permissiveness				Confidence in Legitimacy Institutions				Tolerance towards immigrants			
	Unweighted	Rank	Weighted	Rank	Unweighted	Rank	Weighted	Rank	Unweighted	Rank	Weighted	Rank	Unweighted	Rank	Weighted	Rank
Albania	2.41	32	2.10	32	1.41	34	1.08	34	2.05	32	2.01	32	7.34	1	7.71	1
Armenia	2.33	33	2.02	33	2.95	5	2.70	4	2.25	28	2.21	27	5.97	3	5.98	3
Austria	5.75	12	5.80	12	1.96	15	1.73	14	2.71	6	2.72	6	4.36	29	4.26	30
Azerbaijan	2.49	31	2.31	31	2.42	8	2.18	8	2.78	3	2.85	2	5.76	5	5.79	5
Belarus	3.96	23	3.80	23	3.15	3	3.01	2	2.56	13	2.61	11	4.94	22	5.02	22
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.05	28	2.66	29	1.85	23	1.40	30	2.16	30	2.18	30	5.08	21	5.10	19
Bulgaria	3.68	25	3.51	25	1.63	32	1.26	33	2.01	33	2.01	32	4.17	31	4.04	32
Croatia	3.97	22	3.81	22	2.17	11	1.86	11	1.98	34	1.97	34	5.25	14	5.29	14
Czechia	5.64	14	5.68	14	2.24	9	2.07	9	2.28	25	2.28	23	3.36	34	3.20	34
Denmark	7.18	1	7.40	1	1.56	33	1.33	32	2.75	5	2.76	5	4.74	25	4.75	26
Estonia	4.49	17	4.36	17	1.93	17	1.69	16	2.62	9	2.64	9	4.68	27	4.65	27
Finland	6.27	8	6.38	8	1.86	22	1.63	20	2.83	2	2.83	3	5.25	14	5.28	15
France	6.33	6	6.44	6	2.48	7	2.25	7	2.57	12	2.59	13	5.48	10	5.45	10
Georgia	2.19	34	1.93	34	1.85	23	1.50	27	2.38	21	2.37	20	5.90	4	5.88	4
Germany	6.24	9	6.36	9	1.66	31	1.37	31	2.56	13	2.58	14	5.32	13	5.33	13
Great Britain	6.12	10	6.19	10	1.78	28	1.47	28	2.56	13	2.55	15	5.64	6	5.59	8
Hungary	4.45	18	4.35	18	1.96	15	1.73	14	2.33	22	2.33	22	3.70	33	3.54	33
Iceland	6.81	4	6.88	4	1.98	14	1.75	13	2.67	8	2.66	8	6.31	2	6.41	2
Italy	5.15	15	5.12	15	1.81	27	1.61	23	2.40	20	2.37	20	4.63	28	4.60	28
Lithuania	4.04	20	3.99	20	2.68	6	2.45	6	2.49	17	2.51	17	4.74	25	4.78	25
Montenegro	2.68	30	2.42	30	1.87	20	1.67	17	2.26	27	2.19	28	5.35	12	5.41	11
Netherlands	6.95	3	7.09	3	1.93	17	1.67	17	2.59	10	2.62	10	4.86	24	4.84	24
North Macedonia	3.41	27	3.07	27	1.87	20	1.51	26	2.21	29	2.19	28	5.50	9	5.46	9
Norway	6.67	5	6.83	5	1.83	26	1.61	23	2.90	1	2.91	1	5.18	16	5.16	16
Poland	3.80	24	3.57	24	1.75	30	1.45	29	2.30	23	2.27	25	5.10	19	5.08	20
Portugal	4.00	21	3.97	21	1.77	29	1.63	20	2.58	11	2.61	11	5.44	11	5.39	12
Romania	2.96	29	2.68	28	2.11	12	1.64	19	2.28	25	2.25	26	5.09	20	5.14	17
Russia	4.19	19	4.07	19	3.71	1	3.53	1	2.47	18	2.49	18	4.29	30	4.27	29

Serbia	3.55	26	3.35	26	2.20	10	1.89	10		2.07	31	2.05	31	4.88	23	4.89	23
Slovakia	4.84	16	4.89	16	2.99	4	2.70	4		2.45	19	2.46	19	4.14	32	4.08	31
Slovenia	5.66	13	5.70	13	1.91	19	1.63	20		2.29	24	2.28	23	5.14	18	5.08	20
Spain	6.04	11	6.06	11	3.24	2	2.90	3		2.53	16	2.54	16	5.59	8	5.64	6
Sweden	7.03	2	7.24	2	1.85	23	1.58	25		2.76	4	2.81	4	5.62	7	5.64	6
Switzerland	6.29	7	6.39	7	1.99	13	1.81	12		2.68	7	2.72	6	5.17	17	5.13	18
Mean	5.14		5.11		2.41		2.15			2.49		2.49		5.00		4.98	
Number of categories	10				10					4				10			
Number of items	6				4					9				4			
Mean rwg(j)	0.314				0.796					0.901				0.334			
Range	0.866				0.934					0.142				0.678			
Mean awg(j)	0.030				0.126					0.429				0.216			
Range	0.529				0.501					0.401				0.670			
Kendall's Tau-b	0.996				0.886					0.973				0.961			



## 8.5 Results

Table 8.1 reports the findings from assessing the interrater agreement for the four constructs, and it maps the changes that occur in the ranking of countries when their position is estimated on each of the four constructs using unweighted country means and response data-based weighted country means, respectively. For self-interest permissiveness and confidence in legitimacy institutions mean  $r_{wg(j)}$  values across countries indicate a sufficient level of agreement (using the heuristic threshold of .70). However, except for confidence in legitimacy institutions, the findings also indicate a broad range in interrater agreement for the separate countries. The mean  $a_{wg(j)}$  estimates suggest for all four constructs unacceptable levels of agreement, with the  $a_{wg(j)}$  values being between the heuristic values of 0 and 0.59 (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005, p. 178). Finally, we also see for the  $a_{wg(j)}$  values a relatively broad range of estimates across all countries. In summary, an inspection of some critical interrater agreement statistics suggests only weak evidence for aggregating individual responses to represent country-level constructs.

Turning to the results concerning the comparison of unweighted and response data-based weighted country means on the four constructs, we see, first, that applying the weighting procedure has some – and occasionally, considerable – effects on the relative ranking of countries, and in particular for the constructs of self-interest permissiveness, confidence in legitimacy institutions, and tolerance towards immigrants. Kendall's Tau-b values for these constructs suggest that country rankings on self-interest permissiveness are affected by the weighting procedure (Tau-b = .886). We see, for example, that Bosnia and Herzegovina drops considerably from rank 23 (unweighted) to rank 30 (weighted), and Georgia drops from rank 23 (tied unweighted with Bosnia and Herzegovina) to rank 27. Also, North-Macedonia and Romania show considerable drops in ranking. For confidence in legitimacy institutions and tolerance towards immigrants, we observe changes in rankings of generally maximally two positions, albeit Romania promotes from position 20 (unweighted) to position 17 (weighted) on the tolerance towards immigrants construct. Only for the personal-sexual permissiveness construct, country rankings remain largely the same between both methods of aggregation (Tau-b = .996).

## 8.6 Discussion

In this contribution, I have shown that statistical interrater agreement measures for a small selection of constructs in the most recent wave of the EVS show weak evidence for warranting aggregation of individual-level for deriving country-level constructs. I have also applied a response weighted mean aggregation method described by Van Bruggen et al. (2002) that incorporates the degree of agreement among respondents' responses into the calculation of the country-specific mean scores on the constructs. When comparing the results from the weighted approach to the unweighted approach, I found that for three out of four constructs considered, the ranking of some countries on their position on the construct concerning changed considerably. However, despite this, I also found that the correlation between the unweighted rank and the weighted rank was still high, which suggests that countries' position can be estimated with sufficient reliability.

Of course, my simple descriptive analysis raises more fundamental questions about the explanation and methodological implications of the findings that need to be addressed in future research. For example, the low interrater reliability for the constructs may result from the wording of the survey items that indicate the construct: items with a group (here: country) referent may be better able to capture country-level constructs (Klein, Conn, Smith, & Sorra, 2001). Also, in my analysis, I have not compared the accuracy of both estimation methods. Finally, I have assumed that the constructs' measures are invariant across countries and not systematically biased, a psychometric property that should be tested (although the latter has recently been disputed, see Welzel et al. (2021)).

A key question is whether a high-within group agreement is necessary for aggregation in multilevel research. LeBreton and Senter (2008) advance that the researcher's research question and composition model should be guiding. In particular, they point out that agreement measures do not play a role in the aggregation process in the additive composition model or the pure compilation process model. On the other hand, in a composition model such as the direct consensus model, it is assumed that aggregated variables are to be essentially

identical – isomorphic – to lower-level constructs in form and function (Bliese, 2000). In the latter case, the evaluation of agreement measures, assessment of the construct validity, and systematic measurement error are crucial for the empirical analysis. The response data-based weighted mean approach may be necessary for estimating more accurate country means. Thus, an essential task for values researchers who intend to measure collective beliefs as contextual characteristics inferred from individual beliefs lies first with considering the type of composition model appropriate for their research. The EVS then provides us with invaluable data for testing hypotheses about the effects of aggregated variables that may show little agreement among citizens of countries. The researcher may have solid theoretical reasons that warrant aggregation anyway.

## List of References

- Bliese, P. D. (2000). Within-Group Agreement, Non-Independence, and Reliability: Implications for Data Aggregation and Analysis. In K. J. Klein and S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), *Multilevel theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions* (pp. 349–381). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Brown, R. D., & Hauenstein, N. M. A. (2005). Interrater Agreement Reconsidered: An Alternative to the rwg Indices. *Organizational Research Methods*, 8(2), 165-184.
- Chan, D. (1998). Functional Relations Among Constructs in the Same Content Domain at Different Levels of Analysis: A Typology of Composition Models. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83(2), 234-246.
- Enders, C. K., & Tofighi, D. (2007). Centering Predictor Variables in Cross-Sectional Multilevel Models: A New Look at an Old Issue. *Psychological methods*, 12(2), 121-138.
- Firebaugh, G. (1978). A Rule for Inferring Individual-level Relationships from Aggregate Data. *American Sociological Review*, 557-572.
- Glick, W. H. (1985). Conceptualizing and Measuring Organizational and Psychological Climate: Pitfalls in Multilevel Research. *Academy of Management Review*, 10(3), 601-616.
- Hagenaars, J. A. P., Halman, L. C. J. M., & Moors, G. B. D. (2003). Exploring Europe's Basic Values Map. In: *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study* (pp. 23-58). Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L. C. J. M., & Draulans, V. J. R. (2004). Religious Beliefs and Practices in Contemporary Europe. In W. A. Arts, & L. C. J. M. Halman (Eds.), *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium* (pp. 283-316). Leiden: Brill.
- James, L. R., Demaree, R. G., & Wolf, G. (1984). Estimating Within-group Interrater Reliability with and without Response Bias. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 69(1), 85-98.
- Kalmijn, M., & Uunk, W. (2007). Regional Value Differences in Europe and the Social Consequences of Divorce: A Test of the Stigmatization Hypothesis. *Social Science Research*, 36(2), 447-468.
- Klein, K. J., Conn, A. B., Smith, D. B., & Sorra, J. S. (2001). Is Everyone in Agreement? An Exploration of Within-group Agreement in Employee Perceptions of the Work Environment. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 86(1), 3-16.
- LeBreton, J. M., & Senter, J. L. (2008). Answers to 20 Questions about Interrater Reliability and Interrater Agreement. *Organizational Research Methods*, 11(4), 815-852.
- Moor, R. A., de (Ed.). (1995). *Values in Western Societies* (Vol. 2). Leiden: Brill.
- Van Oorschot, W., Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2005). Welfare State Effects on Social Capital and Informal Solidarity in the European Union: Evidence from the 1999/2000 European Values Study. *Policy & Politics*, 33(1), 33-54.
- Oberwittler D. (2004) A Multilevel Analysis of Neighbourhood Contextual Effects on Serious Juvenile Offending: The Role of Subcultural Values and Social Disorganization. *European Journal of Criminology*. 1(2):201-235.
- O'Neill, T. A. (2017). An Overview of Interrater Agreement on Likert Scales for Researchers and Practitioners. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8(777).
- Van Bruggen, G. H., Lilien, G. L., & Kacker, M. (2002). Informants in Organizational Marketing Research: Why Use Multiple Informants and how to Aggregate Responses. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 39(4), 469-478.
- Wagner, S. M., Rau, C., & Lindemann, E. (2010). Multiple Informant Methodology: A Critical Review and Recommendations. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 38(4), 582-618.
- Welzel, C., Brunkert, L., Kruse, S., & Inglehart, R. E. (2021). Non-invariance? An Overstated Problem With Misconceived Causes. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 0(0), 0049124121995521.



# 9. MODERNIZATION AND SECULARIZATION IN SPAIN:

EVIDENCE FROM VALUES SURVEYS

---

*María Silvestre Cabrera*

*Edurne Bartolomé Peral*

*Javier Elzo Imaz*

## **Abstract**

*Secularization is one of the most visible and widespread processes linked to modernization and subsequent value transformations in Europe across the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Spain is no exception to this relevant value shift and transformation. This chapter explores the process of secularization in Spain, showing, on the one hand, the evolution of various indicators of individual secularization, and, on the other hand, reflecting on which factors explain this process in Spain. For this purpose, we rely on EVS data catalogue for Spain from 1981 to 2017. Our main findings is that Spain has experienced a clear process of secularization during the last decades, although relevant differences can be found in terms of age, job status, post-materialism and political ideology.*

## 9.1 Introduction

As is well recognized in the existing literature and research, the systematic improvement in economic and material conditions, and the resulting massive access to education and health services, have consequences for citizens' value systems. In modern societies we observe a general process whereby external sources of authority, such as the Church, are substituted by more individualized options when it comes to establishing the orientation of citizens' values (Ester, Halman and De Moor, 1994). In this respect, Loek Halman has made an outstanding contribution to the explanation of the process of secularization in Europe, in relation to the process of modernization and connecting secularization with other processes such as morality (Halman and Van Ingen, 2015). Spain is no exception to this process; in fact, the country has been one of the most visible examples of the transition from a predominantly Catholic and religious society to a broadly secular one. This chapter presents the data for this evolution towards post-materialism and secularization, while also demonstrating which factors explain these positions around religion at different levels: individual, institutional and societal (Dobbelaere, 2012).

## 9.2 The Rise and Fall of the Theory of Secularization Understood as a Consequence of Modernity

In 1882, Friedrich Nietzsche published his work *The Gay Science*. In section 125 he wrote his oft-repeated affirmation, "We have killed him – you and I... God is dead!". A few lines down, he added: "There was never a greater deed – and whoever is born after us will on account of this deed belong to a higher history than all history up to now!" (Nietzsche, 2001:119-120).

In the year 2014, Peter L. Berger published a book in which he reflects on an anecdote about a bumper sticker: "I saw the following, of all places, just off Harvard Yard: 'Dear Mr. Nietzsche, You are dead. Yours very truly, God'. This comes rather close to the empirical reality of our age" (Berger, 2014:21).

Between these two assertions by Nietzsche (2001) and Berger (2014), the pro-

cess of secularization is carved out. During the 1960s the idea of the death of God, as extolled by Nietzsche (2001), returned with a vengeance in the sociology of religion. Its influence was enormous, especially in Europe; in many places, such as Spain, it continues today. Let us recall the following titles: *The Death of God* by Gabriel Vaharían (1961), *Honest to God* by John A.T. Robinson (1963), and *The Secular City* by Harvey Cox (1965), to name but a few.

Other authors followed, in the first place Protestant theologians or intellectuals who moved in left-wing academic circles, with particular reference to society and Christianity in the United States, where the eclipse of God was obvious (Knox, 1962) *Time* magazine opened its 8 April 1966 issue with the question, "Is God Dead?" Shortly afterwards the subject of the death of God arrived in Spain. In 1968 the philosopher Victoria Camps was the first in that country to publish a study on the theologians of the death of God (*Los teólogos de la muerte de Dios*). One year later appeared the Spanish translation of Jourdain Bishop's essay "Theologians of the Death of God" (Bishop, 1969).

Of what does the phenomenon of secularization consist of? Charles Taylor (2007), in his great work *A Secular Age* emphasizes the following features:

1. *The withdrawal of religion from the public sphere. This could involve two not necessarily simultaneous processes:*
  - a) *The privatization of religion. This thesis is very much supported in Spain, where secularism is understood to exclude religious practice.*
  - b) *The marginalization of religion, meaning religious considerations should not have any influence on public life and in public decision making.*
2. *The shrinking or decline of religious belief and practice.*
3. *A change in conditions of belief. This third aspect is linked to the formation of a humanist alternative, with an immanentist sign. Taylor (2007, p. 514) notes:*

*there is a ... powerful unthought operative: an outlook that holds that religion must decline either a) because it is false, and science shows this to be so; or b) because it is increasingly irrelevant now that we can cure ringworm by drenches; or c) because religion is based on authority, and modern societies give an increasingly important place to individual autonomy; or some combination of the above.*

The reading of religion as something that comes from “out there”, which injects itself into the self-determination and decisions of the individual, of each and every one of us, is intellectually unsustainable.

Peter Berger, one of the pioneers of the secularization thesis in the second half of the twentieth century, edited a collective work in 1999 in which he retracted a large part of his previous thesis. This is his central proposition of his novel findings in which he questions secularization (Berger, 1999, p. 2):

“the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today, with some exceptions is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken.”

Berger (1999, p. 203) continues:

“Although the term “secularization theory” refers to works from the 1950s and 1960s, the idea of the theory can indeed be traced to the Enlightenment. That idea is simple: modernization necessarily leads to a decline in religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals. And it is precisely this idea that has turned out to be wrong.”

In an extraordinary work, the German sociologist Hans Joas (2020, p. 243) argues that in the contemporary period “in the Social Sciences predominant thinking has moved away from the secularization thesis to a rejection of it. The question today is how to understand religion when it emerges in the post-secular age.

According to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2011 [2004], p. 4) various phenomena in the present day call into question religion’s death sentence. These range from the continued popularity of churchgoing in the United States to the emergence of New Age spirituality in Western Europe, the growth in fundamentalist movements and religious parties in the Muslim world, the evangelical revival sweeping through Latin America, and the upsurge of ethno-religious conflict in international affairs. This leads the authors to conclude that

the importance of religion and religiosity take on greater meaning in contexts of vulnerability, fragility and poverty (Norris and Inglehart, 2011 [2004]).

Wolfram Weisse (2016, p. 32) argues that in modern societies religion plays a new role: “change processes are taking place in different countries based on different contextual backgrounds, with different motives, actors and aims, but nevertheless in a way that similarly affects both religious pluralization and secularization.” And yet in spite of the process of secularization, we see that religion continues to be highly influential. This can be explained by the fact that different religions have differing impacts on the process of secularization. For example, studies reveal that “the religious tradition of countries appears to be relevant” (Voicu, 2012:336). Halman and Draulans (2004) also maintain that Catholicism has a strong impact on the maintenance of religious values.

A number of studies (Halman, 2015:4) have related the process of secularization to the rise of moral frameworks unconnected to the views of ecclesiastical institutions, to such an extent, for example, that Halman and Van Ingen (2015, p. 4) hypothesize that “a decline of church attendance at the country level is accompanied by a growing diversity of moral opinions (about homosexuality, euthanasia, abortion, and divorce) at the country level.”

However, research such as that by Emma T. Budde (2017, p. 58), which references the level of tolerance for abortion and euthanasia, indicates that “the larger the share of the population that adheres to a religion that strongly opposes the liberalization of such policies, the more restrictive the regulation.” This should not be interpreted to mean that the process of secularization involves greater moral polarization (Storm, 2013, p. 111; Finke and Adamczyk, 2008, p. 634). But it could be explained by the relationship which appears to be established between the process of secularization, individual autonomy and morality. In this sense, according to Ingrid Storm (2013, p. 111), “religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s.” In Storm’s view, the influence of religion on moral standards diminishes where the process of secularization is greatest.

Relevant social processes that are also related to the process of secularization in the studies of values are modernization and postmaterialism. Modernization theory (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) claims that a maintained and steady economic growth have as a consequence a systematic improvement in living conditions, massive access to education and healthcare, and rising life expectancy. These improvements allow for an unprecedented human development, shaping citizens' value structures as a consequence of better material conditions. This modernization, by the hand of economic prosperity and welfare state facilitated the conditions for more individualized value systems in relation with personal and social conditions and new psychological needs related to survival and social order. Individualization of value orientations and secularization would be, in this regard, direct consequences of the process of modernization

In this context, materialist and postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1977) are at the core of these value transformations. Inglehart's main hypothesis is that those generations that have not suffered conflicts such as Second World War or the economic grievances of the post-wars, and that have been socialized in abundance prioritize issues of an immaterial nature: orientations such as social and political participation, self-realization at work or creativity in the education of their children. The question is whether post-materialist values respond to the socialization process or to the age cohorts; the latter would imply the assumption that as we age our values tend to be more conservative and more materialistic. What has not been demonstrated is the dichotomy materialism vs postmaterialism overlaps with other related concepts such ideology (left vs right) since it is possible to establish materialism and postmaterialism on both sides of the ideological continuum (Silvestre, 1996).


### 9.3 Religious Values in Spain: Evolution from 1981-2017

Values studies, for their part, have defined and measured the process of secularization with reference to a threefold dimension: micro (individual), meso (institutional secularization) and macro (social). According to the literature (Dobbelaere, 2012; Pérez-Agote, 2014, p. 897), secularization occurs at these

three levels. At a personal level, individuals give less and less importance to religion and God in their lives. In the institutional realm, secularization translates into a fall in church membership and attendance. Finally, at a social level there is a decline in the value of religion and its leaders in society.

The process of secularization in Spain has taken place over a period of some decades. We have selected some of the variables that bring together the three levels of secularization (individual, institutional and societal) in order to observe its evolution between 1981 and 2017 (see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1 Evolution of religious values in Spain 1981-2017. Total percentages. EVS-Spain.



Source: Constructed by authors based on data from EVS for Spain 1981-2017. Deusto University [Please note that items in the graph appear as they appeared in the actual survey] 1981 (n= 2303), 1990 (n= 2637), 1999 (n= 1200), 2008 (n= 1500), 2017 (n= 1209)

Individual secularization was studied based on the importance given to religion in a person's life (this question was not asked in 1981). Here we observe the greatest decline between 1990 and 1999, when it went from being very important for 21.8 per cent of the population to being very important for 14.8 per cent almost a decade later. We have also taken into account religious identity, an identity that has lost strength over the past few decades. Whereas in 1981, 61.5 per cent of the population declared themselves to be religious people, this per-

centage fell to 34.3 in the last wave of the EVS in 2017. Once again, the greatest jump was between 1990 and 1999.

Institutional secularization was analysed based on weekly attendance at church. In this case, the most significant data come from the difference between attending mass on a weekly basis at the time of answering the question and attending mass once a week in childhood, at age 12. The differences here are very significant because in all the waves analysed there was a difference of more than 25 percentage points: 26.2 (1999), 30.6 (2008) and 25.7 (2017). In this case, we observe that church attendance declined progressively between 1981 and 2017 and, above all, we note how this behaviour has changed if we compare childhood to adult life in the present. The difference in the decrease between 2008 and 2017 is due precisely to the fact that when asked in 2017 about church attendance in childhood, it has decreased and, therefore, the difference also decreases. This data confirms Van Ingen's and Moor's (2011) conclusion that the greatest decline in religiosity is found in attendance at religious rituals and services.

Societal secularization is measured with reference to the trust the Church enjoys as an institution. We analysed the evolution of no trust in the Church and observed that in 1981 and 1990 those who declared no trust in the Church were a small minority. From 2008 until 2017, that is, during the contemporary period, this position was endorsed by more than a third of the population.

A descriptive analysis of the decline in religious values in Spain using data from the different waves of the European Values Study (EVS) leads us to conclude that in the case of individual and institutional secularization the change was produced above all in the 1990s, while societal secularization appears to have taken on more force in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Individual secularization shows the greatest oscillation in the data. On one hand, we've observed that religion has ceased to be important in the lives of a significant part of the Spanish population, though the starting point was not very high. On the other hand, we can see that in 2017 almost half the population (49.2 per cent) considered themselves to be religious. While it is true that this percentage has dropped 12.3 points since 1981, it still represents an important

part of Spanish society. Given the obvious levels of social and institutional secularization, we are led to conclude that the religiosity expressed by almost five out of ten people corresponds to a range of different, varied and complex ways of defining religion, or religious sentiment. This marks a move away from Catholicism as the majority and omnipresent religion during the forty years of the Franco dictatorship, from 1939 to 1978. As Weise argues, notwithstanding the process of secularization, religion continues to be important and conditions behaviour and moral frameworks. In this regard, secularization, religiosity and religious plurality coexist (Weise, 2016: 38).

According to Manuel Urrutia (2020), the second wave of EVS data collection, in 1990, enabled us to confirm empirically that in Spain, the process of political democratization was accompanied by an important process of secularization. In the words of Grace Davie (1999, p. 78): "The Spanish case is particularly instructive sociologically in that it is an artificially delayed and therefore speeded-up version of modernity, in which the competing tensions are unusually clear. What has taken a century in most parts of Europe has happened within a generation in Spain." The subsequent waves of the EVS, in 1999 and 2008, confirmed that Spain was going through an intense process of secularization which, since the turn of the century, appears to be to be gradually slowing down (Urrutia, 2020).

In Spain, the moral dilemmas have been subject to different and conflicting ideological debates, in which it has been shown that the proposals of the Catholic Church are taken on by political conservatives. The Spanish data from the fifth wave of the EVS show that religious values have declined and tolerance for homosexuality, euthanasia, abortion and divorce is among the highest in Europe (Silvestre, 2020).



#### 9.4 What Factors Explain Individual Levels of Religiosity in Spain?

Based on the three levels of secularization (personal, institutional, societal) mentioned above we have selected the dependent variables, measured at the individual level. First, in relation to the personal level of secularization, we have chosen the importance of God in people's lives as well as the importance of religion. Second, we include the frequency of attendance at religious ceremonies as the indicator of secularization at the institutional level. Finally, trust in the institution of the Church serves as the measurement of secularization at the societal level.

Table 9.1 shows the results of the regression analyses for the chosen dependent variables and which factors explain these levels of religiosity in society. The data used in this model are taken from the EVS for Spain in the years 2008 and 2017.

We can see that formal membership in a religious denomination is a very significant factor in terms of explaining the importance of God, religion and participation in religious services and trust in the Church, with a clearly positive effect. This indicator has been used in previous studies (Voicu, 2012, p. 338) as a predictor for religiosity. In addition, according to our results, there is a strong positive effect by age. Younger people tend to demonstrate significantly lower levels of religiosity, importance given to religion and trust in the Church, as is shown by the impacts. Contrary to our expectation, 2017 shows a positive effect parameter (that is, a greater level of religiosity compared to 2008). The composition of the Spanish population, with a progressive higher number of people in older cohorts, exhibiting higher levels of religiosity might be a factor explaining this effect.

In Spain, the impact of political ideology is also very strong, with a clear and significant positive effect, indicating that people who identify with the political right show a higher level of religiosity. The same holds for educational level, with an effect consistent with theories of modernization which show a relationship between cognitive mobilization and weakening traditional forms

of authority in the orientation of individuals' value systems. In the same way, and in accordance with this same relationship between modernization and secularization, we can observe that for two of our four dependent variables, post-materialist values are accompanied by higher levels of secularization. This association is significant with regard to the importance of the Church and the trust in ecclesiastical institutions.

There is also a clear relationship between higher salaries and a lower value placed on religion, though this is only significant in the case of the importance of God. Reinforcing this relationship, we can also see that being employed has a negative impact on the value placed on religion and the Church. According to Inglehart (1997), higher levels of cognitive mobilization and a personal situation of higher autonomy in terms of income and employment would tend to reflect the shift from external religious reference in personal decisions and religious practice towards a more individualized perspective towards religious values and morality. This relationship is significant in almost all models. We can thus observe that a higher level of personal and economic freedom is associated with a lower relevance of religion in people's lives.

Levels of personal welfare and life satisfaction, which measure the degree of satisfaction with people's life conditions, demonstrates a positive but weak effect, only significant in relation to the importance of God in a person's life.

As for the relationship with gender, we observe a significant regression coefficient in all models, demonstrating that in all that the Church and religion have a significantly lower relevance for men than for women.

Table 9.1 Regression models analysing secularization at the personal, institutional and societal levels in Spain

	Importance of God	Importance of religion	Frequency of attendance rel. service	Trust in the Church
	B	B	B	B
(Constant)	4.711	2.286	2.600	1.814
Belonging to a religious denomination	2.799***	0.644***	1.402***	0.682***
Gender (1=male)	-0.598***	-0.45***	-0.327***	-0.197***
Age Completed Studies	-0.023*	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003
Employed_dummy	-0.181	-0.178***	-0.282***	-0.158***
Post-materialism	-0.014	-0.121***	-0.041	-0.132***
Household net income. Deciles	-0.071***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.009
dummy_2017	0.258**	0.257***	0.432***	0.205***
Political view: left-right	0.293***	0.093***	0.192***	0.127***
Birth cohort - 10 years	-0.127***	-0.058***	-0.121***	-0.045***
	R2= .394	R2= .294	R2 = .322	R2 = .352
	N=2669	N=2707	N=2689	N=2676

Source: Constructed by authors based on data from EVS for Spain 2008-2017. University of Deusto

## 9.5 Discussion and Conclusions

Based on the analysis above, the case of Spain appears to confirm the thesis that the process of secularization does not mean the end of religion; secularization, modernization and religiosity coexist. Just as the literature suggests, the process of secularization is compatible with the demand for and maintenance of spirituality at the individual level.

As part of this process of individualization and the loss of a reference to institutionalized religion as an external source of authority, we observe a decline in the relevance of religious rituals, which translates in turn into a decline in the importance and frequency of attendance at religious services. This observation is particularly visible with reference to the contrast between present levels of church attendance and those at age 12.

If we look at the overall picture of secularization in Spain, we observe that the most secularized part of the population is that which is the most economically independent, with postmaterialist values and the highest levels of education, as well as being young, male and politically on the left. This picture of Spain concurs, therefore, with the image that runs through modernization theories of secularization, along with the thesis that the process of cognitive mobilization arises from a systematic improvement in material conditions. This in turn has the effect of a change in values towards post-materialism and self-expression, particularly visible in younger cohorts, away from external sources of formal authority such as the Church and religion and towards increased levels of individualization.

This secularization has relevant implications for our society. Secularization is accompanied by a growing moral tolerance and individualization of value orientations. In those groups and cohorts in which religion is less important and less present, there is greater moral tolerance. In contrast, those who are closer to religion and its dogma tend to be governed more by these and to be more morally strict. This is also linked to political ideology, as shown in our data.

## List of References

- Berger, Peter (2014) *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age*. Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Berger, Peter (2001) *Le réenchantement du monde*, Paris: Bayard.
- Berger, Peter, ed. (1999) *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Michigan: Eerdmans.
- Bishop, Jourdain (1969) *Los teólogos de la muerte de Dios*, Herder.

- Budde, Emma T., Xabier Fernández-i-Marín, Christoph Knill and Caroline Preidel (2018) “A matter of timing: the religious factor and morality polices”, *Wiley Governance*, 31, pp. 45-63.
- Davie, Grace (1999) “Europe: the exception that proves the rule?” in Peter L. Berger (ed.) *The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Michigan: Eerdmans, pp. 65-83.
- Dobbelaere, Karel (2002) *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels*. Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang.
- Elzo, Javier (2020) “El desierto religioso en Europa occidental”, *Sal terrae: Revista de teología pastoral*, 108 (1253), pp. 199-214.
- Elzo, Javier (2018) “La divinización de la Sociedad”, *Seminarios sobre los ministerios en la Iglesia*, 64 (224), pp. 83-114.
- Elzo, Javier (2016) “¿Un mundo postsecular? Miradas desde la sociología”, *Razón y fe: Revista hispanoamericana de cultura*, 274 (1416), pp. 229-242.
- Ester, Peter, Ruud De Moor and Loek Halman (1994) *The Individualizing Society*. Tiburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Finke, Roger and Amy Adamczyk (2008) “Cross-national moral beliefs: the influence of national religious context”, *Sociological Quarterly*, 49, pp. 617-652.
- Halman, Loek and Veerlee Draulans (2004) “Religious beliefs and practices in contemporary Europe” in Wil Arts and Loek Halman, eds., *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*. Boston, Leiden: Brill, pp. 283-316.
- Halman, Loek and Erik Van Ingen (2015) “Secularization and changing moral views European trends in church attendance and views on homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and euthanasia”, *European Sociological Review*, 31 (5), pp. 1-12.
- Halman, Loek and van Erik Ingen (2013) “Secularization and the sources of morality: religion and morality in contemporary Europe” in Joep De Hart, Paul Dekker and Loek Halman, eds., *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York and London: Springer, pp. 87-108.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton : Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton : Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Joas, Hans (2020) *Les pouvoirs du sacré*, Paris: Seuil.
- Knox, John (1962) *The Church and the Reality of Christ*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers.
- Nietzsche, Friederich (2001) *The Gay Science*. Bernard Williams, ed.; Josefine Nauckhoff, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart (2011) [2004] *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pérez-Agote, Alfonso (2014) “The notion of secularization: Drawing the boundaries of its contemporary scientific validity”, *Current Sociology*, 62(6), pp. 886-904.
- Silvestre, María (1996) “El grado de postmaterialismo [The level of postmaterialism]” in Javier Elzo (dir.) *Los valores en la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco y Navarra. Su evolución en los años 1990-1995*, Servicio Central de Publicaciones de Gobierno Vasco y Universidad de Deusto, pp. 257-292.
- Silvestre, María (coord.) (2020) *Valores en la era de la incertidumbre: individualismos y solidaridades. Quinta Encuesta Europea de Valores en su aplicación en España* [Values in the Age of Uncertainty: Individualisms and Solidarities. Fifth European Survey of Values in its application in Spain], Madrid: Libros de la Catarata.
- Storm, Ingrid (2016) “Morality in context: a multilevel analysis of the relationship between religion and values in Europe”, *Politics and Religion*, 9(1), pp. 111-138.
- Taylor, Charles (2007) *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Urrutia, Manuel (2020) “Valores y creencias religiosas de los españoles”, in María Silvestre, ed. *Valores en la era de la incertidumbre: individualismos y solidaridades. Quinta Encuesta Europea de Valores en su aplicación a España*. Madrid: Libros de la Catarata, pp. 113-132.
- Van Ingen, Erik and Nienke Moor (2011) “Explanations of changes in church attendance between 1970 and 2009”. Paper presented at European Values Conference, Tilburg.
- Voicu, Malina (2012) “Effect of nationalism on religiosity in 30 European Countries”, *European Sociological Review*, 28 (3), pp. 333-343.
- Weisse, Wolfram (2016) “Religious pluralization and secularization in Continental Europe, with focus on France and Germany”, *Society*, 53 (1), pp. 32-40.

# 10. SAINTS, SCHOLARS, SCEPTICS AND SECULARISTS:

THE CHANGING FAITH OF RELIGIOUS  
PRACTICE IN IRELAND, 1981-2020

---

*Michael J. Breen*

*Ross Macmillan*

## **Abstract**

*This study examines the issue of declining religiosity in Ireland as a gateway for thinking about broad processes of value change. Drawing on the data of the European Values Study, the European Social Survey, and the PERSOCOV study, it authors look at one simple facet of religion in Ireland, viz., the degree to which the adherents of the largest faith grouping, the Catholic church, attend religious services. The examination of religious practice has implications beyond the obvious: degradation or abandonment of communal religious practice on a wholesale basis has implications for society as a whole, believers and unbelievers alike. Drawing on the work of Loek Halman in particular, the study references the complex links between religious participation and value change. The study documents the decline of religious practice from 1981 to 2020, including the initial period of COVID-19 pandemic, showing how the resulting social restrictions impacted religious participation in Ireland. During the COVID-19 lockdown almost 90 percent of the population indicated that they participated in religious services less than monthly. Finally, the study looks at the implications for the church in Ireland as religious participation continues to decrease.*

## 10.1 Introduction

Of all the clichés about Irish history none has been more enduring, nor enjoyed such universal popularity, as the ‘Golden Age’ of early Irish culture. The ‘Island of Saints and Scholars’ which was a beacon for the rest of Europe when the continental countries languished in their ‘Dark Ages’, and whose missionary monks brought light to those darkened regions, has left an afterglow that persists to the present day (Ó Cróinín, 1995).

There is a tendency among religious apologists in Ireland to hark back to a time when Ireland was the land of saints and scholars. It is a term that originates in the monastic tradition of men dedicated to learning and piety, and whose knowledge was spread far and wide by pilgrims and travellers. In particular their computational skills were critical in the literature regarding the establishment of the date for Easter.

The Church at that time was wealthy, well-connected, and a source of education and erudition for, at least some, of the populace. But it was also a church that reflected to some degree the cultural *mores* of its own time. O’Corráin writes of the attitudes to abandoned children:

“*Expositi*, children rejected for many reasons—because they were the offspring of incest or adultery, because they were defective or otherwise unwanted ... were often dumped on the church, in Ireland as elsewhere. The Canon lawyers ruled “... a child abandoned to the church is its slave unless he is redeemed. Nor, if he be violent, shall his evil conduct stain the church if it corrected him as far as possible” (2013, p. 14).

The position of the church was maintained into modern times. Larkin, writing in 1975, described the failed attempts to limit the power of the Church in Ireland, because ‘the Church had so integrated itself psychologically, functionally, and historically into the Irish way of life that it became virtually at one with the nation’s identity (p. 123). But that was coming to an unexpected end.

The relationship between religious practice and moral outlooks is well documented in the European Values Study literature, including the work of Loek Halman. This research line is essentially arguing that increasing secularization is a precursor of increased liberalism in societies (cf., Cohen et al, 2006; Halman and Draulans, 2006; Philips, 2012; Voas et al, 2013; Feich and O’Connell, 2015; Halman and Van Ingen, 2015; Storm, 2016; Kanik, 2018; Shorrocks, 2018; Matuilic and Balabanic, 2019; Nikoderm and Zrinscak, 2019; Fuchs et al, 2020). As Halman and Van Ingen put it (2015), fundamental shifts in religious practice, such as diminishment of church attendance, are social indicators of potentially profound change.

Because religion provides a normative framework for opinions on moral issues, declining levels of religiosity may have far-reaching consequences for the moral order within societies. ... Knowing that Europeans are increasingly accepting of homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and euthanasia, it could be argued that this increased permissiveness in people’s moral attitudes is linked with the diminished role of churches in secularized societies where the churches’ strict moral codes are no longer self-evident to all (2015, p. 618).

## 10.2 The Irish Church Today

The dominant theme of religious influence in Republic of Ireland has been the Catholic voice, which held sway over much of health and education, but with a particularly strong influence on social and moral perspectives general. In the 1937 Irish Constitution, the role of the Catholic Church was specifically enshrined: “*The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.*” That special position, albeit never precisely defined, was removed from the Constitution in 1975. Since then, much in the Irish religious landscape has changed, in fact changed utterly (see Anderson, 2010; Breen, 2001,2002; 2003; Breen & Reynolds, 2011; Breen & Healy, 2014; Cassidy, 2002; Howlett, 2008; Inglis, 1998; Inglis & MacKeogh, 2012; Matte, 2011).

In reality, change has been ongoing in Ireland for decades. At the time of writing, the Church in Ireland has undergone great scrutiny of its stewardship of

children, in relation to the sexual abuse of children, the provision of education in religious run industrial schools for orphans, and more recently in the management of homes for unmarried mothers. None of these events have covered the ecclesial authorities in glory and all may be said to have a profound negative impact of the practice of faith among the Irish. The recent scandals which have engulfed the Catholic Church are not the cause of the religious transformation documented below, but they may well have served as catalytic agents for it. The Catholic Church in Ireland is in decline, perhaps inevitably. As Inglis put it in 1998 (p. 224):

“There is no doubt that the absolute religious power of the Catholic Church in Ireland is dying, if not already dead.”

The twenty years that have passed since then would give pause for thought as to whether such change is transitional or permanent, and it could be argued that Inglis’s prediction was somewhat premature. Inglis himself is unsure, prefacing the previous quote with the statement

“While there is definite evidence of the decline of the influence of the institutional Church in many fields of Irish social life, it would be wrong to think that Irish Catholicism is dying, especially when the Church still has such control in education...” (Inglis 1998: 224).

Given ambiguities, this chapter revisits the issue of religiosity in Ireland as a gateway for thinking about broad processes of value change. Drawing on the data of the European Values Study, among others, the authors look at one simple facet of religion in Ireland, viz., the degree to which the adherents of the largest faith grouping, the Catholic Church, attend religious services. The Code of Canon Law lays down the requirement: “On Sundays and other holy days of obligation, the faithful are obliged to participate in the Mass” (Can. 1247). The data document the relentless fall in religious practice over the last 40 years in Ireland, a fall which has been accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic.

### 10.3 The European Values Survey

Comparative social survey data provide an invaluable lens into the levels of conformity with this regulation over time. Ireland has participated in the European Values Study in its first four waves: 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008<sup>1</sup>, and in the European Social Survey since its inception in 2001. In this chapter, the data are used from both studies, and from one additional survey, the PER-SOCOV study, to cover a period of 40 years, from 1981 to 2020, and which cover the most significant changes in the practice of religious faith in Ireland.

There have been several scholarly pieces drawing on the initial waves of the EVS which are pertinent. Breen wrote in 2002 (p. 120):

“The data to hand suggest a variety of important social questions which cannot be answered from within the data alone. If religious and social values and attitudes are changing, as strongly suggested here and elsewhere, then what are the implications for Irish society? ... Is it incontrovertible that Ireland will be different in the future, that the social map will have very different contours, especially in relation to institutional religion? ... Or are we simply becoming a mature nation amongst the nations of Europe, whose value and belief systems will simply be more homogenous with our neighbours, who have not fallen apart at the seams?”

In the years that followed, other scholars started providing the outline of answers to these questions. Following a five-country analysis of three waves of the EVS, Williams *et al* (2009, p. 181) concluded that

“it is reasonable to hypothesise that those who dissociate themselves from religious affiliation and religious practice are less likely to feel influenced by religious teaching. (I)t is reasonable to hypothesise that those who live outside conventional (married) family structures may wish to distance themselves from religious communities”

<sup>1</sup> Ireland did not take part in the 5<sup>th</sup> wave of the EVS due to funding difficulties.

The examination of religious practice, therefore, has implications beyond the obvious: degradation or abandonment of communal religious practice on a wholesale basis has implications for society as a whole, believers and unbelievers alike. This is increasingly evident in Ireland in respect of education and certain aspects of social care as many of these functions in Ireland involve the Catholic Church. Anderson (2010, p. 37) puts it thus

“Irish society has undergone massive social, political and economic changes since the 1960s. The institution that has perhaps suffered the most from these is the Catholic Church, which has lost its virtually exclusive power to control the minds, bodies and hearts of Irish people. The Church is now only one of many influential institutions and has to compete for an audience in all the major social fields, such as education, the media, health and politics.”


In the remainder of this chapter, we look briefly at some of the religious practice data, on the basis that establishing a convincing picture of religious practice change over a sustained period, it is all but inevitable that the changes to which Halman and others have alluded necessarily follow. A focus on religious participation is fitting given Halman’s own contributions (see De Hart, Dekker, and Halman 2013; Halman and Draulans 2006; Halman and Riis 2003). With specific attention to issues secularization and how one might best measure and model secular trends, Halman pointed to important, albeit complex links between religious participation and value change across European countries.

#### 10.4 Empirical Snapshots

One commonly used indicator of the strength of church belonging is the frequency of participation in religious services. Figure 10.1 captures this with comparative cohort analysis for two periods, 1981 and 2018. The thirty year span is important in capturing the precise period where the social influence of the Catholic Church was in decline. It also looks at pre-covid data. In 1981, the vast majority of the population reported attending church weekly with only small percentages attending monthly or less often. Equally important, cohort variation was relatively small. For all age groups, between 88 percent and 96

percent attended on a weekly basis. Fast forward 35 years, the modal practice is to attend church less than monthly and there is a clear cohort gradient. For the youngest people in the sample, approximately 12.5% attend church weekly and this increases to 64.3% for those in the oldest cohort. Simultaneously, 75% of the youngest group attend church less than once a month and this decreases to 27.6% for those in the oldest cohort. Such patterning echoes Ryder’s (1965) seminal description of cohorts as vehicles for social change.

Figure 10.1 Comparative data for Church practice, by age cohort, 1981 and 2018




Source: EVS and ESS

While the story of declines in religious participation are not entirely surprising, the months from January 2020 through to Spring of 2021 provide a further arena for study. Here, the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting social restrictions raised or renewed questions about religion and religious participation in people’s lives. From one perspective, participation became more difficult and more complicated with the majority of services moving online. From the standpoint of technological competence, one might expect that religious par-

ticipation would fall even further given strong age gradients in competence and IT accessibility (Peacock and Kunemund 2007) and religious participation. From another perspective, theoretical work extending back to Durkheim has postulated that people turn to religion in “times of trouble” as both a coping mechanism and a response to stress (Pargament and Park 1995). Importantly, both perspectives can operate simultaneously and hence produce a complicated account of religious participation in the contemporary period. Figure 10.2 explores such questions below with the ESS and EVS augmented with data from a unique nationally representative sample from Ireland collected for the period of the first major lockdown in spring of 2020, the PERSOSOV data.

Figure 10.2 Church practice, 35 or under, 1981-2020



Source: EVS, ESS, & PERSOCOV

Although evidence of declines in participation were clear in the ESS and EVS data, there is a clear spike during the COVID-19 lockdown with almost 90 per cent indicating that they participated in religious services less than monthly. In fact, when we examine the data in detail, it is worth noting that over the

last 20+ years, the middle ground – those who go at to church monthly – has been steadily decreasing. From about 20% of the population in 1999 and 2008, this group decreased to left than half of that amount in 2018 to under 8% and during covid to less than 4%. When we look at the PERSOCOV data, it transpires that of the 18–25-year-olds 2.2% attend weekly, while 96.7% attend less often than monthly; of the 26–35-year-olds the corresponding figures are 11.7% and 91.5%; and for the 36–45-year-olds the corresponding figures are 11.7% and 89.5%. Even in the oldest age group, the over 65s, only 17.7% attend weekly while 76.5% attend less than monthly. The decline in the youngest age groups is all the more remarkable when their likely higher versatility with the digital world is taken into account – those most digitally able were the least likely to vail of the virtual outreach by the Church.

### 10.5 Rethinking Religion and Values

On the basis of the data reported above, there is little doubt but that there is an ongoing seismic shift in traditional levels of church attendance, and by extension, a concomitant shift in values. But its implications for values and value change may be more complicated. Ganiel (2019) posits the notion of a post-Catholic Ireland that has resonances with Habermas ‘post-secular’ Europe. She writes (2019, p. 472)

“Habermas asserts that the post-secular is characterised by a shift in consciousness in the way Europeans think about the public role of religion. It is not that Europe was once secular and now it is not; rather, Europeans have recognised that religion is not going away, and will continue to influence society and politics. In post-Catholic Ireland, Catholicism is important but no longer monopolises the religious market.”

Her study focused on people committed to religion: she found people searching for faith expression were often characterised by a regard of “the ‘institutional’ church as a dry and lifeless hierarchy”, which they ignored in favour of keeping their faith alive outside of the church context. She defines this as ‘extra-institutional religion’ as a way of describes the practice of some people



who are committed to their religion, and will use the sacramental life of the church to some degree but for whom their religious practice is very different to past experience.

Ganiel's argument is very convincing: if she is correct, then in fact there may be very little comfort for the hierarchy even in the number of people who attend church regularly. It may well be the case, as she suggests, that extra-institutional religion is a more accurate description of how some people approach their faith practice 'outside or in addition to historic state churches', an approach that balances two 'structural strengths: its position on the margins, and its continued links with institutional religion' (p. 481).

In the PERSOCOV study we asked respondents if they regarded themselves as a religious person, not a religious person, or an atheist. Modal participation for all groups is never attending church services indicating that even those who identify as religious people forgo church services. It suggests that something important may be missed by using participation to capture religiosity or the meaning of religion in contemporary society.

The second important feature is the opposite phenomenon. Significant numbers of people who *do not identify as religious* still participate in religious services. About one and a half percent do so daily. This increases to 4.4 and 3.1 percent for weekly and monthly attendance, respectively. Another 23 percent attend at least once a year or on special occasions. Again, such behaviour highlights two things. First, formal religion is clearly serving some purpose for people, regardless of their personal identity as a religious person. Second, we clearly miss something when not incorporating identity and values in our accounting of religion in contemporary society.

A second lens on religion in contemporary society focuses on the relationship between religious identity and value differentiation. In the PERSOCOV data we focused on differentiation with respect to the various items in the Schwartz value scale (Schwartz and Bilsky 1990). In summary, people who see themselves as religious people are more traditional, favour being well-behaved and obedient, are more oriented towards equality (but only in comparison to those who

do not see themselves as religious people), value safety and respect, think it is important to do good in the world and be helpful, and think it is important to showcase abilities (at least in relation to atheists).

Obviously, there are also values where there is no differentiation by religious identity and this includes diversity, modesty, hedonism, successfulness, loyalty, creativity, the importance of wealth, and novelty. But as Schwartz has repeatedly noted, values are not a zero-sum game and evidence of the social sources of values differentiation of any type can tell us important things about the institutional make up of a society and the key social dynamics at work. In our case, they show the continued relevance of religion for how people see themselves, how people see society, and how people see the connection between the two.

## 10.6 Conclusions

Alternative evidence aside, it is abundantly clear that church attendance is heading in the direction of near-total collapse, given the degree to which current trends are cohort-related. Voas and Chaves (2018, p. 710), writing in the context of the United States put it thus

The intensely religious population may be declining more slowly than the more moderately religious population, but this is to be expected. Nominal members are the first to defect, doubters are the first to disbelieve, and occasional churchgoers are the first to stop attending; a committed core remains.

It is difficult to conclude anything other than an increasing level of decline for the Catholic Church. While it still maintains strong influences in hospitals, these are effectively run by independent lay trusts. In education, the other great bastion of church control, there is little evidence to suggest a strong focus on religiosity. In 2018 Heinz *et al*, based on an anonymous survey on Initial Teacher Education students from the primary sector, reported that One (32-35%) of Initial Teacher Education applicants rarely or never attend religious services and/or practice their religion, and that Catholic religious instruction received little support, even from Catholic ITE applicants.

In the Irish context, there is a need for ongoing research in undertaking a sophisticated analysis of values orientation, including religiosity. Such research would potentially be of immense benefit to the institutional church in providing a detailed breakdown of the multifaceted nature of religious belief in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, exploring in particular the phenomenon of belief without belonging.

The future will be very different. Any response from the institutional Church will need to take into account the likelihood of greatly diminished influence and the necessity to engage with a largely secular society, the majority of whom may not be hostile but may evidently simply be disinterested.

## List of References

- Andersen, K. (2010). Irish Secularization and Religious Identities: Evidence of an Emerging New Catholic Habitus. *Social Compass*, 57(1): 15-39.
- Breen M.J. and Healy, A. (2014) Secularization in Ireland: Analyzing the relationship between religiosity and demographic variables in Ireland from the European Social Survey 2002-2012. *The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society*, 3(4): 113-125.
- Breen, M.J. (2002). Different from their Elders & Betters: Age cohort differences in the Irish data of the EVS. In Cassidy, E. (ed.) *Measuring Ireland: Discerning values and beliefs*. Veritas: Dublin.
- Breen, M.J. (2003). Ask Me Another: An evaluation of issues arising from the European Values Survey in relation to questions concerning Technology & Transcendence. In Breen, M.J., Conway, E. and McMillan, B. (eds.) *Technology & Transcendence*. Columba Press: Dublin.
- Breen, M.J. (ed.) (2001). *A Fire in the Forest: Religious life in Ireland*. Veritas Publications: Dublin.
- Breen, M.J. and Reynolds, C. (2011). The Rise of Secularism and the Decline of Religiosity in Ireland. *The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society*, 1(2): 195-212.
- Cohen, J., et al. (2006). "European public acceptance of euthanasia: Socio-demographic and cultural factors associated with the acceptance of euthanasia in 33 European countries." *Social Science & Medicine* 63(3): 743-756.
- de Hart, J., Dekker, P., & Halman, L. C. J. M. (Eds.) (2013). *Religion and civil society in Europe*. Springer.
- Feich, P. O. and M. O'Connell (2015). "Changes in Roman Catholic Beliefs and Practices in Ireland between 1981 and 2008 and the Emergence of the Liberal Catholic." *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 30(2): 231-247.
- Fuchs, L. M., et al. (2020) Value Differences between Refugees and German Citizens: Insights from a Representative Survey. *International Migration* 55(9): 59-81.
- Ganiel, G. (2019). Religious practice in a post-Catholic Ireland: Towards a concept of 'extra-institutional religion'. *Social Compass* 66(4): 471-487.
- Halman, L. and V. Draulans (2006). "How secular is Europe?" *British Journal of Sociology* 57(2): 263-288.
- Halman, L., & Riis, O. (eds.). (2003). *Religion in a Secularizing Society: the Europeans' Religion at the End of the 20th Century*. Brill: Leiden.
- Halman, L. and Van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and Changing Moral Views: European Trends in Church Attendance and Views on Homosexuality, Divorce, Abortion, and Euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5): 616-627.
- Heinz, M., Davison, K. and Keane, T. (2018). 'I will do it but religion is a very personal thing': teacher education applicants' attitudes towards teaching religion in Ireland. *European Journal of Teacher Education*, 41(2): 232-245.
- Howlett, M. (2008) Searching for European Identity: Culture, Religion & the Irish Experience. In Breen, M.J. and Conway, E. (eds.) *Culture Technology & Values: Ethical Dimensions of European Identity*. Rothersthorpe: Paragon Publishing, pp. 25-34.
- Inglis, T (1998) *Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland*. 2nd ed. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.
- Inglis, T. and MacKeogh, C. (2012). The double bind: Women, honour and sexuality in contemporary Ireland, *Media Culture & Society*, 34(1): 68-82.
- Kanik, C. (2018). "Evaluation on European Turkish's religiosity- in the context of religiosity typology of Unver Gunay." *Bilimname* 35(1): 127-144.
- Larkin, E. (1095). *The Historical Dimensions of Irish Catholicism*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press.
- Matte, I. (2011). Economic boom and decline of religious practices in Ireland: when the Celtic Tiger devoured sense. *Social Compass*, 58(3): 302-308.
- Matulic, T. and I. Balabanic (2019). "SELECTED BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS IN THE CROATIAN SOCIETY ACCORDING TO RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY 2017." *Bogoslovska Smotra-Ephemerides Theologicae Zagrabenses* 89(2): 385-409.
- Nikodem, K. and S. Zrinscak (2019). "Between Distanced Church Religiosity and Intensive Personal Religiosity: Religious Changes in Croatian Society from 1999 to 2018." *Drustvena Istrazivanja* 28(3): 371-390.
- Ó Corráin, D. (2013). Island of saints and scholars: myth or reality? In Rafferty, O.P. (ed.) *Irish Catholic Identities*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 32-16.
- Ó Crónín, D. (1995). *Early Medieval Ireland 400-1200*. London: Routledge.
- Pargament, K.I. and Park, C.L. (1995). Merely a defense? The variety of religious means and ends. *Journal of Social Issues*, 51(2), 13-32.
- Peacock, S. E., and Künemund, H. (2007). Senior citizens and Internet echnology. *European Journal of*

*Ageing* 4(4): 191-200.

- Phillips, R. (2012). "Interventions against forced marriage: contesting hegemonic narratives and minority practices in Europe." *Gender Place and Culture* 19(1): 21-41.
- Ryder, N.B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review*, 30(6): 843-861.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: Extensions and cross-cultural replications. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 58(5), 878.
- Shorrocks, R. (2018). "Cohort Change in Political Gender Gaps in Europe and Canada: The Role of Modernization." *Politics & Society* 46(2): 135-175.
- Storm, I. (2016). "Morality in Context: A Multilevel Analysis of the Relationship between Religion and Values in Europe." *Politics and Religion* 9(1): 111-138.
- Voas, D., et al. (2013). "Modernization and the gender gap in religiosity: Evidence from cross-national European surveys." *Kolner Zeitschrift Fur Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie* 65: 259-283.
- Voas, D. and Chaves, M. (2018) Even Intense Religiosity Is Declining in the United States." *Sociological Science* 5: 694-710.
- Williams, E., Francis, L.J., and Village, A. (2009). Changing patterns of religious affiliation, church attendance and marriage across five areas of Europe since the early 1980s: Trends and associations. *Journal of Beliefs & Values - Studies in Religion & Education*, 30(2): 173-182.

# 11. THE TRANSMISSION OF RELIGIOUS VALUES

---

*David Voas*

*Ingrid Storm*

## **Abstract**

*With relatively few exceptions, adults are religious because faith was inculcated in childhood and adolescence. Religious socialization by parents can occur in a multitude of conscious and unconscious ways. The habits and ideas that children bring into adult life are shaped in a wider social context, however, so the environment also matters. In previous research, we found that both parental influence and national context are important in the religious socialization of children, but they are largely independent of each other. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that devout parents in secular societies pay particular attention to their children's religious upbringing seems plausible. If the culture does not reinforce their values, parents have to make some extra effort to defend the faith. We can test directly whether they do so, using data from the European Values Study. We find no evidence that people for whom religion is important in life feel a greater commitment, in absolute or even relative terms, to the religious socialization of children in the home if they live in a secular rather than a religious society. On the contrary, religious contexts seem to reinforce religious values and behavior, including the importance attached to raising children in the faith.*

## 11.1 Introduction

Values are basic convictions that are prior to, and help to organize, more particular attitudes, actions and moral judgments. The question of how and why values are changing is important because values determine what people care about. The extent to which those things include national identity, religion, ethnicity, gender equality, the environment, and so on has profound social and political effects. The concept of ‘value change’ – perhaps rivalled only by ‘globalization’ and ‘social capital’ – has captured the imagination of both social scientists and the general public.

In a volume edited by Arts and Halman several years ago, I argued that “Secularization remains the paradigm of value change” (Voas & Doebler, 2013, p. 249). In what follows we describe some recent work on the role of parents and the national environment in this process, including findings from the EVS. It is appropriate to offer this chapter as a tribute to Loek Halman, because religion and secularization have featured prominently in his scholarly contributions from the outset (see Halman et al., 1987).

## 11.2 Religious Socialization

Studies of age, period and cohort effects on religious involvement show that secularization is largely the result of generational replacement (Voas & Chaves, 2016). In most Western countries, each birth cohort is on average less religious than the one before. Religious identity, belief and practice typically persist over the adult life course. Some individuals do change, but within any given birth cohort these changes largely amount to self-cancelling noise (Voas & Crockett, 2005, Voas & Chaves, 2016). Generations are noteworthy for their aggregate stability.

The success or failure of religious socialization is the primary determinant of whether religion gains or loses strength (Storm & Voas, 2012). With relatively few exceptions, adults are religious because faith was inculcated in childhood and adolescence. Similarly, people raised without a religion tend to remain non-religious,

at least in secular societies. Religious transmission within families is far more important than any other factor in explaining variation in religiosity.

Religious socialization by parents can occur in a multitude of conscious and unconscious ways, including teaching and learning, participation and habit formation, modelling and imitation, and so on. The degree of parental influence is a contested issue, however. Nature and nurture within families only account for a portion of the variation in complex behavioral traits (Turkheimer, 2000, p. 160), and some studies suggest that the direct influence of parents’ religious behavior is rather small (Erickson, 1992, p. 149). The multiple forms of socialization often vary by religious tradition in their effects (Vaidyanathan, 2011).

In any event, even direct parental influence can be complicated. According to social learning theory, the extent to which religious and political values are transmitted to the next generation depends on the strength and consistency of the parents’ behavior (Jennings et al., 2009, p. 783). For example, parents are more likely to have churchgoing children if both attend rather than only one (Francis & Brown, 1991; Voas & Crockett, 2005; Voas & Storm, 2012). Moreover, agreement between the parents (Hoge et al., 1982; Myers, 1996) and consistency of beliefs and behaviors (Bader & Desmond, 2006) are important predictors of successful transmission of religious involvement. Divorce can disrupt religious socialization, though its impact depends on circumstances (Uecker & Ellison, 2012).

Parenting style may have effects on religious transmission that are difficult to predict. Some studies suggest that people who grow up with parents who combine support with strictness are more likely to be religious (Dudley & Wisbey, 2000; Myers, 1996). The warmth of the parent-child relationship has also been found to be associated with successful religious transmission (Bengtson, 2013). Individual autonomy is a strong value among young people, however, and “most U.S. teens are at least somewhat allergic to anything they view as *trying* to influence them” (Smith, 2005, p. 144). Dutch people who grew up being strictly monitored by their parents are less likely to attend church as adults (Vermeer et al., 2012). The influence of different kinds of parenting may depend

on the cultural context. Parents lay the groundwork for religious values and behavior, but if the social environment does not accept and support their religiosity, children are likely to reject it as they come of age.

In addition to direct effects, parents also influence religiosity via indirect pathways. Most of the effect of parents on adolescent religious attendance is arguably mediated through peer and educational influences (Erickson, 1992). Parents affect where the family lives, whom the children encounter, whom they trust, which schools they attend, and what media they consume (Erickson, 1992, p. 142; Jennings et al., 2009, p. 795). The environment is not under their control, but they can choose and regulate it to some extent.

Identity, beliefs and behavior do not derive from families alone, however. The habits and ideas that children bring into adult life are shaped in a wider social context. Young people interact with siblings, peer groups, popular culture, teachers and other adult authorities. These other sources of influence may help to solidify the religious values inculcated by parents, or they may do the reverse (Erickson, 1992, p. 140; Desmond et al., 2010).

While religious doctrines and rituals are often aimed at vertical transmission to a far greater extent than horizontal transmission (through conversion), not all religious parents undertake the task with diligence. Religious socialization in secular society can be onerous. It is not easy to control children's social environments, particularly once they begin to interact with others outside the parental home. Kelley and De Graaf (1997, p. 641) describe the difficulty facing devout parents in predominantly secular societies: "To ensure that their children acquire and retain orthodox religious beliefs, they need to control their children's social environment and restrict their choices of friends to those with compatible religious beliefs." Parents who are significantly more religious (or differently religious) than society at large need a dual commitment: not only to the faith, but to the importance of its transmission.

Moreover, many parents, regardless of religious preference, accept the 'modern' values of independence and self-determination. If children are allowed to make up their own minds, there is a limit to how much family pressure can be

applied to promote religious involvement. What characterizes late modernity is not only a move away from traditional and towards secular-rational values, but also a shift from survival-orientated towards self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Thus, value change creates a double handicap for religious socialization: religion loses prestige (Bruce, 2011), and at the same time parents become increasingly reluctant to impose their own beliefs and practices on their children.

While religious parents may have stricter parenting styles on average, it is not evident that in secular countries they are able to impose conservative morality to counter the influence of liberal self-expression values. Their traditionalism may be less intense than in other societies. Several studies have found a weaker relationship between individual religiosity and conservative morality in less religious countries (Finke & Adamczyk, 2008; Scheepers et al., 2002; Storm, 2016).

### 11.3 The Effect of the Environment

While religious parents generally raise religious children, the trends imply that parents' religiosity is not perfectly reproduced in their children. Other socializing influences such as peers, education and popular culture affect the religious involvement of young people, shaping their habits in adulthood. Indeed, belief and practice are most likely to be transmitted when they are taken for granted, that is to say, when children do not become aware that there are alternatives.

How much do parents matter, compared to the social context, in the religious socialization of young people? Does the influence of parents differ between countries, depending on the national levels of religiosity? And if it does vary, do parents devote more effort to transmitting their worldviews when the national culture is supportive, or when they wish to offset its influence?

A key issue is whether parents make more or less of an effort to transmit their religious beliefs and practices when people around them have similar views. One hypothesis is that religious parents work harder to instill religious com-

mitment in places where the social environment is relatively secular. An alternative hypothesis is that they feel less inclination to undertake religious socialization in such contexts – or if they do, they may be led into counter-productive strictness. Conversely, where religious involvement is recognized as having high value, parents feel encouraged to pass it on. The null hypothesis is that the parents’ and wider society’s levels of religiosity are both important, but their effects are independent of each other.

Kelley and De Graaf (1997) examined the relative influence of parents and the national context on religious beliefs in 15 historically Christian Western countries. They found that the national level of religiosity not only affects the effectiveness of intergenerational transmission of religiosity, but also the relative influence of parents. Their claim is that “in relatively secular nations, family religiosity strongly shapes children’s religious beliefs, while the influence of national religious context is small; in relatively religious nations family religiosity, although important, has less effect on children’s beliefs than does national context” (Kelley & De Graaf, 1997, p. 655). They explain the finding by arguing that religious parents in secular countries put extra effort into religious socialization to try to ensure that their children keep the faith.<sup>1</sup>

We re-examined the evidence and found that there does not in fact appear to be any substantial interaction between parental influence and national context (Voas & Storm, 2021). Both are important in the socialization of children, but they are largely independent of each other. To the extent that there is any national influence on religious transmission from parents to children, a more religious environment slightly increases rather than decreases the effect of parental religiosity.

<sup>1</sup> Other explanations are possible if the observation is correct: the religious might tend to be socially separated from the mainstream in secular societies, for example, in which case the effectiveness of religious socialization could be the result of separation rather than effort.

## 11.4 Additional Evidence on Religious Socialization

In Voas and Storm (2021), we looked at the outcomes of religious socialization to test the claim that parents make more difference in secular than in religious societies. Although we rejected that hypothesis, the proposed mechanism – that devout parents in secular societies pay particular attention to their children’s religious upbringing – seems plausible. If the culture does not reinforce their values, parents have to make some extra effort to defend the faith. We can test directly whether they do so.

In the European Values Study (EVS) 2008, respondents were asked which qualities children should be encouraged to learn at home. The key question reads “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.” The qualities are: good manners, independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for other people, thrift, saving money and things, determination, perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience.

Religious parents in secular societies will recognize that their children are unlikely to acquire faith unless they learn it at home. If Kelley and De Graaf (1997) are right, such parents might be expected to make this quality a particular priority, and more so than if they lived in a religious environment.


The EVS also has a question about the subjective importance of religion. Respondents were asked “Please say, for each of the following how important it is in your life...,” one of the items being “Religion.” The answer options were “Very Important,” “Quite important,” “Not important” and “Not at all important.”

We can calculate the percentage of people who think that religion is a key quality for children to learn at home as a function of the importance of religion in their own lives. The proportion of people who see religion as very important in their lives varies considerably across the continent – from 10 percent in Northern Europe to 37 percent in Southern Europe. In all regions, roughly half of the very religious regard faith as a key quality for children to acquire: somewhat

more in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe, and somewhat less in Northern Europe.

Figure 11.1 shows how the desire to make faith a priority in raising children varies across Europe.<sup>2</sup> As we would expect, religious people are more likely than the nonreligious to say that faith is important for children to learn at home, wherever they live. At every level of subjective religiosity, however, people in relatively religious regions are more committed to religious socialization in the home than residents of more secular countries. These regional differences are just as large among people for whom religion is important as among the more secular.

Figure 11.1 Religious faith is a key quality for children to acquire, by importance of religion and region



Source: EVS 2008. Weighted data; unweighted N=51,847.

<sup>2</sup> As an alternative to looking at regions, we conducted the same analysis with the 48 countries divided into quartiles based on national means on a religiosity scale. The results are essentially identical.

In summary, there is no evidence that people for whom religion is important in life feel a greater commitment, in absolute or even relative terms, to the religious socialization of children in the home if they live in a secular rather than a religious society. On the contrary, religious contexts seem to reinforce religious values and behavior, including the importance attached to raising children in the faith.

## 11.5 Conclusion

We found that parental and respondent religious involvement are not more strongly associated in secular than in religious countries. On the contrary, parents have very much the same influence on average across different societies. Religious parents in secular countries are less rather than more committed to the domestic religious socialization of their children, compared to their counterparts in religious countries.

Transmission from one generation to the next does not fail because parents cease to be religious. Religious socialization fails because of a general change in attitudes to both socialization and religion. Wanting children to make their own choices and regarding religion as a personal choice are attitudes that have become increasingly common in the West (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). This cultural shift may affect not only parenting styles and parental religiosity but also young people's reactions to these influences.

Even very religious people living in secular societies are influenced by value change in the wider culture. They are likely to accept at least in part the concern for personal freedom that is associated with secularization, even while maintaining their religious identity, beliefs and practice. Regarding religion as a personal preference not to be inflicted on others is an expression of a general respect for individual autonomy (Smith, 2005, p. 160). Moreover, religious exclusivism is now widely rejected in Western countries: 80 percent of respondents in the 2008 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) agree that all religions should be respected.



Parental efforts to offset contrary social influences may be found in some families, but they do not happen on a large enough scale to override contextual influences. The end result is that both parents and context matter to religious practice and belief, but the degree of parental influence is similar across Europe and beyond. The EVS has contributed greatly to our understanding of such phenomena, and Loek Halman deserves our thanks for leading the program and providing continuity with its founding principles.

## List of References

- Bader, C.D., & Desmond, S.A. (2006). Do as I say and as I do: The effects of consistent parental beliefs and behaviors upon religious transmission. *Sociology of Religion*, 67(3), 313–329.
- Bengtson, V. (2013). *Families and faith: How religion is passed down across generations*. Oxford University Press.
- Bruce, S. (2011). *Secularization: In defence of an unfashionable theory*. Oxford University Press.
- Desmond, S.A., Morgan, K.H., & Kikuchi, G. (2010). Religious development: How (and why) does religiosity change from adolescence to young adulthood? *Sociological Perspectives*, 53(2), 247–270.
- Dudley, R.L., & Wisbey, R.L. (2000). The relationship of parenting styles to commitment to the church among young adults. *Religious Education*, 95(1), 38–50.
- Erickson, J.A. (1992). Adolescent religious development and commitment: A structural equation model of the role of family, peer group, and educational influences. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 31(2), 131–152.
- Finke, R., & Adamczyk, A. (2008). Cross-national moral beliefs: The influence of national religious context. *Sociological Quarterly*, 49(4), 617–652.
- Francis, L.J., & Brown, L.B. (1991). The influence of home, church and school on prayer among sixteen-year-old adolescents in England. *Review of Religious Research*, 33(2), 112–122.
- Halman, L., Heunks, F., de Moor, R., & Zanders, H. (1987). *Traditie, Secularisatie en Individualisering: Een studie naar de waarden van de Nederlanders in een Europese context*. Tilburg University Press.
- Hoge, D.R., Petrillo, G.H., & Smith, E.I. (1982). Transmission of religious and social values from parents to teenage children. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 44(3), 569–580.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jennings, M.K., Stoker, L., & Bowers, J. (2009). Politics across generations: Family transmission reexamined. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(3), 782–799.
- Kelley, J., & De Graaf, N.D. (1997). National context, parental socialization, and religious belief: Results from 15 nations. *American Sociological Review*, 62(4), 639–659.
- Myers, S.M. (1996). An interactive model of religiosity inheritance: The importance of family context. *American Sociological Review*, 61(5), 858–866.
- Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.
- Scheepers, P., Te Grotenhuis, M., & Van Der Silk, F. (2002). Education, religiosity and moral attitudes: Explaining cross-national effect differences. *Sociology of Religion*, 63(2), 157–176.
- Smith, C. (2005). *Soul searching: The spiritual lives of American teenagers*. Oxford University Press.
- Storm, I. (2016). Morality in context: A multilevel analysis of the relationship between religion and values in Europe. *Politics and Religion*, 9(1), 111–138.
- Storm, I., & Voas, D. (2012). The intergenerational transmission of religious service attendance. *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society*, 25(2), 131–150.
- Turkheimer, E. (2000). Three laws of behavior genetics and what they mean. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 9(5), 160–164.
- Uecker, J.E., & Ellison, C.G. (2012). Parental divorce, parental religious characteristics, and religious outcomes in adulthood. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 51(4), 777–794.
- Vaidyanathan, B. (2011). Religious resources or differential returns? Early religious socialization and declining attendance in emerging adulthood. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 50(2), 366–387.
- Vermeer, P., Janssen, J., & Scheepers, P. (2012). Authoritative parenting and the transmission of religion in the Netherlands: A panel study. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 22(1), 42–59.
- Voas, D., & Chaves, M. (2016). Is the United States a counterexample to the secularization thesis? *American Journal of Sociology*, 121(5), 1517–1556.
- Voas, D., & Crockett, A. (2005). Religion in Britain: Neither believing nor belonging. *Sociology*, 39(1), 11–28.
- Voas, D., & Doebler, S. (2013). Secularization in Europe: An analysis of inter-generational religious change. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *Value contrasts and consensus in present-day Europe* (pp. 231–250). Brill.
- Voas, D., & Storm, I. (2012). The intergenerational transmission of churchgoing in England and Australia. *Review of Religious Research*, 53(4), 377–395.
- Voas, D., & Storm, I. (2021). National context, parental socialization, and the varying relationship between religious belief and practice. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 60(1), 189–197.

# 12. BETWEEN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY:

## RELIGIOSITY AMONG HUNGARIANS IN TRANSYLVANIA

---

*Dénes Kiss*

*Gergely Rosta*

*Bogdan Voicu*

### **Abstract**

*In our study, we examine the religious characteristics of the Hungarians in Transylvania, who once used to be part of the state-forming nation in Hungary but have long been an ethnic minority in Romania. We raise the question about the position of this group in terms of religious belonging, practice and faith between the Romanian and Hungarian societies. Our empirical analyses are based on the Romanian and the Hungarian databases of the European Values Study (EVS) 2017 as well as the database of the EVS-survey conducted in 2019 in Transylvania among the Hungarian minority. Our results clearly show the Hungarian minority in Transylvania to be closer to the Romanian than to the Hungarian society in terms of religiosity. Previous interpretations that Hungarians in Transylvania are in an intermediate position in terms of religiosity is not confirmed by our results. A slightly higher degree of religiosity of Hungarians in Transylvania compared to Romanians was found for several indicators. This is probably at least partly due to differences in social modernization, as the position of the Hungarian population in the Romanian social structure has become increasingly disadvantaged in recent decades.*

## 12.1 Introduction

As Loek Halman has frequently demonstrated, the tension between religiosity and secularization is core to changing towards modernity (Halman & Pettersson, 2003; Halman & Riis, 2003; see also Hervieu-Léger, 2010). The decreasing salience of religiosity in contemporary societies displays differently in public and private realm (Halman, Pettersson & Verweij, 1999), which makes it important to assess differences between societies that provide common paths but different public contexts. In this, Postcommunist societies are highly relevant cases, given the speed of transformations in the 1990s and afterwards (Tomka, 2010; Voicu, 2007). Hungary and Romania, connected through the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania, provide an excellent area to study how religiosity changes.

For centuries, many different ethnic and religious groups lived in the historical region of Transylvania. Nowadays, this part of Romania is home to one of Europe's largest native national minorities: the Hungarians. According to the last census, 1.2 million Hungarians and approximately 400,000 other nationalities were residing in this region, in addition to the majority Romanians who make up three quarters of Transylvania's population of around 6.8 million (Institutul Național de Statistică, 2011).

In our study, we examine the religious characteristics of the Hungarians in Transylvania, who once used to be part of the state-forming nation in Hungary but have long been an ethnic minority in Romania. We raise the question about the position of this group in terms of religiosity that is different between the Romanian and Hungarian societies.

## 12.2 Social Factors Influencing the Religiosity of Hungarians in Transylvania

Until the end of the First World War, Transylvania was part of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Habsburg Empire. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it became part of Romania, along with some other areas that are

now also considered as part of Transylvania.<sup>1</sup> According to the 1910 Hungarian census, already before its union with Romania Transylvania had a majority Romanian population (54%), while Hungarians made up 32% of the population, and there were only 11% of Germans (Varga, 1988, p. 6).

When examining the religiosity of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, several social factors must be considered. The first is religiosity of the society as a whole. Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe (Sandor & Popescu, 2008; Tomka, 2005). Analyses about the religious change in Romania attribute it to a number of factors, some of which have an impact on the religious situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, too.

Romania, like other Eastern European countries, underwent a “double secularisation”, due to the modernisation process and the anti-religious nature of the socialist political system. (Need & Evans, 2001; Tomka & Zulehner, 2000) However, both processes were specific to Romania (Voicu, 2019).

Romania industrialised slowly and rather late, with half of the population still living in rural areas and a third working in the agricultural sector at the time of the fall of communism. A large proportion of those working in industry were workers commuting daily to their jobs from the villages, thereby continuing to live their daily lives partly in a more or less traditional community which often where organised around the church. This delay in socialist modernisation is also reflected in the educational attainment of the population, with one of the lowest rates of tertiary education in Europe (Stoica, 1997; Voicu & Vasile, 2010).

Another important reason is the generally less restrictive state policy towards religions in socialist Romania compared to other countries of the Eastern Bloc. Although the churches in Romania also suffered various forms of persecution, especially during the first period of communist rule, the Orthodox Church found ways how to cooperate with the regime relatively quickly (Stan & Turcescu, 2010). Communist leader Ceaușescu's confrontation with the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, we refer to 'Transylvania' as the present-day territory of it, i.e. the 16 counties of Romania that have been part of the Hungarian Kingdom until 1918.

Union led to a further relaxation of the strictness of religious policy. Thus, for example, while the country remained an atheist state in public discourse, the authorities turned a blind eye to the building of new churches and houses of worship. The Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) has even developed an own dogma, which legitimized the subordination of the Church to the communist government (Kiss, 2020; Voicu 2007, 2019).

However, Spohn (1998) argues that it is not clear that the persecution of religion has necessarily weakened religiosity in the former Eastern Bloc. According to him, a weakened role of religion is particularly the case in countries with a longer history of secularisation, which he links to the historically central position of a nation within an empire. In contrast, for nations that were in a peripheral position within an empire, like Romanians in Transylvania, this lead in many cases to a stronger interconnectedness of national and religious identities and an enhancement of the role of religion. This was especially the case when the predominant religion of a peripheral ethnic group differed from the dominant religion within the empire. According to Spohn (1998), the peripheral position itself has not changed much during the decades of communism, only the centre of the empire (Russia) and the predominant religion (Atheism) changed. The implication of this, according to Spohn (1998), is that the religiosity of some Eastern European nations, including the Romanians, did not decline significantly during the communist era.

Pollack (2001, pp. 139-142) also commented on the importance of this link between religion and national identity. His argument is that the closer religion and national identity were in a given Eastern European country, the greater the importance of religion under socialism and the higher the degree of religiosity.

As it is usually the case in Orthodox countries, the link between religion and national identity is particularly strong in Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church played a prominent role in nation-building in the 19th century. Between the two World Wars, nationalist movements built to a large extent on this connection, increasing its salience (Leustean 2007, Stan & Turcescu, 2007). During the anti-religious ideological campaign of the socialist regime – in the complete absence of external support, thereby relying solely on its own

strength, but nevertheless in line with the Byzantine idea of symphony – it sought to establish a *modus vivendi* with the socialist power to ensure short-term survival (Voicu, 2007, p. 28).

On the one hand, these factors resulted to a position of religion in Romania that was not weakened to the same extent as in some other countries of the Eastern Bloc during the socialist period; on the other hand, these factors have also steadily strengthened religiosity after the change of regime. The growth of religiosity was particularly strong in the 1990s, when the country was experiencing a severe economic crisis and political and social instability (Voicu, 2007). During this period, the levels of religiosity of the comparatively less religious generations that had grown up under socialism, caught up with the religiosity levels of the older generations that had been socialised before socialism, as well as with those of the generations born and raised in the post-socialist era. This catching-up became so pronounced in the course of ten years that the age differential in religiosity largely disappeared, and remained virtually unchanged thereafter, i.e. in the second phase of the period. In the second decade of the period, the pace of religious revitalisation slowed down, but religiosity continued to grow, no longer as a result of the socio-political crisis, but as a result of strengthening national sentiments and massive state investments in religion (Voicu, 2007; Voicu & Constantin, 2012). It was only in the late 2010s that the levels of religiosity of the newer cohorts, born after 1990 and in particular after 2000, proved to be lower as compared to older generations (Voicu, 2020)

To study the religiosity of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, one should take into consideration the above aspects, and further consider the context given by the religious situation in Romania. Miklós Tomka (2001) has interpreted the modernisation effect along an East-West modernisation slope where he positions the Hungarians in Transylvania as in between the Hungarian and Romanian society in terms of modernisation. He shows that for most dimensions of religiosity, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania occupies this intermediate position (Tomka, 2001). Following Tomka's claim, the modernisation argument would imply a lower degree of religiosity among Hungarians in Transylvania than the overall position of religiosity in Romania.

The atheist religious persecution affected the other religious communities more than the Orthodox Church (Spohn, 1998). At the same time, following Spohn's argument presented earlier, Hungarians had a peripheral position within the Romanian state; because of the close link between religious and national identity as well as the denominational difference between Romanians and Hungarians, this may have resulted in a weakened position of religion.

The denominational composition of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania also suggests that the Hungarian population is undergoing a process different from the Romanians. Pollack (2001) argues that, generally, the more hierarchical and centralised a Church is, and the more sharply it demarcates between "insider" and "outsider", the more successful it is in resisting the oppressive regime. According to him, the Catholic Church was the most successful in fending off attacks on religion; the Protestant Churches (especially Lutheran) were the least successful, while for the Orthodox Churches, success varied from country to country (Pollack, 2001). In the case of Hungarians in Transylvania, this suggests both higher (Catholics) and lower (Reformed and other Protestant denominations) levels of religiosity compared to the Orthodox (Pollack 2001).

As can be seen from the above, we can identify several factors that are socio-geographically related to Romania, which could explain a lower or even a higher level of religiosity among the Hungarian national minority in Romania. In addition, however, an external factor must be also considered: the connection with the Hungarian society. Hungary, as we will see from the data too, is much stronger secularised than the Romanian society. There are a number of historical reasons for this, with the relatively weaker link between national and religious identity and the higher degree of modernisation most noteworthy (Tomka, 2010; Rosta, 2012).

The Hungarians in Transylvania have many ties (cultural, political, family, etc.) with Hungary; before 1990, however, it was not easy to maintain these ties. After the fall of communism, these circumstances changed, with one of the consequences being the legalisation of emigration, and consequently the increase in migration to Hungary. As younger, more highly educated groups tend to be more mobile (Chiswick, 1999) but less religious, the migration pro-

cess may indirectly result in an increase in the proportion of religious people among those who remain in Transylvania. In addition, despite the intensification of Hungarian-Romanian relations after 1990, there is still a big question as to what extent religious, or in more general terms cultural processes in Hungary, may have an impact on Hungarians living in Transylvania.

### 12.3 Data and Methods

Our analysis investigates to what extent the Hungarians in Transylvania can be considered to hold an intermediate position between the Romanian and the Hungarian societies. Religiosity is examined empirically, focussing on the dimensions of belonging, practice and faith, following work by Pollack and Rosta (2017). Our analyses are based on the European Values Study (EVS) 2017.<sup>2</sup> Both Romania and Hungary have been participating in the survey conducted every nine years since 1990. The data that we analyse is collected in 2018, in both countries, from national representative samples of roughly 1500 respondents. An additional survey was conducted in 2019 in Transylvania on a probabilistic sample of roughly 1100 respondents, representative of the Hungarian minority. The EVS 2017 sample in Romania also included Hungarian respondents from Transylvania. In the comparison with the two other samples, we did not exclude them from the analysis, because we wanted to contrast Romania and Hungary as a whole.


We firstly assess the differences in religiosity between the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and respectively the Hungarians and Romanians in their respective countries; subsequently, we attempt to explain these differences. In this Chapter, we do not aim at explaining, but only to noting the differences at aggregate level, and also showing how these differences are indeed at least partly rooted in processes during the communist era.

<sup>2</sup> For the data analysis we used the latest versions Integrated Dataset of EVS 2017 (ZA7500\_v4-o-o.sav) and the EVS 2017: Romania - Hungarian minority dataset (ZA7550\_v1-o-o.sav), using the weighting variables `weight` and `RO_hu_WEIGHT`, respectively. For more details on the methodology of the surveys see <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/methodology/>, <https://search.gesis.org/research.data/ZA7500> and <https://search.gesis.org/research.data/ZA7550>

## 12.4 Assessing Differences in Dimensions of Religiosity

The largest difference between the three groups is found in terms of denominational membership. In each of the three samples, a different group constitutes the majority: Protestants in the case of the Hungarians in Transylvania, Orthodox in the case of the Romanian sample, and non-members in the case of the Hungarian sample. Hungarians in Transylvania are similar to the Romanian society, as almost 100% of both groups identify themselves as belonging to a religious denomination; but they are also similar to the Hungarians in Hungary, as the majority of those belonging to a denomination are in both cases, in varying proportions, either Protestant or Catholic.

Figure 12.1 Distribution of adult population by religion in Hungary, Romania and Hungarians in Transylvania




Source: EVS Hungary 2018, EVS Romania 2018, EVS Hungarians in Transylvania 2019.

Another important indicator of religious attachment is religious identity. The majority of all three groups identify themselves as religious, but while in Transylvania and Romania the proportion is close to 90%, in Hungary it is just slightly above 50%. The latter also differs from the former two in that there are more people who identify themselves as religious than those who belong to a denomination. This suggests that individual forms of religiosity – unaffiliated with a religious institution – is more prevalent in Hungary than in Romania or Transylvania. A joint analysis of the two variables supports this assumption: while in Romania and among Hungarians in Transylvania, 98% and 100% of those who consider themselves religious also belong to a denomination, the corresponding proportion in Hungary is only 71%. In other words, not only is the proportion of people in Hungary who consider themselves religious much lower than in the other two samples, but in addition, nearly 30% of them do not belong to a denomination. In this, it is worth noting that based on both indicators of religious affiliation, a slightly larger proportion of Hungarians in Transylvania were religious than Romanians.

Regarding the ritual dimension, both in its institutional form (church attendance) and in its more personal form (prayer, meditation), the frequency of religious practice among Transylvanian Hungarians is similar to that of Romanians, but slightly higher. While both regular church attendance and daily prayer are typical for more than half of Hungarians in Transylvania, the same is true for only about one in six adults in Hungary.

In the dimension of faith, the pattern observed in belonging and religious practice is only partially reflected. Looking at the patterns among Hungarians in Transylvania and in the Romanian society, it seems that practically everyone believes in God, while the share of believers is significantly lower in Hungary. Similar proportions of people in Transylvania and Romania believe in life after death and heaven, but in these cases the proportion of non-believers is also significant (1/3-1/4 of the respective samples), while in Hungary the majority does not believe in either of both.

Figure 12.2 Selected indicators of religiosity in Hungary, Romania and among Hungarians in Transylvania



Source: EVS Hungary 2018, EVS Romania 2018, EVS Hungarians in Transylvania 2019.

However, there are two issues for which this scheme does not apply: beliefs in hell and in reincarnation. While in Romania, roughly as many people believe in this as in the existence of an afterlife or heaven, only one in two Hungarians in Transylvania and barely one in three Hungarians in Hungary believe in hell. The difference between the Hungarian and total sample in Romania is particularly interesting because other research on religiosity in the region has just found that Catholics in Eastern Europe tend to believe in heaven and hell to a greater extent than Orthodox Christians (Pew, 2017). And while there is nothing surprising about more people believing in heaven than hell (Pew, 2017), the 20 percentage point difference in the Transylvanian sample is quite significant and the reason for this needs further investigation.

Reincarnation is the only indicator of religiosity that shows the Hungarian sample to be the most religious, while the Romanian sample has the lowest percentage of believers in reincarnation. However, the difference between the three groups is rather small, ranging from 22% to 31%.

Overall, the belief in religious doctrines seems to be more consistent in the Romanian society than among Hungarians in Transylvania or Hungarians in Hungary. The significant difference between the share of those believing in God on the one hand, and believing in other Christian doctrines on the other hand as well as the relatively widespread belief in reincarnation, together indicate a stronger religious individualisation in the dimension of belief, and a stronger presence of “à la carte”-type belief (Hervieu-Léger, 2010) in Hungary than in the other two samples.

Thus, although the Hungarians in Transylvania share common cultural roots with Hungarians in Hungary, also their denominational background is similar to that of the Hungarian society, but their religiosity is clearly closer to that of the most “religious country” (Tomka, 2005) than to that of the more secularized Hungary. This arrangement of the data is convincing enough to show that the living conditions shared with the population of Romania, and above all the degree of modernisation, override the links with the Hungarian culture and the Hungarian population in terms of religiosity.

## 12.5 Reasons For the Differences

Some important explanatory factors for the differences between the three groups in terms of religiosity are processes rooted in the past. EVS data offers the possibility to gain some insight into past changes by means of a retrospective question. The analysis of religious practice in childhood by birth cohort shows the role of transmission of religion within the family and how this changed in different periods. Of course, there are several limitations to this analysis: on the one hand, the retrospective account may be distorted both by fading memories and by the interviewees’ present-day attitudes towards religion. On the other hand, the frequency of church attendance as a single indi-

cator of childhood religiosity, is not ideal because of the different expectations of the different denominations regarding religious practice.

A comparison of the three groups reveals several important findings. First, in all three countries, the majority of people born before the Second World War attended church at least monthly. The Hungarians do not differ from Romanians in this respect. On the other hand, the Hungarian population in Transylvania attended church in their childhood to a greater extent than the other two groups, even among the oldest cohort. Thus, even before the communist period, there were factors that led to higher levels of religiosity among Hungarians in Transylvania. The argument of modernisation and/or minority existence<sup>3</sup> seemed to be already valid in this period.


Thirdly, and perhaps the most exciting result of the comparison, in the Romanian and Transylvanian Hungarian sample, childhood religious practice shows a high degree of stability when comparing cohorts, while in the Hungarian sample, the age groups born under socialism – except for the last one – attended church services in decreasing proportions. One could say that in Hungary, a declining proportion of families passed on their religion to the next generation during the decades of socialism. Whether the reason for this is to be found in the persecution of religion, or rather in socialist-style modernisation combined with the relatively higher prosperity of the Kádár<sup>4</sup> era, or perhaps in both at the same time, is difficult to decide here. Tomka (2005) argues for the combination of both effects. In any case, it seems that the effects that led to a higher degree of stability in Romanian religiosity during the decades of socialism affected the majority Romanian and minority Hungarian populations equally. However, this stability also implies a difference between the two groups that persists up to this day: the proportion of Hungarians in Transylvania who attend church as children is much higher than in Romanian entire society. The minor differences in the religiosity of the two samples in favour of the Hungarians living in Transylvania, as described earlier, are therefore

3 For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that as a result of the second Vienna decision (1940), the northern part of Transylvania became part of Hungary again between 1940 and 1944. But all in all, the socialisation of the pre-1945 generation is also shaped by the experience of belonging to an ethnic minority.

4 János Kádár was the leader of Hungary from the defeat of the 1956 revolution until 1988.

most likely at least partly rooted in differences in religious socialisation that seems to play a greater role among Hungarians than Romanians. However, a comparison of childhood and current religious practice rates also reveals that the difference between the two groups is smaller in adulthood, suggesting that more Hungarians than Romanians abandon their regular childhood religious practice later.

Figure 12.3 Proportion of people attending church at least monthly at the age of 12 by birth cohort



Source: EVS Hungary 2018, EVS Romania 2018, EVS Hungarians in Transylvania 2019.

The slightly higher degree of religiosity of Hungarians in Transylvania compared to Romanians, that was found for several indicators, is probably partly due to differences in social modernization. Although the fact that the Hungarian population in Romania lives in a more modernised region than the national average argues against this. However, the fact that the position of the Hungarian population in the Romanian social structure has become more



disadvantaged in recent decades supports this thesis. For example, Hungarians in Transylvania are less educated, live in rural areas to a greater extent compared to the Romanian average, and are underrepresented in the highest earning strata (Kiss 2018; Csata 2018) – all variables that are known to be closely linked to religiosity.

## 12.6 Conclusion

Our results clearly show the Hungarian minority in Transylvania to be closer to the Romanian than to the Hungarian society in terms of religiosity. Miklós Tomka's (2005) interpretation that Hungarians in Transylvania are in an intermediate position in terms of both modernisation and religiosity is not confirmed by the latest EVS data.

Of the factors influencing the religiosity of the Hungarians in Transylvania, the most important is probably the impact of modernisation, or the lack of it. However, it is questionable whether the different trends in religious socialisation during the socialist period are solely due to differences in social modernisation processes between Hungary and Romania, or whether the different effects of Church persecution also play a role. When interpreting the differences between the two samples from Romania, we must consider not only socio-structural effects but also differences in the denominational character and, in this context, the identity-strengthening effect of religion for the ethnic minority. Neither the scope of this Chapter, nor the available data are sufficient to allow a systematic separation of the impacts of these aspects. Further research should consider comparison against Romanians in Transylvania, controlling for education, gender, age, urbanization and, more important, denominational affiliation, in multivariate approaches. Exposure to Hungarian cultural traits produced in Hungary should also be considered for being controlled. For the time being, and given the limited space of this Chapter, we end up noting the importance of current days societal context in shaping the religiosity. The conclusion could be easily extended to the cases of other overlapping ethnic structures across the Globe.

## List of References

- Chiswick, B. (1999). Are immigrants favorably self-selected? *American Economic Review*, 89(2), 181-185.
- Csata, Zs. (2018). Economy and Ethnicity in Transylvania. In Kiss, T., Székely, I. G., Toro, T., Nándor, B. & Horváth, I. (eds.): *Unequal Accommodation of Minority Rights. Hungarians in Transylvania*. (pp. 345–379). New York – London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Halman, L., Pettersson, T., & Verweij, J. (1999). The religious factor in contemporary society: The differential impact of religion on the private and public sphere in comparative perspective. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 40(1), 141.
- Halman, L., Pettersson, T. (2003). Differential patterns of secularization in Europe: exploring the impact of religion on social values. In Halman, L., & Riis, O. (eds.). *Religion in a Secularizing Society: The Europeans' Religion at the End of the 20th Century*. (pp. 48-75). Brill.
- Halman, L., & Riis, O. (2003). Contemporary European Discourses On Religion And Morality. In Halman, L., & Riis, O. (eds.). *Religion in a Secularizing Society: The Europeans' Religion at the End of the 20th Century*. (pp. 1-21). Brill.
- Hervieu-Léger, D. (2010). Le partage du croire religieux dans des sociétés d'individus. *L'Année sociologique*, 60(1), 41-62.
- Institutul Național de Statistică (2011). *Recensământul populației și locuințelor din România, 2011. Volumul II: Structura etnică și confesională. Populația după etnie – macroregiuni, regiuni de dezvoltare, județe și categorii de localități*. Retrieved May 2, 2021, from [http://www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/vol2\\_t2.xls](http://www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/vol2_t2.xls)
- Kiss, D. (2020). "Nekiink csak ez van": vallás és egyházak a rendszerváltás utáni Erdélyben. Cluj: Exit – Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet
- Kiss, T (2018). A Changing System of Ethnic Stratification: The Social Positions of Transylvanian Hungarians. In Kiss, T., Székely, I. G., Toro, T., Nándor, B. & Horváth, I. (eds.): *Unequal Accommodation of Minority Rights. Hungarians in Transylvania*. (pp. 419–458). New York – London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Leustean, L. N. (2007). "For the Glory of Romanians": Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greater Romania, 1918–1945. *Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 35(4), 717-742.
- Need, A. & Evans, G. (2001). Analyzing patterns of religious participation in post-communist Eastern Europe. *British Journal of Sociology* 52(2), 229–248.
- Pollack, D. (2001). Modifications in the religious field of Central and Eastern Europe. *European Societies* 3(2), 135–165.
- Pollack, D & Rosta, G. (2017). *Religion and modernity: An international comparison*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosta, G. (2012). Church and Religion in Hungary: Between Religious Individualization and Seculariza-

- tion. In: Pollack, D., Müller, O. & Pickel, G. (eds.): *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*. (pp. 187-205). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.
- Sandor, S. D., & Popescu, M. (2008). Religiosity and values in Romania. *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences* 4(22), 171–180.
  - Spohn, W. (1998). Religion und Nationalismus. Osteuropa im westeuropäischen Vergleich. In Pollack, D., Borowik, I. & Jagodzinski, W. (eds.): *Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas*. (pp. 87-120). Würzburg: Ergon
  - Stan, L. & Turcescu, L. (2007). *Religion and politics in post-communist Romania*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  - Stan, L. & Turcescu, L. (2010). The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-communist Democratisation. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52(8), 1467-1488
  - Stoica, A. (1997). Communism as a Project for Modernization: the Romanian Case. *Polish Sociological Review*, 120, 313-331.
  - Tomka, M. (2001). Jelentés a vallásosságról – Erdély, az Úr 2000. évében. In Gereben, F. & Tomka, M. (eds.): *Vallásosság és nemzetudat. Vizsgálódások Erdélyben*. (pp. 9–52). Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány – Corvinus Kiadó.
  - Tomka, M. (2005). *A legvallásosabb ország? Vallásosság Szatmárban, Erdélyben, Romániában*. Piliscsaba: PPKE BTK
  - Tomka, M. (2010). *Religiöser Wandel in Ungarn. Religion, Kirche und Sekten nach dem Kommunismus*. Ostfildern: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag
  - Tomka, M. & Zulehner, P. (2000). *Religion im gesellschaftlichen Kontext Ost(Mittel)Europas*. Ostfildern: Schwabenverlag
  - Varga E., Á (1988). Az erdélyi magyarság főbb statisztikai adatai az 1910 utáni népszámlálások tükrében. In Juhász, Gy (ed.) *Magyarságkutatás*. (pp. 37–65). Budapest: Magyarságkutató Intézet.
  - Voicu, B. (2020) Intergenerational change as engine of societal change. In Voicu, B., Rusu, H. & Tufiş, C. (eds.). *Atlas of Romanian Values. Romania turning 100*. (pp. 193-197). Cluj: Presa Universitară Clujeană
  - Voicu, B. & Vasile, M. (2010). Rural-Urban Inequalities and Expansion of Tertiary Education in Romania. *Journal of Social Research & Policy*, 1(1), 5–24.
  - Voicu, M. & Constantin, A. (2012). Religious revival in Romania: between cohort replacement and contextual changes. In Pickel, G. & Sammet, K. (eds.): *Transformations of religiosity: religion and religiosity in Eastern Europe 1989-2010*. (pp. 155-174). Wiesbaden: Springer Science & Business Media.
  - Voicu, M. (2007). *România religioasă. Pe valul european sau în urma lui?* Iași: Institutul European.
  - Voicu, M. (2019). Religious Supply, Existential Insecurity and Church Attendance in Post-communist Romania. *Review of Religious Research* 61, 365–388.

# 13. SECULARIZATION AND VALUES:

EXPLORING CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS  
FACTOR IN PREFERENCES FOR OBEDIENCE  
AND AUTONOMY

---

*Inge Sieben*

*Katya Ivanova*

## **Abstract**

*Previous research, mostly US based, shows that religious beliefs and practice are related to parental values: religious individuals value obedience more and autonomy less as an important quality to teach children at home than their non-religious counterparts. One wonders how this 'religious factor' is in secularized Northwestern Europe. According to secularization theory, the association between being a religious person and the preferences for obedience and autonomy will weaken due to the loss of social significance of religion. An alternative theoretical perspective however predicts that this only happens in the first stage of secularization, after which the association might increase again as religious identities of those who remain religious may be strengthened in a secular world. Employing EVS data of Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands for the period of 1981-2017, we find evidence for this U-shaped pattern in Germany, Great Britain and, for obedience only, in France. However, in Denmark and the Netherlands, the patterns are quite mixed and not in line with the theoretical perspectives. Future research could focus on the heterogeneity of both the religious and non-religious population to explain the trends observed.*

### 13.1 Introduction

The European Values Study (EVS) is all about values. However, what exactly values are is not so evident. As Loek Halman, who devoted his academic life to the study of values and values change, explains: “one of the reasons why a clear definition of values is lacking is that they are not directly observable or measurable. However, there is “a common-sense understanding” that values are rather basic in nature: they are deeply rooted motivations or principles that would guide norms, attitudes, beliefs and opinions” (Halman & Sieben, 2020: 1). Given this ‘functional’ definition, one may wonder whether the EVS project addresses values in a direct way, or that the questionnaires tap values more indirectly by referring to attitudes and opinions. However, a closer look at the EVS questionnaire reveals one particular battery of items that is rather closely related to the more general nature of values. These so-called parental values are defined as the criteria or standards used as a basis to evaluate which qualities are most desirable for children to be taught at home (Kohn, 1969). Since individuals attach more importance to those child qualities that they think will prepare children best for the requirements made by society’s future, parental values are seen as an important indicator for social change as well (cf. Inkeles, 1983 [1955]).

The primary focus in the literature has been on two of these values: *obedience*, i.e. the conformity to external rules and obeying adult authority, and *autonomy*, i.e. the ability to think for yourself and to reason independently (see Alwin, 2001). Scholars have established a clear link between these values and religion: religious denomination (Lenski, 1961), beliefs (Ellison & Sherkat, 1993; Starks & Robinson, 2005; 2007) as well as practice (Alwin, 1986; Xiao, 2000) are associated with a higher preference for obedience and a lower preference for autonomy. However, most of these studies on the so-called ‘religious factor’ (Lenksi, 1961) are US-based, described as one of most religious developed countries in the world (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). What about Europe? Loek Halman’s work on religion shows that there is a clear trend towards secularization in North-Western Europe (e.g., Halman & Draulans, 2004; 2006). One thus wonders what the association between religion and parental values is in this secularized part of the world. In this chapter, we will answer this question by employing data from five North-Western European countries present in all

five EVS rounds (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017): Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain.

### 13.2 Secularization and the Religious Factor in Parental Values

Religious individuals in general prefer obedience more and autonomy less than those who are not religious. The reason for this religious factor can be found in religious doctrine. Religious teachings are traditional and conservative, promoting “divine and filial obedience” (Kim & Wilcox, 2014: 559). Religious people therefore find it important that children are obedient, while autonomy is not strongly encouraged (Starks & Robinson, 2007). In addition, religious messages are spread in religious services and in religious networks, and this will further strengthen these parental values (Starks & Robinson, 2005). However, in the process of secularization, religion gradually loses its social significance (Berger, 1967) and its encompassing role in prescribing traditional values and norms (Halman & Draulans, 2004). Religious institutions such as the church are no longer able to spread their messages through major institutional vehicles like the media, education and politics. Moreover, in secularized countries, the pool of devout people is smaller, which limits the opportunities for close networks with individuals of a similar religion (Perl & Olson, 2000). All this leads to a weakening “impact of religion on the micromotives of the citizens” (Dobbelaere, 1989:38). With respect to parental values, this means that religion simply is not an important driver anymore, making the gap between religious and non-religious individuals in preferences for obedience and autonomy smaller with higher levels of secularization.

However, thinking of the impact of secularization in a linear way may be too simplistic, as it does not consider how the process of secularization leads to changes in the (non)religious population. It is true that in the first stages of secularization, we would expect a diminishing religious factor, as indeed religious institutions lose ground in society and the social control function of religious networks weakens. However, these impacts are felt by the less religious individuals in society first. Secularization will disproportionately affect

the less devout believers: they have less and less incentives to stay connected with their religious congregations and therefore abandon the churches, leaving the religious community to the group of passionate and traditional believers (cf. Wilkins-Laflamme, 2014). Secularization thus produces a sort of purification of the religious population (Achterberg et. al, 2009; Sieben & Halman, 2014), while the non-religious population becomes more diverse. Individuals who choose to be religious in an otherwise secularized society, presumably do so not so much out of tradition or social pressure, but because the message spread by their religion appeals to them. This implies that the remaining religious individuals will more strongly adhere to traditional family values promoted by the churches, such as a preference for obedience and an aversion to autonomy as important qualities to teach children. Thus, in later stages of the secularization process, religion becomes more salient for those who remain religious, which will strengthen the religious factor in parental values.

This is reinforced by mechanisms of cultural defence (Achterberg et. al, 2009). Religious individuals in secularized societies may realize that their way of living is uncommon; they are deviant from or even stigmatized by the growing surrounding non-religious population (Hill & Olson, 2009). As a reaction to this, they will even more strongly hold on to their religious identity. In addition, religious individuals may feel that secularization is a threat to their religious communities, which may not be able to sustain themselves and the services they provide (Hill & Olson, 2009). To prevent this from happening, religious individuals become more actively involved in their congregation, which also facilitates interaction with individuals who share the same religious beliefs (social network function). Secularization thus leads to identity activation and more commitment among believers. This may be reinforced by the ‘supply side of religion’ (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987; Finke & Iannaccone, 1993): churches will mobilize their congregations in a ‘battle’ for believers. They increase their efforts not only to recruit newcomers, but also to bind current members to their congregations. This leads to more religious vitality and commitment (Finke & Stark, 1988).

To sum up, religious identities may become more salient as a reaction to the process of secularization itself. Secularization is seen as a threat to religious

culture, which makes that religious individuals more strongly hold on to their identity and to their religious practices and beliefs in a highly secularized society (Bruce, 2002; 2011). This implies that “that (non) religious identities become intensified and distinctions between religious and non-religious more pronounced” (Wilkins-Laflamme, 2016: 733). Thus, in the first stage of the process of secularization, the gap between religious and non-religious individuals in preferences for obedience and autonomy would become smaller, but in a later stage, this gap would increase again.

### 13.3 Data and Methods

We use data from five North-Western European countries that were present in all five survey rounds of the European Values Study (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017): Denmark (final sample size = 8,075), France (n=7,084), Germany (n=10,401), the Netherlands (n=7,083), and Great Britain (n=6,588) (EVS, 2020a; 2020b). Since we are using mostly descriptive analytical techniques, we apply weights provided in EVS so that the distribution of the sample matches the distribution of gender, age (and in some rounds: education and region) within the country’s population.

Respondents were asked to choose up to five qualities they considered to be most desirable from a list of eleven qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. We construct two dummy variables which indicate whether the qualities ‘obedience’ and ‘independence’ (the latter indicating autonomy) were chosen or not. Respondents who picked more than five qualities were dropped from the sample (n=1,283). In addition, respondents indicated whether they are a religious person, not a religious person, or a convinced atheist. The latter two categories are combined to indicate being not religious. By aggregating this variable for each country in a specific round, the proportion of people who do not identify as religious at the time of survey indicates the level of secularization. This macro level variable ranges from 0.26 in Denmark in 1981 to 0.62 in Great Britain in 2017. Finally, we measure the religious factor by looking at the gap between religious individuals and non-religious individuals in preferences for obedience (or independence) in a specific country and year (cf. Kalmijn, 2010). For example, 22.9% of the religious individuals in the Neth-


erlands in 1981 prefer obedience, and 15.0% of the non-religious. The gap is thus 7.9 percentage points, and this represents the association between religion and the preference for obedience (the religious factor) in the Netherlands in 1981. We will use aggregate-level bivariate analyses to link the associations between religion and parental values to the levels of secularization in each country and year. We present the results in a graphical way split by country in order to take into account country-specific contexts, such as religious heritage. For example, Denmark and Great Britain have a Protestant tradition, while in France Catholicism is more dominant. Germany and the Netherlands show a mix of Protestant and Catholic denominations.

### 13.4 Results

Figure 13.1 shows the gap between religious and non-religious individuals in preferences for obedience (as a measure of the religious factor) on the vertical axis, and the level of secularization on the horizontal axis for each country separate. The graphs first show that there is an overall trend towards higher levels of secularization in all five countries in the period 1981-2017. In addition, we see that, in general, religious individuals more value obedience as an important quality to teach children than their non-religious counterparts, since the gap in preference for obedience between these two groups is overall positive (the two exceptions being France in 1990 and Great Britain in 1999). However, the graphs display different patterns for the link between secularization and the religious factor. In Germany, we see that the gap between religious and non-religious individuals decreases with higher levels of secularization, as predicted by the secularization paradigm. Alternatively, we could think of Germany as being still in the first stage of secularization, which would confirm the second theoretical perspective as well. In Great Britain, where secularization is at higher levels than in Germany, we observe a U-shaped pattern between secularization and the religious factor, confirming the ideas of both weakening salience of religion in the first stage of secularization, and of purification and religious identity activation in a later stage. Moreover, in France, where levels of secularization in general are higher and increasing, we see that the gap between religious and non-religious individ-

uals in the preference for obedience increases with secularization. We could interpret this as France being in the second stage of secularization, where purification and religious identity activation among the remaining religious individuals lead to a stronger religious factor. However, Denmark and the Netherlands show a pattern that cannot be linked to these theoretical perspectives. In the Netherlands, characterized by a trend from rather low to higher levels of secularization, we see an increasing gap, while in Denmark, with rather low levels of secularization until 2008, a reversed U-shaped pattern is visible.

Figure 13.1 Secularization and the religious factor in the preference for obedience per country




Source: EVS

Note: Plotted on y-axis: Percentage point difference between religious and non-religious populations in preference for obedience.

In Figure 13.2, the graphs are displayed with respect to the religious factor and the preference for independence. In all countries, we observe that non-religious individuals more often prefer this quality than their religious counterparts do. In Germany and Great Britain, we again find confirmation for the U-shaped link with secularization. The patterns in the other three countries are less clear and do not match with our theoretical expectations. The data points are quite scattered in Denmark and the Netherlands, while for France we observe a reversed U-shape.

Figure 13.2 Secularization and the religious factor in the preference for independence per country



Source: EVS

Note: Plotted on y-axis: Percentage point difference between religious and non-religious populations in preference for independence.

### 13.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we set out to investigate changes in the religious factor in parental values in five countries in North-Western Europe in the period 1981-2017: Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. In all countries, we confirmed findings from previous literature that religious individuals prefer obedience more and autonomy less than non-religious individuals. We also showed that all these countries experienced an overall trend towards higher levels of secularization, although starting points and speed are different. This variation in secularization made it possible to investigate two contrasting theoretical perspectives. The first maintained that secularization implies that religion loses its social significance, meaning that the gap between religious and non-religious individuals in preferences for obedience and autonomy would decrease with higher levels of secularization. The second perspective states that this happens in the first stage of the process of secularization only. Once a society is highly secularized, processes of purification and religious activation among the remaining religious individuals will strengthen the religious factor. We observed such a U-shaped pattern in Germany and Great Britain and, for obedience only, in France. However, in Denmark and the Netherlands, the patterns are quite mixed and not in line with our theoretical perspectives.

How to explain these variations? A first suggestion is that we maybe need to take a closer look at diversity in the religious landscape in the different countries. For example, Sieben and Halman (2014) showed that there is heterogeneity within and between religious denominations in the Netherlands when it comes to religious beliefs and parental values. Especially the Roman Catholic population, which are a large part of the religious Dutch, is rather diverse in this respect. Another line of thinking was suggested by Loek Halman himself when he stated that non-religious individuals “do not generally take anti-Christian stances” (Halman & Van Ingen, 2015: 624). The non-religious population may become more heterogeneous in the process of secularization, being a mix of atheists, agnostics, spiritual people, and former believers (who may range from individuals with strict anti-church sentiments to those who rather care for Christian values). This diversity may blur the association between religion and parental values, making it quite complex to arrive at theo-

retical expectations. Both suggestions call for more in-depth country studies focusing on heterogeneity within religious and non-religious populations to unravel the trends observed here.

## List of References

- Achterberg, P., Houtman, D., Aupers, S., De Koster, W., Mascini, P. & Van der Waal, J. (2009) A Christian Cancellation of the Secularist Truce? Waning Christian Religiosity and Waxing Religious Deprivatization in the West. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48(4): 687-701.
  - Alwin, D. (1986) Religion and Parental Child-Rearing Orientations: Evidence of a Catholic-Protestant Convergence. *American Journal of Sociology* 92(2): 412-40.
  - Alwin, D. (2001) Parental Values, Beliefs, and Behavior: A Review and Promulga for Research into the New Century. *Children at the Millennium: Where Have We Come From, Where Are We Going?* 6: 97-139.
  - Berger, P. (1967) *The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co.
  - Bruce, S. (2002). *God is dead: Secularization in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell.
  - Bruce, S. (2011) *Secularization: In defence of an Unfashionable Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  - Dobbelaere, K. (1989). The secularization of society? Some methodological suggestions. Pp 27-44 in Hadden, J.K. & Shupe, A. (Eds). *Secularization and Fundamentalisms Reconsidered*. New York: Praeger.
  - Dobbelaere, K. (2002) *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels*. Brussels: Peter Lang.
  - Ellison, C. & Sherkat, D. (1993) Obedience and Autonomy; Religion and Parental Values Reconsidered. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32(4): 313-29.
  - EVS (2020a) EVS Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008. ZA4804 Data file v.3.1.0 GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, doi:10.4232/1.13486.
  - EVS (2020b) European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset. ZA7500 Data file v.4.0.0. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, doi:10.4232/1.13560.
  - Finke, R. & Iannaccone, L. (1993) Supply-side Explanations for Religious Change. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 527: 27-39.
  - Finke, R. & Stark, R. (1988) Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities, 1906. *American Sociological Review* 53(1): 41-49.
  - Halman, L. & Draulans, V. (2004) Religious beliefs and practices in contemporary Europe. Pp. 283-316 in: Arts, W. & Halman, L. (Eds) *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*. Boston, Leiden: Brill,
  - Halman, L. & Draulans, V. (2006) How secular is Europe? *British Journal of Sociology* 57(2): 263-88.
  - Halman, L. & Sieben, I. (2020) Values. In: List, R., Anheier, H. & Toepler, S. (Eds) *International Encyclo-*
- dia of Civil Society. New York: Springer.
  - Halman, L., & Van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and changing moral views: European trends in church attendance and views on homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5): 616-627.
  - Hill, J. & Olson, D. (2009) Market Share and Religious Competition: Do Small Market Share Congregations and Their Leaders Try Harder? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48(4): 629-649.
  - Inkeles, A. 1983 [1955]. Social Change and Social Character: The Role of Parental Mediation. *Journal of Social Issues*, 11: 12-23. Reprinted, *Journal of Social Issues*, 39: 179-191.
  - Kalmijn, M. (2010). Country differences in the effects of divorce on well-being: The role of norms, support, and selectivity. *European Sociological Review*, 26(4): 475-490.
  - Kim, Y. & Wilcox, W. (2014) Religious Identity, Religious Attendance, and Parental Control. *Review of Religious Research* 56(4): 555-80.
  - Kohn, M. (1969) *Class and Conformity. A Study in Values*. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
  - Lenski, G. (1961) *The religious factor: A sociological study of religion's impact on politics, economics, and family life*. New York: Doubleday.
  - Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2004) *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  - Perl, P., & Olson, D.V. (2000). Religious market share and intensity of church involvement in five denominations. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 39(1): 12-31.
  - Sieben, I., & Halman, L. (2014). Religion and parental values in a secularized country: Evidence from the Netherlands. *Social Compass*, 61(1): 121-140.
  - Stark, R. & Bainbridge, W. (1987) *A Theory of Religion*. New York: Peter Lang.
  - Starks, B. & Robinson, R. (2005) Who Values the Obedient Child Now? The religious Factor in Adult Values for Children, 1986-2002. *Social Forces* 84(1): 343-59.
  - Starks, B. & Robinson, R. (2007) Moral Cosmology, Religion, and Adult Values for Children. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 46(1): 17-35.
  - Wilkins-Laflamme, S. (2014) Toward Religious Polarization? Time Effects on Religious Commitment in US, UK, and Canadian Regions. *Sociology of Religion* 75(2): 284-308.
  - Wilkins-Laflamme, S. (2016). Secularization and the wider gap in values and personal religiosity between the religious and nonreligious. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 55(4): 717-736.
  - Xiao, H. (2000) Class, Gender, and Parental Values in the 1990s. *Gender and Society*, 14(6): 785-801.



# 14. THE IMPACT OF THE CHILD ABUSE SCANDALS ON TRUST IN THE CHURCH:

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM BELGIUM

---

*Koen Abts*

*Bart Meuleman*

## **Abstract**

*Over the last decennia, the position of the Church and religion in Western societies has become less central to social, cultural and public life. On top of structural processes of secularization, the Catholic Church has, more recently, faced painful moments of deep crisis because of child sexual abuse scandals. This contribution investigates how the child abuse scandal involving Roger Vangheluwe (the bishop of Bruges), has affected institutional trust in the Catholic Church in Belgium. To do this, we analyse panel data from EVS wave 4 (2009) and a follow-up survey among the same respondents in 2010. This panel design -with the child abuse scandal as a natural experiment in between the two measurements- allows us to study conjunctural changes in trust in the Church. Our results indicate that the loss of trust in the church-as-institution is especially outspoken among the religiously more involved persons. Those who are convinced that the church authorities did not fulfill their role as ‘guardians of trust’ in dealing with the pedophilia cases report the strongest decrease in trust. These results are illustrative of churchgoers’ disappointment with the behavior of priests and indignation about the improper functioning of church hierarchies.*

## 14.1 Introduction

Over the last decennia, the position of the Church and religion in Western societies has changed drastically. Through processes of secularization, religion is less central to social, cultural and public life, while its moral authority and impact on the citizen's personal life have profoundly diminished. Secularization and the wider value changes has figured prominently on the research agenda of the *European Values Study (EVS)*, the project in which Loek Halman played an invaluable role. But Loek has also more directly contributed to the empirical research into secularization. Loek, together with Veerle Draulans (2006), studied religious practices and beliefs among Europeans, and conclude that secularization is taking place across Europe, but that the speed and trajectories vary substantially across countries. Furthermore, together with Erik van Ingen, Loek (2015) found that the moral guidance of churches is no longer self-evident nowadays and seem to be collapsing.

Also in Flanders-Belgium, the Catholic Church is losing its privileged religious and moral authority. Particularly fundamental shifts in religious practice have taken place in the period 1967-2020. First, the number of Flemish people who regularly go to church has fallen to below five percent in the last fifty years, while in the late 1960s more than half of population were active churchgoers (Verschraegen & Abts, 2022). Secondly, there is also a strong decline in the number of church baptisms, marriages and funerals. While these figures were still above ninety percent in the late 1960s, in the 2020s the number of religious baptisms and funerals fell below 40%, while just over one in seven couples still enter into a church wedding (cf. De Maeyer & Abts, 2013; Verschraegen & Abts, 2022). These statistics illustrate the exodus of the church, and at the same time that Flemish society is strongly secularizing. Some groups are almost completely alienated from Catholic Church and faith; only very few young people are still going to church, while also the belief in God is withering away (Dobelaere, Voyé & Billiet, 2011). This evolution illustrates the waning authority of the Catholic Church in Belgium.

In addition to these structural trends, the Catholic Church has, more recently, faced painful moments of deep crisis because of child sexual abuse scandals.

In the case of Belgium, the Catholic Church experienced its *annus horribilis* in 2010. On April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2010, Roger Vangheluwe (the bishop of Bruges) had to resign because it was discovered that he had committed years of child abuse in the past. In the aftermath of the Vangheluwe case, hundreds of new complaints about child abuse in the church surfaced. This led to the establishment of an investigative commission into child abuse in the Church, led by child psychiatrist Peter Adriaenssens. The investigation sketched a shocking picture of what had gone wrong over the past decades with respect to child abuse within the Church. The discovery of audio tapes on which Cardinal Godfried Danneels can be heard trying to convince a victim to forgive Vangheluwe and to keep the abuse secret exacerbated atmosphere of scandal even further. During the scandal, the dominant picture is that of a Church that seems more concerned with protecting its own interests than offering a helping hand to the victims. During this crisis, the church hierarchy failed to act resolutely and transparently and missed the opportunity to make a public *mea culpa* (cf. Loobuyck, 2011, pp. 26-28; Mettepenningen, 2011, pp. 15-24).

As a tribute to the work and academic career of Loek Halman, we investigate how the child abuse scandal have changed institutional trust in the Catholic Church in Belgium. By coincidence, the Vangheluwe scandal occurred in between the fieldwork of EVS wave 4 (2009) and a follow-up survey among the same respondents in 2010. This panel design – with the child abuse scandal as a natural experiment in between the two measurements – allows us to study conjunctural changes in trust in the Church.

## 14.2 Sources of (Dis)trust in the Church

To assess the impact of the child abuse scandals, the population's trust in the Church as an institution is a more proximal indicator than religious practices or beliefs. Trust is a way of dealing with the freedom of others. Trust enables persons to take risks and to deal with the unknown, uncertain and uncontrollable future. In general terms, trust is the voluntary act of making oneself vulnerable to the (unlikely) possibility of being disadvantaged in situations where one is dependent on the other. Trust is therefore always a leap of faith, express-

ing belief in the competence, sincerity and good intentions of others and the belief in the proper functioning of social systems (Luhmann, 1979; 1988; Misztal, 1996; Seligman, 1997; Sztompka, 1999; Möllering, 2001; Abts, 2005).

Systemic trust and confidence in institutions is contingent on three conditions. First, the institution must be experienced as meaningful and seen as fulfilling its social function. As a religious institution, the Church is expected to “make definite the indefinite, to reconcile the immanent and the transcendent” (Luhmann, 2013). Second, trust in an institution depends on the behaviour of its officials. The so-called authority figures – as representatives of a social system – need to be competent and sincere about their function. Consequently, trust in the Church is not independent of the competence, vigour and morality of the authorities who represent it (Giddens, 1990, p. 88). Third, trust in an institution presupposes that one is able to assume that others have confidence as well, which is highly dependent on the proper functioning of control institutions. Institutional trust therefore also depends to a large extent on confidence in the proper functioning of internal control mechanisms and ‘guardians of trust’ (Luhmann, 1979, pp. 56-58; Shapiro, 1987). The failure of internal supervision, for example, often proves to be an important source of distrust. In the latter case, distrust transcends the disappointment in particular authority figures, but spills over to the institution as a whole.

These three sources of institutional (dis)trust are useful to distinguish the structural and conjunctural decline in trust the Catholic Church is confronted with. Secularization theory assumes that the structural crisis of confidence mainly relates the first source, namely the fact that the Church is perceived by the population to be less and less useful and meaningful in the exercise of its religious function. The doctrine of faith no longer offers convincing answers to the religious questions people struggle with. It seems that traditional religious doctrine leaves too little room for the personal search and religious interpretation of each individual. The child abuse scandals directly erode the two other foundations of trust as well. Trust in the Church assumes that clergymen do no harm and do not abuse the vulnerability of the believer – an assumption that is clearly contradicted by the cases of child abuse. Furthermore, the Church authorities are blamed for taking little decisive action in tackling child

abuse in their own circles. This is a clear failure as internal guardians of trust (cf. Abts, 2005).

### 14.3 Data and Indicators

Data collection of EVS wave 4 in Belgium offers unique opportunities to analyse how the child abuse scandals have affected trust in the Church. In 2009, a two-stage probability sample of the Belgian population older than 18 years were approached by means of a computer assisted personal interview (CAPI) for the EVS fieldwork (realized sample size: 1509; response rate: 50.0%). This survey took place before the child abuse scandals. Between November 2010 and January 2011 – after the child abuse scandals – the EVS respondents were re-contacted with the request to fill out a short follow-up survey. 641 respondents participated in this self-completion postal survey, implying that a serious level of attrition may threatening the generalizability to the whole Belgian population (external validity). However, the panel design combined with the occurrence of important events between the measurements provides an interesting picture of the changes that have taken place among the respondent group as a result of the scandals (internal validity).

The dependent variable is the trust in the Church item that is part of the EVS core questionnaire since 1981: “Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? The Church”. The variable is re-scaled so that higher scores indicate a higher level of trust (a great deal = 4, quite a lot = 3, not very much = 2, none at all = 1). This item was measured at both time points.

To understand changes in trust, a series of explanatory factors is used. As socio-demographic variables, we include *gender*, *birth cohort* (born before 1945, 1945-1959, 1960-1975, 1975-1991), *educational level* (left school before 14, before 18, before 20 or after 20 years of age) and *living area* (rural / town smaller than 20,000 inhabitants vs. urban / larger towns and cities). Of particular interest is the variable *religious involvement*. Following Billiet (1995) we combine religious denomination and individual attendance of religious services into a single

indicator, distinguishing between regular churchgoers (Catholics attending services at least once per month), irregular churchgoers (Catholics attending services only on specific holy days), marginal Catholics (Catholics attending services even less frequently) and non-Catholics.

Besides these socio-demographics, we also investigate the effect of various subjective and attitudinal dimensions. *Ethical permissiveness* is a composite score of six items asking to what extent particular situations or acts can be justified: married men/women having an affair, homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, and prostitution. *Religious beliefs* measures whether respondents believe in God, life after death, hell, heaven, and sin. Whether respondents see the Church as *meaningfully fulfilling its function* is operationalized based on whether respondents think the churches are giving adequate answers to the moral problems and needs of the individual, the problems of family life, people's spiritual needs, and the social problems facing our country today. All these variables were measured during the main EVS fieldwork, that is before the child abuse scandal. In the follow-up survey (carried out after the media coverage of the child abuse scandals), the questions asking whether the Church fulfils its function were retaken – for this predictor we have repeated measurements.

In addition, the follow-up survey contains two statements regarding way in which the Church responded to the child abuse scandals – ‘*The leadership of the Catholic Church has covered up paedophilia cases too much*’ and ‘*The leadership of the Catholic Church still gives the impression that the institution is more important than the victims.*’ Agreement with these statements (measured on a five-point agree-disagree answer scale) is combined into a composite score. All these scales are transformed to range from 0 to 10.


#### **14.4 Structural and Conjunctural Changes in Trust in the Church**

To distinguish structural from conjunctural changes in trust in the Church, a long-term perspective is needed. Figure 14.1 combines information from various EVS waves and displays the percentage of Flemish respondents re-

porting high levels of trust in the Church (answer categories ‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’ combined) over the period 1981-2010. The figure suggests that the Church experienced a structural crisis of confidence in the period 1981-2009, which was substantially reinforced by a conjunctural confidence shock after the 2010 child abuse scandals. In fact, three phases in trust in the Catholic Church over the past three decades can be distinguished. The first phase is a period of sharp decline in trust in the 1980s. In 1981, 62% of the Flemish people still trusted the Catholic Church, as opposed to 44% in 1990. In one decade, the institution lost about twenty percentage points. The second phase refers to the period 1990 to 2009, characterized by a slowing down but steadily eroding trust. Over two decades, trust in the Church declines by more than ten percentage points, to around 31% in 2009 (Verschraegen & Abts, 2022). The third phase seems to be the phase of completely imploding confidence in the wake of the child abuse scandals within the Church and the way in which the Church authorities dealt with them. In the short period between 2009 and 2010, trust in the Church fell by as much as 16 percentage points. With this low score, the Church finds itself at the bottom of the trust ladder of all institutions.

Figure 14.1 also shows the evolution in trust by religious involvement. For some time now, the Church has really appealed to a few irregular churchgoers and fringe churchgoers only. Those who have been suspicious of the Church for years are confirmed in their distrust by the paedophilia cases. More striking is that the trust of a whole group of churchgoers, who still believe in the high moral values of the Church, has been shaken profoundly. While confidence in the Church remained relatively high and stable between 1990 and 2009 among churchgoing Catholics, since 2010 institutional confidence has been in free fall for the first time among this group. This makes the crisis of confidence all the more serious. The role of the Church as an authoritative body that can credibly promulgate philosophical, ethical, social and moral views is thus increasingly threatened and questioned - not only by the secularists but also by church-going Catholics.

Figure 14.1 Percentage reporting 'quite a lot' or 'a great deal' of trust in the church (EVS waves 1981-2009 and ISPO-EVS 2010 panel respondents – Flanders)



## 14.5 Explaining the Decline

To gain deeper insight in the erosion of trust, we zoom in on the panel data that contains measurements among the same respondents in 2009 ( $t_1$ ; before the child abuse scandals) as well as 2010/11 ( $t_2$ ; after the child abuse scandals). Table 14.1 presents a model analysing the change in trust between these two time points. The model shown is a fixed effect difference model (Allison, 2009, pp. 7-10). The model exploits the panel nature of the data and explains the change in trust individuals experienced. Most of the predictors are time-invariant and measured at  $t_1$ , with two exceptions: (1) the evaluation of the reaction of the

Church to the crisis is measured at  $t_2$ ; (2) views on whether the Church is fulfilling a meaningful function are measured in both surveys, allowing us to include a time-invariant and a time-varying component in the model. The specifications the model can be summarized as follows:

$$Trust_{i2} - Trust_{i1} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 Z_{i1} + \beta_3 (Z_{i2} - Z_{i1}) + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $X$  is an example of a time-invariant and  $Z$  a time-varying predictor.

In Model 1, the effects of religious-involvement and several sociodemographic factors are estimated. The intercept indicates that trust in the Church decreased with almost 0.3 points for the reference group (that is, non-Catholic males born between 1960 and 1974 who left school before the age of 14 and live in a rural environment). This shift is statistically significant and substantially relevant, given that trust is measured on a scale from 1 to 4. The effects of religious involvement confirm the pattern displayed in Figure 14.1: respondents that are religiously more involved, experience a more outspoken decrease in trust. Among churchgoers (both regular and irregular) as well as marginal Catholics, the decline in trust following the child abuse scandals is about 0.3 points stronger than the change observed among non-Catholics. Besides religious involvement, none of the socio-demographics is significantly related to the change in trust. Apparently, the impact of the child abuse scandals on trust in the Church is rather similar across socio-demographic categories.

Model 2 adds several attitudinal predictors that shed more light on how the scandals eroded the sources of trust. First, whether respondents think the Church is able to fulfil its function meaningfully is included both as a time-invariant and as a time-varying factor. The results show that especially the latter is relevant to understand the erosion of trust. The positive effect ( $b = 0.045$ ,  $p < .0001$ ) indicates that respondents who became more convinced that the Church fulfils its function in a meaningful way have gained trust in the Church. In other words, the observed drop in trust can be linked to perceptions that the Church loses its social function as it is giving less adequate answers on the moral and social problems of our society. Second, disapproval of the way in which the Church responded to the cases of child abuse surfacing is signifi-

cantly linked to a decline in trust as well ( $b = -0.039$ ,  $p = .0412$ ). The loss of trust is more marked among those who are convinced that the internal guardians of trust did not function properly. The effect parameters in Model 2 show also that the recent decline in trust is not significantly related to ethical permissiveness.

Table 14.1 Results from a fixed effects difference model explaining change in trust in the Church ( $N = 610$ ) – unstandardized regression coefficients

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Par.Est.	Std.Err.	p-value	Par.Est.	Std.Err.	p-value
Intercept	-0.293	0.120	0.0149	0.039	0.231	0.8667
Religious involvement						
Regular church-goer	-0.309	0.085	0.0003	-0.235	0.105	0.0265
Irregular church-goer	-0.291	0.090	0.0013	-0.199	0.099	0.0442
Marginal Catholic	-0.316	0.074	<.0001	-0.230	0.079	0.0038
Non-Catholic (ref.cat.)				-0.007	0.059	0.9086
Gender						
Female (ref.cat.)						
Male	0.014	0.059	0.8128	-0.007	0.059	0.9086
Birth Cohort						
Born before 1945	0.007	0.094	0.9391	-0.036	0.094	0.7013
1945-1959	0.115	0.079	0.1484	0.086	0.078	0.2708
1960-1974						
1975-1991	0.000	0.089	0.9987	-0.072	0.088	0.4171
Education						
Left school before 14 (ref.cat.)						
Left school before 18	0.074	0.102	0.4684	0.095	0.103	0.3543
Left school before 20	0.113	0.117	0.3372	0.112	0.119	0.3466
Left school after 20	0.202	0.110	0.0655	0.221	0.112	0.0489
Living area						
Rural (ref.cat.)						
Urban	0.022	0.059	0.7106	0.024	0.059	0.6839
Ethical permissiveness				0.012	0.019	0.5370

Religious beliefs	-0.030	0.011	0.0081
Meaningful function of Church			
Situation at t1	0.020	0.011	0.0739
Change between t1 and t2	0.045	0.010	<.0001
Disapproval response Church to crisis			
	-0.039	0.019	0.0412
R-squared (adjusted)	0.038	0.090	

## 14.6 Conclusion

Religious decline is often related to shifts in moral outlooks. In this sense, secularization theory argues that the Church-prescribed rules and moral standards do not fit any longer with mainstream opinions among Western European population. Loek Halman has mainly studied the degree to which European people are secular, not only focusing on religious practices but also on beliefs, and has looked into the consequences of church attendance on values and moral permissiveness. We would like to add that secularization does not only mean that Catholic religion has lost its impact on public life, and its moral authority over issues related to personal life, but has also lost trust over the recent decades.

Our analysis supports the general diagnosis of the structural decline of Catholicism that the Church-as-institution (and its doctrine of faith) is no longer perceived by the general population as giving useful and meaningful answers to all kind of moral, religious and existential issues, which results in an ongoing decline of institutional distrust. However, our analysis illustrates that there is not only disillusionment regarding the Church's moral and religious function, but also disappointment with the behaviour of priests and indignation about the improper functioning of church hierarchies acting not resolutely and transparently. Our results indicate that, in the case of the child abuse scandals within the Catholic Church, the loss of trust in the Church-as-institution is more outspoken among those who are convinced that the Church authorities as 'guardians of trust' did not function properly in dealing with the pae-

dophilia cases. Besides, it became clear that these scandals have eroded institutional trust predominantly among those who are religiously more involved. Those who were already suspicious are only confirmed in their mistrust by the child abuse cases, while the regular churchgoers are shocked about the abuse of power and the conduct of their own institution. These results give insights into the different mechanisms generating institutional distrust. An important question is whether this decline of trust as a result of the child abuse scandals within the Church will turn out to be temporary or permanent. Or, in other words, will the Church be able to restore the shocked distrust, or will it be an irreversible phenomenon?

## List of References

- Abts, K. (2005). De grammatica en dynamica van vertrouwen: een sociologische verkenning, *Ethiek en Maatschappij*, 8(2): 3-27.
- Allison, P. D. (2009). *Fixed effects regression models*. SAGE publications.
- De Maeyer J. & Abts, K. (2013). Catholicisme et identités régionales en Belgique. In: Y. Tranvouez (Ed.). *La décomposition des chrétientés occidentales, 1950-2010* (pp. 223-238). Brest: CRBC-UBO.
- Dobbelaere, K., Voyé, L. & Billiet, J. (2011). Religie en kerkelijke betrokkenheid: Naar een sociaal gemarginaliseerde kerk? In: K. Abts, K. Dobbelaere, and L. Voyé (Eds.), *Nieuwe Tijden Nieuwe Mensen. Belgen over arbeid, gezin, religie en politiek* (pp. 143-172). Tiel: LannooCampus.
- Halman, L., & Draulans, V. (2006). How secular is Europe? *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57(2), 263-288.
- Halman, L., & Van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and changing moral views: European trends in church attendance and views on homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5): 616-627.
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Loobuyck, P. (2011). De crisis van een instituut in crisis. *Ons erfdeel*, 54(2): 24-33.
- Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and power*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, Confidence, trust: problems and alternatives. In: D. Gambetta (ed.), *Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations* (pp. 94-107). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Luhmann, N. (2013). *A systems theory of religion*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
- Mettepenningen, J. (2011). *Welke kerk? Vandaag en morgen*. Leuven: Davidsfonds Uitgeverij.
- Misztal, B. (1996). *Trust in modern societies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Möllering, G. (2001). The nature of trust: From Georg Simmel to a theory of expectation, interpretation and suspension. *Sociology*, 35(2): 403-420.
- Seligman, A. (1997). *The problem of trust*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Shapiro, S. (1987). The social control of impersonal trust. *American Journal of Sociology*, 93:623-658
- Sztompka, P. (1999). *Trust: A sociological theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Verschraegen, G. & Abts, K. (2022). De kerk in Vlaanderen in de naoorlogse periode: enkele trends en cijfers. In: G. Gunst and S. Latré (Eds.). *De kerk in Vlaanderen* (pp. 19-40). Antwerpen: Pelckmans, 19-40.

# 15. THE RISE OF THE NONES IN ICELAND

---

*Gudbjorg Andrea Jonsdottir*

*Inga Run Saemundsdottir*

*Gudny Bergthora Tryggvadottir*

## **Abstract**

*The number of people that do not belong to a religious denomination – ‘nones’ is growing rapidly in the Nordic countries. The aim of this analysis is to predict non-affiliation in Iceland and other Nordic countries using logistic regression. The hypotheses tested are that people 1) who have little confidence in the church; 2) who are of immigrant background; 3) with left-wing political views, 4) who have more liberal worldviews (moral attitudes) are more likely to be ‘nones’. For this we used existing data obtained in the European Values Study (EVS) wave 5, and previous waves to look at the increase in non-affiliation since the first wave of the EVS in the early eighties. The results show that the strongest predictors for being a ‘none’ are lack of confidence in the church and being of immigrant background. Those who do not belong to a religious denomination have a somewhat more liberal worldview than those who do. Our results also suggest that a decline in confidence in the Icelandic church may explain the rapid increase of ‘nones’ in Iceland. A similar decline in confidence is not seen in the other countries.*



## 15.1 Introduction


The growing number of the ‘nones’ is a feature observed in many European countries (Davie, 2015; Stolz *et al.*, 2016; Woodhead & Catto, 2012) as well as in the USA (Chaves, 2011: 13–17; Hout & Fischer, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2012; Pew Research, 2018; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Burge, 2021). This development is reflected in results from the European Values Study (EVS), which was greatly coordinated by Loek Halman, and the General Social Survey (GSS), showing this trend clearly, with rising numbers of respondents claiming that they do not belong to a religious denomination. In 1990 around a quarter of all respondents in the EVS (EVS, 2020a) said they did not belong to a religious denomination, with numbers ranging from 2 percent in Iceland to 60 percent in the Czech Republic. Subsequently, in 2017 (EVS, 2020b), this number had risen to 30 percent overall. Similarly, although this development seems to happen a little later in the U.S., the GSS shows that while only 6 percent of respondents said they had no religious affiliation in 1991, this increased to 14 percent in 2000, 18 percent in 2010, and 23 percent in 2018 (Smith *et al.*, 2019).

Davie’s (1994) ‘believing without belonging’ thesis stresses the importance of distinguishing between religiosity and religious affiliation, contending that believing is declining at a much slower rate than belonging. As Voas and Crockett (2005) and Tromp *et al.* (2020) explain, Davie (1994) defines the terms ‘believing’ and ‘belonging’ rather loosely, giving room to two different theories on religious change, namely de-institutionalization of Christianity on the one hand, and spiritualization of religion on the other (Tromp *et al.*, 2020: 519). The religious landscape in the Nordic countries has a high overall membership in the Lutheran state churches. The overwhelming majority of the populations in these countries have, until recently, belonged to the Lutheran state churches (Furseth *et al.*, 2018). However, some scholars suggest that these are very secular societies (Botvar & Schmidt, 2010; Furseth, 2015; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Some even claim that the Nordic countries are among the most secular in the world (Zuckerman, 2008). This distinction has given rise to the thesis of ‘belonging without believing’ called the ‘Nordic paradox’ (Gustafsson & Pettersson, 2000). Sundback (2000) suggests that this paradox can be explained by the state churches having a power of unification and an important cultural role

in people’s life events. By being members of the church, people are in effect showing their support for their nation’s cultural symbols and tradition (Hugason, 2001).

With the rapid increase in the number of immigrants in the Nordic countries in the last decades, their populations have become more heterogeneous, resulting in a more complex religious landscape than before with more diversity in faith communities (Furseth, *et al.*, 2018). Iceland remained homogenous with few immigrants until this century with the percentage of immigrants rising from 3% in 2000 to 9% in 2008 and 15% in 2020 (Statistics Iceland, 2021). At the same time, the number of people not registered in any religious organization or other unspecified has risen from 4% in 1999 to 16% in 2017 and up to 24% in 2021, as depicted in figure 15.1.

Figure 15.1 Populations by religious and life stance organizations 1999–2021



Source: Statistics Iceland, 2021

Although immigration may be a part of the explanation for the growth of ‘nones’ in Iceland, the more commonly referred to explanations are numerous problems and scandals connected to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ice-

land since the mid-1990s. These controversies and scandals are related to debates on same-sex church weddings and accusations against the bishop (who was in office from 1989-1997) of sexual harassment and child abuse, and the failure of the church to address these accusations (Spanó *et al.* 2011).

But who are the ‘nones’? As has been pointed out by, among others, Davie (2015), Putnam and Campbell (2010), and Tromp *et al.* (2020): non-affiliation does not necessarily imply non-religion. The non-affiliated may consist of immigrants who have not joined a religious community despite identifying with a religious tradition. They may be secular people, or they may be people who identify as spiritual. But do their values differ from the religiously affiliated, and will the growing number of ‘nones’ lead to a different society? Burge (2021) has studied the ‘nones’ in the U.S and found that the people who are not married and do not have children are the group most likely to be religiously unaffiliated — to be ‘nones’. Pew Research (2018) found that among the most important reasons for non-affiliation were opposition to the positions taken by churches on social and political issues and dislike of religious organizations. Schwadel (2020) argues that having no religious affiliation changes the way people move through the world, and it can dramatically alter their political views and participation. He suggests that having a liberal political perspective may lead some people to becoming ‘nones’.

Based on previous research our hypotheses are the following: People 1) who have little confidence in the church; 2) who are of immigrant background; 3) with left-wing political views, 4) who have more liberal worldviews (moral attitudes) are more likely to be ‘nones’.

## 15.2 Data and Analysis

We make use of all five available waves (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008 and 2017) of the European Values Study (EVS), a repeated cross-sectional dataset that covers a period of nearly four decades. Our sample comprises the Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Three countries, Denmark,

Iceland and Sweden had data available for all five waves. Finland did not participate in the first wave, and Norway did not take part in 1999.

The main focus of the data analysis is to predict non-affiliation among the Nordic countries, using logistic regression using the most recent data set from 2017 (EVS, 2020b; EVS, 2020c). Data was collected by different modes, 3369 interviews were conducted in Denmark by face to face interviews (51.5%), a web survey (37.5%) and a postal survey (11.1%); in Finland, 1220 interviews were completed by face to face interviews (33.3%), a web survey (12.5%) and a postal survey (12.5%); in Iceland<sup>1</sup> 3229 interviews were conducted by face to face interviews (28%), a web survey (68%) partly based on a matrix design (see Luijkx, *et al.* 2021) with some respondents only answering part of the questionnaire; in Norway 1123 respondents answered the survey 86.6% in face to face interviews and 13.4% by telephone; all 1198 respondents in Sweden were interviewed face to face.

The dependent variable in our analysis is the question “Do you belong to a religious denomination?”. Predictor variables in the logistic regression are sex, age, marital status (those who are legally married, in a registered partnership or widowed are classified as married, others as single), whether people have children or not, education (lower, medium and higher), immigrant status (those with both parents born in another country are classified as immigrants), confidence in the church (a great deal/quite a lot, not very much, none at all), political view (left-right scale from 1-10). As measures of liberal moral attitudes, we use the questions of whether the following can be justified (scale 1 to 10 where 1 means never justified and 10 means always justified): taking soft drugs, homosexuality, abortion and divorce.


Data were weighted by the variable ‘gweight’ that has been computed using the marginal distribution of age, sex, educational attainment, and region (European Values Study (EVS) 2017).

<sup>1</sup> EVS 2017 in Iceland was supported by the Icelandic Research Fund, grant number 174181051-3.

### 15.3 Results

Figure 15.2 shows the growing number of religious ‘nones’ in the Nordic countries from 1981 to 2017 according to the European Values Study. The percentage of people that do not belong to a religious denomination is now approaching 40% in Sweden and Norway, close to 30% in Finland and around 20% in Denmark and Iceland. The number of respondents not belonging to a religious denomination has increased significantly between waves 4 (2008-2010) and 5 (2017) in Denmark, Iceland and Norway and to a smaller (non-significant) extent in Finland and Sweden.

Figure 15.2 Percentage not belonging to a religious denomination in the Nordic countries



Source: EVS 1981/1984 – 2017

Table 15.1 shows separate logistic regressions for the five Nordic countries predicting non-affiliation. As expected, (hypothesis 1) confidence in the Church is a strong, significant predictor in all the countries, especially in Finland and Iceland, where those who have no confidence in the Church are almost sixteen times more likely to be non-affiliated than those who have a lot of confidence in the Church in Finland, and almost thirteen times more likely in Iceland.

Being of immigrant background, with both parents born abroad (hypothesis 2) is another strong predictor in Iceland, Sweden and especially in Denmark, where immigrants are almost 15 times more likely than natives not to belong to a religious denomination. Only one respondent in the Finnish data reported having both parents born abroad, making it impossible to test whether immigrants are more likely to stand outside religious denominations. The effect was not significant in Norway.

Having political views to the left of the political left-right spectrum (hypothesis 3) increases the likelihood of not belonging to a religious denomination in all the countries except Sweden where no effect is found.

To test whether liberal moral attitudes were predictors of non-affiliation (hypothesis 4), four variables were included in the analysis. The variables measured whether the following can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between on a scale from 1 to 10: taking soft drugs, homosexuality, abortion and divorce. In all cases where a significant effect was found; it was in the predicted direction: the more liberal the attitude, the more likely that the respondent was a ‘none’. However, the effects found are in some cases very small, or not significant at all, such as in Sweden, where we see that there is not a significant difference in the moral attitudes, nor in political view of those who belong to a religious denomination, and those who do not. The only moral attitude variable with a similar and significant effect in all the countries apart from Sweden is whether it is justifiable to take soft drugs. A more positive stance on this issue goes hand in hand with an increased likelihood of non-affiliation. However, the overall mean for this variable is only 3.1, which shows that this is not generally accepted in the Nordic countries, whereas the means for homosexuality, abortion and divorce are 8.6, 7.73 and 8.31, respectively, showing a general acceptance of these issues. Attitude to homosexuality has a significant effect in Iceland only; attitude to abortion has a small effect in Norway; attitude to divorce has a significant effect in Denmark and Finland.

Men are more likely not to be affiliated than women in all the Nordic countries, apart from Iceland, where there is no significant difference between men and women after other variables presented in Table 15.1 are taken into account. Al-

though younger people are slightly more likely than older not to belong to a religious denomination, this is only significant in Iceland. Marital status and having children or not have little effect, and is only significant in Finland. Education has a significant effect in Denmark and Iceland, where those with a university degree are more likely to be non-affiliated than those with lower education.

Table 15.1 Binary logistic regression predicting who are the Nones in the Nordic countries

	Denmark OR (95% CI)	Finland OR (95% CI)	Iceland OR (95% CI)	Norway OR (95% CI)	Sweden OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.03***	0.16***	0.18***	0.36*	0.18***
Sex					
Men (reference)					
Women	0.64*** (0.51-0.79)	0.57** (0.40-0.80)	0.93ns (0.73-1.20)	0.68** (0.51-0.90)	0.72* (0.54-0.95)
Age					
Age in years	1.00ns (0.99-1.00)	0.99ns (0.98-1.0)	0.99** (0.98-0.99)	0.99ns (0.98-1.00)	1.00ns (0.99-1.00)
Marital status					
Married (reference)					
Single	0.96ns (0.73-1.25)	0.63* (0.43-0.94)	0.78ns (0.58-1.05)	1.08ns (0.77-1.53)	0.83ns (0.61-1.14)
Children					
No children (reference)					
Children	0.91ns (0.68-1.21)	1.76* (1.14-2.73)	0.80ns (0.56-1.15)	0.87ns (0.58-1.29)	1.07ns (0.74-1.54)
Education					
Lower (reference)					
Medium	1.05ns (0.79-1.38)	0.59* (0.37-0.96)	1.23ns (0.88-1.69)	0.71ns (0.50-1.02)	0.90ns (0.60-1.33)

Higher	1.65** (1.24-2.20)	1.18ns (0.73-1.19)	1.44* (1.05-1.97)	0.89ns (0.61-1.29)	1.34ns (0.89-2.02)
Immigrant					
Non immigrant (reference)					
Immigrant	14.66*** (10.24-21.0)	- 1)	3.93*** (2.48-6.23)	1.11ns (0.70-1.76)	4.21*** (2.83-6.28)
Confidence in the church					
A great deal/quite a lot (reference)					
Not very much	2.32*** (1.84-2.94)	4.38*** (3.10-6.20)	3.40*** (2.47-4.69)	2.22*** (1.65-2.97)	2.34*** (1.74-3.14)
None at all	10.48*** (7.6-14.47)	15.75*** (9.34-26.58)	12.52*** (8.80-17.82)	7.57*** (4.41-12.99)	5.47*** (3.51-8.53)
Political view – Left-Right					
1-10 (mean=5.33)	0.91*** (0.87-0.96)	0.91** (0.84-0.98)	0.85*** (0.80-0.90)	0.93* (0.87-0.99)	1.00ns (0.94-1.07)
Justifiable: taking soft drugs					
1-10 (mean=3.10)	1.11*** (1.07-1.16)	1.14*** (1.07-1.23)	1.66*** (1.42-1.94)	1.10** (1.03-1.16)	0.95ns (0.89-1.01)
Justifiable: homosexuality					
1-10 (mean=8.60)	1.03ns (0.96-1.09)	0.94ns (0.87-1.01)	1.32*** (1.15-1.51)	1.04ns (0.97-1.11)	1.07ns (0.99-1.15)
Justifiable: abortion					
1-10 (mean=7.73)	1.02ns (0.95-1.08)	1.06ns (0.97-1.15)	1.05ns (0.99-1.12)	1.08* (1.00-1.16)	0.99ns (0.91-1.07)
Justifiable: divorce					
1-10 (mean=8.31)	1.12** 1.03-1.21)	1.14* (1.03-1.27)	0.94ns (0.88-1.00)	0.98ns (0.92-1.08)	1.04ns (0.95-1.14)
Number of respondents	N=3067	N=1030	N=2581	N=1046	N=1042
Cox & Snell R2	0.18	0.24	0.25	0.15	0.13
Nagelkerke R2	0.30	0.35	0.40	0.20	0.18

Statistical significance: \* $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$

1) Only one respondent in Finland had both parents born abroad

## 15.4 Discussion and Conclusions

Not surprisingly, lack of confidence in the Church seems to be one of the strongest predictors of non-affiliation. Whether this lack of confidence in the Church can be argued to be the cause of the increase in the number of ‘nones’ in the Nordic countries over the last forty years, however, is doubtful. Looking at the changes in confidence in the Church over the years reveals that only in Iceland has the trust to or confidence in the church declined since the start of the EVS. In the first wave of the EVS back in the early eighties, only 29% of respondents reported having not very much or no confidence at all in Iceland, compared to around or above 50% in the other countries. Since then, confidence in the Church has increased or remained the same in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, but significantly decreased in Iceland and in the latest wave of the EVS in 2017 there is less confidence in the Church in Iceland than in any of the other countries with 54% of respondents saying that they have not very much or no confidence in the Church at all. Thus, it seems very plausible that this lack of trust contributes to the rise of the ‘nones’ in Iceland. The model yields a fairly high  $R^2$  in Iceland (Nagelkerke  $R^2=0.40$ ), in Finland (0.35) and in Denmark (0.30) but only 0.20 in Norway and 0.18 in Sweden suggesting that there are other explanations for the increased number of ‘nones’ than we assessed in the model.

The results presented in Table 15.1 do not give strong support for the hypothesis that an increase in the number of the ‘nones’ will lead to a value shift in society. There is a difference between those who belong to a religious denomination in the Nordic countries and those who do not. The latter have a somewhat more liberal worldview, but that is a matter of degree and not of a kind.

As for the limitations, different modes of data collection may have an impact on comparison between countries and needs to be analyzed further. Response rates among immigrants are generally much lower than among natives in general population surveys (cf. Font & Méndez, 2013). This may undermine diversity in value orientations, especially in countries where the number of immigrants is high.

## List of References

- Botvar, P.K. & Schmidt, U. (Eds.). (2010). *Religion i dagens Norge. Mellom sekularisering og sakralisering*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget
- Burge, R.P. (2021). *The Nones: Where They Came From, Who They Are, and Where They Are Going?* Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Chaves, M. (2011). *American Religion: Contemporary Trends*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Davie, G. (1994). *Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Davie, G. (2015). *Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- European Values Study (EVS) 2017: Weighting Data. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ss0ar-70113-4>
- EVS (2020a): European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file Version 3.1.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13486>
- EVS (2020b): European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 4.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13560>
- EVS (2020c): European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017) - Matrix Design Data. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7502 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13561>
- Font, J., & Méndez, M. (Eds.). (2013). *Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Furseth, I. (Ed.). (2015). *Religionens Tilbakekomst i Offentligheten? Religion, Politikk, Medier, Stat og Sivilsamfunn i Norge Siden 1980-Tallet*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Furseth, I., Ahlin, L., Ketola, K., Leis-Peters, A. & Sigurvinnsson, B.R. (2018). Changing Religious Landscapes in the Nordic Countries. In: I. Furseth (Ed.), *Religious Complexity in the Public Sphere*. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy.
- Gustafsson, G. & Petterson, (Eds.) (2000). *Folkkyrkor och religiös pluralism – den nordiska religiösa modellen*. Stockholm: Verbum.
- Hout, M., & Fischer, C.S. (2014). Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987–2012. *Sociological Science* 1: 423–446.
- Hugason, H. (2001). Trúarhefð á Norðurlöndum í ljósi kirkjusögunnar. *Ritröð Guðfræðistofnunar*, 11(15): 57-79.
- Luijckx, R., Jónsdóttir, G.A., Gummer, T., Ernst Stähli, M., Frederiksen, M., Ketola, K., Reeskens, T., Brisinger, E., Christmann, P., Gunnarsson, S. Th., Hjaltason, Á.B., Joye, D., Lomazzi, D., Maineri, A.M., Milbert, P., Ochsner, M., Pollien, A., Sapin, M., Solanes, I., Verhoeven, S. & Wolf, C. (2021). The European Values Study 2017: On the Way to the Future Using Mixed-Modes. *European Sociological Review*, 37 (330–346).
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Pew Research Center. (2012). 'Nones' on the Rise. <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise>.
- Pew Research Center. (2018). Why America's 'nones' don't identify with a religion. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/08/why-americas-nones-dont-identify-with-a-religion>.
- Putnam, R.D. & Campbell, D.E. (2010). *American Grace. How Religion Divides and Unites Us*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Schwadel, P. (2020). The Politics of Religious Nones. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 59(1).
- Smith, T. W., Davern, M., Freese, J. & Morgan, S.L. (2019). *General social surveys, 1972–2018, cumulative codebook*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Spanó, R. R., Guðmundsdóttir, B. & Njálsson, Þ.I. (2011). *Rannsóknarnefnd Kirkjubings. Skýrsla um viðbrögð og starfshætti þjóðkirkjunnar vegna ásakana á hendur Ólafi Skúlasyni biskupi um kynferðisafbrot*. Reykjavík: Rannsóknarnefnd Kirkjubings.
- Statistics Iceland (2021). Population by origin, sex and age 1996-2020. [https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/lbuar/lbuar...mannfjoldi...3\\_bakgrunnur...Uppruni/MAN43000.px/?rxid=3f3e3a26-dbd6-4fe0-8968-a6d2b55b1885](https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/lbuar/lbuar...mannfjoldi...3_bakgrunnur...Uppruni/MAN43000.px/?rxid=3f3e3a26-dbd6-4fe0-8968-a6d2b55b1885).
- Stolz, J., Könnemann, J., Purdie, M.S., Englberger, T. & Krüggeler, M. (2016). *(Un)Believing in Modern Society. Religion, Spirituality, and Religious—Secular Competition*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Sundback, S. (2000). Medlemskapet i de lutherska kyrkorna i Norden. In: G. Gustafsson and T. Petterson (Eds.), *Folkkyrkor och religiös pluralism - den nordiska religiösa modellen* (pp. 34-74). Stockholm: Verbum.
- Tromp, P., Pless, A. & Houtman, D. (2020). 'Believing Without Belonging' in Twenty European Countries (1981–2008). Deinstitutionalization of Christianity or Spiritualization of Religion? *Review of Religious Research*, 62:509–531.
- Voas, D., & Crockett, A. (2005). Religion in Britain: Neither Believing Nor Belonging. *Sociology*, 39(1): 11–28.
- Woodhead, L. & Catto, R. (Eds.) (2012). *Religion and Change in Modern Britain*. London: Routledge.
- Zuckerman, P. (2008). *Society Without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us About Contentment*. New York: New York University Press

# 16. TRUST THY NEIGHBOUR:

CONTEXTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN NON-RELIGIOSITY AND TOLERANCE

---

*Peter Achterberg*

*Christof van Mol*

## **Abstract**

*Over the years, Loek Halman has had a vast interest in investigating religious change and its ramifications. In this chapter, his neighbours at the Department of Sociology study how people with different religious backgrounds differ in their tolerance towards neighbours. Based on the last wave of the European Values Study, they investigate under what conditions religious people and the religious ‘nones’ – agnostic, atheistic and spiritual-minded people – are more tolerant. Their findings indicate that non-religious groups are less tolerant compared to religious ones in more secularized countries. On the other hand, their findings also suggest that in more secularized countries, tolerance levels are somewhat higher.*

## 16.1 Introduction

Throughout his career, secularization theory, the European Values Study (EVS), and international comparative research played a prominent role in the work of Loek Halman (see e.g. Halman & Draulans, 2006; Halman & Van Ingen, 2015; Sieben & Halman, 2014; Halman & Riis, 2002). In several of his papers, he also touched upon the issue of tolerance (see e.g. Muis *et al.*, 2019; Halman & Luijkx, 2008), which is an important sentiment for harmonious neighbour relations (Baumgartner, 1988; cited in Cheshire, Fitzgerald & Liu, 2019). As Loek is our close neighbour within the department of Sociology at Tilburg University, in this chapter we therefore focus on trust in neighbours, relying on the EVS. We particularly focus on the relationship between non-religiosity and tolerance. After all, in the academic literature, secularization is linked to both more and less tolerance (Nandy, 1988; Gorski & Altinordu, 2008). Our analysis makes two main contributions to scientific understanding of this relationship.

First, recent scholarship on the issue points to the importance of distinguishing between several groups among the so-called religious ‘nones’ (Lim, MacGregor & Putnam, 2010; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2015), that is, individuals who are not religious and/or no longer religious. Smith & Baker (2009) were among the first to suggest that ‘the nones’ should not be uniformly treated. They found distinct categories among the ‘nones’, who differ in their world-views and political outlook. While, of course, it will be unclear how to accurately define different categories among the unaffiliated, in this study, extending Smith and Baker’s distinction, we discern three categories: ‘atheists’, ‘agnostic people’, and the ‘spiritually-minded’. The first category consists of atheists, who do not affiliate with a religious denomination and deny the overall existence of a God (Bullivant, 2008). The second category consists of agnostic people, who are sceptical about the existence and nature of God and simply ‘do not know’ (Bullivant, 2008). They generally do not believe there is a way of finding out whether God exists. The last category consists of spiritually-minded, who generally appeal to “multiple traditions, styles, and ideas simultaneously, combining them into idiosyncratic packages” (Houtman & Aupers, 2007: 306).

Second, Loek Halman indicated in his work that secularization is particularly

associated with greater acceptance of abortion, divorce and euthanasia, but not homosexuality, in Western Europe (Halman & Van Ingen, 2015). However, the opinions of Eastern Europeans on these four issues appeared to be far more conservative. As such, Loek’s work underlines the importance of adopting an international comparative approach when analysing the relationship between secularization and tolerance. Tolerance, furthermore, generally correlates positively with trust (Frederiksen, 2019; Van Doorn, 2014), and international variation in levels of trust and tolerance are reported in other studies as well (see e.g. Borgonovi, 2012).

Consequently, in this chapter we study tolerance towards neighbours among religious ‘nones’, taking into account a variety of profiles that exist within this group, as well as how country-level differences in secularization affect trust in their neighbours.

## 16.2 Theory and Hypotheses

In the literature, two broad lines of thought can be discerned about the effects of secularization and Christian religiosity on trust and tolerance. On the one hand there are scholars who worry about the ‘dissolution of the moral space’ (Sztompka, 2002: 64) in advanced secularized societies. A similar view can be obtained from Etzioni (2001: 360), who argued that ‘without a shared moral culture, ordering life will have to rely on laws not undergirded by moral commitments, which (...) has numerous ill consequences. (...) social order most continually be constructed – or men (and women) be wolf to one another.’ Remarkably, this theoretical view is supported by ideas on the ties between religiosity and populist voting behaviour. In this literature, Christians are shielded or ‘inoculated’ against voting for intolerant radical right-wing parties, as Christians are sharing ideals of stewardship and solidarity, promoting mutual tolerance and trust between all sorts of groups (Arzheimer and Carter, 2009; Siegers & Jedinger, 2020). This theoretical perspective leads to the expectation that the religious ‘nones’ are less inclined to be tolerant towards their neighbours (hypothesis 1a) than their religious counterparts, and that this is especially so in highly secularized contexts (hypothesis 1b).



On the other hand, there is a far more optimistic perspective on the effects of secularization on trust and tolerance. In this view, the merits of modernization are put central stage. Emerson and Hartman (2006: 130), for example, argue that ‘modernization (...) squeezes out religious influences from many of its spheres and greatly reduces religion’s role in the others. (...) Given this vast pluralism, societies and their governments are able to claim less and less as common to all. What rise to the top as shared values are tolerance and acceptance. These become the core values of highly modernized societies.’ Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also predict that in these highly modernized and fully secularized countries, a highly tolerant cultural climate is fostered. This view is supported by the literature on religiosity and populism. In this view, religiosity (might) foster(s) nativism, authoritarianism and intolerance of out-groups as it promotes a closed-mindset (Montgomery and Winter, 2015). Following this perspective, one might expect that the religious ‘nones’ are more inclined to be tolerant towards their neighbours (hypothesis 2a), and that this is especially so in highly secularized countries (hypothesis 2b).

### 16.3 Data and Measures

In order to test the two main hypotheses, we analyse the last wave of the European Values Study – in which Loek Halman played a pivotal role. We analyse all countries included in the data: Albania, Azerbaijan, Austria, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, North Macedonia, and Great Britain. In our analyses, we include information of 53,533 individuals in these countries – which means that about 3,197 individuals there were one or multiple missing values on their responses to the questions we included in the analysis.

For brevity’s sake, we only discuss the most relevant information about the measures we used. For more information about the measurements, the data

package on the website of the Open Science Foundation can be consulted.<sup>1</sup>

In order to measure our dependent variable *tolerance towards neighbours*, we used the questions about which of the groups of people individuals would not like to have as neighbours. We constructed a scale based on ‘people of a different race’, ‘heavy drinkers’, ‘immigrants/ foreign workers’, and ‘drug addicts’. Additionally, there was information on the category of ‘homosexuals’, yet we decided to not include this information in the analyses reported here as previous research shows that there are very strong ties between religious background and acceptance of homosexuality (Halman and Van Ingen, 2015).<sup>2</sup> Factor analyses on the dichotomous responses on these four items yielded one factor with an eigenvalue of 1.76, explaining about 44% of variance within the four questions. The scale (which had a reliability  $\alpha = 0.57$ ) was calculated as a mean score for each respondent who had at least three valid responses ( $M = 1.55$ ,  $sd = 0.28$ ). Higher scores on this scale stand for more tolerance toward all sorts of groups of neighbours.

Based on the question which statement comes closest to the respondents’ beliefs, we measured their *religious background*, our main independent variable. Persons who indicated that they believed that ‘there is a personal’ God (39%) were coded as religious persons and constitute our reference category. Persons who indicated that ‘there is some sort of spirit or life force’ (33%) were coded as spiritual-minded people. Those who chose ‘I don’t really know what to think’ (14%) were coded as agnostic people. And those indicating that ‘I don’t really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force’ (14%) were coded as atheists.


Our country-level variable, *nation-level religiosity*, is a construct of multiple items. At the individual level we used information about membership of a religious denomination (dichotomized), on belief in a personal god (used above as well), in church participation (on a seven point scale) and on confidence in the church (on a four-point scale). After standardizing the answers to these

<sup>1</sup> [https://osf.io/v8hda/?view\\_only=e516ebc15e894dc996b9b45d63fcf6e3](https://osf.io/v8hda/?view_only=e516ebc15e894dc996b9b45d63fcf6e3)

<sup>2</sup> Inclusion of this item does not yield substantially different results than the ones presented in this chapter.

items, we constructed an individual-level scale ( $\alpha = 0.76$ ) measuring religiosity, which we then, in a next step, aggregated to the national level. Higher scores on this measure for nation-level religiosity stand for more religiosity in a nation. Figure 16.1 shows average nation-level religiosity.

Figure 16.1 Differences in nation-level religiosity



Source: EVS 2020

In our analyses, we controlled for the effects of age, education, social class, and gender. Given the short nature of this chapter, we did not add control variables at the country level.

## 16.4 Results

In order to test the hypotheses, we estimated multi-level models using the Mixed-methods command in IBM SPSS Statistics 24. As a first step, we estimated an empty model, which allows to determine how much of the variance in the

dependent variable can be explained at the country level. The Intra Class Correlation indicated that about 18 percent of the differences in tolerance towards neighbours can be explained at the national level, indicating the need for a multi-level analysis. Next, we estimated two multi-level models to test our hypotheses.

Table 16.1 Multilevel regression models predicting tolerance towards neighbours

	Model 1	Model 2
<b>Fixed effects</b>	<b>Main model</b>	<b>Interaction effects</b>
Constant	1.578 (0.021)	1.584 (0.021)
<i>Religious background</i>		
Religious (=ref)	--	--
Atheist	0.003 (0.003)	0.011 (0.008)
Agnostic	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)
Spiritual-minded	0.009 (0.003)**	0.006 (0.004)
Nation-level religiosity	-0.082 (0.055)	-0.113 (0.055)*
<i>Interactions</i>		
Atheist*Nation-level religiosity	--	0.086 (0.022)***
Agnostic*Nation-level religiosity	--	0.078 (0.019)***
Spiritual-minded*Nation-level religiosity	--	0.054 (0.012)***
<b>Random effects</b>		
Individual-level variance	0.066	0.065
Country-level variance	0.014	0.14
Slope atheist *10 <sup>-2</sup>	--	0.125
Slope agnostic	--	0.092
Slope spiritual-minded	--	0.017
Deviance	6387.598	6292.242
DF	21	27

Source: EVS 2020


Notes: REML estimation, Bs and Standard Errors between brackets shown; N=53,533 in 34 countries; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (Two-sided tests for significance); the effects of the control variables (age, education, class, gender) are not shown here but can be consulted in the data package.

As can be observed in Table 16.1, we did not find much evidence in support for hypotheses 1a and 2a. In model 1, we only observe a correlation between spiritual-minded people and tolerance towards neighbours, indicating that, on average, spiritual-minded individuals are slightly more likely to be tolerant towards their neighbours compared to religious people. The other two non-religious groups, however, are equally tolerant towards neighbours as religious people. As such, hypothesis 1a and 2a can be rejected.

The second model adds two sets of estimations as compared to model 1. First, we added an estimation of the variances of the slopes for the effects of the religious background dummies. The results show that these are significantly different across countries. This is a prerequisite for the estimation of the cross-level interactions between these dummies and national-level religiosity, which is the second set of estimations that are added in model 2. Each of the three cross-level interactions is statistically significant.

Figure 16.2 graphs the interactions that are estimated in Model 2. The x-axis depicts national-level religiosity, and the y-axis shows the predicted tolerance towards neighbours for the three non-religious groups (as compared to the religious). The figure shows that the three non-religious groups are less tolerant than the religious group in more secular societies (the left-hand side of the figure), and that these groups are more tolerant towards neighbours in more religious contexts. This clearly refutes hypothesis 2b, while it is in favour of hypothesis 1b. As non-religious live in more secularized societies, they are less likely to be tolerant towards their neighbours compared to their religious counterparts. It needs to be noted though, that the general level of tolerance is higher in these nations than in more religious ones.

Figure 16.2 Predicted tolerance by the cross-level interaction of national-level religiosity and individual-level religious background



Source: EVS 2020

## 16.5 Conclusion

In this short chapter, we investigated the tolerance of the so-called ‘nones’. As is common in much sociological work, the chapter does not unequivocally lead to either the conclusion that secularisation leads to more tolerance or that it leads to less tolerance. Instead, the conclusion brings forward a far more nuanced conclusion. On the one hand, gloomy side thinkers are right in the sense that non-religious groups are less tolerant compared to religious ones in more secularized countries. On the other hand, our findings seem to indicate that in more secularized countries, tolerance levels are somewhat higher, showing how right more optimistic scholars are on this subject.

Either way, these findings warrant more research. Not only on future waves of

the EVS, which will show how these trends will develop. But more so, on the exact, underlying mechanisms that are at work here. These may answer questions as to why religious people are more tolerant in more secular nations, as well as what exactly explains the marked differences between the agnostic, spiritual-minded and atheist groups in their trust of neighbours.

As Loek himself indicated in his first scientific publication (Halman 1991, 140-141, authors' translation from Dutch): 'Dutch people are well known for their tolerance [...], but the numbers [of Loek's analysis] indicate that Dutch people do not excel in this compared to other countries.' Luckily, for us, Loek is not a very typical Dutchman. Only one (respectively two) walls separated our offices from Loek's office. Yet, Loek has always been an extremely tolerant neighbour.

## List of References

- Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2009). Christian religiosity and voting for West European radical right parties. *West European Politics*, 32(5): 985-1011.
- Baker, J. O. B., & Smith, B. (2009). None too simple: Examining issues of religious nonbelief and nonbelonging in the United States. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48(4): 719-733.
- Baumgartner, MP. (1988). *The Moral Order of a Suburb*. Oxford University Press.
- Borgonovi, F. (2012). The relationship between education and levels of trust and tolerance in Europe. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 63(1): 146-67.
- Bullivant, S. (2010). The New Atheism And Sociology: Why Here? Why Now? What Next? Pp. 109-124 in: Amarasingam, A. (Ed.), *Religion and the New Atheism. A Critical Appraisal*. Brill.
- Cheshire, L., Fitzgerald, R. & Liu, Y. (2019). Neighbourhood change and neighbour complaints: How gentrification and densification influence the prevalence of problems between neighbours. *Urban Studies*, 56(6): 1093-112.
- Emerson, M.O. & Hartman, D. (2006). The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism. *Annual Review of Sociology* 32: 127-144.
- Etzioni, A. (2001). On Social and Moral Revival. *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 9(3):356-371.
- EVS (2020). European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 4.0.0*, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13560>.
- Frederiksen, M. (2019). On the inside of generalized trust: Trust dispositions as perceptions of self and others. *Current Sociology*, 67(1): 3-26.
- Gorski, P. S., & Altinordu, A. (2008). After Secularization? *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34(1): 55-85.
- Halman, L. (1991). *Waarden in de westerse wereld: een internationale exploratie van de waarden in de westerse samenleving*. Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., & Draulans, V. (2006). How secular is Europe? *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57(2): 263-288.
- Halman, L., & Luijkx, R. (2008). What happened to Dutch values? Investigating general and differential trends in values in the Netherlands. In T. Petterson & Y. Esmer (Eds.), *Changing values, persisting cultures. Case studies in value change* (pp. 175-198). Brill.
- Halman, L., & Riis, O. (Eds.). (2002). *Religion in Secularizing Society. The Europeans' Religion at the End of the 20th Century*. Brill.
- Halman, L., & van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and Changing Moral Views: European Trends in Church Attendance and Views on Homosexuality, Divorce, Abortion, and Euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5), 616-627.
- Houtman, D., & Aupers, S. (2007). The spiritual turn and the decline of tradition: The spread of post Christian spirituality in 14 Western countries, 1981-2000. *Journal for the Scientific Study of religion*, 46(3): 305-320.
- Lim, C., MacGregor, C. A., & Putnam, R. D. (2010). Secular and liminal: Discovering heterogeneity among religious nones. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 49(4): 596-618.
- Montgomery, K. A., & Winter, R. (2015). Explaining the Religion Gap in Support for Radical Right Parties in Europe. *Politics and Religion*, 8(2): 379-403.
- Muis, Q., Sieben, I., Reeskens, T., & Halman, L. (2019). Seksueel-ethische permissiviteit: trends in Nederland 1981-2017. *Mens en Maatschappij*, 94(4): 429-458.
- Nandy, A. (1988). The politics of secularism and the recovery of religious tolerance. *Alternatives*, 13(2): 177-194.
- Sieben, I., & Halman, L. (2014). Religion and parental values in a secularized country: Evidence from the Netherlands. *Social Compass*, 61(1): 121-140.
- Siegers, P., & Jedinger, A. (2020). Religious Immunity to Populism: Christian Religiosity and Public Support for the Alternative for Germany. *German Politics*, 1-21.
- Sztompka, P. (2002). On the decaying moral space. Is there a way out? *European Review*, 10(1): 63-72.
- Van Doorn, M. (2014). The nature of tolerance and the social circumstances in which it emerges. *Current Sociology*, 62(6): 905-27.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wilkins-Laflamme, S. (2015). How Unreligious are the Religious' Nones'? Religious Dynamics of the Unaffiliated in Canada. *Canadian Journal of Sociology (Online)*, 40(4): 477.

# 17. POPULISM AND RELIGION:

## EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION ON POPULIST ATTITUDES

---

*Yilmaz Esmer*

### **Abstract**

*This is a comparative analysis of the association between populist attitudes and religious affiliation –namely, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. Using the most recent EVS/WVS survey data from 76 countries, we develop a populist attitudes scale consisting of 10 items and covering some major dimensions of populism on which we find general agreement in the relevant literature. A regression analysis of over 94,000 cases and controlling for education and income, reveals significant religious effects on our populist attitudes scale. Further, and confirming expectations, the signs of religion effects on democratic values and attitudes are the opposite of the effects on populist attitudes. This is an indication that, at the attitudinal level, populism and democracy reside in opposing corners.*

## 17.1 Introduction

Since the last decade, populism has become one of the most frequently used – and, if one may say so, overused and abused – terms in political vocabulary. Both journalistic and academic analyses of national, as well as international politics increasingly rely on this concept to describe and sometimes explain current political developments. Undoubtedly, events such as Brexit, the election of Donald Trump as American President, and democratic backsliding in European Union member states such as Hungary and Poland, have contributed greatly to the need to depend on a catchword which could serve as an umbrella that would cover these and similar developments in different corners of the globe. However, despite – or perhaps because of – the immense popularity of the term, a consensus on its precise definition does not seem to be in sight. From time to time, one even gets the impression that any political party, from far left to far right, that one dislikes can get labelled as populist and the same can be said of political leaders as well.

Although the term itself is much older, quite justifiably, the conference organized by the London School of Economics in 1967 with the participation of an impressive rostrum of distinguished international scholars is regarded as the first rigorous attempt at defining populism. The conference proceedings that were put together in an edited volume (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969) started out with a bold and striking statement: “A spectre is haunting the world –populism.” Marx and Engels’ famous opening sentence of *The Communist Manifesto* seems to have lost its appeal as well as credibility since the collapse of the Soviet Union but Ionescu and Gellner’s prediction cannot be refuted off hand –at least not for the present and probably not for the foreseeable future either.

Commendable as it was, the 1967 LSE conference was concluded in disappointment with regard to reaching a rigorous or even just agreed-upon definition of populism. Indeed, the only consensus that seems to have emerged from this ambitious and high powered meeting was a “no consensus” on the definition of populism. In a rather harsh review of the conference book cited above, Saloutos (1970) concludes that the authors were unable “to come up with an acceptable definition of populism.” Although considerably more com-

plimentary than Saloutos, reviewing the same book, de Kadt (1970) concedes that “populism is a slippery concept.”

In a much more recent commentary, Baker (2019) sums up the feelings concerning the LSE conference in a rather blunt way. “In 1967, when political theorists from around the world gathered at the London School of Economics [...] they had a hard time figuring out exactly what they were supposed to be talking about. [...] In the end, the conference proceedings failed to clarify the matter at hand. ‘There can be no doubt about the *importance* of populism,’ read a summary report. ‘But no one is clear what it is.’”

Where do we stand over half a century after the LSE conference? The situation is not nearly as hopeless as it seemed back then, but the definitional issues still have not been completely resolved. The mere subtitle of Baker’s article (2019) should suffice to sum up the present state of affairs: “The battle to define populism.” Kriesi (2018, p. 5) succinctly summarizes both the immense popularity of the term, as well as the ongoing confusion over its definition: “We are living in a time when the term ‘populism’ has become a buzzword that is used by almost everyone in almost every conceivable situation. The concept has never been known for its exceptional clarity and academics have rather characterized it as ‘slippery’, ‘chameleonic’, or worse.”

Nevertheless, there is *some* agreement on at least few indicators of this multi-dimensional concept and the analysis I present below takes advantage of this, admittedly shallow, consensus.

It is more or less commonly agreed that the milestone for the contemporary literature on the subject of populism is the famous article published in 2004 (Mudde 2004). It is now next to impossible to come across to any academic publication on populism that does not include a reference to Mudde’s 2004 article (as of 21 March 2021, Google Scholar reported 4096 cites) and his definition: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism” (Mudde, 2004, p.

543; emphases original). Mudde also describes populism as a “thin-centred ideology” (2004, p. 544) in an attempt at justifying the labelling of political parties situated anywhere along the widest possible ideological spectrum as populist.

Mudde’s (2004) widely accepted definition raises a rather fundamental question: is populism a unidimensional concept that can be reduced to the glorification of the “common folk” and the vilification of the “elites?” How about nativism and the related rhetoric of defending the motherland against foreigners, intruders, immigrants, etc.? Or is the yearning for a strong, charismatic leader irrelevant? Are the levels of trust in politicians and/or political institutions to be ignored? Mudde’s response (2004, p. 545) is that “These features facilitate rather than define populism.”

Regardless of whether these features cannot be separated from the definition of the concept, as many including the present author would argue, or be simply – and one might even say casually – regarded as “facilitators,” they still need to be dealt with if the task at hand is the empirical measurement of populism.

## 17.2 Measuring Populism

Clearly, operationally measuring a concept that is so elusive, vague and even controversial is a task of mammoth proportions. And yet, what cannot be operationally measured cannot be empirically related to anything else. Therefore, the efforts to come up with a list of indicators (given that populism itself has to be treated as a latent variable) must be regarded as “work in progress” and the present chapter should also be read with that caveat.

In a very recent working paper, Norris (2020, p.2) refers to the very same problem and notes that “Unfortunately, systematic, valid and rigorous cross-national measurement of the populist phenomenon has lagged far behind scholarly research.” Then, she details an international project ([www.globalpartysurvey.org](http://www.globalpartysurvey.org)) aimed at classifying political parties in 163 countries with data obtained through an expert survey. Few attitude questions derived from EVS/WVS questionnaires are intended to relate the positions of the voters of political parties

on selected indicators. My aim in this Chapter is to identify populist attitudes at the micro level and to estimate their distribution among adherents of major religions in as many countries as the data will allow.

As noted above, despite the enormous appeal and popularity of the subject, attempts at operational measurement of populist attitudes have been rather limited. We briefly review here some that are relevant for our purposes.

First, we, once more, turn our attention to Mudde and his collaborators whose paper, entitled “Measuring Populist Attitudes” (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012, p. 7), has direct relevance to our present topic. The authors claim to have developed “four statements that capture the key elements of populism.” These “key elements” to be adopted in survey questionnaires aimed at measuring populist attitudes are, we are told, “a Manichean view of politics, a notion of reified popular will, and, and a belief in conspiring elite.” With these elements in mind, four survey questions are developed. Additionally, the authors draft a module of pluralism (three questions) and use the so-called “stealth democracy” module consisting of four survey questions and drafted by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002). Hawkins *et.al.* (2012) test the validity of their questions on two large scale surveys carried out in the United States. Two years later, Mudde, this time joined by two different collaborators, published another article proposing scales of populist (eight items), pluralist (3 items) and elitist (three items) attitudes and relating them to political party preferences (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2014).

This time their test data came from the Netherlands. As the number of items indicates, the populism scale proposed two years ago was expanded and slightly revised.

Due to limitations of space, I shall forego reviewing additional, but mostly similar, measures drafted by other authors but would like to draw the readers’ attention to an interesting empirical comparison of seven recent scales of populist attitudes (Castanho Silva, B. *et. al.*, 2019) including the Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014) scale. This article reports the results of the validity tests (along with other major quality checks) of the questions included in these seven scales and propose the items that seem to be the best measures. Their

tests are conducted on data from online surveys collected in nine countries.<sup>1</sup>

### 17.3 Populist Attitudes and Religious Faith

Valuable as they are, data limitations of the seven scales mentioned above prevent us from using them in the present Chapter. It will be recalled that our aim is to assess the distribution of populist attitudes among adherents of major world religions. Obviously, to allow meaningful comparisons, this aim necessitates the availability of large-scale international survey data ideally covering as many societies as possible. Among the data sets that these scales are tested with, only the fifth round of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) seems suitable for our purposes. The CSES surveys carried out between 2016 and 2021 cover 20 countries with a total sample size of 35,165. However, a closer examination of the data reveals that Muslims make up only 4.2% of the total number of interviews (n=1,471). And much more importantly, 71% of these 1,471 interviews were conducted in Turkey with an additional 237 coming from Montenegro. Put differently, the overwhelming majority of the interviews are located in only two countries which makes it impossible to disentangle country effects from religion effects.<sup>2</sup>

Under these circumstances the latest round of EVS/WVS surveys seems to be the only reasonable alternative among international comparative data sets available for analysis. However, EVS/WVS surveys do not include a populism module. To at least partially overcome this limitation, I shall construct a scale with, at best indirect, indicators of populist attitudes from EVS/WVS questionnaires.

### 17.4 An Indirect and Imperfect Scale of Populist Attitudes

Given the deep definitional disagreements, it is doubtful that any scale of populist attitudes can be entirely satisfactory. The scale proposed in this Chapter,

<sup>1</sup> For the list of seven scales tested, see Silva *et.al.* 2019; Table 1.

<sup>2</sup> CSES data are publicly available and can be downloaded from [www.cses.org](http://www.cses.org). The reference above is to module 5 (2016-21).

on the other hand, is by necessity even more approximate and indirect due to limitations of data.

Sifting through the most recent questionnaires, the following items that are common to both the European Values Study and the World Values Surveys seem to be the best candidates for our scale. These items are:

- “Would or would not want a neighbour of a different race?”
- “Would or would not want immigrants/foreign workers as neighbours?”
- “Agree/disagree with the statement that “when jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.”
- “Trust or do not trust people of another religion?”
- “Trust or do not trust people of another nationality?”
- “Agree/disagree that it would be a good thing for people to have greater respect for authority?”
- “Confidence in political parties?”
- “Confidence in parliament?”
- “Confidence in the United Nations?”
- “Would or would not want a homosexual neighbour?”

The first six items of the proposed scale aim at measuring populist-pluralist dimension in a society. This is important because pluralism, an essential feature of democratic regimes, is regarded as the direct opposite of populism. (Norris, 2019) These six items tap attitudes towards groups that are commonly regarded as the “other.” Thus, unlike pluralists, populists are expected to hold negative views of people of different religions, nationalities and races. Political parties commonly regarded as populist have strong nativist and at times even racist tendencies. (Baker, 2019). Similarly, strong hostile feelings against immigrants are widely regarded as a central characteristic of populism. (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012; Joppke, 2020) An emphasis on “dangers” posed by immigrants and support of anti-immigrant policy proposals have been central to the rhetoric and actions of populist leaders around the globe. From Brexiteers over Donald Trump to Viktor Orban, outright hostility towards foreigners in general and immigrants in particular have been a trademark populism and populist leaders.



As Mudde (2004:546) writes “[populists] do not want to change their values or their way of life.” and the objection to having a homosexual neighbor is an indicator of this attitude. Also noted by Mudde (2004:559) is the common observation that populists reject the “political class” and, therefore, lack of confidence in political parties and national parliaments are at least indirect measures of this attitude.

Deep distrust of international organizations and international governance, often highly correlated with nationalistic ideologies, is certainly not a recent or surprising discovery. And although nationalism and populism are not one and the same, both seem to share a profound skepticism of international organizations. As put by Copelovitch & Pevehouse (2019, pp. 169-170) “Around the world, populism and nationalism are on the rise. Everywhere one looks, it seems, the tide is shifting away from globalization and global governance toward economic nationalism and a rising backlash against international organizations.” This observation is shared widely and one is not hard-pressed to cite current examples from different corners of the globe (e.g. Bosco, 2018) The populist challenge to the United Nations was voiced by the organization’s Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres in no uncertain terms: “The U.N. chief painted a grim picture of the state of the world in his opening address to the annual gathering of presidents, prime ministers, monarchs and government officials from the U.N.’s 193 member nations. He pointed to rising polarization and populism, ebbing cooperation, *‘fragile’ trust in international institutions...*” (Lederer & Peltz, 2018; emphasis is mine).With these considerations, we can comfortably include our “confidence in the United Nations” variable in our list of indicators of populism and turn to the task of constructing a populism scale using EVS/WVS data.

### 17.5 Hypothesis, Measurement, and Analysis

Assuming I have justified our list of 10 populism indicators based on the most recent EVS/WVS questionnaires, I now proceed to construct a scale of populism. However, I must warn the reader once again that the proposed scale is an incomplete (it does not cover all dimensions that are generally agreed upon in

the relevant literature) and indirect (items were not originally formulated as indicators of populism) measure. With these caveats in mind, the task now is to construct the scale and test our hypothesis.

With each item coded as 0 and 1, our simple additive scale ranges between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating higher degrees of populism.<sup>3</sup> The frequency distribution of our populism scale<sup>4</sup> for 94,006 cases spread over 76 countries (mean=4.90; median=5.00 and standard deviation=2.15) is given in Table 17.1.

Table 17.1 Frequency Distribution of 10-item Scale of Populism

	FREQUENCY	REL. FREQ. (%)
0	1,391	1.5
1	4,186	4.5
2	8,148	8.7
3	11,947	12.7
4	14,463	15.4
5	15,299	16.3
6	15,202	16.2
7	12,733	15.5
8	6,822	7.3
9	2,844	3.0
10	9,71	1.0
Total	94,006	100
Mean	4.9	
Median	5.0	
St. Dev.	2.1	

3 All items are dichotomized with 0 ‘not populist response’ and 1 ‘populist response’.

4 The scale has a Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.59 which does not indicate a high reliability. Although deletion of some items, in particular “greater respect for authority” variable, would considerably improve the reliability score, it is thought that keeping this theoretically important dimension in the scale should override concerns about improving reliability scores.

Among the 76 countries for which data are available, on the average, Scandinavian countries have by far the lowest levels of populist attitudes. Table 17.2 gives five countries in our sample of 76 which are at the lowest and five countries at the highest end of our scale. The five countries with the highest scores on the scale give us an indication about the relationship between religion and the prevalence of populist attitudes. In fact, macro level correlations point out to this correlation. However, this chapter is about mass values and attitudes and, therefore, calls for an analysis of micro level data.

Table 17.2 Populism Scale Means in Selected Countries (Lowest and Highest Populism Scores)

Country	Arithmetic Mean
Sweden	1.98
Norway	2.03
Denmark	2.80
New Zealand	3.22
Switzerland	6.62
Iraq	6.65
Tunisia	6.65
Jordan	6.84
Egypt	7.08

In a previous paper (Esmer, 2013), using EVS data from 47 member states of the Council of Europe, I had shown that there was a significant association between religious affiliation and democratic values. Furthermore, this correlation was still strong after controlling for income and education. More specifically, Protestants in Europe, on the average, had the highest and Muslims the lowest scores on a scale of democratic values.

I hypothesize that the same relationship will hold with our populism scale as well. Put differently, Protestants will have the lowest and Muslims will attain the highest scores with Catholics in between the two. I further hypothesize

that, similar to democratic values, the relationship will hold when income and education are controlled for. As stated above, to test this hypothesis I use the last round of EVS/WVS data which covers 76 countries.<sup>5</sup>

The estimates of the regression equation with populism scale as the dependent; Protestant, Catholic and Muslim affiliations (all coded as dummy variables) as independent and income (10 levels) and education (ISCED) as control variables are given in Table 17.3.

Table 17.3 Regression Populist Attitudes Scale on Religious Affiliation and Control Variables

Independent variable	B	St. error of B	Beta	t	Significance
Constant	6.23	0.02		267.11	0.000
Muslim	0.05	0.02	0.01	2.29	0.022
Catholic	-0.60	0.02	-0.13	-29.48	0.000
Protestant	-1.82	0.02	-0.31	-74.54	0.000
Income (1-10)	-0.05	0.00	-0.07	-20.04	0.000
Education (ISCED)	-0.12	0.00	-0.11	-29.95	0.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.13				

Although the populism scale is, as I have repeatedly warned, rather imperfect, we observe that all the coefficients in Table 17.3 are in the expected direction and all are highly significant. Furthermore, the effects are quite similar to the ones on the democratic values scale mentioned above (Esmer 2013). More specifically, even after controlling for income and education, being a Muslim has positive, while being a Catholic or Protestant has negative effect on populist attitudes scale. Viewing the standard coefficients, Protestantism has the largest effect. Put differently, being Protestant significantly decreases an individual's likelihood of espousing populist attitudes.

<sup>5</sup> EVS/WVS data for all waves since 1981 are publicly available and can be downloaded from <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu> or <https://worldvaluessurvey.org>

## 17.6 Conclusion

To our knowledge, this is the first analysis linking attitudes – albeit mostly indirectly – associated with populism with major world religions in the largest possible number of countries located in all corners of the world. In fact, our analysis covers 76 countries although, as emphasized a number of times, the list of available indicators leaves much to be desired and fails to cover some important dimensions of populism. Nevertheless, results indicate a clear religion effect over and above the effects of income and education. Further, as expected, our populist attitudes scale is negatively correlated with democratic values.

We find that adherents of Islam – compared to Catholics and Protestants – have closer affinity to populist values while, Protestants, on the average, score much lower in our scale. To give but one example, Egypt’s score (7.08) is more than three times that of Sweden’s (1.98).

Honouring Loek Halman’s academic legacy (see e.g. Halman & Van Ingen, 2015), it is well documented that religious faith plays an important role in shaping values of adherents. This Chapter shows that we can safely conclude that populist attitudes are not an exception to that rule.

## List of References

- Akkerman, Agnes, Mudde, Cas and Zaslove, Ankrej. 2014. “How populist are the people: Measuring populist attitudes in voters.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(9), pp. 1324-1354.
- Baker, Peter. C. 2019. “We the people’: the battle to define populism.” <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/10/we-the-people-the-battle-to-define-populism> accessed Feb 15, 2021.
- Bosco, David. 2018. “For the U.N. a rise in populism reveals an old challenge.” *The Wilson Quarterly*, Fall.
- Castanho Silva, B., Jungkunz, S., Helbling, M., & Littvay, L. (2019). An Empirical Comparison of Seven Populist Attitudes Scales. *Political Research Quarterly*, 73(2), pp. 409-424.
- Copelovitch, Mark & Pevehouse, Jon C. W. 2019. “International organizations in a new era of populist nationalism.” *Review of International Organizations*, 14(1), pp. 169-186.
- De Kadt, Emanuel. 1970. Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics. *International Affairs*, 46(1), pp. 138-139.
- Eatwell, Roger and Goodwin, Mathew. 2018. *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy*. London: Pelican Books.
- Esmer, Yilmaz. 2013. “Democracy, civil society and Islam” in de Hart, Joep, Dekker, Paul and Halman, Loek, eds. *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*. Springer. pp. 267-84.
- Halman, L., & Van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and Changing Moral Views: European Trends in Church Attendance and Views on Homosexuality, Divorce, Abortion, and Euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5), pp. 616-627.
- Hawkins, Kirk, Riding, Scott and Mudde, Cas. 2012. “Measuring populist attitudes.” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.965.5278&rep=rep1&type=pdf>. Accessed Mar 24, 2021.
- Hibbing, John R. and Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth. 2002. *Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about How Government Should Work*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ionescu, Ghita and Gellner, Ernest, eds. 1969. *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*. London: The Macmillan Company.
- Joppke, Christian. 2020. “Immigration in the populist crucible: comparing Brexit and Trump”. *Comparative Migration Studies*. Vol. 49. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-020-00208-y>. Accessed Mar 30, 2021.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2018. “Revisiting the populist challenge.” *Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science*. Vol.1. pp.1-24.
- Lederer, Edith M. and Jennifer Peltz. 2018. “In most global of settings, U.N. ponders populism’s problems.” <https://apnews.com/article/699abba4c15e4bdea7c7963dec19a3a4>, accessed Mar. 14, 2021.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The populist zeitgeist.” *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), pp. 541-563.
- Norris, Pippa. 2019. “Varieties of populist parties.” *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 45(9), pp. 981-1012.
- Norris, Pippa. 2020. “Measuring populism worldwide.” Faculty Research Working Paper Series. Harvard Kennedy School, Feb. 2020. Accessed Mar. 31, 2021.
- Saloutos, Theodore, 1970. Reviewed Work: Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics by Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner. *Technology and Culture*, 11(2), pp. 327-329.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES  
INTO EUROPEAN VALUES

---

# 18. LIVING ARRANGEMENT AND VALUES OF YOUNG ADULTS IN 1990 AND 2017:

BRIDGING GENERATIONS

---

*Guy Moors*

## **Abstract**

*Using data from the 1990 and 2017 European Values Studies, this study investigates the link between values and living arrangements among young adults from France, Germany and the Netherlands. Researching the diversity in transitions between living arrangements of young adults gained momentum in the 1990s. The logic to link these transitions to values can be traced back to the Second Demographic Transition argument that states that demographic transitions follow generational changes in values that reflect increasing orientations to autonomy. Almost thirty years later, we are able to update this research by looking to what extent today's generation of young adults – which is in fact the generation of children of the young adults in 1999 – compare with their parents as far as the values profiles of living arrangements is concerned. The results show that to a large extent, the values profiles of living arrangements are similar across the two generations of young adults or even became more articulated when values were related to topics that can be linked to the religious sphere.*

## 18.1 Introduction

The diversity in transitions between living arrangements of young adults that we experience today is the outcome of a process that started after the Second World War. Scholars started to recognize the complexity of transitions in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Bumpass, 1990; Rindfuss & VandenHeuvel, 1990; Lesthaeghe, Moors & Halman, 1992; Lesthaeghe & Moors, 1996). The traditional sequence of experiences by which young adults leave the parental home after getting married and then become parents themselves was clearly no longer the only pathway that was followed. Intermediate states such as premarital cohabitation and parenthood outside of marriages had emerged and, in some cases, consolidated in end-states. Today hardly anyone is surprised by the finding that diversity in pathways leaving the parental home has become the rule.

Up until the 90s, explanations for the processes involved were predominantly linked to socio-economic theories of demographic transitions. With the rise of large-scale survey research since the 1980s – of which the European Values Studies (EVS) played a pioneering role – opportunities to study the role of cultural factors in shaping the living arrangement transitions sharply improved. Upon my initial study in the 1990s, Ron Lesthaeghe invited me to join him in a trip to ‘Mister European Values Studies’; the trip was to Tilburg, and ‘Mister EVS’ appeared to be Loek Halman. Present chapter is an update of our initial work that was the product of that first meeting three decades ago. Also present study departs from the idea that cultural factors alongside socio-economic dynamics define demographic transitions: this thesis is at the heart of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory. In a nutshell, this theory claims that generational changes in demographic transitions follow generational changes in values that reflect increasingly orientation towards autonomy.

In this present chapter, I look back at these alleged cultural profiles of young adults in 1990 and make a comparison with the cultural profiles of young adults in 2017 using data from the EVS in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Young adults are selected within the age groups of 20-24 and 25-29. Given that there is 27 years in between the two selected EVS waves, the young adults from 2017 can be considered to be the generation representing the children of

the generation of young adults from 1990. This opens up a rather interesting perspective since I will investigate how the linkage between values and demographic transitions of the 1990 generation is reconfirmed in the generation of their ‘children’ in 2017, thereby bridging generations.

## 18.2 Theoretical Perspective and Research Goals

This chapter is primarily an exploratory study. The starting point is to find out to what extent the linkage between living arrangements and values of young adults that was documented in the 1990s (Lesthaeghe, Moors & Halman, 1992) is transmitted to the next generation of young adults in 2017. In this section, I briefly present the original theoretical perspective that yielded the argument that cultural factors are essential factors in understanding early adulthood transitions. Subsequently, I reflect on how the processes initiating this relationship of cultural and demographic transition in the 1990s may still play a role in shaping this relationship almost three decades later.

SDT was first introduced in the late 1980s (Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa, 1986; see also: Batool & Morgan, 2017) and focuses on providing a framework to ‘predict’ demographic changes towards low fertility and increasing diversity of union formation. The SDT perspective is inclusive in the sense that it recognizes the contribution of socio-economic types of explanations as provided by, for instance, neo-classic economic theory (e.g., Becker, 1981) or social-deprivation type of theories (e.g., Easterlin, Macdonald & Macunovich, 1990). What SDT emphasizes is that values reflecting autonomy and self-actualization constitute independent prime drivers of demographic changes. Essential assumption is that these values themselves are rooted within the – proverbially – generational DNA. Applied to this study, this implies that researching value differences between different living arrangements of young adults should reflect differences in autonomy and self-actualization. A drawback of this study is that values are measured after the transition is made and not prior to the transition. This is inevitable with cross-sectional data. However, using panel data it has been demonstrated that values do predict future demographic transitions and that demographic transitions in turn reinforce values consistency with the

choices made (Moors, 2000; 2003a). As such, cross-sectional findings provide a kind of footprint of the reciprocal connection of values and transitions.

In this study, I compare differences in values of young adults in four different types of living arrangement, namely living with parents, single, cohabiting or married. I define two age-groups, namely 20-24 and 25-29 years old. For the youngest age group, the three states of living independently from one's parents indicate early transitions. For the older group these states include both earlier (before the age of 25) and later (at the age of 25 or later) transitions. Especially, as far as the situation of married persons is concerned, I expect that early marriages will differ in values compared to the other living arrangements. Hence, this expectation presents the need to check interaction effects of living arrangements and age groups on values.

SDT has gained increasing attraction during the 1990s (Billari & Liefbroer, 2004) and continued to do so this century (Zaidi & Morgan, 2017). It was not left uncriticized (see Zaidi & Morgan, 2017 for an overview) in that period. One of the critical questions was whether the observed changes are truly complete and irreversible. This critical question directly links to a key research goal of this study: are the initial findings of the relationship between values and living arrangements observed amongst young adults in 1990 also observed among the young adults of 2017? Also here, interaction effects need to be studied, i.e. the interaction between year of survey and living arrangements in the effect on values.

### 18.3 Data, Research Design and Methods

The data used in this research stem from the European Values Surveys of 1990 and 2017. In the reference study (Lesthaeghe, Moors & Halman, 1992) the data from the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and France were selected because these countries exhibit similar developments and could for that reason be pooled. In 2017, however, no data were collected for Belgium, implying that I only focus on the Netherlands, Germany and France. All the analyses are pooled data of the three countries to overcome small sample sizes within each living arrangements state and survey year.

As indicated before, our analysis is restricted to include only respondents in the age range of 20 thru 29 and respondents that could be allocated to one of four living arrangements: living with parents, living in a single household, cohabitation and marriage. Sample size information split by living arrangement and survey wave is presented in Table 18.1. From that table it can be read that the increasing popularity of cohabitation and singlehood at the expense of marriage has continued to increase between 1990 and 2017.

Table 18.1 Living arrangements (LA) by year of survey (YE)

		YE			
		1990	2017	Total	
LA	single living with parent	Count	333	268	601
		column%	29.5%	28.8%	29.2%
	single not living with parents	Count	259	336	595
		column%	23.0%	36.2%	28.9%
	with partner cohabiting	Count	197	221	418
		column%	17.5%	23.8%	20.3%
	with partner married	Count	339	104	443
		column%	30.1%	11.2%	21.5%
Total	Count	1128	929	2057	
	column%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Source: EVS

When analysing secondary data, researchers are always constrained by the initial design of the survey. In this, the questionnaires of the EVS have changed in time. A particular drawback relevant to this study is that the EVS only allows to snapshot current state of living arrangements without differentiating into previous states. The limitation present is that categories of living arrangements are more heterogenous in composition than is preferred. For instance, in the case of marriage, it might be relevant to know whether marriage was pre-

ceded by periods of cohabitation or living in a single household. This problem is partially covered by distinguishing between two age groups, i.e. respectively the 20-24 and 25-29 year olds. In case of the youngest age group, the category of married respondents is much more likely to be homogenous than in the case of the oldest age group. After all, immediate marriages, i.e. people who leave the parental home for marriage, correlates with early marriages, i.e. marriage at younger ages of young adulthood.

Instead of focusing on scales, I make use of the individual items. The main reason is that if a systematic pattern would be observed across several items, the mechanism that links values to living arrangements is indicative of an important claim of the SDT, namely that living arrangements and values are systematically and consistently linked to one another. The items selected are in the domains of religion, marriage, children, morality and post-materialism. The latter is included because SDT explicitly refers to the concept of post-materialism (Lesthaeghe & Moors, 1996). The other items hold a normative component towards individual behaviour in the religious, public and personal sphere. SDT claims that values that reflect autonomy or self-actualization, will result in choosing 'new' intermediate and/or end-states after leaving the parental home: cohabitation and/or living single.

I used LatentGold (version 6, see <https://www.statisticalinnovations.com>) to run ordered logit regression analyses. Deviation coding was used. Effect sizes are log odds of the given category relative to the average log odds. Positive estimates thus indicate higher than average scoring and negative estimates lower than average. First, I estimated the main effect models only in which each item is regressed on living arrangement (LA), age group (YA), and year of survey (YE). Gender, education, occupational status, and country are included as additional covariates (control variables). Second, I added the two interaction effects of interest to this study, i.e. interaction of LA with YA and interaction of LA with YE. Results are presented in figures to facilitate interpretations. Details about operationalizations and full tables with estimated effect sizes are available on request.


## 18.4 Empirical Results: Main Effects

In this section, I present results grouped by theme: religion, marriage, children, morality and post-materialism. It is important to realize that the effects presented in all the figures are significant net effects controlling for all other covariates.

### Religion

The religious foundation of marriage as opposed to cohabitation is clearly visible in all four religious items (see Figure 18.1). The category of single persons falls in between both. The largest difference between married and cohabiting people is observed in religious practice but also the believe in Christian religious symbols, i.e. God, Heaven and Hell, is clearly profiled. The finding is consistent with the SDT argument that secularization in religious beliefs is associated with a lower likelihood of marriage.

Figure 18.1 Religious service attendance (at least once a month) (RSA), Believe in God (BiG), Heaven (BiH) and Hell (BiD) by living arrangement (LA)




Source: EVS



## Marriage

In Figure 18.2, I bring together the results of two items expressing traditional views on what is important to marriage, i.e. faithfulness and children; and two items that reveal weakening ties, i.e. evaluating marriage as outdated and justifying divorce. The general picture is that the profile of married persons fits the expectation that they would score highest on faithfulness and importance of children to marriage and lowest on finding marriage outdated – in this case obviously reinforced by the very fact that they are married – as well as lowest in justifying divorce. Although cohabiting people take an opposite view, it is the category of single households that contrasts most with married people on the marriage issues of faithfulness and children. Their autonomy desire is highest on these matters.

Figure 18.2 Importance to marriage: faithfulness (IMF), and children (IMC); finding marriage outdated (MOI), and justification of divorce (NAJDI) by living arrangement (LA)




Source: EVS

## Children

The items selected from the questionnaire of what people find important for children reflect the autonomy versus conformity distinction that plays a major role in the SDT theory. Typical of the category of married respondents (Figure 18.3) is that they rate good manners and thrift higher than cohabiting and single living persons. At the same time married people score less on the qualities of imagination and independence. In the latter case differences are small though. The general picture again confirms what was expected from the SDT framework.

Figure 18.3 Important qualities to have for children: good manners (ICGM), thrift (ICT), imagination (ICIM), and independence (ICI) by living arrangements (LA)




## Morality

The morality questionnaire gauges what actions can be justified and hence indicates the amount of autonomy people should have in making their own choices. Two items indicate civil morality: 'claiming state benefits one is not

entitled to' and 'cheating on tax'. Justification of 'homosexuality' and 'prostitution' represent sexual morality. Ethical morality is linked to issues of interference in the lives of people, i.e. justification of 'abortion' and 'euthanasia' (Figure 18.4). On almost all morality issues, single and cohabiting people are at the same high level of justifying the acts. This is somewhat less the case with the issue of 'claiming state benefits' that is less justified amongst cohabitants compared to singles. This is in sharp contrast with married people who clearly tend much more not to justify all listed behaviours.

Figure 18.4 Justification of behaviour: unjustified claiming of state benefits (NAJSB), cheating on tax (NAJCT), homosexuality (NAJHO), prostitution (NAJPR), abortion (NAJAB), and euthanasia (NAJEU) by living arrangements (LA)



Source: EVS


### Post-materialism

The original post-materialism index (Inglehart, 1990) contrasts a post-materialist item preference of 'giving people more say' and 'freedom of speech' with the materialist combination of preferring 'fight rising prices' and 'main-

taining order in the nation'. The post-materialism theory perfectly fits in the SDT framework since it claims that post-materialist preferences gradually replace materialist preferences by the succession of generation: younger generations freed from materialistic concerns shift their priorities to autonomy and self-expression. The same mechanism is defined within the SDT framework: young adults in the 1980s and 1990s have shifted towards more autonomous pathways out of the parental home compared to their own parents. In later research on post-materialism, it was found that the index could be unfolded into two subindices (Moors, 2003b) of which the subindex 'giving people more say versus maintaining order' was the most clearly linked to generations. This was much less the case with the subindex 'freedom of speech versus fight rising prices'. In Figure 18.5, I present the results from the full index and the 'giving people more say versus maintaining order in the nation' subscale. The relationship of living arrangements with the second subdimension was not significant in any of our models. As such this is an important finding since it does indicate that the autonomy-autocracy distinction reflected in the 'more say – maintaining order' contrast triggers choices regarding living arrangements.

Results in Figure 18.5 are perfectly in line with expectations: married people score lowest on post-materialism and the 'more say – maintaining order' subindex in contrast with cohabiting and single household persons. I like to underscore the significance of this finding since it has been demonstrated that the generational profile of post-materialism (Inglehart, 1990) and the 'more say – maintaining order' subindex (Moors, 2003b) are indeed generational profiles and not profiles that change with age.

Figure 18.5 Post-materialism index (PM) and 'more say versus maintaining order' subindex (sayorder) by living arrangement (LA)



Source: EVS


## 18.5 Generational Profiles

One of the most important puzzles of this article is whether values differences in living arrangements in 1990 could be reproduced in 2017. For nine out of the selected 20 items, I found significant interaction effects between year of survey and living arrangements. The first conclusion is that in more than half of the items the results presented in the previous sections apply for both survey years indicating consolidation of the associations between values and living arrangements.

When significant interaction effects were found, I ran separate analyses for each survey year using the same model as the pooled main effect approach in previous sections. This way, estimates of living arrangements are estimates relative to the specific average for each survey year. In four of the nine cases, I found that the 2017 differences were no longer significant: 'importance of thrift for children', 'justification of cheating on tax', and both post-materialism indi-

ces. As far as the post-materialism indicators is concerned, the differences between living arrangements were still in line with the pooled result picture, but no longer significant. This was not the case with the other two items. For five items I observed that the 2017 data showed an increasing differentiation in values amongst the categories of living arrangements as is shown in Figure 18.6.

Figure 18.6 Generational differences in the relationship between values and living arrangements: 1990-2017



Source: EVS


Three religious items, i.e. believe in God, Heaven and Hell, and two morality items, i.e. justification of homosexuality and abortion, reveal the same pattern by which the married persons in 2017 even more strongly separate from cohabiting and single living persons than in 1990.

## 18.6 Age Group Profiles

The motivation to estimate the interaction effect between age groups and living arrangements on values flowed from the expectation that, for both age

groups, the composition of the living arrangements might differ in the amount of heterogeneity. This expectation results from the diagnosis that there is no information on the history of living arrangements available in the data – only information of current status is present. In merely five out of twenty items, I found significant interaction effects. How the categories of living arrangements differed across age groups on these items is presented in Figure 18.7.

Figure 18.7 Age group differences in the relationship between values and living arrangements: 20-24 versus 25-29 years old



Source: EVS

In three of the five items it is especially the category of married people that differs in values depending on the age group they belong, i.e. believe in God and justification of abortion and euthanasia. Each time the difference between married people and other categories becomes smaller in the 25-29 age group compared to the 20-24 group. This is in line with the argument that in the age group of 20-24, the proportion of immediate marriages (without prior transition to intermediate states) is most likely higher than in the 25-29 group that combines immediate marriages with later marriages. Typical of later marriages is that intermediate states between leaving the parental home and the mar-

riage are more likely to have occurred. I do not want to overly underscore this finding since for most items, I did not find significant interaction effects of age groups with living arrangements.

A unique finding, not replicated in any of the other items, is how the cohabiting people and those who live with their parents position themselves on the topic of faithfulness in marriage. In the 20-24 age group, they align in between married and single persons. If one, however, is (still) living with their parents at the age of 25 or later, than faithfulness is found even slightly higher than married people. Cohabitants move in the other direction with cohabitants in the 25-29 group almost equally low on faithfulness than their single living counterparts.

Finally, the significant interaction effect between age groups and living arrangement in the case of justification of 'claiming state benefits' is due to how the two categories without a partner differ. In the youngest age group, they share the same average level of justification; however in the oldest age group, the single persons are much more willing to justify non-entitled claims of state benefits whereas the single persons (still) living in the parental home are much less willing to do so.

## 18.7 Conclusion and Discussion

Nowadays, most people would probably ask 'why would choices regarding living arrangements *not* be driven by values people hold?'. Of course, the same people would recognize the socio-economic forces and restrains involved in the process. More than three decades ago, however, the question was rather 'to what extent do values play a role in socio-demographic transitions?'. At the very heart of the Second Demographic Transition framework lies the proposition that values do have their own and independent role to play and that this mechanism would continue to be observed. This research contributes to this line of thinking by studying whether patterns of association between values and living arrangements among young adults in the 1990s re-emerged almost three decades later in the generation of 2017. My conclusion is: it does to a

large extent. In case of the religious-morality domain the profiling of living arrangement became even somewhat more pronounced. In a few items that were somewhat more linked to the political-materialist domain the differences between living arrangements decreased and became not significant.

Of course, this study has limitations that are linked to doing secondary data analysis on cross-sectional data. The EVS was not particularly designed to study transitions in living arrangements among young adults. It does not use a life-history design which limited this research to focusing on current states at the time of the survey. Questionnaires themselves changed over time. Constructing comparable measures of occupational status of the household or even parenthood in the 1990 and 2017 dataset proved to be impossible. Limitations of the cross-sectional design in putting the research questions to the test, have been repeatedly discussed in the past (Zaidi & Morgan, 2017) but also recognized by the adherents of the SDT framework (Lesthaeghe & Moors, 2002). My longitudinal repeated cross-sectional research at least provided some evidence that the pattern of associations of values and living arrangements is there to stay. And let's be honest, no one of us really ever saw a dinosaur; however, in the footprints of their existence, provided by anthropological excavations, we are capable of creating a reasonable accurate picture.

## List of References

- Billari F.C., & Liefbroer A.C. (2004). Is the Second Demographic Transition a Useful Concept for Demography? Introduction to a Debate. *Vienna yearbook of population research*. 2004:1–3 <https://ideas.repec.org/a/vid/yearbk/v2y2004i1p1-3.html>
- Becker G. (1981). *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bumpass L. L. (1990). What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic and Institutional Changes. *Demography*, 27(4): 483-498.
- Easterlin R. A., Macdonald C., & Macunovich D.J. (1990). How Have American Baby Boomers Fared? Earnings and Economic Well-being of Young Adults, 1964-1987. *Journal of Population Economics*, 3(4): 277-290.
- Inglehart R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lesthaeghe, R., Moors, G. & Halman, L. (1992). Living Arrangements and Values Among Young Adults in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany, 1990. *IPD-Working Paper 1992-3*. <https://www.vub.ac.be/>

demography/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/WP-IPD-1992-3.pdf

- Lesthaeghe, R., & Moors, G. (1996). Living Arrangements, Socio-economic Position and Values Among Young Adults – a Pattern Description for France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. In: D. Coleman, (Ed.), *Europe's Population in the 1990s* (pp. 163-221). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lesthaeghe R., & Van de Kaa, D. (1986). Twee Demografische Transitie's? In R. Lesthaeghe and D. van de Kaa (Eds.), *Groei of Krimp?* (pp. 9-24). Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus.
- Moors, G. B. D. (2000). Values and Living Arrangements: a Recursive Relationship. In L. J. Waite (Ed.). *The Ties That Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation*. Hawthorne: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Moors, G. B. D. (2003a). Estimating the Reciprocal Effect of Gender Role Attitudes and Family Formation: A Log-linear Path Model with Latent Variables. *European Journal of Population*. 19(2): 199-221.
- Moors, G. B. D. (2003b). The Two Faces of (Post)materialism: A Decomposition Approach. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 15(4): 396-412.
- Rindfuss, R., & VandenHeuvel, A. (1990). Cohabitation: A Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single? *Population and Development Review*, 16(4): 703-726.
- Zaidi, B. & Morgan, S.P. (2017). The Second Demographic Transition Theory: a Review and Appraisal. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 43: 473-492.

# 19. GENDER EQUALITY VALUES AND CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS

---

Vera Lomazzi

## **Abstract**

*This contribution offers a comparative analysis of attitudes towards gender roles (GRA) in the domestic and public domains and their relation to cultural orientations. Using the novel alignment method, the factor means of GRA have been estimated while assessing for their measurement equivalence across the whole set of 34 countries included in the final release of EVS 2017. The results address the necessity of considering the multidimensionality of this concept. The country ranking showed that several countries support egalitarian gender roles in the public and domestic domains differently. In some cases, support for gender equality in the public sphere was expressed alongside traditional views in the private sphere, displaying, therefore, ambivalence between attitudes in these two domains. The Pearson correlations between GRA and the cultural values scores (Schwartz 2006) show that societies that emphasize the importance of the collective and status quo tend to support more traditional gender roles, both in the public and in the domestic domain. However, this relationship is stronger and clearer in the public domain. These findings suggest that the shift towards more egalitarian societies risks being slowed down if policies favor female economic and political participation but neglect the promotion of equality in the household.*

## 19.1 Introduction

Since 2009, with the Treaty of Lisbon, equality between men and women has been included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and as such recognized among the values of the Union. However, the dawn of the long process of institutionalization of the gender equality principle can be dated back to the end of the fifties of the last century. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome, which stipulated the birth of the European Economic Community, affirmed equal pay for men and women. This process still continues nowadays, in the context of a unified strategy based on Gender Mainstreaming<sup>1</sup> as a guiding principle for European legislation and policies (Lomazzi & Crespi, 2019)

However, the implementation of these directives deals with different social structures and cultural contexts. The transition from formal norms to substantive practices and values change can take a long time, bringing to different outcomes, which are not always easily measurable (Moser & Moser, 2005). Gender equality progress is often monitored through indices built on objective statistics concerning structural aspects of equal rights; however, the cultural orientations of societies, which are in an interactive relationship with structural contexts, are often neglected. These cultural orientations refer to the prevailing complex of values, norms and beliefs in a society and have a relevant role in shaping individual beliefs and behaviours, also concerning gender role expectations.

The European Values Study (EVS), whose Executive Committee was chaired by Loek Halman until 2021, offers the scientific community an authoritative source of data covering many topics. This chapter presents the contribution of the EVS in the study of the cultural aspects of gender equality. After introducing the available survey instruments in EVS 2017, the study focuses on the revised scale measuring gender role attitudes and, by using comparable factor means obtained through the alignment method, it explores the relationship

<sup>1</sup> The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, defined Gender Mainstreaming (GM) as a global strategy for gender equality. Article 79 of the Report (United Nations 1996, 27) states: "Governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programs so that before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively". The European Union embraced the GM perspective in 1996.

between prevailing cultural orientations, measured according to the Schwartz theory of values (2006), and normative beliefs about gender roles in the public and domestic domains in 27 countries.

## 19.2 Measuring Gender Equality: The Contribution of the European Values Study

The multidimensional nature of gender equality makes the measurement of this concept particularly challenging. The unequal treatment of gender differences can take place, and therefore can be measured and studied, in several domains of life. Inequalities can concern the public sphere and regard dynamics and segregation phenomena in the labour market, educational system, politics. But they can take place in the private sphere as well, where deeper gender dynamics build on socialization processes and daily negotiations (Wharton, 2005).

Alongside to macro-indicators, providing information about structural aspects regarding gender inequalities, data collected via survey instruments can offer information on subjective gendered experiences, both concerning behaviour and, more interestingly, on values and attitudes, giving therefore hints about the cultural dimensions of gender equality.

Individual gender equality values motivate the pursue for equality in daily life and constitute the most relevant explanatory factor of the unequal distribution of paid work and unpaid care work between men and women (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). At the aggregate level, information on gender equality values and attitudes can contribute studying gender cultures and complement the figures given by macro-indicators (Lomazzi & Crespi, 2019; Pfau-Effinger, 1998).

With its last wave, the EVS offers the most recent and broader coverage of Europeans gender equality values through four survey instruments. The first one concerns the principle of gender equality as part of the idea of a democratic society. The respondents are asked to indicate to what extent they consider that

“women have the same rights as men” is an essential characteristic of democracy. The second question concerns equal rights in the labour market and asks the respondents whether they agree with the statement “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women”. The third instrument belong to a broader battery on elements considered important for a successful marriage or partnership and concerns the item “share the household chores”. While these instruments grasp gender equality principles, the fourth instrument is a battery on gender role attitudes.

Gender role attitudes (GRA) refer to the beliefs concerning the perceived appropriateness of social roles for men and women, in particular about the division of paid labour, childcare, and housework, on the basis of a gendered separation of tasks and responsibilities (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Grunow et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2010). Traditional GRA support the specialization of roles by gender. Historically, this means that social roles related to childcare and housework, and for extension job in caring activities, are considered the most proper social roles for women. Complementarily, roles in the public sphere connected to paid job, authority, and for an extension also power positions, are appropriate just for men. Progressive attitudes towards gender roles tend to go beyond this gendered separation and express support for women’s role in the public sphere as well as the men’s role in the private one (Albrecht et al., 2000; Lomazzi & Seddig, 2020). Whereas most of the other existing surveys cover gender beliefs only on domestic or public dimensions, the EVS 2017 is currently the only cross-national survey allowing for measuring gender role attitudes in both the domains.

### 19.3 Gender Role Attitudes in the EVS 2017

The EVS measures gender role attitudes GRA since its second wave in 1990. Compared to the previous editions, the measurement of GRA in EVS 2017 has been deeply revised to address some of the most relevant methodological concerns regarding validity and measurement equivalence (Braun, 1998; Constantin & Voicu, 2015; Grunow et al., 2018; Lomazzi, 2017, 2018; Voicu & Tufiş, 2012; Walter, 2018).

Table 19.1 lists the items surveyed in EVS 2017. From the past waves, only item b, performing better in previous assessments (Constantin & Voicu, 2015; Voicu & Tufiş, 2012), was preserved in the same form. The other items were replaced by items more positively evaluated in empirical literature (Braun, 1998; Constantin & Voicu, 2015; Walter, 2018). Items a, c, and d were borrowed from the ISSP. Items e, f, and g from the measurement included in the WVS since 1995 (for a broader discussion on the development of the GRA scale used in EVS 2017, see Lomazzi, 2022). Even if the current measurement still fails in covering the multidimensionality and complexity of GRA (the focus remains limited to female roles, for example), the current revision brings two main advantages: the extension of possibilities for worldwide comparative studies and the fact that both content validity of these items (Braun 1998; Constantin & Voicu 2015; Lomazzi 2017; Walter 2018), as well as the suitability for trustable cross-sectional comparison (Constantin & Voicu 2015; Lomazzi 2018; Lomazzi & Seddig 2020), have been already investigated. Furthermore, the inclusion of these three last items met the goal of improving the conceptualisation of gender role attitudes by focusing on female roles in the private and public spheres (Constantin & Voicu 2015).

Table 19.1 GRA scale in EVS 2017 (Answer categories: 1=agree strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree strongly)

a) When a mother works for pay, the children suffer. (in older edition: A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works)
b) A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children.
c) All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
d) A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.
e) Overall, men make better political leaders than women do.
f) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
g) Overall, men make better business executives than women do.



## 19.4 The Measurement Model of GRA and Its Cross-National Comparable Factor Means

In order to explore the relation between GRA and societal cultural orientation, the first step is to compute comparable means at the country level of GRA. Following the reflexive perspective in the measurement of attitudes (Coltman *et al.*, 2008), a factorial approach is used. First of all, an exploratory factor analysis is conducted to identify the configuration model, which is then assessed via confirmatory factor analysis country by country, considering the whole set of the 34 countries included in the final release of the fifth wave of the EVS (2020). Secondly, its measurement equivalence is evaluated by applying the alignment method. Finally, factor means obtained through the alignment method are compared.

The exploratory factor analysis conducted on the whole sample (Table 19.2), indicates a bidimensional structure with items a, b, c loading on factor 1 covering the “Domestic domain”, and items e, f, g loading on factor 2 tackling the “Public domain”. Item 5 loads about equally on both the factors. As this cross-loading is quite critical, the item is excluded by the model. The model fit of this hypothetical model (displayed in Figure 19.1) was assessed country by country (results not reported) and the model fit the data in each one of them.


Table 19.2 Measurement of GRA: Exploratory Factor Analysis (MLR Estimation, GEOMIN rotation). For the full description of the items, please see Table 19.1

	F1 - Domestic Domain	F2 - Public Domain
Item a)	0.764*	0.003*
Item b)	0.585*	0.185*
Item c)	0.830*	-0.011*
Item d)	0.461*	0.411*
Item e)	0.009*	0.829*
Item f)	0.061*	0.607*
Item g)	-0.071*	0.893*

\*Significant at 5% level

Source: EVS 2017

Figure 19.1 Measurement model of GRA. For the full description of the items, please see Table 19.1



Because of the large number of groups included, the evaluation of whether the measurement model of GRA is suitable for meaningful country comparisons is conducted using the alignment method, a recently developed technique particularly suitable in these situations (Davidov *et al.*, 2018). It builds on the concept of approximate equivalence that, in contrast to the exact approach implemented in other statistical techniques, as the multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, allows for including cultural variability and uncertainty in the assessment (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014; Lomazzi, 2018; van de Schoot *et al.*, 2013). The alignment method estimates factor means and variances while considering the real differences in loadings and intercepts among groups and identify the most invariant pattern across the groups. As a complementary output, the alignment procedure provides elements to assess the degree of non-invariance, which is helpful in evaluating whether to trust and accept the alignment results. According to the empirical literature, the amount of non-invariant parameters should be lower than 25% (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014).

Following this approach, the GRA measurement results sufficiently equivalent across the 34 countries included in the assessment. The amount of noninvari-

ant parameter is 22.5% and a Monte Carlo study was carried out to evaluate the accuracy of the latent mean estimations and country ranking. To consider the alignment results trustworthy, the correlation of the estimated and generated mean factors should be higher than 0.98 (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). In this study, which was performed carrying out 500 replications assuming sample sizes closer to the EVS ones, these correlations are extremely high (Domestic domain: 0.997; Public domain: 0.998). These results indicate that unbiased factor means comparison of GRA can be carried out across the 34 countries. The alignment method estimates factor means using a reference group, whose factor mean is fixed to be 0. Estimated factor means can therefore take positive or negative values. In this case, where no specific substantive research questions suggested to define a specific reference group, the default reference group is the first group listed in the data (Albania) in both the dimensions.

Table 19.3 reports the country ranking for each domain (higher scores indicates greater support for progressive values). While some countries showed similar positioning in the domestic and public domains, others showed relevant discrepancies. For example, the respondents in Albania expressed traditional attitudes regarding the consequences of female economic participation in family life (31<sup>st</sup> position) but displayed progressive attitudes regarding the role of women in the public sphere (7<sup>th</sup>). A similar gap was observed in the case of Italy (28<sup>th</sup> position in Domestic domain, 15<sup>th</sup> in Public domain). Other countries (e.g., Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Belarus) showed higher ranking in the domestic sphere but lower in the public one. In the future, substantive studies could investigate these discrepancies between the dimensions of GRA as well as the differences between countries.

Table 19.3 Alignment results: Factor mean of GRA in the Domestic and Public Domains, country ranking

GRA -Domestic Domain		GRA -Public Domain		
Ranking	Value	Mean	Value	Mean
1	Norway	2.468	Norway	0.58
2	Denmark	2.325	Sweden	0.5


3	Sweden	2.324	Iceland	0.269
4	Finland	1.809	France	0.21
5	Iceland	1.793	Denmark	0.161
6	Spain	1.78	Spain	0.135
7	Netherlands	1.603	Albania	0
8	France	1.447	Switzerland	-0.041
9	Great Britain	1.338	Germany	-0.044
10	Germany	1.169	Austria	-0.06
11	Switzerland	1.047	Finland	-0.094
12	Slovakia	1.04	Netherlands	-0.158
13	Estonia	0.961	Great Britain	-0.2
14	Romania	0.952	Croatia	-0.246
15	North Macedonia	0.93	Italy	-0.344
16	Croatia	0.915	Portugal	-0.385
17	Belarus	0.858	Slovenia	-0.441
18	Czechia	0.828	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.525
19	Slovenia	0.806	Serbia	-0.62
20	Serbia	0.763	Hungary	-0.675
21	Portugal	0.734	Poland	-0.688
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.697	Montenegro	-0.728
23	Hungary	0.671	Estonia	-0.731
24	Austria	0.639	Romania	-0.761
25	Poland	0.443	Czechia	-0.864
26	Montenegro	0.44	North Macedonia	-0.882
27	Bulgaria	0.388	Bulgaria	-0.949
28	Italy	0.333	Lithuania	-0.965
29	Russia	0.314	Slovakia	-1.163
30	Lithuania	0.274	Georgia	-1.304
31	Albania	0	Belarus	-1.373
32	Georgia	-0.056	Russia	-1.527
33	Azerbaijan	-0.325	Armenia	-1.719
34	Armenia	-0.398	Azerbaijan	-1.761

Source: EVS 2017

The graph in Figure 19.2 displays the relationship between the two different domains ( $r=0.79$ ). It shows that only in a few countries progressive GRA are manifested in both domains while in most of the countries, despite progressive attitudes in the public sphere, GRA in the domestic sphere are more traditional.

The different positioning by domain and the ambivalence displayed offer therefore further insights about the importance of considering the multidimensionality of gender role attitudes also in more sophisticated analyses because, for example, the explaining factors of GRA could have different effects by domain.

Figure 19.2 Relationship of GRA in the Domestic domain and GRA in the Public domain (country - level data,  $N=34$ )



Source: EVS 2017

## 19.5 Gender Role Attitudes and Societal Values Orientations

Are gender role attitudes an imprint of deep-rooted societal values orientations? Building on Schwartz' theory of individual differences in value priorities (2006), a recent study by Lomazzi & Seddig (2020) used data from the ISSP to investigate the relation between GRA and the prevailing values system in 36 countries showing that GRA in the domestic sphere are connected with Embeddedness, Hierarchy, and Egalitarianism, but correlate strongly only with the cultural value of Embeddedness ( $r=0.7$ ). This orientation refers to societies in which people are seen as entities deeply embedded in the collectivity (Schwartz, 2006: 140) and wherein keeping the status quo is considered important: here, people tend to express traditional gender role attitudes, as part of a traditional system to be preserved. Here we use EVS data and aggregated scores of data on individual values provided by Schwartz (2008), whose cross-national comparability has been already assessed (Schwartz, 2006), to explore whether a similar relationship might differ when considering different GRA domains.<sup>2</sup>


The association between GRA factor means and cultural values scores for Embeddedness is shown in Figure 19.3 (Public Domain) and Figure 19.4 (Domestic domain). In both the cases we observed a negative relationship (Public domain:  $r = -0.76$ ; Domestic domain:  $r = -0.61$ ) indicating that the more societies emphasize the importance of the collective and status quo, the less they support progressive gender role models. Some of the countries with the highest levels of Embeddedness (e.g., Georgia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Russia) are among those expressing more traditional views concerning gender roles in the public domain. On the other side, countries with the lowest scores on Embeddedness (e.g., Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark) support more progressive gender roles.

The association between Embeddedness and GRA in the Domestic domain is slightly weaker. Looking at the distribution displayed in Figure 19.4, we found that countries that shows high Embeddedness scores also endorse less pro-

<sup>2</sup> Among the countries included in EVS 2017 cultural values scores aren't available for Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Iceland, Lithuania, and Montenegro, so this relationship is investigated including 27


gressive GRA (e.g., Georgia, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia) whereas countries with the lowest scores on Embeddedness (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland) are among those with the least traditional gender role attitudes. However, this relationship appears less clear than the previous one and would require further investigation because of relevant exceptions to the expected relationship, such as in the case of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (low embeddedness but also less progressive GRA).

Figure 19.3 Relationship of the cultural value embeddedness and GRA in the Public domain (country - level data, N=27)



Source: EVS 2017; Schwartz 2008

Figure 19.4 Relationship of the cultural value embeddedness and GRA in the Domestic domain (country - level data, N=27)



Source: EVS 2017; Schwartz 2008

## 19.6 Summary and Conclusions

Differently from other sources frequently used to monitor and compare structural aspects of gender equality, the EVS allows for grasping information about the cultural component of gender equality. Among the different measurement of gender equality values included in EVS 2017, this chapter focused on the revised scale of gender role attitudes (GRA), which tackles gender beliefs in the domestic and public domains. Using the novel alignment method, the factor means of GRA have been estimated while assessing for their measurement equivalence. The assessment, supported by Monte Carlo simulations, confirmed the comparability of the measurement model of GRA across the whole set of 34 countries included in the final release of EVS 2017. The country ranking showed that several countries support egalitarian gender roles differently in the public and domestic domains, reinforcing the necessity of considering the multidimensionality of this concept in future research. Furthermore, am-

bivalence in GRA has been detected: looking at the wider public scene –where people experience the increased female participation – Europeans tend to support equality, probably also as a reflection of a common European wide narrative on gender equality in this realm. But when issues of gender roles come closer to the private sphere, one might express opposite feelings, in line with their actual situation and/or affected by the implication for family life when women work and family policies are not generous (Sjöberg, 2010).

Assuming that gender beliefs are strictly connected with value orientations prevailing in each society, the relationship between the societal cultural value of Embeddedness (Schwartz, 2006) and GRA has been further investigated. The Pearson correlations between the GRA factor means estimated through the alignment method and the cultural values scores show that societies that emphasize the importance of the collective and status quo tend to support more traditional gender roles, both in the public and in the domestic domain. However, this relationship is stronger and clearer in the public domain.

With GRA in the domestic domain deeply rooted in long-lasting traditional cultures, the shift towards more egalitarian societies appears therefore slowed down if, for example, institutional measures supporting egalitarian gender roles in the household are weak while favoring only female economic and political participation (Lomazzi & Crespi, 2019). The risk is, in another words, achieving a sort of formal equality in the public domain, but still lacking substantial equality in the domestic domain, with consequences on the intergenerational transmission of gender role expectations as well (Farré & Vella, 2013).

## List of References

- Albrecht, J. W., Edin, P.-A., & Vroman, S. B. (2000). A Cross-country Comparison of Attitudes Towards Mothers Working and their Actual Labor Market Experience. *LABOUR*, 14(4): 591–607.
- Asparouhov, T., & Muthén, B. (2014). Multiple-Group Factor Analysis Alignment. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 21(4): 495–508.
- Braun, M. (1998). Gender roles. Pp. 111-134: Van Deth, JW (Ed.), *Comparative Politics: The Problem of Equivalence*. Routledge.
- Coltman, T., Devinney, T. M., Midgley, D. F., & Venaik, S. (2008). Formative versus reflective measurement models: Two applications of formative measurement. *Journal of Business Research*, 61(12): 1250–1262.
- Constantin, A., & Voicu, M. (2015). Attitudes Towards Gender Roles in Cross-Cultural Surveys: Content Validity and Cross-Cultural Measurement Invariance. *Social Indicators Research*, 123(3): 733–751.
- Davidov, E., Muthén, B., & Schmidt, P. (2018). Measurement Invariance in Cross-National Studies: Challenging Traditional Approaches and Evaluating New Ones. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 47(4): 631–636.
- Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N. (2009). Gender Ideology: Components, Predictors, and Consequences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35(1): 87–105.
- EVS. (2020). *European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017)*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 4.o.o.
- Farré, L., & Vella, F. (2013). The Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Role Attitudes and its Implications for Female Labour Force Participation. *Economica*, 80(318): 219–247.
- Grunow, D., Begall, K., & Buchler, S. (2018). Gender Ideologies in Europe: A Multidimensional Framework. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 80(1): 42–60.
- Lee, S. K., Tufiş, P. A., & Alwin, D. F. (2010). Separate Spheres or Increasing Equality? Changing Gender Beliefs in Postwar Japan. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 72(1): 184–201.
- Lomazzi, V. (2017). Testing the Goodness of the EVS Gender Role Attitudes Scale. *Bulletin of Sociological Methodology/Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique*, 135(1): 90–100.
- Lomazzi, V. (2018). Using alignment optimization to test the measurement invariance of gender role attitudes in 59 countries. *Methods, Data, Analyses : A Journal for Quantitative Methods and Survey Methodology (Mda)*, 12(1): 77–103.
- Lomazzi, V. (2022). Improving measurements by survey infrastructures synergies: Insights from the revised gender role attitudes scale in the european values study 2017. *Quality & Quantity*.
- Lomazzi, V., & Crespi, I. (2019). *Gender mainstreaming and gender equality in Europe. Policies, culture and public opinion*. Policy Press. <https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/gender-mainstreaming-and-gender-equality-in-europe>
- Lomazzi, V., & Seddig, D. (2020). Gender Role Attitudes in the International Social Survey Programme: Cross-National Comparability and Relationships to Cultural Values. *Cross-Cultural Research*, 54(4): 398–431.
- Moser, C., & Moser, A. (2005). Gender mainstreaming since Beijing: A review of success and limitations in international institutions. *Gender & Development*, 13(2): 11–22.
- Pfau-Effinger, B. (1998). Gender cultures and the gender arrangement—A theoretical framework for cross-national gender research. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 11(2): 147–166.
- Schwartz, S. (2006). A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications. *Comparative Sociology*, 5(2): 137–182.

- Schwartz, S. (2008). *National cultural value orientation scores*. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304715744-The\\_7\\_Schwartz\\_cultural\\_value\\_orientation\\_scores\\_for\\_80\\_countries](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304715744-The_7_Schwartz_cultural_value_orientation_scores_for_80_countries)
- Sjöberg, O. (2010). Ambivalent Attitudes, Contradictory Institutions Ambivalence in Gender-Role Attitudes in Comparative Perspective. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 51(1–2): 33–57.
- van de Schoot, R., Kluytmans, A., Tummers, L., Lugtig, P., Hox, J., & Muthen, B. (2013). Facing off with Scylla and Charybdis: A comparison of scalar, partial, and the novel possibility of approximate measurement invariance. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 4: 770.
- Voicu, M., & Tufiş, P. A. (2012). Trends in gender beliefs in Romania: 1993–2008. *Current Sociology*, 60(1): 61–80.
- Walter, J. G. (2018). The adequacy of measures of gender roles attitudes: A review of current measures in omnibus surveys. *Quality & Quantity*, 52(2): 829–848.
- Wharton, A. S. (2005). *The Sociology of Gender: An Introduction to Theory and Research*. Blackwell Publishing.

# 20. ARE CHILDREARING VALUES' PREFERENCES IN EUROPE ASSOCIATED TO SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES?

---

*Alice Ramos*

*Jorge Vala*

## **Abstract**

*Based on two waves of the EVS (1990-93 and 2017-20), this chapter analyses childrearing values and their change/stability throughout the last 30 years in Europe at the level of their hierarchy or preferences, as well as at the way they are organised; and secondly explores the relationships between societal factors (GDP, Social well-being and GINI) and childrearing values priorities. Results show that in both EVS waves studied a bi-dimensional structure was found: one oriented towards the endorsement of authoritarian and conservative values and another promoting the development of values oriented to autonomy and cooperation. Regarding the relationship between values salience and social factors, results suggest that economic and social development are positively associated with a preference to teach children according to the values of autonomy and independence and negatively associated with the values of authoritarianism and conservatism. Importantly, regarding the endorsement of values related with autonomy, we found that in richer countries, higher levels of inequalities are associated with a lower endorsement of autonomy values, while in poor countries such association was not found.*

## 20.1 Introduction

Values are central to life. They shape our choices, our preferences, and the way we perceive and interpret the world.<sup>1</sup> They guide individual actions, attitudes and goals towards both personal development and social cooperation and are related to a wide range of social attitudes and behaviours, such as attitudes towards immigration (e.g. Ramos, Pereira & Vala, 2016; Davidov *et al.*, 2020; Vala, Lima & Lopes, 2004), subjective well-being (e.g. Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000), pro-social behaviour (e.g. Schwartz, 2010), institutional trust (e.g. Ramos, Brites & Vala, 2016) and political identities (Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2012). The role that values play in the construction and maintenance of a common basis of social understanding explains why they constitute a universal dimension of parenting and education of young children.

This Chapter aims to celebrate the unique and important contribution of Loek Halman to the study of values, specifically his renowned input to the research on the relation between values and social capital (Halman & Luijkx, 2006), and social cooperation (Dekker & Halman, 2003), as well as the relation between religion and values (Halman & Petterson, 2003). The bright intellectual path of Loek contributed to the knowledge of the impact of values on the construction and maintenance of a common basis of social understanding. In the frame of a larger project that we are developing, linking the relationship between childrearing values and children's values, the research here presented addresses childrearing values in a 30-years time span perspective.

Indeed, the last 30 years were times of turbulence in the world and in Europe. For instance, 10 years of a bloody civil war in the Balkans leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia; the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001; the 2008-2012 economic crisis; terrorist attacks in Europe (e.g. Paris-2015; Brussels and Nice-2016; Manchester and Barcelona-2017); the Syrian civil war in 2011; the refugee crisis in 2015. Despite the fact that theoretically values tend to be stable, it is relevant to put the question about the possible impact that events such as the ones described may have had on values priorities along time and specifically on childrearing values.

<sup>1</sup> This work was financed by FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian and Fundação La Caixa.

Accordingly, the present Chapter has the following aims: firstly, to analyse childrearing values and their change/stability throughout the last 30 years in Europe at the level of their hierarchy or preferences, as well as at the way they are organised; and secondly to explore the relationships between societal factors and childrearing values priorities.

The analysis of values hierarchy will be done within the framework of the association between socioeconomic development and values priorities (e.g. Inglehart, 1977). However, our proposal is to study this association in a broader perspective, taking into consideration not only the relationship between the hierarchy of childrearing values and national wealth (measured by GDP based on power purchasing parity), but also with quality of life, or social wellbeing measured by the expected years of schooling<sup>2</sup>. Besides the association with socioeconomic development, childrearing preferences will be analysed from the point of view of social inequalities measured through national income differences (Gini Index).

In order to account for possible changes in the structure and the hierarchy of childrearing values, two waves of the EVS will be analysed, the second wave (1990-93) and the fifth (2017-20).

## 20.2 The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Development, Societal Wellbeing and Childrearing Values Preferences

Values priorities have been mostly seen as shaped by social and economic development in the sense that values change and social transformation can be understood as correlated processes, since technological innovation, economic growth, the expansion of schooling levels and the increase of quality of life are associated processes for the change of individual orientations resulting from the need of individuals to adapt to pressures exerted by society. These process-

<sup>2</sup> 'Expected years of schooling' is a component of the Human Development Index (UNPD, 2000), that measures the number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if the current age-specific enrollment rates persist throughout the child's life by country.



es have been described as the emergency of a 'civic culture' (Almond & Verba, 1963), 'individual modernity' (Inkeles & Smith, 1974), or 'modernisation' (Inglehart, 1977). This transformation processes lead to the expansion of an ethos based on individualism, characterised by the development of personal patterns of values and norms and motivated by the need of pursuing self-actualisation and personal happiness (Arts & Halman, 2004: 27). According to these perspectives, industrialisation has produced individuals open to new ideas, who value individual initiative and who are motivated to success, but that at the same time, are concerned with quality of life and the dignity of others, have societal and environmental preoccupations and engage in human rights and peace movements (Inglehart, 1997).

However, there are also studies that contradict the theoretical assumptions of modernisation processes and put the emphasis on the nature of national institutions. For instance, while Listhaug (1990) found high levels of life satisfaction and weak religiosity among Scandinavian countries, a relationship that could easily be explained by similar economic levels and cultural contexts (supporting modernisation theory). Halman (1992) showed that there was not a uniform pattern of values in the Scandinavian countries, concluding that heterogeneous value patterns could be found in homogeneous economic and cultural contexts and that other than these factors should be considered to explain value differences. It must be noted that these findings report to values in general and not specifically to childrearing values.

Following this rationale, and regardless the debate about the direction of causality between values priorities and economic dynamics, our analysis will focus on two perspectives: one that relates economic performance to childrearing preferences, and a second one that relates these preferences to social performance. Indeed, apart from economic performance, higher prospects of education per se, that reflects a higher wellbeing, can also be related with values preferences to be encouraged in children. In sum, extending the empirical results obtained by Inglehart (1997), and Inglehart and Baker (2000), we hypothesised that in less developed societies, basic motivations and correspondent values related to individual security and the conservation of the social order are more salient and consequently more stimulated in children. In the same

line, in societies with higher levels of socioeconomic development the most salient values are those that go beyond basic needs, i.e., personal development needs, mainly those related with personal autonomy and collective harmony.

### **20.3 The Association Between Social Inequalities and Childrearing Values Preferences**

This new approach relates values' priorities to social inequalities and is supported by the main findings of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) about the impact of social inequalities on social life. It does not put the focus simply on wealth but on the way wealth is distributed, meaning that low levels of inequality, for instance, can be found either in rich and poor countries and vice-versa. Social inequalities have negative effects in many societal dimensions, such as, physical and mental health, education, social mobility, trust and community life and child wellbeing, outcomes are significantly worse in more unequal rich countries (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). In this vein, social inequalities can hamper the pursuing of individual prospects and limit human existence to the searching of means of survival.

Specifically, the impact of social inequalities on social values was studied in the context of social dominance orientation (Kunst *et al.*, 2017). It was shown that the support of group-based hegemony and social hierarchies was higher in societies where social inequalities were also higher. The study also showed that social dominance orientation was positively correlated with the preference for values related with the need of power and dominance, values that are opposed to universalistic values, according to the typology of Schwartz (Ramos, 2011). Consequently, we can propose that in societies with higher social inequalities, there is a higher probability to the endorsement of values related with obedience, respect for social hierarchies and conservation of social order and, consequently, these are also the values with higher probably to be taught to children. In line with this approach, and parallel to the potential association between values and socioeconomic performance, we expect the level of social inequalities to be also related to childrearing preferences in terms of values.

## 20.4 Data and Method

Data sets from the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> waves of the EVS were used, corresponding to a total of 85,981 respondents.

To measure childrearing preferences the following question was used: “Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five” The list of options consisted on 11 values: ‘good manners’, ‘independence’, ‘hard work’, ‘feeling of responsibility’, ‘imagination’, ‘tolerance and respect for other people’, ‘thrift, saving money and things’, ‘determination, perseverance’, ‘religious faith’, ‘unselfishness’, and ‘obedience’.

The data analysis was performed in 2 steps: 1) analysis of values structure and hierarchy in 1990-93 and 2017-20 (hierarchical cluster for binary variables, with clustering on variables, using the between-groups linkage clustering method and the Phi 4-point dissimilarity measure); 2) Analysis of the association between value priorities and socio economic performance (measured by GDPppp and expected years of schooling) and prevalence of societal inequalities (measured by Gini Index).

## 20.5 Results


### The hierarchy of childrearing values in Europe

As referred, from a list of eleven values that children can be encouraged to learn at home respondents were invited to select up to five. Figure 20.1 shows the percentage of times that each value was chosen in 1990-93 and 2017-20, in the 22 countries<sup>3</sup> that participated in both EVS-waves. Not only the hierarchy is the same, as the importance attributed to each value remains equal in most cases. Nevertheless, two characteristics registered a considerable shift: ‘obe-

<sup>3</sup> Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great-Britain, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

dience’, that decreased 10 percentage points and ‘hard work’ that increased 7 percentage points.

Figure 20.1 Hierarchy of childrearing values in 22 countries (%)



Overall, having good manners, a sense of responsibility, and being tolerant and respectful are the three most important values that children must be inculcated. Being independent and hard worker are also valued, followed by being thrift with things and money, having determination and perseverance.

This is an important finding suggesting that despite the sort of social and political changes that occurred in Europe, with different impact degrees on the everyday life of the populations, the values that are considered important to transmit to the new generations are, in general, still the same as 30 years ago.

### The structure of childrearing values in Europe

To explore the structure of childrearing values we followed the analytical strategy proposed by Tufis (2008) and ran a hierarchical cluster for binary variables,

with clustering on variables, using the between-groups linkage clustering method and the Phi 4-point dissimilarity measure. Results for the 22 countries that participated in the two EVS waves are shown in Figure 20.2a and 20.2b.

Figures 20.2a and 20.2b Childrearing values' structure in 1990-93 and 2017-20 in 22 countries.




Figure 20.2a -1990-93

Figure 20.2b -2017-20


As it was hypothesised, the time span between the two EVS waves did not produce changes in the 22 countries under analysis: not only the overall importance of each of the values remains similar, as its structure persists.

However, when the data obtained in all countries included in the 2017-20 wave (N=34) was subjected to the same statistical procedure something changed: the value 'good manners' shift from one cluster to the other one. This shift may be due to different conceptualizations of its meanings, and for that reason this item was excluded from further analyses.

Based on these results we will consider from now on two dimensions: autonomy, gathering the values of independence, imagination, determination and perseverance, feeling of responsibility, tolerance and respect and unselfishness; and authoritarianism, representing the values of hard work, thrift with

money and things, religious faith and obedience. Regarding the data collected in 2017-2020, and considering the group of 34 countries, the values representing autonomy have been more chosen (M=2.84, SD=1.08) than the ones corresponding to authoritarianism (M=1.19, SD=.91). Figure 20.3 illustrates the contrast between the preferences for each of the childrearing values dimensions.

Figure 20.3 Countries' placement in the crossroad between authoritarianism and autonomy




Globally, it is clear the opposing sides occupied by Eastern and Nordic countries, the first highly attached to authoritarian values and the second ones highly attached to autonomy values. In between, countries like Austria, Denmark, Spain or Slovenia appear as giving similar importance to both values dimensions. Moreover, the correlation between the two value dimensions ( $r(34) = -.85, p < .001$ ) supports the theoretical assumption according to which they have opposite underlying motivations (e.g., Inglehart, 2017; Schwartz, 1992, 2012).

### The association between economic performance and societal wellbeing in childrearing values priorities

To analyse the relationship between economic performance and childrearing preferences we used the GDPppp (Source: World Bank; measure: US\$; year 2020). Figures 20.4a and 20.4b show the associations between economic performance and the preference for values that promote autonomy and values that promote authoritarianism, respectively.

Figures 20.4a and 20.4b Association between socioeconomic performance and childrearing values' preferences, 2017-2020




Results show a strong association between economic performance and the configuration of value patterns ( $r_{\text{autonomy}} = .77, p < .001$ ;  $r_{\text{authoritarianism}} = -.84, p < .001$ ) (Figures 20.4a and 20.4b). Countries with lower GDPppp, such as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Belarus, North Macedonia and Serbia give less importance to the values that promote autonomy, while the richer, specially the Nordic countries, are more oriented towards the education of their children within the values of autonomy. Interestingly, the richer country of the group, Switzerland, is near other countries of the central Europe zone, namely Germany and The Netherlands, suggesting that other

factors that wealth are influencing childrearing values choices. Regarding the relationship between economic performance and authoritarianism values, the arrangement of countries is almost symmetrical.

However, societal wellbeing is more than strict economic performance. For instance, higher levels of objective wellbeing are usually characterized by higher educational performance. Figures 20.5a and 20.5b represent the association between the expected years of schooling in each country and the importance attributed to both dimensions of childrearing values.

Figures 20.5a and 20.5b Association between expected years of schooling and childrearing values' preferences, 2017-2020




Results confirm our hypotheses, showing a pattern of associations between expectations regarding educational attainment and childrearing preferences is very similar to the one observed with the wealth of the country: the richer, namely the Nordic countries, that offer higher educational expectations score higher on autonomy and lower on authoritarian childrearing values; and the poorer countries showing the inverse pattern ( $r_{\text{autonomy}} = .79, p < .001$ ;  $r_{\text{authoritarianism}} = -.80, p < .001$ ).

### The association between social inequalities and childrearing values' priorities

To analyse the impact of social inequalities in values orientations, we used Gini Index (UNDP 2020). Regarding the associations with social inequalities, although less strong they are statistically significant

$$(r_{\text{autonomy}} = -.39, p < .05; r_{\text{authoritarianism}} = .38, p < .05).$$

Figures 20.6a and 20.6b Association between social inequalities (Gini Index) and childrearing values' preferences, 2017-2020



Observing the scatter plots it is possible to identify groups of countries that score low on autonomy and that have either low inequality levels (Slovakia and Byelorussia) or high levels of inequalities (Russia, Romania and Georgia) (Figure 20.6a). The group of Nordic countries combines the lower Gini scores and the higher adherence to autonomy values. Regarding the adherence to authoritarian values (Figure 20.6b) it is possible to observe a similar pattern with countries with high Gini scores (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Russia) as well as countries with low Gini scores (Slovakia, Belarus and Czech Republic) among the ones that give more importance to the transmission of authoritarian values. These results suggest an interaction between wealth and social inequalities both in the case of a) authoritarianism and b) autonomy.

In order to analyse the referred possible interaction effects, two regression analyses were performed with three independent variables (GDP, GINI and GDP\*GINI), with autonomy and authoritarian values as dependent variables. Results show that only GDP is significantly associated to the adherence of childrearing values, in the sense that the higher the GDP, the higher the adherence to autonomy and the lower the adherence to authoritarianism. Contrary to our hypotheses, social inequalities are not directly associated with childrearing preferences (table 20.1).


Table 20.1 Predictors of adherence to childrearing values (standardised coefficients)

	Authoritarianism	Autonomy
GDPppp	-.80***	.68***
Gini	.09	-.19
GDP*Gini	.12	-.28*
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.697	.644

Note: N=34; \*\*\*p<.001; \*p<.05

Importantly, in the case of autonomy, we found an interaction effect between GDP and Gini. The decomposition of this interaction effect (Figure 20.7) shows that the moderation of economic performance (GDP) on the relationship between inequalities (Gini) and the endorsement of autonomy values is significant in richer countries (+1SD,  $b = -.06$ ;  $SE = .02$ ;  $p < .05$ ) but not in poorer countries (-1SD,  $b = .02$ ;  $SE = .02$ ;  $p < .25$ ). This means that in richer countries more inequalities are associated with lower endorsement of autonomy values, while in poor countries no association between these values and inequalities was found.

Figure 20.7 Interaction between economic performance and social inequalities in the endorsement of autonomy childrearing values



## 20.6 Discussion

This Chapter aimed at analysing the structure, change and contextual predictors of parents' preferences regarding childrearing values in Europe. We found a bi-factorial structure, opposing two contrasted dimensions of childrearing values: one oriented towards the endorsement of authoritarian and conservative principles and another promoting the development of self-oriented ideals that motivate autonomy and cooperation. This structure was found both on EVS waves of 1990-93 and 2017-2020. These are two contributions of this research to the knowledge on childrearing values: the identification of those two dimensions and the fact that they remain stable along the last thirty years.

Actually, one of the structural-theoretical assumptions of Inglehart's model is the consideration that "traditional conformity values, which subordinate hu-

man autonomy to community discipline, tend to give way to more emancipative values that emphasise human choice" (Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003: 342). Indeed, according to our findings it is reasonable to interpret the two childrearing values dimensions in the same way as Hageaars, Halman & Moors (2003) did: a continuum opposing orientations towards authority and autonomy as polar dimensions. These two dimensions have also meaningful similarities with the dichotomy that characterises the axis of Schwartz's (1992, 2012) model that opposes *conservation* (values that promote security, conformity and traditional costumes and norms) to *openness to change* (values that match post-materialist priorities).

The third contribution of this chapter to the study of childrearing values regards the relationship between the social context and the degree of preferences for each of the two dimensions of values. Three measures of social and economic climate were used: economic performance (GDPppp), social performance (expected years of schooling) and social inequalities (Gini Index). According to Inglehart's model, economic development shapes key human motivations that, on its turn, impact on values, for instance, shifting security and authoritarian values to autonomy ones. Our analysis intended to go a step further by considering two other contextual dimensions: social wellbeing and social inequalities.

The main findings suggest that in countries that have higher economic and social development but also where people have higher expectations of reaching a high level of formal education, there is a preference to teach children according to the values of individual autonomy and independence. Convergent with our hypothesis, we also found that countries with higher economic and social development are also the ones where the childrearing values of authoritarianism and conservatism gather lower preference.

Regarding the relationship between the level of inequalities and the propensity to teach children under the principles of each of the value dimensions considered, the direction of the relationships are similar to the ones observed with GDP and education expectations, although their strength being considerably lower, i.e the less social inequalities the higher the salience of the values related to individual autonomy and the lower the salience of authoritarian values.

More interesting to the understanding of childrearing preferences, is the interaction effect found between GINI and GDP and its impact on the endorsement of values. While the preference for teaching children under the values of respect for authority and conservatism seems to be the same in richer and poorer countries, independently of the level of inequalities, in what regards the values of autonomy our findings suggest a different tendency: in poorer countries the level of inequalities has no effect on the adherence to autonomy values, but when low inequalities meet high socioeconomic development, the endorsement of autonomy childrearing values tend to be higher. In sum, social inequalities are a critical factor for the understanding of the influence of economic development on the adherence to childrearing autonomy values.

Note, however, that some limitations of our findings should be considered. Firstly, taking in to account that 29 out of 34 EVS countries are classified as ‘very high development countries’, we believe that these findings ask for further analysis, with more heterogeneous countries in order to deeper explore the role played by economic performance, social wellbeing and social inequalities on the preference for childrearing values. Secondly, the format of the questions creates in itself some limitations for statistical data analyses: the final product is a set of dichotomous variables that do not allow ranking the values in terms of importance. Thirdly, the values used to measure childrearing values do not stem from a specific model about values organization, which limited the scope of comparisons that could have been made between our findings and some of the best known values models in the literature (e.g. Schwartz & Inglehart).

We hope that the results here presented can contribute to place the study of the similarities and contrasts between childrearing values, children values and adult values, as well as the interactions between them. Moreover, taking into account our findings, more research is needed to understand the mechanisms that drive the effect of socioeconomic development and social inequalities on childrearing values preferences as, in the words of Stiglitz (2014: 391), “Countries also pay a high price for inequality in terms of their democracy and the nature of their societies”.

## List of References

- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture - political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. London: Sage Publications.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2004). European values change in the second age of modernity. In: W. Arts and L. Halman (Eds.), *European values at the turn of the millennium*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, pp. 25-52.
- Davidov E, Seddig D, Gorodzeisky A, Rajzman R, Schmidt P, Semyonov M. (2020) Direct and indirect predictors of opposition to immigration in Europe: individual values, cultural values, and symbolic threat. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(3): 553-573.
- Dekker, P. & Halman, L. (2003). Volunteering and Values. In: P. Dekker and L. Halman (Eds.), *The Values of Volunteering. Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies (An International Multidisciplinary Series)*. Boston: Springer.
- Hagenaars, J., Halman, L., & Moors, G. (2003). Exploring Europe’s basic values map. In W. A. Arts, L. Halman, & J. Hagenaars (Eds.), *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study* (pp. 23-58). (European Values Studies; No. 6). Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L. (1992). *Scandinavian Values: How Special Are They?* Tilburg University: Institute for Social Research.
- Halman, L. (2009). Value change in Western European societies: Results from the European values study. *Kwansei Gakuin University School of Sociology Journal*, 107: 35-48.
- Halman, L., and Ruud L. (2006). Social capital in contemporary Europe: evidence from the European Social Survey. *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 5 (1):65-90.
- Halman, L. & Petterson, T. (2003). Differential patterns of secularization in Europe: exploring the impact of religion on social values. In L. Halman & O. Riis (Eds.) *Religion in Secularizing societies: The Europeans’ Religion at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (pp. 48-75). Leiden: Brill.
- Inglehart, R., & Wayne E. B. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review* 65(1): 19-51.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution in Europe: Changing values and political styles among western publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and post-modernization: cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2017). *Evolutionary Modernization Theory: Why People’s Motivations are Changing*. *Changing Societies & Personalities* 1(2): 136-151.
- Inkeles, A., & Smith, D.H. (1974). *Becoming modern: individual change in six developing countries*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kunst, J., Fisher, R., Sidanius, J. & Thomsen, L. (2017). Preferences for group dominance track and mediate the effects of macro-level social inequality and violence across societies. *Proceedings of the National*

- Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 114(21): 5407-5412.
- Ljsthaug, O. (1990) Macrovalues: the nordic countries compared. *Acta Sociologica* 33 (3):219-234.
  - Ramos, A. (2011) *Human values and attitudes towards immigration in Europe*. PhD Thesis. University of Lisbon. (unpublished)
  - Ramos, A., Pereira, C. R. & Vala, J. (2016). Economic crisis, human values and attitudes towards immigrants. In: M. Voicu, I.C. Mochmann and H. Dülmer (Eds.), *Values, Economic Crisis and Democracy* (pp. 104-137). London & New York: Routledge. Taylor and Francis
  - Ramos, A., Brites, R. & Vala, J. (2016). Confiança nas instituições políticas em países europeus. O papel dos valores, da experiência democrática e da perceção de eficácia do sistema político numa perspetiva multinível [Trust in political institutions in European countries. The role of values, democratic experience, and perception of political efficacy in a multilevel analysis]. In Machado, F. L., Almeida, A. N. de, Costa, A. F. da (Org.), *Sociologia e sociedade: estudos de homenagem a João Ferreira de Almeida* [Sociology and Society: an homage to João Ferreira de Almeida] pp. 345-367. Lisboa: Mundos Sociais
  - Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S.H. (2000). Value priorities and subjective well-being: direct relations and congruity effects. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 30:177-198.
  - Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advanced and empirical testes in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 1-65). New York: Academic Press.
  - Schwartz, S.H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., C., Beierlein, Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J-E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., & Konty, M. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 103 (4): 663-688.
  - Schwartz, S.H. (2010). Basic values: How they motivate and inhibit prosocial behavior. In: *Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature* (pp. 221-241). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.
  - Stiglitz, J.E. (2014). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers our Future. In: P. S. Dasgupta, V. Ramanathan and M. Sánchez Sorondo (Eds.), *Sustainable Humanity Sustainable Nature Our Responsibility* (Workshop Proceedings). Vatican: The Pontifical Academy of Sciences.
  - Tufis, P. (2008). Social status and childrearing values. In: B. Voicu and M. Voicu (Eds.) *The Values of the Romanians: 1993-2006. A Sociological Perspective*. Institutul European.
  - UNPD (2020). *Human Development Report*. New York.
  - Vala, J., Lima, M. & Lopes, D. (2004). Social values, prejudice and solidarity in the European Union. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.) *European values at the turn of the millennium*, (pp. 139-164). Leiden: Brill.
  - Vala, J. & Costa-Lopes, R. (2012). National identity and attitudes towards immigrants in a comparative perspective. In F. Höllinger and M. Hadler (Eds.) *Crossing borders, shifting boundaries: national and transnational identities in Europe and beyond* (pp. 71-100). Campus Verlag
  - Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H.D. (2003). The theory of human development: a cross cultural analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42: 341-379.
  - Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2010). *The Spirit Level. Why equality is better for everyone*. London: Penguin Books.



# 21. CHANGES IN WORK VALUES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTER- NATIONAL MIGRATION

---

*Bogdan Voicu*

## **Abstract**

*Subjective importance of work is core to work values and subject to change in recent decades, as a decreasing salience is being noticed in post-modern ages (Halman, 1999). This happens in a Europe that undergoes a process of individualization that includes changes in work values (Halman, 1996), and in which migrations bring people from one societal context to another, including in such way the change of the culture to which they are exposed (Rudnev, 2014; Voicu, 2014). This chapter shows that migration comes with a shift in value orientations, that leads to mixing the values in the country of origin with the ones in the host society, which become more important. The results bring support for both the socialization hypothesis (Inglehart, 1997) and the institutionalization assumption (Arts, 2011), showing their complementarity with respect to work values. In contrast to the culture of work in the society of origin, the culture of work in the host society proves to be more influential for immigrants. A process of acculturation but not assimilation is therefore observed because both cultures continue to be influential.*

## 21.1 Introduction

The literature on value formation and change was dominated for more than half a century by the assumption that values are stable features (Jagodzinski, 2004). Mannheim's (1952) generational replacement explanation and Ryder's (1965) focus on cohorts provided grounds for Inglehart's (1997) socialization hypothesis to become core of his postmaterialist theory. Conditions during early years are said to be key for value formation, and individuals tend to maintain their values over the entire life. This strong assumption is considered as given by most of the literature devoted to defining social values (Featherstone, 2011; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Jagodzinski, 2004; Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1994).

However, assimilation theories, irrespectively if in their classic, neoclassic, or segmented versions, claim that immigrants daily interact with the dominant culture and acquire new ways of doing, memories, behaviours, attitudes, and values specific to the dominant group (Esser, 2010; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). This involves a strong assumption related to value change in adult life. The idea is also to be found among scholarship of social values and/or social change. Ogburn's (1957) macro-level lag theory is such an example. Inkeles's (1969: 213-214) view of the factory as school for modernization stresses the informal learning that occurs at the workplace and in school as one of the drivers of modernization. Gundelach (1994) coins institutions as containers of value patterns to be internalized by immigrants. This institutionalization assumption in value formation (Arts, 2011) is also to be found in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001). The strength of contextual factors in value change is also underlined by the regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 2011) developed in psychology, as well as by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) who show that values are subject to change when experiencing high inflation or persistent economic recession. As Welzel (2007) puts it: culture is adaptive to contextual changes.

This chapter focuses on the two compelling hypotheses of socialization and institutionalization and employs international migration as 'natural experiment' (Dinesen, 2013) to test for their complementarity. I focus on work values, which are core to value change in recent decades (Halman, 1999; Halman &

Müller, 2006; Halman & Gelissen, 2019; Kraaykamp, Cemalcilar, & Tosun, 2019; Voicu, 2008). Changes are reported for work orientations towards both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (de Witte, Halman & Gelissen, 2004), as well as for the overall importance of work (Halman, 1999). While centrality of work remains strong, its salience knows enough variation across Europe to be noted (Halman, 1999). In this chapter, I focus on importance of work. I expect that immigrants' work values depend on the work culture in the society of origin, as stated by the socialization assumption. In addition, these values should also depend on the work culture in the country of current residence, as stated by the institutionalization assumption.

To test these hypotheses, I use data from the European Values Study 2008-2009 (EVS, 2008), collected before the global economic recession at the end of 2000s, which may have acted as a game changer, and before the refugee crises, which brought immigrant issues on the top of the European agenda.

## 21.2 Data and Methods

The EVS 2008-2009 questionnaire included a battery of questions tapping work values. Respondents expressed their agreement on 5-points scales with four statements: (1) It is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it; (2) People who don't work become lazy; (3) Work is a duty toward society; and (4) Work should always come first, even if it means less free time. Previous research showed that the battery has full metric invariance, but no scalar invariance (Dülmer, 2011). For simplicity, I use as dependent variable the mean value of responses to these 4 items. The main independent variables are the country-averages for the "work is a duty" question, computed for the country of origin and for the host society. These averages are indicators of the culture of work in the countries of birth and current residence. The EVS 2008-2009 sample includes 6,297 foreign-born respondents, from 153 countries of origin and living in 47 host societies. To increase the number of countries of origin for which information on work culture is available, I computed the average for "work as duty" in the WVS 2005-2009 sample. However, the mean estimates for the EVS and WVS samples are not fully comparable. For instance, in Spain,

Turkey, Poland, and Romania, the 95% confidence intervals estimated in the two surveys are not overlapping. Therefore, I choose three different strategies for the analyses: The first set of models employs cases from the EVS sample only, and restricts the sample to 5,087 cases of European born immigrants with full information available (47 origin countries and 47 host societies). The second set of models considers only those born in countries included in the WVS sample, which leaves only 2,270 cases for analysis (40 origin countries and 46 host societies). The third set of models employs all available cases and uses average pooled indicators for the countries of origin where two surveys are available. For these models, listwise deletion leads to 5,444 cases with full information available (70 origin countries and 47 host societies).

The cases under analysis are individuals, nested on the one hand in their host societies, and on the other in their societies of origin. This double hierarchical nature of data leads to the need for analysing cross-classified multilevel models which are estimated using lmer in R. Control variables at the individual level include education, age, age squared, female, life satisfaction, marital status, number of children, subjective health, and employment status (measured by no work, parttime work, fulltime work). This enables us to find out whether immigrants internalize the values from the host society and/or reflect the ones from the country of birth beyond their individual characteristics. Furthermore, I control for unemployment rate, GDP per capita, and GDP growth in the host country (all World Bank Indicators) and for the index of democracy compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. I also control for the unemployment rate in the country of origin. All these macro-level indicators are computed for the year of survey. The unemployment rate is likely to affect work values by putting or releasing pressure in the labour market; GDP is related to the general economic development of the country, while GDP growth gives an indication of the current insecurity in the respective society.

The above-described models are repeated in two different scenarios. First, a cross-level interaction between the work culture in the country of origin and the time spent in the host society (in years) is included, with the expectation that the latter acts as moderator for the impact of the first. In other words, one may expect that the values taken from the country of origin become less influ-

ential with the time spent in the host society. Second, the models are repeated by including the natives (i.e. those born in the host societies) from the samples, in order to contrast immigrants to these non-migrants. Please note that for natives, the indicator for work culture is identical for both host and origin country.

### 21.3 Results

Across Europe, considering the host culture, there is a stronger orientation to consider work important in Eastern and Southern countries, with values decreasing towards the North and West. This is compliant with previous findings (Voicu, 2008), confirming that work loses its societal salience when entering late modernity.

Table 21.1 introduces the results from the first set of models, showing the coefficients for the macro-level effects only. The total variation between respondents with regard to orientations towards work, based on the values of ICC (not shown in table), can be decomposed in roughly 15% between origin countries, 8% between host societies, and 77% at the individual level. This implies that there is enough difference induced by host societies and countries of origin to justify being inspected.

The results show that except for the country-level indicators for work culture, no other macro-level predictor is significant in these models. Apparently, the two indicators for work culture, one located at the level of the host society and the other for the country of origin, are strong enough to overwrite any other influence that may derive from the indicators of economic and political conditions tapped by GDP, unemployment, or the index of democracy.

Table 21.1 Models without cross-level interactions, natives excluded: effects of macro-level variables

		Model 1: data for country of origin = EVS2008 (n= 5087)	Model 2: data for country of origin = WVS2005 (n=2720)	Model 3: pooled data on country of origin (n=5444)
<b>HOST</b>	Work culture	0.63 ***	0.66 ***	0.59 ***
	Unemployment rate	-0.01	-0.02	0.00
<b>SOCIETY</b>	ln(GDP per capita)	0.00	-0.13	-0.01
	GDP Growth Rate	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	Index of Democracy	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
<b>COUNTRY</b>	Work culture	0.18	0.34 **	0.15 †
<b>OF ORIGIN</b>	Unemployment rate	0.00	0.01	0.00

\*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10. Models include controls at individual level for education, age, age squared, female, life satisfaction, marital status, number of children, subjective health, employment status.

The impact of the work culture existing in the host society is stable across models. One point increase in its values leads to about 0.6 points increase in the values of individual orientations towards work (scale ranges from 1-5). This means that in a country that values work, immigrants will also tend to value work more than in a country that puts less emphasis on work. Since the scales of the two indicators are identical, the effect is quite strong, showing that acquiring values from the host society is important. This supports the institutionalization assumption.

The impact of the work culture in the country of origin is weaker and turns insignificant in the model that employs EVS data only. In the models that use only the immigrants from WVS countries (model 2) or pools together all immigrants (model 3), despite that the point estimate for culture of origin is smaller than the one for the host country, the 95% confidence intervals overlap, showing that the impact of the work culture in the country of origin is not so much different compared to the one from the host.

Table 21.2 Models with cross-level interactions: effects of macro-level variables

		Model 1: data for country of origin = EVS2008 (n= 5063)	Model 2: data for country of origin = WVS2005 (n=2720)	Model 3: pooled data on country of origin (n=5420)
<b>HOST</b>	Work culture	1.03 ***	0.60 ***	0.67 ***
	Unemployment rate	0.00	0.00	-0.02
<b>SOCIETY</b>	ln(GDP/capita)	0.02	0.01	-0.13
	GDP Growth Rate	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	Index of Democracy	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03
<b>COUNTRY</b>	Work culture	0.05	0.20 +	0.34 +
<b>OF ORIGIN</b>	Unemployment rate	-0.01	0.00	0.00
<time spent in the host society> *		0.00	0.00	0.00
<work culture in country of origin>				

\*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10. Models include controls at individual level for education, age, age squared, female, life satisfaction, marital status, number of children, subjective health, employment status.

Table 21.2 shows the same models but adds the cross-level interaction effect. The expectation was that time spent in the host society will reduce the impact of the heritage brought by the work values internalized during early childhood. However, it turns out that there is not such an effect. Moreover, the impact of the indicator for the host culture remains significant and unchanged, with a notable increase in the first model employing EVS data only.

Table 21.3 changes the set up and introduces the natives into the analysis. When using them as control group, the impact of the work culture in the host society remains unchanged. The impact of the culture of origin turns significant. In the models from Table 21.3, the estimated 95% confidence intervals for the two work cultures do not overlap in the same model, indicating that the impact of the host culture is stronger as compared to the one from the country of origin.

Table 21.3 Models without cross-level interactions, natives included: effects of macro-level variables

		Model 1: data for country of origin = EVS2008 (n= 63226)	Model 2: data for country of origin = WVS2005 (n=21832)	Model 3: pooled data on country of origin (n=63637)
<b>HOST</b>	Work culture	0.63 ***	0.66 ***	0.59 ***
<b>SOCIETY</b>	Unemployment rate	0.00	-0.02	0.00
	ln(GDP/capita)	0.04	-0.13	-0.01
	Index of Democracy	-0.04 +	-0.02	-0.01
	GDP Growth Rate	0.00	-0.02	-0.01
<b>COUNTRY</b>	Work culture	0.14 *	0.34 **	0.15 +
<b>OF ORIGIN</b>	Unemployment rate	0.00	0.01	0.00

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; † $p < .10$ . Models include controls at individual level for education, age, age squared, female, life satisfaction, marital status, number of children, subjective health, employment status.

## 21.4 Conclusion and Discussion

The results show moderate support for the socialization hypothesis. Values in the country-of-origin matter, but the effect is less stable and not as strong. In other words, it is likely that individuals adhere to values internalized during early socialization, but there is less proof in this respect as compared to the acculturation of norms that they find in the country of residence. Perhaps better measurement is needed. The data do not allow to exactly determine how much time immigrants actually spent in the country of birth. We only know when they arrived in the country of current residence, but their life-course may include multiple migrations. In other words, the exposure to the work values in the country of origin might have been low from the very beginning.

Controlling for the time spent in the host society is only partly solving the issue. The other unseen part in the models is the current exposure to the culture in the country of origin. In fact, on the one hand, the current values of the country-of-origin indicator show how work values are *today*, not at the time

when the nowadays immigrants lived there. Since work patterns and work salience changed a lot in recent decades, it might be a very weak indicator for early socialization. Controlling for age and contrasting to immigrants from other societies and natives partly smooths the imprecision, but still it remains the question whether different societies of origin changed their work culture faster or slower than others. On the other hand, there is the need to control for current contact with the country of origin. In a transnational world, one can expect constant interactions with friends and relatives which were left behind, exposure to media and social media, recurring visits home and from home, and even embeddedness in a network of immigrants from the same origin that persists over time. In the sense of the institutionalization assumption, this would mean that culture of origin could produce institutionalization effects as well. A control for present interactions with the country of origin is required, but existing surveys do not provide such information.

Finally, there is a limitation to the impact of the host society: it might be the case that a selection effect is present. Immigrants might have chosen countries of destination according to their preferences related to work culture, which might lead to endogeneity in assessing causation between the host-culture indicator and individual value orientations towards work. However, controlling for a variety of host-origin pairs should have at least partly removed the risk to wrongly interpret the results in this respect.

With these cautions in mind, the main message of this chapter remains that individuals have a strong embeddedness of their work values in the work values of the host countries, and there is moderate support to believe that they combine such influence with the one from their countries of origin. The effect remains unchanged irrespective of the specifications in the models that were introduced above, and it also remains the same when changing the dependent variable to single items such as “work is a duty” or “work comes first” (models not shown). The remarkable robustness of the findings to measurement, modelling, or sample selection confirms the institutionalization assumption with respect to work values. People derive their own values from existing societal norms and behave accordingly. Such results suggest that in a global world it matters more where one lives than where one is born. Processes of accultura-

tion and assimilation also go against the concerns of anti-immigration activists and xenophobes claiming that incoming migrant flows may severely affect the national culture.

Similar results were observed in case of civic participation (Voicu, 2014) and basic human values (Rudnev, 2014). For researchers in the sociology of values, such results push towards reconsidering the strength of the socialization assumption and urge for integrating an explanation that considers complementarity with the institutionalization assumption. For migration studies, the results show that assimilation still occurs, but it should be reinvented in the sense that, at least culturally, it actually leads to a mixture of host-origin values.

Considering practical implications within the work domain, employers may expect their immigrant employees to display rather similar values as their native counterparts, with a pinch of their culture of origin. If this proves valid for other traits beyond the importance of work, this means that employees will build on a common ground provided by the host culture and add to it flavors from the culture in the country of origin. Managing such mixture in a creative way may increase profit and efficacy. Ignoring it through imposing a normative approach to work may lead to frustrations and potential disruptions within organizations.

*Acknowledgements: The work on this chapter was supported by grant GAR-UM-2019-XI-5.3-9 from Romanian Academy.*

## List of references

- Arts, W. (2011) Explaining European Value Patterns: Problems and Solutions, *Studia UBB Sociologia* LVI (1): 7-31.
- Beck, U. & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2001). *Individualization. Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences*. London: Sage.
- de Witte, H., Halman, L. & Gelissen, J. (2004). European work orientations at the end of the twentieth century. Pp. 255–282 in: Arts, W. & Halman, L., eds., *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*, Leiden: Brill.
- Dülmer, H. (2011). A multilevel regression analysis on work ethic. Pp. 311–340 in: Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., Billiet, J., & Meuleman, B. (Eds.). *Cross-cultural analysis: Methods and applications*. Routledge.
- Esser, H. (2010). Assimilation, Ethnic Stratification, or Selective Acculturation? Recent Theories of the Integration of Immigrants and the Model of Intergenerational Integration, *Sociologica* 1: 1-29
- EVS (2008): European Values Study 2008 Integrated Dataset, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4800, v.4.0.0 (2016-04-15), doi:10.4232/1.12458.
- Featherstone, M. (2011). Societal value formation and the value of life. *Current sociology*, 59(2): 119-134.
- Gundelach, P. (1994). National value differences: modernization or institutionalization?. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 35: 37-58.
- Halman, L. (1996). Individualism in individualized society? Results from the European Values Surveys. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 37(3): 195.
- Halman, L.C.J.M. (1999). Europeans and their work orientations. (WORC paper; Vol. 99.04.005/1). WORC, Work and Organization Research Centre.
- Halman, L., & Gelissen, J. (2019). Values in life domains in a cross-national perspective. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 71(1): 519-543.
- Halman, L., & Müller, H. (2006). Contemporary work values in Africa and Europe: Comparing orientations to work in African and European societies. *International journal of comparative sociology*, 47(2): 117-143.
- Higgins, E. (2011). *Beyond Pleasure and Pain: How Motivation Works*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hitlin, S., & Piliavin, J. A. (2004). Values: Reviving a dormant concept. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.*, 30: 359-393.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Post-Modernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R., Baker, W.E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values, *American Sociological Review*, 65: 19-51.
- Inglehart, R., Welzel, C. (2005). *Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Inkeles, A. (1969). Making Man Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, *American Journal of Sociology*, 75(2): 208-225.
- Jagodzinski, W. (2004). Methodological problems of value research. Pp. 97-121 in: Vinken, Soeters & P. Ester (Eds.) *Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*, Leiden: Brill.
- Kraaykamp, G., Cemalcilar, Z., & Tosun, J. (2019). Transmission of work attitudes and values: Comparisons, consequences, and implications. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 682(1): 8-24.
- Mannheim, K. (1952). The Problem of Generations, Pp. 276-322 in: Mannheim K., *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Ogburn, W.F. (1957). Cultural Lag as Theory. *Sociology and Social Research*, 41: 167-174.

- Portes, A. & Rumbaut, R.G. (2006). *Immigrant America: A Portrait. Third edition. Revised, Expanded, and Updated*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rudnev, M. (2014). Value adaptation among intra-European migrants: Role of country of birth and country of residence. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 45(10): 1626-1642.
- Ryder, N. B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review*, 30(6): 843-861.
- van Deth, J. & Scarbrough, E. (1994) The Concept of Value in van Deth, J. & Scarbrough, E. (Eds.) *The Impact of Values*, Oxford University Press.
- Voicu, B. (2008). Social values, working time and the future of society, Pp. 141-158 in: Neumaier, O., Schweiger, G. & Sedmak, C. (Eds.), *Perspectives on Work: Problems, Insights, Challenges*, Munster, Hamburg, London: LIT Publisher Group.
- Voicu, B. (2014). Participative immigrants or participative cultures? The importance of cultural heritage in determining involvement in associations. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 25(3): 612-635.
- Welzel, C. (2007). Individual Modernity, Pp. 186-205 in: Dalton R., Kilngemann HD (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

# 22. INCOME INEQUALITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF CORRUPT ACTS

---

*Ioana Pop*

*Caroline Dewilde*

## **Abstract**

*This chapter makes use of the EVS longitudinal integrated file to analyse whether an overall trend towards higher income inequality is associated with growing or declining acceptance of corrupt acts among different social strata. Taking advantage of innovations in multilevel modelling allowed for by the ‘repeated cross-sectional’-nature of this data source, we find that contradictory findings established in previous studies are hard to replicate: there is no relationship between the ‘average’ level (between countries) or the changes (within countries) in income inequality and the acceptance of corrupt acts. Further findings suggest that future research should account for so-called ‘cluster-effects’, whereby ‘families of countries’ with similar religiously-rooted institutional and legal-historical traditions and regulations, systematically vary in terms of value orientations. In particular, we find higher acceptance of corrupt acts in the Southern- and Eastern-European countries compared to the Northern countries. Future research could flesh out which macro-level institutional arrangements (e.g., religion) are associated with which micro-level social attitudes and norms related to the ‘acceptance of corruption’.*



## 22.1 Introduction

Corruption – defined as the (ab)use of public authority and/or office for private gain, large or small – is a topic of study across the social sciences. Sociologists, not surprisingly, are interested in the social causes and consequences of the level of corruption, as well as its acceptance by the general population. Regarding its social consequences, the level of corruption in a society acts as a contextual stressor leading to, for instance, lower life satisfaction (Amini, 2020) and mental illness (van Deurzen, 2017). When corruption is more abundant, people feel more concerned, powerless, and hostile towards the unfairness and injustice of their social environment. Corruption also impacts on material living conditions, by endangering access to often basic goods and services (Lambsdorff, 2006).

According to You & Khagram (2005), the level of corruption is influenced by material and normative behaviours, among which a higher tolerance of corruption as ‘acceptable behaviour’ is a key element. The authors then link the higher acceptance of corrupt acts to the level of income inequality, thus proposing a causal relationship between increasing inequality levels and increasing corruption levels through this mechanism. This argument goes against (development) economists’ focus on the detrimental impacts of corruption on efforts to achieve a more equitable (re)distribution of resources (e.g., by reducing tax revenues or the effectiveness of public spending), resulting in a ‘loss’ of economic growth, as well as higher levels of inequality (Lambsdorff, 2006). A ‘drone-like review’ of the literature reveals that reversed relationships between various forms of ‘inequality’ on the one hand, and ‘corruption’ on the other hand – in other words: “does corruption lead to higher inequality, or does higher inequality breed more corruption?” – are a proverbial ‘can of worms’.

Most studies attempt to answer these questions by modelling statistical (often cross-sectional) relationships between ‘macro-level’ indicators (e.g. the Gini-index as a measure of income inequality and the often-used ‘Corruption Perception-Index’ compiled by Transparency International) pertaining to geographically widely different samples of countries, characterized by vary-

ing levels of economic development and democracy (e.g. Policardo & Sánchez Carrera, 2018; Pop, 2012; You & Khagram, 2005). Because there is also a strong and consistent negative macro-level association between economic affluence and the level of corruption confounding relations between corruption and its social causes and consequences (van Deurzen, 2017), a pattern of contradictory and ‘entangled’ research findings arises. This is further complicated by the fact that most studies focusing on societal (macro-level) indicators put forward a host of speculative ‘underlying’ micro-level argumentations that are hardly empirically verified. In line with You & Khagram (2005), Policardo *et al.* (2018, p. 100), for instance, also suggest that a positive impact of income inequality on corruption<sup>1</sup> may be explained by the fact that “*when poverty is widespread and people underpaid, the incentives to pursue wealth (even in an unfair and illegal way) increase.*”

Based on such arguments, it is easy to assume associations between the level of inequality and acceptance of corrupt acts. However, from a methodological perspective, comparative studies of this kind suffer from serious limitations, in the sense that inferences about social change over time are mostly derived from cross-country differences at a particular point in time. Focusing more directly on finding more robust evidence for this mechanism, i.e., that changes in income inequality are linked to changes in the level of acceptance of corrupt acts, is a first step toward settling the income inequality-corruption dispute, and the pathway that we are exploring in this chapter.

It is furthermore likely that at least part of these supposedly ‘linear’ relationships arises from so-called ‘cluster-effects’, whereby ‘families of countries’ with similar religiously-rooted institutional and legal-historical traditions and regulations, which also happen to cluster around certain levels of inequality and economic affluence, systematically vary in terms of value orientations. Even though with modernization and rationalization came secularization, religion remains an important influence in people’s lives. Numerous public and private institutions and organizations (e.g. social policy, schools, and civil society) continue to reflect the hallmarks of their religious roots. As

<sup>1</sup> Controlling for Gross Domestic Product/capita.

Loek Halman repeatedly demonstrated in his work, religion hence directly and indirectly serves as a source of morality and civic engagement (De Hart, Dekker & Halman, 2013; Halman & Van Ingen, 2015). Religion is furthermore associated with variations across Europe on the dimension of normative value orientations, i.e. “*the maintenance of strict moral standards and the valuing of strict social norms, institutions, and solidarity with a rejection of self-interest and illegal behaviors*” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 3). Regarding the focus of this chapter, a cultural-legal heritage of Protestantism (stressing individual responsibility) and British common law (focused on the preservation of private property) tend to be associated with lower levels and acceptance of corruption (You & Khagram, 2005). Halman & Voicu (2010), however, note that Catholic societies appear stricter than Protestant and Orthodox ones, although in the latter, mostly Eastern-European, countries, since the collapse of communism a religious revival has taken place.

## **22.2 Does Increasing Income Inequality Relate to Changes in the Acceptance of Corrupt Acts?**

In this explorative chapter, we contribute to the existing literature by focusing on one particular mechanism that has been put forward regarding the supposed causal impact of inequality on corruption: the acceptance of corrupt acts. To this end, we make use of advanced statistical modelling to exploit the richness and longitudinal nature of the European Values Study (EVS). We focus particularly on income inequality, given that there is a long-standing body of literature documenting, firstly, its increase since the mid-70’s across both advanced and emerging welfare democracies across the western hemisphere, following interdependent processes of economic globalization and technological change, welfare state restructuring, post-communist market transition, and changes in household formation (e.g. Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; Bandelj & Mahutga, 2010; Esping-Andersen, 2007; Heyns, 2005; Milanovic, 2016; OECD, 2015).

Secondly, a large body of literature has sought to substantiate Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2009) claim that in particular relative income inequality has harmful

social consequences, through processes such as increased competition for social status or declining solidarity (e.g. Lancee & Van de Werfhorst, 2012; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012; van Deurzen, van Ingen, & van Oorschot, 2015). As “*income distributions change at a glacial pace*” (Heyns, 2005, p. 173), a common criticism is that most of these (cross-sectional) studies capture country-differences rather than actual change over time. As one of the most long-running surveys, the EVS, however, offers the opportunity to study the impact of changes in income inequality on changes in the acceptance of corrupt acts, for a suitably long time period, whilst taking account of both micro-level (individual) and macro-level (contextual) influences. Furthermore, the survey includes a wide range of countries, including new democracies that experienced deep social change (e.g., from communism to a free-market economy), and often-times also strong increases in income inequality, since the 1990s.

From previous research it is possible to derive competing expectations regarding the impact of changes in income inequality on the acceptance of corrupt acts. This is also reflected in the empirical evidence so far: whilst You & Khagram (2005) expect and find an ‘overall’ positive effect of income inequality on perceived corruption (mediated by a higher acceptance of corruption), Pop (2012) reports an overall negative association between income inequality and the acceptance of corrupt acts. Though the latter study includes 43 European countries (compared with 129 countries in the former), and this could explain the divergent conclusion, from a theoretical perspective the possibility exists that individuals with different social positions experience the distribution of resources in society differently and this would make corrupt behaviour more or less acceptable. In other words, higher inequality could be associated with either higher or lower acceptance of corrupt acts by different social groups in society.

One such line of argumentation links increases in inequality to increased opportunities for the rich and powerful to lead increasingly segregated lives, contributing to declining meeting opportunities with, empathy for, and solidarity with poorer people (Mijs, 2019; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012). You & Khagram (2005) furthermore argue that at higher levels of inequality, those at the high-end have more to lose through the proper functioning of ‘meritocratic’ processes,

as well as possessing more resources to gain influence in order to counter-act such influences. *Higher inequality will therefore be more conducive to a higher tolerance of corrupt acts among the higher social strata (H1).*

But what happens with the rest of the population? Expectations become more blurry when it comes to the lower social strata. On the one hand, it could be that, especially in societies with higher inequality and less democracy, where “*it is impossible to do well honestly*” (You & Khagram, 2005, p. 138), corruption is a necessary ‘everyday evil’ in order to secure access to basic needs. This would imply that higher inequality would result in higher acceptance of corrupt acts in the whole population. On the other hand, however, we might expect that in a European context, where levels of affluence and democracy are higher, and welfare states at least aim to achieve some level of basic security and equal opportunity, people in lower social positions might become increasingly less acceptant of corrupt acts. If we add also a self-interest argument (the lack of financial resources and power puts the members of lower social strata at a disadvantage on a playing-field where this is the currency), a stronger expectation is that *among the lower social strata, higher income inequality translates into lower acceptance of corrupt acts (H2).* As such, these contrasting arguments could tilt the balance either way and could explain the inconsistent pattern of relationships between income inequality and acceptance of corrupt acts as found in the literature so far.

## 22.3 Results from the EVS 1990 to 2017

Our data source is the longitudinal integrated file of the EVS. In our analyses, we included only the countries that had at least 2 waves of data collection. Some countries and waves were discarded because of missing values for the contextual income inequality<sup>2</sup> and wealth measures<sup>3</sup>. Finally, we had 40 countries and 125 country-wave combinations in our analyses, covering the

2 Income inequality was measured as an average across 3 years (or the closest value) of the Gini-Index of disposable household income, derived from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009), corresponding to each country-wave combination.

3 The wealth of a country was measured in a similar fashion but using the GDP per capita PPP current international \$ derived from the World Development Indicators dataset (World Bank, 2020).


period from 1990 to 2017.

We followed Pop (2012) in measuring acceptance of corrupt acts. For the items ‘accepting a bribe’, ‘claiming undeserved state benefits’, ‘cheating on tax’ and ‘paying cash to avoid tax’, respondents that chose a score from 6 to 10 (on a scale from 1 to 10, where a higher value indicates more acceptance) were coded with 1. Around 22 percent out of 181504 respondents in the working file found justifiable at least one of these corrupt acts. However, we found large differences between countries within each wave in the proportion of the population that found any of the 4 acts acceptable. The Russian Federation stands out with almost 60 percent of the population that found corrupt acts acceptable in the 2017 wave, while on the other end we had Turkey where in 1999 wave only around 3 percent of the population found corrupt acts justifiable.

We first explored within each wave the country-level bivariate relationship between the level of income inequality or wealth and the societal acceptance of corrupt acts. Figure 22.1 presents an unclear picture:<sup>4</sup> the relationship is not significant in the 1990-wave, is negative in 1999, remains negative but weakens in 2008 and finally became positive in the 2017-wave. The correlations within each wave indicated that all these relationships were however not statistically significant.

4 The country codes are as followed: AL: Albania; AT: Austria; AM: Armenia; BE: Belgium; BA: Bosnia Herzegovina; BG: Bulgaria; BB: Belarus; HR: Croatia; CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; GE: Georgia; DE: Germany; GR: Greece; HU: Hungary; IS: Iceland; IR: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; RU: Russian Federation; RS: Serbia; SK: Slovakia; SI: Slovenia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; CH: Switzerland; TR: Turkey; UA: Ukraine; MK: Macedonia; GB: Great Britain.

Figure 22.1 Acceptance of corrupt acts (proportion by country and wave) and income inequality




Source: EVS

The bivariate relationship between the proportion of respondents that found any of the four corrupt acts justifiable and the level of economic affluence within each wave showed a more consistent negative pattern (Figure 22.2). However, these relationships were also not significant.

To test our expectations formally we applied the method proposed by Fairbrother (2014). In brief, we estimated a 3-level multilevel model with country-waves nested in countries. Although the acceptance of corrupt acts was a dichotomous measure, we followed Mood (2010) and estimated linear probability models, treating thus the dependent variable as continuous and expressing the probability to find corrupt acts justifiable. To capture the effect of the level and of the change in time in income inequality we computed two mea-

asures, one capturing the mean by country across the waves in the dataset and the other one as the difference of each wave to the grand mean within the country. We added a set of individual-level control variables (gender, labour market position, age, and education level in 3 categories) as well as dummies for the waves. We used the same strategy to decompose the GDP per capita measure into the mean and difference to the country-specific mean. We used the harmonized level of education provided in the integrated datafile as a proxy for the socio-economic position of respondents. This resulted in discarding the 1990 wave due to missing values. This solution was preferable to using a measure of income at the individual level that additionally suffered from high levels of missing values when collected.

Figure 22.2 Acceptance of corrupt acts (proportion by country and wave) and societal wealth



Source: EVS

Did the increase of income inequality between 1999 to 2017 relate to higher or lower probabilities of finding corrupt acts justifiable? Based on our analyses, this was not the case.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the average of income inequality across the waves included in the analyses was also not linked to the probability of finding corrupt acts justifiable. The same can be said about the two (between- and within-) measures of wealth. Moreover, the estimation of interactions between over-time changes in income inequality and education level dummies, led to the same conclusion, i.e., there was no significant or significantly different impact of trends in income inequality on the attitudes towards corrupt acts for individuals with different education levels.

## 22.4 If not income inequality, then what?

We then turned our attention to possible ‘cluster-effects’, whereby ‘families of countries’ with similar religiously-rooted institutional and legal-historical traditions and regulations, which also happen to cluster around certain levels of inequality and economic affluence, systematically vary in terms of value orientations. Based on the sources of variations mentioned above (also see e.g. De Jong, Lalenis & Mamadouh, 2002), we assigned countries to a ‘preliminary’ and admittedly rough classification differentiating between a *Northern-European* (Protestant, Common Law or pragmatic/decentralized law system, Beveridgean welfare state origins), a *Southern-European* (predominantly Catholic, French or Germanic Civil Law, conservative-corporatist social and labour market policy) and an *Eastern-European cluster* (legacy of communist rule, Catholic/Orthodox). We found that, when not including the level of inequality and of wealth, the level of acceptance of corrupt acts was significantly higher in the Southern and Eastern clusters. Including the level of and the changes in time in wealth and inequality did not explain away these effects. Including interactions between the level of and changes in income inequality, and the cluster dummies resulted in a significant interaction with the Eastern-European cluster: in those countries with higher levels of inequality, the overall higher acceptance of corrupt acts was significantly lower.

<sup>5</sup> Alternative estimations that excluded education, thus covering the waves 1990 to 2017, led to the same overall conclusions.

## 22.5 Conclusion

Attitudes towards corrupt acts display a wide variation between countries – from around three percent of the population in Turkey 1999 that found any of the four corrupt acts justifiable to almost 60 percent in the Russian Federation in 2017. Also, as illustrated by the figures, a change in time and within countries in the acceptance of corrupt acts is visible. Still, and against arguments and previous evidence from the literature, we found no relationship between the ‘average’ level or the changes in income inequality and the acceptance of corrupt acts. This comes as a surprise because it contradicts a study that using data from the EVS 2008 wave found an overall negative association between income inequality and the acceptance of corrupt acts (Pop, 2012). In addition, it also contradicts the study by You & Khagram (2005), who expected and found an ‘overall’ positive effect of income inequality on perceived corruption; this effect was mediated by a higher acceptance of corruption.

How can we explain these inconsistent findings? We proposed a more theoretical reasoning and we argued that high levels of income inequality might be perceived differently by individuals with different social standing. However, this was not the case also. Possibly, other contextual factors play a role in modelling how income inequality is perceived within the population and subsequently, what kind of effects it might have. First, Mijs (2019) finds that increasing income inequality across European countries is associated with a higher tolerance of inequality as more people believe that higher income gaps are meritocratically deserved. If this is the case, then “deserved” inequality is likely not reflected in attitudes towards corruption through the arguments that we discussed.

Next, engagement in corrupt acts as a cultural facet of Eastern-European societies could also have a role in moderating the effect of income inequality on the acceptance of corrupt acts, especially in combination with the profound institutional and economic changes that also have led to often strong increases in income inequality after the fall of communism. Corrupt acts could have a dual role in these societies, on the one hand being embedded still in the social psyche, being condemned as a social problem but still safeguarding the access

to public resources in a context of acute instability. This possibility was also supported by the analyses where we examined the differences between clusters of countries, in particular the finding that the overall higher acceptance of corrupt acts in Eastern European societies was significantly lower in those countries with higher levels of inequality.

As a conclusion to this chapter, we point out the higher acceptance of corrupt acts in the Southern- and Eastern-European countries compared to the Northern countries. ‘Acceptance of corruption’ seems to be a rather ‘stable’ characteristic of countries associated with typical religiously-rooted social institutions and legal traditions. Future research could flesh out which macro-level institutional arrangements (e.g., religion) are associated with which micro-level social attitudes and norms related to the ‘acceptance of corruption’.

## List of References

- Alderson, A.S., & Nielsen, F. (2002). Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality Trends in 16 OECD Countries. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107(5): 1244-1299.
- Amini, C. & Douarin, E. (2020). Corruption and Life Satisfaction in Transition: Is Corruption a Social Norm in Eastern Europe?, *Social Indicators Research*, 151(2): 723-66.
- Bandelj, N., & Mahutga, M.C. (2010). How Socio-Economic Change Shapes Income Inequality in Post-Socialist Europe. *Social Forces*, 88(5): 2133-2161.
- De Hart, J., Dekker, P., & Halman, L. (2013). *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- De Jong, M., Lalenis, K., & Mamadouh, V. (2002). *The Theory and Practice of Institutional Transplantation. Experiences with the Transfer of Policy Institutions*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2007). Sociological Explanations of Changing Income Distributions. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(5): 639-658.
- Fairbrother, M. (2014). Two Multilevel Modeling Techniques for Analyzing Comparative Longitudinal Survey Datasets. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 2(1): 119-140.
- Halman, L., & Voicu, M. (2010). *Mapping Values and Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe*. Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., & Van Ingen, E. (2015). Secularization and Changing Moral Views: European Trends in Church Attendance and Views on Homosexuality, Divorce, Abortion, and Euthanasia. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5): 616-627.
- Heyns, B. (2005). Emerging Inequalities in Central and Eastern Europe. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 31: 163-197.
- Lancee, B., & Van de Werfhorst, H.G. (2012). Income Inequality and Participation: A Comparison of 24 European Countries. *Social Science Research*, 41: 1166-1178.
- Lambsdorff, J. (2006). Consequences and Causes of Corruption—What Do We Know From a Cross-Section of Countries? Pp. 3-52 in: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.), *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Mijs, J. J. B. (2019). The Paradox of Inequality: Income Inequality and Belief in Meritocracy Go Hand in Hand. *Socio-Economic Review*, 19(1): 7-35.
- Milanovic, B. (2016). *Global Inequality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Mood, C. (2010). Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can Do About It. *European Sociological Review*, 26(1): 67-82.
- OECD. (2015). *In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Paskov, M., & Dewilde, C. (2012). Income Inequality and Solidarity in Europe. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 30(4): 415-432.
- Policardo, L., & Sánchez Carrera, E.J. (2018). Corruption Causes Inequality, Or Is It the Other Way Around? An Empirical Investigation for a Panel of Countries. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 59: 92-102.
- Pop, I. (2012). Acceptance of Corrupt Acts: A Comparative Study of Values regarding Corruption in Europe. *Journal of Social Research and Policy*, 3(1): 27-42.
- Solt, F. (2009). Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. *Social Science Quarterly*, 90(2): 231-242.
- van Deurzen, I. (2017). And Justice for All: Examining Corruption as a Contextual Source of Mental Illness. *Social Science and Medicine*, 173: 26-34.
- van Deurzen, I., van Ingen, E., & van Oorschot, W.J.H. (2015). Income Inequality and Depression: The Role of Social Comparisons and Coping Resources. *European Sociological Review*, 31(4): 477-489.
- Wilkinson, R.G., & Pickett, K.E. (2009). *The Spirit Level. Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*. London: Allan Lane.
- Worldbank (2020). World Development Indicators [Data Set]. <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>
- You, J.-S., & Khagram, S. (2005). A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption. *American Sociological Review*, 70(1): 136-157.

# 23. INCOME, VALUES AND SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING IN EUROPE:

RESULTS FROM THE EVS 1999-2017 DATA

---

*Ruud Muffels*

## **Abstract**

*The basic idea is to view the effects of objective and subjective modernization on subjective wellbeing (SWB). Objective modernisation refers to the nation's socio-economic development, indicated by GDP, absolute and relative income, and income inequality. Subjective modernization refers to people's modernization values including work and social values. Modernisation values used are (post-)materialism and gender-role and leisure time values. Work and social values pertain to work ethos and intrinsic or extrinsic work orientations and to trust in other people and the importance of family and friends and how leisure time is valued. The EVS data used cover a period of 20 years. A multi-level regression model has been estimated with modernisation indicators on country and individual level and controls for gender, age, personal income, health and health behaviour (sports). The story found is clear. The findings illustrate the strong effects of absolute and relative income for people's happiness, but, allegedly, more interesting are the strong effects of work and social values on SWB and the smaller but significant effects of all modernisation values which appear rather stable over time. People who hold strong social values gain in happiness because they engage more in social networks and relationships.*

## 23.1 Introduction

My history with the European Values Study (EVS) and Loek goes back to the late 1990s when I became a colleague of Loek Halman at the Department of Sociology. At that time, I worked on the topic of subjective wellbeing and became aware of the EVS being the pearl of the Department and the information contained in the excellent comparative values datasets. Loek Halman and Inge Sieben asked me in 2010 to write a chapter on subjective wellbeing for a Dutch book on solidarity and modernization values using the EVS-2008 data (Halman & Sieben, 2011). I hesitated initially because as an economist, the subject of values was not very familiar to me. But, it goes without saying that a request of Mr. EVS himself – who happens to be also an excellent researcher and a very nice colleague for a long time – could not be rejected. The substance, quality and richness of the EVS tempted me to write a chapter on the impact of values on subjective wellbeing (SWB) with the title: ‘If money does not make one happy, what does?’ (Muffels, 2011). It was based on the Dutch data of the 2008 wave and it showed that values matter for people’s SWB even after controlling for income at individual and national level (GDP). One year later, Wil Arts and Loek Halman asked me to redo that chapter but based on all countries in the 2008 wave and now for an international volume (Muffels *et al.*, 2014).

At the time of writing of these two chapters, the second Atlas of European Values came out in 2011 with the title: “Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century” (Halman *et al.*, 2011). In the text of the Atlas, it was stated that: “happiness is higher in nations characterized by the rule of law, freedom, civil society, cultural diversity and modernity (schooling, technology, urbanization). Together with material comfort, these factors explain almost all differences in happiness across nations”. This heroic claim suggested that along with socio-economic factors, values cannot be denied as an important explanation of SWB differences across nations. The former analyses I had done provided supporting evidence on this claim.

When I was therefore asked by the editors of this *Liber Amicorum* for Loek

Halman to write a chapter,<sup>1</sup> it appeared obvious to redo the earlier work but including the 2017 data and taking a longer time frame. I address two simple questions, namely firstly whether the effects of values on SWB found in 2008 are confirmed for the entire 20-year period (1999-2017) using data for 47 countries, and secondly whether the effects of values on SWB change over time. I will first sketch my ideas and methodology. Eventually, I will discuss the updated results and draw some conclusions.

## 23.2 Existing Literature

I examine the relationship between values and SWB from a modernization perspective which is a very common approach in values studies (cf. Halman & Gelissen, 2019). The basic idea is to view the effects of objective modernization (socio-economic development or economic welfare indicated by GDP, absolute and relative income and income inequality) and subjective modernization (modernization values, including work and social values) on SWB using the EVS data over the last 20 years.

### Socio-economic Development

The idea that income or GDP levels matter for nation’s levels of subjective wellbeing is generally accepted although questioned in Easterlin’s paradox (1974). He suggested that money does not pay off for wellbeing because beyond a certain level of GDP per capita people in wealthier nations are not better off on SWB than people in less wealthy nations (Easterlin 1974; 2003). The Easterlin paradox is explained by habituation or adaptation according to which people are presumed to be in a sort of ‘hedonic treadmill’: due to rising aspirations, increases in wealth do not lead to similar increases in SWB. The paradox has been disputed in various papers (Hagerty & Veenhoven, 2003; d’Ambrosio *et al.*, 2020) suggesting that money matters for SWB at least up to a certain threshold (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).

<sup>1</sup> The chapter is a revised and shortened version of an earlier paper of Muffels *et al.* 2014. I now analyze three waves of 1999, 2008 and 2017 instead of the 2008 wave and the analyses include only variables available in all three waves.



Not only absolute income matters for SWB, but also relative income, low income and income inequality (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008). The lower the relative income and the longer the poor income status lasts the larger the negative effects on SWB (e.g. Clark *et al.*, 2016). The reason to include relative income is the alleged impact of ‘Keeping up with the Joneses’. People tend to compare themselves with their peers or colleagues and judge their own SWB in response to that (see e.g. Kapteyn, 1977). Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman speaks therefore of income for happiness as ‘a focusing illusion’ (Kahneman *et al.*, 2006). Eventually, though not uncontested, as shown in the seminal 2009 book of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), a negative relationship was found across nations between income inequality and SWB.

### Values and SWB

According to Halman and Sieben (2020), in sociology, “values are the social standards or criteria that can serve as selection principles to determine a choice between alternative ways of action”. In other words, values are commonly shared guiding principles for social behavior. They then discuss related concepts in other disciplines. In economics, a service or good that delivers utility to people is of value because it meets individual preferences, which guide economic behavior. In psychology personal values are “regarded as motivations for behavior” and hence, associated with the attainment of “life goals”, or the things you want to achieve in life (Headey *et al.* 2010). Trust in other people is considered one of the personality traits in psychology but also one of the values in sociology. Halman and Sieben (2020) also refer to ancient Greek philosophy, to Plato’s ideas about the “good”, the virtues of Aristotle for living a good life and the Stoicism school on “virtue ethics”, in which “virtue is the only good” for human beings to achieve eudaimonic happiness. Values are not intrinsically good or bad: “they are more neutral, they do not necessarily lead to a better life, decency or happiness” (Halman and Sieben, 2020). The lessons I draw from this is first, that values are motivational drivers for social behavior and secondly, that values are tied to the notion of the “good life” and to happiness.

Nonetheless, research on SWB from a values perspective is apparently not very common in sociology apart from research on the association of social trust

with SWB (Fukuyama, 1995; Helliwell, 2006, Helliwell *et al.*, 2021). An exception is formed by the work of sociologist Ruut Veenhoven, who examined the relationship between post-materialist values and happiness (Veenhoven 2008). In psychology more work is done, notably on the relationship between the ten Schwartz values and subjective wellbeing (e.g. Schwartz & Sortheix, 2018). Positive psychologists posit in their ‘authentic happiness theory’ that meaning and engagement in life (life orientations) are essential to happiness, providing support to the beneficial effects of strength of character, religion, volunteering and acts of kindness (altruism) for happiness (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Diener & Seligman, 2004). Through analysing German panel data, Headey *et al.* (2010) show that changes in happiness levels are related to life goals and choices made in response to these. If one wants to live a spiritual and/or healthy life (life goal), or one invests in religious services attendance or in exercising, it clearly contributes to a happy life. If one wants to set up a family life, meet friends or spend leisure time with others – which are also considered social values – it increases one’s long-term happiness.

For work values which we consider part of modernization values, in sociology the focus has been on the relationship between work orientations and job satisfaction and to the meaning of work for people’s life. Work is considered an essential element of one’s social network, because of which the importance attached to work or work ethos might have a positive effect on SWB. In Kalleberg’s job satisfaction theory (1977), intrinsic work values refer to characteristics of a job which one finds important, such as autonomy in the job, responsibility, a skills match, and meeting people and extrinsic work values to pay, job security or promotion. In positive psychology, there is clear evidence on the effects of life goals related to work on SWB showing that people striving for material success such as success in a job or pay are less happy than people who attach less value to material goals (Diener and Seligman, 2004, Headey *et al.*, 2010). In psychology, Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory is well-known, stating that intrinsically motivated people engage in an activity because they find it enjoyable and interesting, demonstrating greater effectiveness and persistence in their behavior and improved well-being (Ryan *et al.*, 1997). Hence, we suspect that intrinsic work values show a positive association with SWB and extrinsic work values a negative one.

An additional arguments comes from proponents of modernization theory, who believe that modernization brings about societal, political as well as cultural change. The claim is not uncontested as the proponents of the 'persistence of traditional values' thesis argue (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). In the modernization literature two dimensions of cultural change are distinguished, industrialization and post-industrialization. Industrialization causes a shift from traditional to secular-rational orientations in which the role of religion, religious beliefs and strong social norms become less central in life. In secular-rational societies adherence to religious and social norms has declined and shifted into support for values associated with individual striving and enlightened self-interest (cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Post-industrialization brings about emancipation from authority signaling a shift from survival values to individual or self-expression values and quality of life values. This shift is also delineated by Inglehart and others as a shift from materialism to post-materialism. Previous research indicates that societies emphasizing survival values generally have lower levels of subjective well-being than societies emphasizing self-expression and quality of life values (Inglehart *et al.*, 2005).

### 23.3 Analytical Strategy

In this chapter, the effects of economic welfare and social and modernisation values on SWB are analysed. Economic welfare is measured with GDP, GDP growth and income inequality (GINI). Modernization values refer to (post-) materialism, work ethos and intrinsic or extrinsic work orientations, opinions on gender roles and religion. Social values refer to trust in other people and the importance of family and friends and how leisure time is valued. The analysis controls at personal level for absolute, relative and low income, age, bad health, gender but also religious services attendance and exercising or sports. Indices were created for SWB of which each was normalized ranging from 0 to 10. The effects were then estimated for income and the various values at individual and country level using (multi-level) regression models.

In the EVS people are asked about a wide range of values, attitudes, opinions and preferences. The EVS contains also information on people's demograph-

ics, their income and socio-economic status. I made use of the 1999, 2008 and 2017 wave (165,000 observations in 47 countries, 27 in 1999, 44 in 2008 and 35 in 2017).

The dependent variable subjective well-being is measured in the EVS by asking respondents about the extent in which they are satisfied with life as a whole, ranging from 1 to 10. GDP per capita and GDP growth are derived from the Worldbank database. Relative income is measured as the household income relative to the average income in the country. Low-income status is based on the 30% of all people in the three lowest income groups and the GINI-index is calculated from the EVS income data and rescaled to range from 0 to 10. We control for personal characteristics but also for well-known correlates of SWB, namely religion, religious services attendance and participation in sports.

On *social values*, the EVS contains questions on the importance people attach in life to family, friends and leisure. *Trust* in other people is based on the question "whether people would say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with them". On modernization values, first, egalitarian *gender role values* are measured by the respondent's opinion on two statements: 1. Pre-school child suffers with working mother and 2. Women want a home and children. Next, on *work values* EVS contains a battery of questions on intrinsic and extrinsic work values and how people judge the importance of a particular aspect of their job as derived from Kalleberg (1977). *Work ethos* is measured by three questions: the extent by which people agree with the statement that 'people who don't work turn lazy', that work is 'a duty' and 'work should always come first, even if it means less spare time'. The other modernization values pertain to Inglehart's four points post-materialist scale. Hence, three groups are constructed: a group of 'pure materialists', a 'mixed group' having materialist and post-materialist values and a third group of 'pure post-materialists'.

The various indices and sub-indices for social values and modernization values, including work values, are based on the unweighted row mean scores of the underlying items. For each construct we initially performed factor analysis to research the dimensionality of the scale and the contribution of each item. A

few items were removed to derive a scale that passes the threshold of reliability ( $\alpha > .60$ ). The scale was next normalized or rescaled to range from 0-10.<sup>2</sup> This resulted in better comparability of the found effects. We estimated (multi-level) regression models to calculate the individual and country level effects of income and values on SWB.<sup>3</sup>

### 23.4 Results


In Figure 23.1, the results of two models are presented, one model with controls and all the income and values indicators combined, and one with only the controls, the incomes, and an overall index of values. For this overall index, all separate indicators were combined (see first row in Fig. 23.1). The index shows a significant and substantial effect on SWB (0.135). All income and values indicators appeared significant at 95% confidence level ( $p < 0.05$ ) except post-materialism and the Gini-inequality measure ( $p < 0.1$ ).<sup>4</sup>

Money seems to buy happiness, as the large effects of GDP per capita and absolute income on SWB shows. Income inequality in a country has a significant but small (at 90% level) negative effect on SWB independent from the level of GDP per capita. It confirms Wilkinson and Pickett's results (2010) that people in wealthier societies are happier when the incomes are more equally distributed.<sup>5</sup> Poor people are less happy and people with incomes below the average in society incur a happiness loss confirming the results of other studies and supporting the relative income thesis (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Layard, 2005).

But, more important here is the finding that values matter for subjective well-being and that the effect sizes are sometimes rather large, notably for social

trust (0.4) and social values (0.14). Notice also the negative and quite large effect of the value people attach to pay (-0.10) and extrinsic work values on SWB (-0.026). This is not unexpected knowing that success and monetary gain goals reduce happiness. Intrinsic work values and work ethos on the other hand increase people's SWB. Workers gain happiness from the perceived added-value of working (for the unemployed negative effects are found) and for having an interesting and challenging job, learning new skills and meeting colleagues at work. The effects of modernisation values such as (mixed) post-materialism, gender egalitarian and religious values are significant but modest in size.

Figure 23.1 Estimated effects of incomes and values on SWB



Source: EVS 1999-2017

Note: Estimated effects of incomes and values on SWB plus 95% confidence intervals from various random intercepts multi-level regression models, EVS waves 1999, 2008 and 2017, N=165,508 observations in 47 countries. Controls are age, age squared, age cubed, female, education level, marital status, employment status, exercising and religious services attendance.

- 2 Normalization on a scale from 0-1 is applied to account for the differences in measurement and scaling of the underlying components. To arrive at a scale of 0-10, the score is multiplied by 10.
- 3 For the exact formulation of the empirical model, we refer to the earlier paper (see Muffels et al., 2014).
- 4 Post-materialism, however, was significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) in a model with the controls and only the values indicators.
- 5 Contrary to Kelley and Evans (2017), using EVS-WVS data we found no positive interaction effect of Gini inequality for poor countries (poor nations defined as GDP < 0.3 times the maximum of GDP over all countries in each wave), possibly caused by the EVS data covering wealthier countries compared to the WVS data.

The second research question concerns changes in the effects of values on SWB over time. Only the 24 countries who participated in all three waves were selected for studying the effects in each wave. The effects of social values on SWB are rather stable as are the effects of modernisation values, such as on gender and religion. But, the effects of trust and intrinsic work values apparently increase.<sup>6</sup>

## 23.5 Conclusions

The results from the EVS data tell again a very clear story about the relationship between incomes, values and SWB. Absolute as well as relative income and low income matters to SWB. People are also happier in more equal societies but the effects of inequality are small and much smaller than for the other income measures. The findings illustrate once more the strong effects of absolute and relative income for people's happiness probably because it shapes the social relationships between people. However, what is allegedly more interesting is the strong effects of work and social values on SWB and the smaller but significant effects of all modernisation values which appear rather stable over time. Work ethos and intrinsic work values show a positive and extrinsic work values a negative effect. Strong effects on SWB are found for trust in other people (0.4) that also increases over time, and for the importance people attach to their family and friends (0.16). People who hold strong social values gain in happiness because they engage more in social networks and relationships.

Loek Halman will be in his 'third age' when he receives this *Liber Amicorum*. From the literature and the analyses here, we know that there are negative effects of 'second age' and positive effects of 'third age' (age cubed) on SWB. With EVS as his child, that also brings along a strong social network, I wish and foresee for Loek a productive and happy third life.

<sup>6</sup> The evidence is not reported here, but available upon request from the author.

## List of References

- Clark, A. E., C. D'Ambrosio & Ghislandi, S. (2016). Adaptation to poverty in long-run panel data. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 98(3): 591–600.
- Diener, E. & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 5(1): 1-31.
- Easterlin, R. A. (1974). Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence, in: P.A. David, & M. W. Reder (Eds.), *Nations and households in economic growth*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Easterlin, R. A. (2003). Explaining Happiness, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the USA (PNAS)*, 100, 19: 11176-11183.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* New York: Free Press.
- Hagerty, M. R. & Veenhoven, R. (2003). Wealth and happiness revisited - income does go with greater happiness. *Social Indicators Research*, 64: 1–27.
- Halman, L., Sieben, I., & van Zundert, M. (2012). *Atlas of European Values. Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century*. Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L.C.J.M., & I. J. P. Sieben (2011). *Respect man! Tolerantie, solidariteit en andere moderne waarden*, Amersfoort: Celsium.
- Halman, L., & Gelissen, J. (2019). Values in life domains in a cross-national perspective. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 71(Suppl 1), 519-543.
- Halman, L., & Sieben, I. (2020). Values, In: List R., Anheier H., Toepler S. (eds), *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*. Cham: Springer.
- Heady, B., Muffels, R., & Wagner, G. (2010). Long-running German panel survey shows that personal and economic choices, not just genes, matter for happiness, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the USA (PNAS)*, pp. 1-5; Supporting Information (SOM, online), pp. 1-7.
- Helliwell, J. F. (2006). Well-Being. Social Capital. and Public Policy: What's New? *Economic Journal*, 116 (510): C34-C45.
- Helliwell, J. F., Layard, R., Sachs, J., & De Neve, J.-E. (2021). *World Happiness Report 2021 (and earlier versions)*. New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. *American Sociological Review*, 65 (1), pp. 19-51.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kapteyn, A. (1977). A Theory of Preference Formation, Ph.D. dissertation. Leiden: Leiden University.
- Kahneman, D., Krueger, A.B., Schkade, D., Schwarz, N. & Stone, A. A. (2006). Would you be happier if you

were richer? A focusing illusion, *Science*, 312(5782), pp. 1908-1910.

- Kahneman, D., & Deaton, A. (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being, *PNAS*, 107(38), pp. 16489-16439.
- Kalleberg, A.L. (1977). Work Values and Job Rewards: A Theory of Job Satisfaction. *American Sociological Review* 42(1), pp. 124-143.
- Kelley, J., & Evans, M.D. (2017). Societal Inequality and Individual Subjective Well-being: Results from 68 Societies and Over 200,000 Individuals, 1981-2008. *Social Science Research*, 62, pp. 1-23
- Layard, R. (2005). *Happiness, Lessons for a New Science*. London: Penguin Books.
- Muffels, R. J. A. (2011). Geld maakt niet gelukkig, maar wat dan wel? In L. C. J. M. Halman, & I. J. P. Sieben (Eds.), *Respect man! Tolerantie, solidariteit en andere moderne waarden* (pp. 239-254). Amersfoort: Celsius.
- Muffels, R., Skugor, D., & Dingemans, E. (2014). If Money Does Not Buy Much Happiness, What Does?, In: W. Arts and L. Halman (2014), *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe: painting Europe's Moral Landscapes*. Leiden: Brill.
- Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2000), Value priorities and subjective well-being: Direct relations and congruity effects. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30, pp. 177-198.
- Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2008). Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox. *IZA Discussion Paper, No. 3654*. Bonn: IZA-Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Veenhoven, R. (2008). Sociological Theories of Subjective Well-Being. In: M. Eid and R.J. Larsen (Eds.), *The Science of Subjective Well-Being* (pp. 44-61). Guildford Press.
- Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2010). *The Spirit Level. Why Equality is Better for Everyone*. London: Penguin Books.

# 24. IS POLITICAL PROTEST IN WESTERN EUROPE BECOMING LESS OF A PREROGATIVE OF THE YOUNG AND OF THE LEFT?

---

*Paul Dekker*

*Andries van den Broek*

## **Abstract**

*In what seems to be a process of normalization or democratization of political protest, a shift appears to have taken place in the public that is willing to embrace political protest to further their political agendas, at least in Western Europe. After the upheaval of the 1960s and 70s, political protest was predominantly a vehicle of the young and of those wanting to change society along the lines of a progressive agenda. More recently, protest-proneness seems to have become spread more evenly over the population. Our analyses of developments in nine countries using data from the European Values Study for the period 1981-2017 show strong evidence for the growth of protest-proneness, loosening its ties with the young everywhere, but only in some countries with the political left. In all countries, protest proneness is higher in the 'protest generation' (born 1941-1955) than among people born before that period, but the differences compared with people born later fluctuate.*

## 24.1 Introduction

After the adoption of extra-parliamentary routes to make themselves heard by civil or social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the focus in the study of the political behaviour of citizens broadened from predominantly formalized or 'conventional' means of political involvement to include a range of 'unconventional' political action as well (Barnes & Kaase et al., 1979) – though it should be noted that this type of action was not altogether new, being predated by strikes by labour unions, marches by suffragettes and mass trespasses by walkers to preserve rights of way, for example. However, the broader uptake of political protest in the 1960s and 70s did pave the way for its recognition as part and parcel of political life. In hindsight, this can be interpreted as a first step in the process of normalization of political protest. Of concern here is whether that process has continued since, and whether it has also led to a democratization in the sense that it is not only accepted as a fact of life, but has also been adopted by broader segments of society. The latter implies not only that protest-proneness spread across a larger share of the population, but more specifically that it spread among groups within society other than those that initially adopted it.

Generally speaking, the ascent of political protest in the postwar era was predominantly rooted in the younger segments of society and those seeking to bring about change in accordance with a progressive agenda, whether it was to expand the rights of underprivileged groups (e.g., the working class, women and people of colour) or to oppose perceived threats (e.g. nuclear weapons and environmental pollution). A change-minded or progressive agenda inspired young people to political behaviour that went beyond conventional means (Kostelka & Rovny, 2019).

Recently, political protest seems also to have been adopted by people in later life-stages and by people seeking to further a conservative political agenda. This suggests a certain 'democratization' or 'normalization' (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001; Quaranta, 2014) of protest as a means of pursuing political ends, as predicted by Barnes & Kaase and their co-authors (1979). Proneness to adopt political protest seems to have become more common, in the sense of becoming widespread across the populations as a whole, both in terms of age

and of political preference. As regards the latter, just as in earlier decades the issues of contention are once again non-materialistic, but unlike earlier, the intention now is to oppose rather than to further societal change. What is at stake now more often seems to be the preservation of Western achievements and traditions that are perceived to be under threat from cosmopolitanization in general and immigration in particular.

The relationship between protest-proneness and age can also be reconceptualized as a relationship between protest-proneness and year of birth, or generation, though without seeking to get into the muddy waters of suggesting clear-cut generational differences, for which there is precious little empirical evidence (Van den Broek, 1999). The idea then is that members of some birth cohorts may be more inclined to turn to political protest than members of other birth cohorts. Barnes & Kaase et al. (1979) suggested that, following the rise of political protest achieved by a group of birth cohorts that can loosely be described as the protest generation (born in the period 1941-1955; cf. Van den Broek, 1999), the further spread of political protest would come about because birth cohorts born in later years would be even more prone to turn to political protest, possibly related to a continuing shift towards postmaterialist values (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002).

Below, we reformulate these observations and suggestions into hypotheses which we subsequently test empirically. We are pleased to acknowledge that being able to use the data of the European Values Study (EVS) to test these hypotheses was only possible because of the continued efforts of those who have worked hard to organize the EVS surveys in a number of countries in a consistent manner over the years. Perhaps pointing out the obvious, Loek Halman bore the brunt of the efforts to facilitate that. Without his perseverance and dedication, it is highly unlikely that this chapter could be written. Thanks, Loek!

## 24.2 Hypotheses

We first look at the situation from a 'static' point of view, asking ourselves whether protest-proneness has indeed traditionally been a prerogative of

the young and of the political left. To test this, hypothesis #1 posits that protest-proneness is greater among younger age groups than older age groups, while hypothesis #2 posits that protest-proneness is greater among people on the left of the political spectrum than among those more on the political right.

We then turn to a 'dynamic' view; hypothesis #3 states that, as predicted by Barnes & Kaase et al. (1979) in their groundbreaking work, 'unconventional' political participation has become more widespread over time.

As regards the dynamics of the normalization of protest-proneness, hypothesis #4 posits that, over time, protest-proneness has become less predominantly a characteristic of the young; and hypothesis #5 states that, over time, protest-proneness has become less something that is adopted mainly by people on the left of the political spectrum.

Finally, we look at the dynamics that may lie beneath the surface. Hypothesis #6 posits that differences between successive years are smaller after correcting for differences between generations. Our final hypothesis #7 builds on the dual expectation that the protest generation paved the way for protest, and hence is more protest-prone than people born before them, and that people born later than the protest generation carry the torch forwards and display even higher levels of protest-proneness.

## 24.3 Data, Indicators and Approach

The empirical basis for testing these hypotheses consists of data drawn from the European Values Study (EVS) covering the period 1981-2018 for the nine countries in which data were assembled in each of the five EVS-waves. Traveling from the northwest to the southeast, those countries are Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, (West) Germany, The Netherlands, Great Britain (thus excluding Northern Ireland), France, Spain and Italy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Denmark 1981-2017, France 1981-2018, West Germany 1981-2017, Great Britain 1981-2018, Iceland 1984-2017, Italy 1981-2018, The Netherlands 1981-2017, Spain 1981-2017, and Sweden 1982-2017, and in between 1990, 1999, and 2008 or 2009; per country the total sample size ranges from 5,019 (Iceland) to 9,159 (Italy) respondents. Until the last wave, CAPI was used in all countries, but in 2017/18 multimode fieldwork was used in four of

We use the following indicators for protest-proneness and political preference. To measure protest-proneness, we use the question "Now we would like you to look at this list of different forms of political action that people can take: Signing a petition / Joining in boycotts / Attending lawful demonstrations / Joining unofficial strikes / ...<sup>2</sup> We would like you to indicate, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or whether you would never, under any circumstances, do it." For each of these four items, we dichotomized the responses 'have done' and 'might do' as 'protest-prone' (versus the other responses as not protest-prone) and then combined them in a scale ranging from 0 (no protest-proneness at all) to 4 (protest-prone in all four respects).<sup>3</sup> Note that we include protest-proneness rather than focusing solely on actual protest behavior, because the latter not only depends on a person's attitude but also on the opportunity structure at a given time in a given country.<sup>4</sup>

To measure political preference, we use a question about political left-right self-assessment: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. Generally speaking, how would you place your views on this scale [printed on a card: 1 (= Left) - 10 (= Right)]?" We take 1-4 as an indication for 'left' and compare this with the rest, including respondents who are unable or unwilling to position themselves as politically left or right.

We take 18-34 years old as young (young) and compare this with the 35+ age group; and we use three categories for generations: the 'protest generation' (b.

our countries. In two of them we found small but significant differences (on a 5-point scale, CAWI respondents scored 0.1 lower than CAPI respondents in Denmark, and 0.1 higher in Iceland) and we have decided to use the full samples.

- <sup>2</sup> This is the common selection for all five waves of the survey; in the first four waves the item 'Occupying buildings or factories' was also included, and in the first wave there were two more: 'Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.' and 'Using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police'. These items were placed at the end of the list and we will ignore them completely in this chapter.
- <sup>3</sup> The reliability of the protest-proneness scale is moderate: the average value of McDonalds Omega is .70 for the five waves in the nine countries (lowest in Iceland (.61) and highest in Spain (.78). In only seven of 180 cases (5 x 9 x 4 items) could the reliability be marginally improved by deleting an item. Signing petitions is always the most popular mode and joining unofficial strikes always the most unpopular mode in all countries except Spain (where demonstrations are sometimes most popular and boycotts sometimes most unpopular). To give an impression of the popularity of the modes with the average percentage 'have done' + 'might do' in the nine countries: petitions range from 75% in the first wave to 85% in the fifth wave, boycotts from 40% to 60%, demonstrations from 52% to 71%, and strikes from 22% to 38%.
- <sup>4</sup> See e.g. Inglehart & Catterberg (2002) and Quarantana (2014) for alternative analyses of these items (for developments in a number of countries in the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and for Italy, respectively).



1941-1955) versus those born earlier (pre-protest cohorts) and those born later (post-protest cohorts).

We test our hypotheses for each of the aforementioned nations separately. This is the hardest test for our general statements, and it is useful to know where they fail the test.

## 24.4 Results

We present our first set of findings in Table 24.1. It presents the results of nine multivariate regression analyses using two models, one with main effects only and one including two interaction terms.<sup>5</sup>

Our first hypothesis, that protest-proneness would be higher among the young, receives empirical support across the board. The young are more protest-prone than those aged 35+ (second row in Table 24.1).

Hypothesis #2 is also clearly corroborated in each of the countries investigated: those leaning to the left politically are more protest-prone than those in the middle, on the right or without a left-right identity (third row in table).

As regards our third hypothesis, protest-proneness was indeed higher in the late 2010s than in the early 1980s in all nine countries included in our analyses. There is a significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) linear increase in protest-proneness scores over time everywhere (fourth row in table). This finding is very much in line with the prediction of Barnes & Kaase et al. (1979) that what was then called 'unconventional' political participation would in time become more widespread.

Our fourth hypothesis posited that protest-proneness has become less exclusively a characteristic of the young over time. This hypothesis receives empirical support in eight nations (all but Italy), as the interaction effect between year and age is negative in those eight countries (second to last row in Table 1).

<sup>5</sup> We thus implicitly test hypotheses #1-3 combined in model 1, and #4-5 combined with all others in model 2, but separate tests of the hypotheses would not have resulted in different conclusions.

This strongly suggests that protest-proneness in the earliest years was not, or at least not only, a trait of being young, but that those who were protest-prone then at a young age still are so in later years at a more advanced age.

Table 24.1 Determinants of protest-proneness: Unstandardized regression coefficients

determinants (+ expected effect)	IS	SE	DK	DE(W)	NL	GB	FR	ES	IT
<b>Model 1:</b>									
<b>main effects</b>									
constant	2.18	2.40***	1.55	1.45	1.34	1.72	1.66	1.00	1.36
young (+)	.37***	.28***	.52***	.49***	.43***	.32***	.53***	.61***	.65***
left (+)	.50***	.56***	.74***	.79***	.89***	.67***	.81***	1.01***	.81***
year.10 (0-3.7) (+)	.18***	.08***	.28***	.15***	.21***	.11***	.19***	.13***	.15***
<b>Model 2:</b>									
<b>+ interactions</b>									
constant	2.08	2.27	1.27	1.36	1.15	1.65	1.51	.92	1.39***
young (+)	.62***	.65***	1.06***	.78***	.87***	.62***	.74***	.73***	.65***
left (+)	.54***	.58***	1.22***	.82***	.99***	.52***	1.07***	1.14***	.70***
year.10 (0-3.7) (+)	.22***	.14***	.41***	.21***	.29***	.15***	.26***	.18***	.13***
young * year.10 (-)	-.13***	-.19***	-.23***	-.17***	-.22***	-.16***	-.11***	-.09***	.00
left * year.10 (-)	-.02	-.01	-.19***	-.02	-.05*	.07*	-.13***	-.09***	.06**

a Reference category: 35-54 years old, not 1-4 or 7-10 on a 1-10 left-right scale, in 1981. To make time effects more visible, we use periods of 10 years (1981=0; 2018=3.7).

b Significance: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  and \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (one-sided).

Our fifth hypothesis was that over time protest-proneness has become less exclusively a strategy open to those on the political left. This hypothesis holds true in just four nations: Denmark, The Netherlands, France, and Spain. No trend at all was found in Iceland, Sweden or Germany, while the trend was actually in the reverse direction in Great Britain and Italy (last row in Table 24.1). Clearly, then, this hypothesis does not hold across the board. It is for future

research to seek to explain these diverging patterns.

Table 24.2 sets out our findings regarding the two generational hypotheses. Our sixth hypothesis that the (linear) effect of time diminishes after correcting for differences between generations is corroborated in all countries: the regression coefficients for year.10 reduce by at least one third after generations are taken into account. This decline is statistically significant everywhere ( $p < 0.001$ ).<sup>6</sup> This means that the change over time is not just a general change (period effect) applying to all people in equal measure. Rather, that change is in part embedded in different attitudes between people born in earlier and in later years (cohort effect). What we are witnessing here is the impact on society of the biological processes of birth and death: as more recent cohorts replace the dying cohorts, the proportion of people who are more prone to turn to political protest increases, while the proportion of people less likely to protest diminishes (a process aptly characterized as a ‘silent revolution’ by Inglehart, 1977).

Table 24.2 Time and generation as determinants of protest-proneness: Unstandardized regression coefficients

determinants (+ expected effect)	IS	SE	DK	DE(W)	NL	GB	FR	ES	IT
<b>Model 1: years &amp; age</b>									
year.10	.21***	.08***	.32***	.18***	.22***	.13***	.21***	.17***	.15***
<b>Model 2:</b>									
<b>+ generations</b>									
year.10	.13***	.00	.20***	.12***	.09***	.07***	.14***	.08***	.10***
pre-protest									
generation (-)	-.53***	-.60***	-.80***	-.35***	-.76***	-.47***	-.55***	-.34***	-.34***
post-protest									
generation (+)	.05	-.03	.08*	.05	.15**	-.01	-.09*	.21***	-.05

a Effects are adjusted for age (linear).

Significance:  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  and \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (one-sided).

6 Significance tested with `suest`-command (from Jeroen Weesie) in Stata, as recommended and kindly executed by our SCP colleague Jurjen Iedema.

Our final hypothesis 7, the logical counterpart of the previous one, contains the dual expectation that members of the cohorts loosely referred to as the protest generation are more protest-prone than people born before them and that people born later in turn display even higher levels of protest-proneness. The first part of the hypothesis is clearly supported everywhere: compared to the protest generation, protest-proneness is considerably lower among their predecessors. The second part is only supported in Denmark, The Netherlands and Spain. The French ‘protest generation’ shows slightly higher levels of protest-proneness than people born later, while in the other five countries there is no difference between these two categories. Even in those countries, however, the biological process of cohort replacement makes itself felt, as the post-protest cohorts entering the population are more protest-prone than the dying-out pre-protest generation cohorts they replace.

## 24.5 Conclusions and Discussion

Are we, as suggested in the past by the authors of Political Action (Barnes & Kaase, 1979), witnessing the normalization or democratization of political protest-proneness? The answer is: yes, we most certainly are. Proneness to resort to political protest is on the rise significantly.

Notwithstanding that protest-proneness is still higher among the young, the impression that the normalization of political protest means that it is no longer the prerogative of the young holds true. This means that protest-proneness has spread more evenly across the population, including to people in later life-stages.

However, the same pattern does not apply for protest-proneness and being on the left politically. It is an error to think that the normalization of political protest means that it is no longer mainly a prerogative of the left. With national variations, the general picture is not that protest-proneness has spread more evenly, including to people who do not support a leftist political agenda.

A closer look at generational differences and the effects of cohort replacement

shows that members of the protest generation are more protest-prone than their predecessors everywhere, but they differ less clearly from their successors, if at all. Yet the gradual process of cohort replacement applies everywhere, as the cohorts who die out are less protest-prone than those who take their place.

## List of References

- Barnes, S. H. & Kaase, M., et al. (1979). *Political action. Mass participation in five Western democracies*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Grasso, M. T. (2014). Age, period and cohort analysis in a comparative context: Political generations and political participation repertoires in Western Europe. *Electoral Studies*, 33, 63–76.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution. Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. & Catterberg, G. (2002). Trends in political action. The developmental trend and the post-honeymoon decline. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43(3-5), 300-316.
- Kostelka, F. & Rovny, J. (2019). It's not the left: Ideology and protest participation in old and new democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(11), 1677-1712.
- Quaranta, M. (2014). The 'normalisation' of the protester: Changes in political action in Italy (1981–2009). *South European Society and Politics*, 19(1), 25-50.
- Van Aelst, P. & Walgrave, S. (2001). Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalization of protest to the normalization of the protester. *European Journal of Political Research*, 39(4), 461–486.
- Van den Broek, A. (1999). Does differential cohort socialization matter? The impact of cohort replacement and the presence of intergenerational differences in The Netherlands. *Political Psychology*, 20(3), 501-523.

RESEARCH ON VALUES  
IN THE NETHERLANDS

---

# 25. SAME OLD, SAME OLD?

## VALUE CHANGE AND STABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS

---

*Erwin Gielens*

*Quita Muis*

### **Abstract**

*Following up on Loek Halman's work on value change and stability, we investigate public opinion patterns between 1990 and 2017 in the Netherlands. While large-scale societal processes raise perceptions of severe value changes over time, prior research has shown that Dutch citizens generally rely on already existing values ingrained in Dutch society. Based on theories regarding fundamental differences between values, attitudes, and preferences, we propose different expectations regarding stability and change in public opinion. Based on regression analyses of European Values Study data (1990-2017), we find three main trends in the Dutch public opinion landscape: 1) conservatism and religiosity are declining, 2) preferences for government involvement grow, and 3) materialist values increasingly tend to be prioritized over post-materialist values. Given the revival of economic instability and the rise of cultural insecurity, we conclude that while circumstances change, people's attitudinal reaction generally does not. With the addition of new waves, the European Values Study will continue to deepen our understanding of value development and its relation to changing environments.*

## 25.1 Introduction

Processes such as (post-)modernization (Inglehart, 1997), globalization (Kriesi et al., 2006), and the rise of the Artificial Intelligence Society (Inglehart, 2018) all indicate a gradual, large-scale values change. In a smaller timeframe, the current COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the perception of some people that life as we knew it before the pandemic is over (e.g. Dartnell, 2020). Whether we are in the midst of a pandemic or not, it is clear that our social environment is changing all the time.

Having been involved in the European Values Study (EVS) for decades, Loek Halman has been primarily concerned with how such social transformations influence our values, attitudes, and preferences. Influential work on stability and change in public opinion (Converse, 1964; Inglehart, 1977; Uslaner, 2002) has shown that large-scale contextual changes can slowly alter the value patterns of societies through the replacement of generations and their core values. Yet, compared to values, attitudes and preferences are more volatile and can change quickly within a person (instead of gradually across generations), depending on one's evaluation of the current context. In short, it is well established that a changing environment makes for changing public opinion, both gradually in the long-term, and sometimes abruptly in the short run.

However, in one of his own books on value change in the Netherlands (Halman & Sieben, 2011), Loek concludes that citizens fall back on long-standing values in Dutch society, despite fundamental societal changes and public perceptions of drastic value change. We will extend the work on values development in this contribution by investigating the idea that circumstances change, while people's response to their environment stays stable. To do so, we will make use of cross-sectional EVS data, collected between 1990 and 2017 in the Netherlands.

## 25.2 Stability and Change in Public Opinion

When investigating and explaining trends in public opinion, it is essential to differentiate between values and concepts such as norms, attitudes, preferenc-

es, and beliefs (Halman & Sieben, 2020). There namely exists a hierarchy in which values are believed to be largely stable, while preferences are considered highly volatile (Uslaner, 2002).

First of all, Halman and Sieben (2020, p. 1) defined values as:

*“Deeply rooted motivations, principles, or orientations guiding, steering, channeling, or explaining certain attitudes, norms, opinions, convictions, and desires. Values justify, motivate, and legitimate human behavior, but they are of a more general nature. Adhering to a specific value constitutes a disposition, or a propensity to act in a certain way.”*

Values thus form the basis for identity, behavior, and other kinds of beliefs, because they are ingrained in our belief system through socialization processes at an early age (Converse, 1964; Inglehart 1977; Uslaner 2002). This also means that the more central values are to our way of thinking, the less likely they are to change within a lifetime (Converse, 1964). Examples of such values are religiosity and political ideology, which provide us with moral guidance and a sense of identity and belonging (Carmines & Stimson 1980; Converse 1964; Inglehart, 1977; 1985; Uslaner 2002). Also (post-)materialistic values are thought to be rather stable, because they are formed by the circumstances we grow up in. Based on the socialization- and scarcity hypotheses, Inglehart (1997) argues that being raised in times of (economic) insecurity and instability causes people to prioritize materialistic values over post-materialistic ones. The more secure and stable one's environment becomes, the more room there is to prioritize quality of life over survival (Inglehart, 1997). Consequently, a societal shift in values has occurred through the replacement of less wealthy and less secure generations by those who grow up more prosperously: the 'Silent Revolution' (Inglehart, 1977).

Somewhat less stable are attitudes referred to by Carmines and Stimson (1980, p. 78) as attitudes towards “easy issues”. Such issues elicit “gut responses” and are therefore often the topic of long-term political debate about symbolic policy goals. Issues of permissiveness (both public and private) are good examples, as we are guided by our core values in deciding what is acceptable behaviour

and what is not. Other examples are ethnic prejudice and attitudes towards gender equality. Although Uslaner (2002) considers the latter to be quite volatile, we follow the rationale of Reeskens et al. (2021) that gender equality better fits the definition of an easy issue as elaborated above. Uslaner's (2002) conclusion was based on the strong increase in gender equal attitudes around the 1970s, which was, according to Inglehart and Norris (2016), closely related to the rise of stable post-materialist values.

Lastly, most volatile are “mere preferences” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 57) or attitudes towards “hard issues” (Carmines & Stimson, 1980, p. 78). Contrary to values and attitudes towards easy issues, these kind of attitudes and preferences often regard complex issues that require a thorough evaluation of the current circumstances and information at hand. A clear example is institutional trust. Whether people trust institutions or not depends on their current performance, and when this performance changes, people adjust their trust accordingly. Another example is the preference for government involvement (Converse, 1964). This may sound paradoxical, as such preferences are often related to people's political ideology, which is considered a stable value. However, it makes sense that attitudes on ever changing, technical government interventions ask for more thorough evaluation and are thus more volatile.

In sum, we have argued that people hold values and attitudes that remain largely stable throughout their lives, but they also have preferences and other kinds of attitudes that change frequently within the same lifespan. However, instead of using panel data to study within-person change, we will use cross-sectional data to investigate changes in the Dutch population as a whole. If the theory holds and core values and related easy issues indeed change slowly through generational replacement while preferences and hard issues change back and forward in a relatively small timeframe, it is likely that cross-sectional analyses show the opposite pattern of within-individual analyses (the ‘level of analysis paradox’ (Inglehart, 1985)). That is, we expect to identify consistent, gradual patterns of change in values and easy issues, but inconsistent or even absent patterns of change in preferences and hard issues between 1990 and 2017 in Dutch society.

### 25.3 Data and Measures

We investigate the stability of nine Dutch values, attitudes, and preferences across the four most recent waves of the European Values Study (1990-2017) (see Table 25.1 for an overview). We choose these nine items because they are consistently repeated over the four EVS-waves and cover different kinds of public opinions on a variety of social, cultural, and economic issues.

*Religiosity* is measured by the frequency of church attendance (apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings) and ranges from ‘never’ (1) to ‘more than once a week’ (8).

To measure *political ideology* respondents are asked where they place themselves on the scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

*Post-materialism* ranges from prioritizing order and fighting rising prices to prioritizing freedom of speech and democracy on a 4-point scale. A higher score indicates more post-materialistic (as opposed to materialistic) values.

*Private permissiveness* is composed of five 10-point questions that ask whether the respondent thinks the following is justifiable (ranging from ‘never’ to ‘always justifiable’): homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and suicide. The resulting scale is very reliable ( $\alpha=.863$ ).

Similarly, *public permissiveness* is a scale of four 10-point questions asking to what extent the following is justifiable: claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to, avoiding fare on public transport, cheating on taxes, and accepting a bribe ( $\alpha=.613$ ).

*Ethnic prejudice* is measured by asking whether the respondent would like the following people as neighbours: people of a different race, immigrants or foreign workers, Muslims, and Jews. We thus assume that more ethnically prejudiced respondents mention more groups (0-4).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We are aware that the measurement validity of these items is under scrutiny, but because of the reasons mentioned earlier, we have chosen to include them anyway. The items have been used in previous Dutch

*Gender equality* is operationalized as the mean score of four Likert scale items ranging from ‘agree strongly’ (1) to ‘disagree strongly’ (4): “a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work” (recoded), “being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay”, “a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”, and “a job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children”. Reliability analysis shows the scale is reliable with  $\alpha=.643$ .

*Institutional trust* is indicated by trust in four major societal institutions: the parliament, the justice system, civil services, and the police. The answers range from ‘a great deal of confidence’ to ‘no confidence at all’. Items have been recoded so that a higher mean score on these items reflects greater institutional trust. The scale is reliable with  $\alpha=.733$ .

Finally, preferences for *government involvement* are composed of five 10-point semantic differential questions: “people versus the government should take more responsibility”, “incomes should be made more equal versus there should be greater incentives for individual effort” (recoded), “the private versus government ownership of business and industry should be increased”, and “competition is good versus harmful”. The scale is reliable with  $\alpha=.609$ .

Across four waves, we have a final sample of  $N=5,346$  Dutch citizens (sampling weights are not applied). Item nonresponse is limited, with the highest proportion in left-right self-placement (7.6%) followed by post-materialism (2.7%). The proportion of missing values is approximately equal across waves. Missing values are excluded listwise. The mean values and respective N per wave are presented in Table 25.1.

The mean values between waves suggest that values, as well as some attitudes and preferences do change over time. Church attendance, as a proxy for religiosity, steadily decreased with 27.2% between 1990 and 2017. Post-materialism decreased with 10.1% between 1990 and 1999, after which values stabilize. Relatedly, private permissiveness increased with 24.8%, equivalent to one point

on a ten-point scale. Attitudes in favour of gender equality increased with 15.5% between the four waves. Public permissiveness drops slightly (-5.2%), while the average Dutch citizen wants more government involvement over time (+14.4%). Ethnic prejudice increases substantially over time, with 16.4%. Political ideology and institutional trust fluctuate but stay stable over time.

Table 25.1 Descriptive statistics

	min	max	m	s	1990	1999	2008	2017
Religiosity	1	8	3.00	2.416	3.54	3.11	3.19	2.57
Political ideology	1	10	5.45	1.976	5.47	5.11	5.47	5.59
Post-materialism	1	4	2.68	0.973	2.88	2.66	2.68	2.59
Private permissiveness	1	10	6.57	2.242	5.86	6.25	6.15	7.31
Public permissiveness	1	10	2.07	1.220	2.16	2.16	1.98	2.05
Ethnic prejudice	0	4	0.38	0.859	0.35	0.23	0.47	0.41
Gender equality	1	4	2.80	0.604	2.55	2.75	2.75	2.96
Institutional trust	1	4	2.55	0.508	2.61	2.51	2.52	2.56
Government involvement	1	10	4.85	1.376	4.52	4.63	4.73	5.17
<b>N</b>					<b>907</b>	<b>952</b>	<b>1397</b>	<b>2090</b>

Source: EVS 1990-2017

## 25.4 Results

We test our expectations on the societal-level stability of public opinion with a fixed-effects regression (see Table 25.2). We do not account for explanatory factors, testing only the total mean differences between timepoints. Contrary to our expectations, all values, attitudes, and preferences under scrutiny change significantly over time. However, the explained variance shows that not all public opinions change at an equal pace. Political ideology and institutional trust are most stable, whereas private and public permissiveness are most volatile.

research as well, and results were in line with that of parallel studies in the same journal issue (see Lubbers & Scheepers, 2019).



Table 25.2 OLS fixed effects regression

	Inter-cept	1999	2008	2017	R <sup>2</sup>
Religiosity	3.537 ***	-0.423 (.111) ***	-0.351 (.102) ***	-0.962 (.095) ***	0.022
Political ideology	5.471 ***	-0.363 (.092) ***	-0.003 (.084)	0.115 (.079)	0.007
Post-materialism	2.883 ***	-0.223 (.045) ***	-0.202 (.041) ***	-0.292 (.039) ***	0.011
Private permissiveness	5.856 ***	0.392 (.100) ***	0.294 (.092) ***	1.451 (.086) ***	0.072
Public permissiveness	2.163 ***	-0.002 (.057)	-0.179 (.052) ***	-0.112 (.049) *	0.003
Ethnic prejudice	0.352 ***	-0.124 (.040) **	0.118 (.037) ***	0.058 (.034)	0.009
Gender equality	2.551 ***	0.202 (.027) ***	0.197 (.025) ***	0.408 (.023) ***	0.059
Institutional trust	2.608 ***	-0.100 (.024) ***	-0.088 (.022) ***	-0.048 (.020) *	0.005
Government involvement	4.517 ***	0.113 (.063)	0.217 (.058) ***	0.652 (.054) ***	0.037

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sampling weights apply.

These results point to three crossing trends in the socio-cultural landscape. First, society is shifting away from religious conservatism and the traditional breadwinner family model. Church attendance is decreasing, as private permissiveness and support for (binary) gender equality is rising. This indicates that core values such as religiosity indeed (partly) guide attitudes on related easy issues, and that such public opinions gradually change over time.

Second, there is increasing support for government intervention in the economy, although this trend is contradicted by fluctuating institutional trust and political

ideology. We indeed expected ambiguous fluctuations in institutional trust, as a clear example of an evaluation-dependent preference. However, we also expected this for preferences for government involvement (which turns out to increase consistently), and not for political ideology (which fluctuates inconsistently).

Third, the Dutch cultural landscape has shifted towards a more materialistic and authoritarian position. Although we hypothesized that this value would change over time, we expected this trend to be more pronounced. Moreover, the population became more materialistic as opposed to post-materialistic between 1990 and 1999, and this shift persisted over time. Similarly, the acceptance of breaking the law has dropped persistently since 1999 and 2008.

Lastly, ethnic prejudice does not fit any of these trends, as it displays ambiguous fluctuations of decrease, increase, and stability. Especially the sharp increase in prejudice in 2008, the year the economic crisis hit, may indicate that this attitude is more context-dependent and volatile than the definition of ‘easy issue’ would suggest.<sup>2</sup>

## 25.5 Discussion

In this contribution, we built on prior work on value development in the Netherlands. We investigated earlier conclusions that values change less drastically than we may expect based on large-scale societal changes, and that citizens often fall back on long-standing values in Dutch society (Halman & Sieben, 2011). At first glance, our findings seem to indicate that, in fact, *everything* changes. However, when we zoom out and look at the substantive changes on a more general level, we indeed find indications that circumstances change, but people generally do not.

More specifically, we identified three crossing trends in the public opinion landscape of the Netherlands between 1990 and 2017. First of all, conservatism decreases along with declining religiosity, while, secondly, the wish for more government involvement grows. Lastly, we observe a tendency towards the pri-

<sup>2</sup> Yet, this could also be due to the specific measurements used, as elaborated earlier.

oritization of materialist values over post-materialist ones. According to Inglehart (1977; 1997), people are more focused on materialism, authority, and order in times of (economic) insecurity and instability. Not only has secularization decreased the authoritarian and orderly influence of the church, economic developments may also strengthen feelings of insecurity and instability among the Dutch population. That is, while Dutch citizens become wealthier on average, wealth inequality is enormous in the Netherlands, especially compared to other countries (Toussaint et al., 2020). Moreover, the insecurities brought by the rise of the Artificial Intelligence Society (Inglehart, 2018), the increasingly flexible labor market (Green, 2017), and the instability of the housing market (Lennartz, Arundel & Ronald, 2016) can further increase the desire for state authority and the prioritization of the economy over post-materialist issues such as self-expression; not only among the older, lower educated, but also among the younger, higher educated citizens (Green, 2017). Furthermore, the cultural changes resulting from secularization, (post-) modernization and globalization can induce insecurity regarding identity and belonging, and thus strengthen the need for more stability and order among some groups in society (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). These interesting yet rather descriptive findings ask for future research including more advanced statistical analyses and formal tests of the possible, explanatory mechanisms.

In sum, our findings corroborate earlier work on value change in Dutch society and emphasize the important contributions Loek Halman has made in this field. At the same time, new societal developments and theoretical insights ask for more research in the years to come, indicating that Loek's research agenda as well as the importance of the European Values Study have not come to an end with Loek's retirement. We are honoured to be able to continue this tradition at our very own Tilburg University.

## List of References

- Carmines, E. G., & Stimson, J. A. (1980). The two faces of issue voting. *The American Political Science Review* 47(1), 78-91.
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In: D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and*

*Discontent* (pp. 206-261). New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

- Dartnell, L. (2020, June 20). The Covid-19 changes that could last long-term. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200629-which-lockdown-changes-are-here-to-stay>
- Green, A. (2017). *The crisis for young people: Generational inequalities in education, work, housing and welfare*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Halman, L. C. J. M., & Sieben, I. J. P. (Eds.) (2011). *Respect man! Tolerantie, solidariteit en andere moderne waarden*. Amersfoort: Celsus.
- Halman, L., & Sieben, I. (2020). Values. In: R. List, H. Anheier & S. Toepfer (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society* (pp. 1-9). Cham: Springer.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1985). Aggregate stability and individual-level flux in mass belief systems: The level of analysis paradox. *The American Political Science Review*, 79(1), 97-116.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). *Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash*. Harvard Kennedy School, Working Paper No. RWP16-026.
- Inglehart, R. (2018). *Cultural evolution: people's motivations are changing, and reshaping the world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..
- Kriesi, H. P., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschieer, S., & Frery, T. (2006). Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(6), 921-956.
- Lennartz, C., Arundel, R., & Ronald, R. (2016). Younger adults and homeownership in Europe through the global financial crisis. *Population, Space and Place*, 22(8), 823-835.
- Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P. (2019). Het zijn aardige mensen, maar liever niet als burend...Veranderingen in sociale distantie tegenover migranten, moslims en 'zigeuners' in Nederland in de periode 1990-2017. *Mens en Maatschappij*, 94(4), 459-481.
- Reeskens, T., Muis, Q., Sieben, I., Vandecasteele, L., Luijkx, R., & Halman, L. (2021). Stability or change of public opinion and values during the coronavirus crisis? Exploring Dutch longitudinal panel data. *European Societies*, 23(sup1), S153-S171.
- Toussaint, S., Bavel Van, B., Salverda, W., & Teulings, C. (2020). Nederlandse vermogens schever verdeeld dan gedacht. *ESB*, 105(4789), 438-441.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

# 26. YOU CAN LOOK (BUT YOU BETTER NOT TOUCH):

WHO JUSTIFIES CASUAL SEX BEFORE AND  
DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC?

---

*Tim Reeskens*

*Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld*

## **Abstract**

*The COVID-19 pandemic and particularly lockdowns that were imposed to curtail the spread of the novel coronavirus have had a profound impact on our sociability, restricting our sex lives as a result. Less is known, however, about the extent to which people have justified casual sex less during the pandemic. Scholarship argues that such moral values are socialised at a young age, remain stable across the life course, and are therefore largely resistant against adverse experiences. The pandemic offers a unique opportunity to test this claim. In this chapter, we analyse data of the European Values Study for 1999, 2008 and 2017, representative of the Netherlands, supplemented with additional data collections in May 2020 and October 2020, allowing for an evaluation of the specific nature of justifying casual sex. The analysis shows that the increase in justifying casual sex came to a halt during the 'intelligent lockdown', which was imposed by the Dutch government to curtail the spread of the coronavirus. During the crisis, strong opposition to casual sex was expressed by Dutch respondents who were concerned about the virus. When lockdown measures were eased, justification of casual sex increased again. Although we find evidence for experiential explanations for justifying casual sex, the results of our study further suggest that these justifications are embedded in modernisation theory.*

## 26.1 Introduction

Casual sex, defined as sexual activity that takes place outside romantic relationships, is one of the manifestations of the sexual revolution that took place from the 1960s onwards (Robinson, Ziss, Ganza & Katz, 1991). In tandem with changes in sexual behaviour are changes in the underlying norms, such as attitudes towards pre-marital sex (Christensen & Gregg, 1970) and justifying casual sex. Without any doubt, the European Values Study (EVS), with Loek Halman for a long time in the driver's seat, has been one of the most important sources to study values change. An oft-invoked theoretical model to explain such change is Inglehart's 'Silent Revolution' (1977), which proposes that older cohorts with traditional values that are socialised in times of war and material instability, are gradually being replaced by younger cohorts with modern or self-expression values that reflect growing up in material economic prosperity. Pivotal in this theory is that values are socialised at a young age and remain stable over the lifespan (cf. Mannheim, 1952; Converse, 1964; Uslaner, 2002; Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008). Empirical research on the stability of values such as justifying casual sex, by Inglehart & Welzel (2005) described as a self-expressive value *par excellence*, is scarce however.

An unfortunate event appeared to be a unique opportunity to study the stability or volatility of moral values such as justifying casual sex (see Reeskens et al., 2021).<sup>1</sup> Indeed, what for Loek Halman was supposed to be a smooth *fin de carrière* took a different turn when COVID-19 turned into a global pandemic. At the beginning of the pandemic, some argued that a crisis of this magnitude could be an engine for social change (see Harari, 2020) and this would imply a change in values as well. However, if the assumptions of the 'Silent Revolution' (Inglehart, 1977) hold, i.e., that values are socialised at an early age and remain relatively stable over the lifespan, little change in relevant values should be observed during the coronavirus crisis. There has been some empirical evidence that the exposure to existential insecurity has an influence on our value priorities, leading to a short-lived conservative or materialist turn

<sup>1</sup> Also here, we are indebted to Loek Halman who as Chair of the EVS Executive Committee allowed for innovation in the data collection by offering the possibility for mixed mode designs (see Luijckx et al., 2021). By integrating the EVS 2017 Netherlands in the LISS Panel, we were able to reapproach respondents at later stages.

(e.g., Inglehart, 1985). In contrast, results at the onset of the pandemic showed that general values, such as religiosity and political ideology, have remained rather stable, while political preferences, such as political trust, reacted as a response to the coronavirus crisis (Reeskens et al., 2021).

The specific nature of the pandemic requires a more detailed analysis of whether changes in justifying casual sex occurred. While comparatively, the Dutch population on average is very accepting of casual sex (see Lottes & Alkula, 2011), casual sex is behaviour at odds with public health during the pandemic. Indeed, initially being announced as an 'intelligent lockdown', the national government of the Netherlands asked from its citizens to apply social distancing and interrupt their social networks, to limit public exposure and activities. The government put a ban on non-essential shops and contact occupations. Being confronted with this 'intelligent lockdown', people might be expected to have drastically altered their orientations towards casual sex, as it would pose a major health risk compared to pre-COVID-19 times.

The aim of this chapter is to test the stability or volatility of justifying casual sex over the course of the pandemic. In order to do so, we briefly review the available literature, present average trends from 1999 to October 2020 in justifying casual sex for the Dutch population, and explain the determinants of this moral value before the pandemic (2017) and during the pandemic (May 2020). We conclude this chapter with a reflection on the nature of justifying casual sex.

## 26.2 How COVID-19 Affected Our (Sex) Lives

On 23 March 2020, in a speech to the nation, the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte coined the term 'intelligent lockdown' to announce measures to curtail the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus (Rijksoverheid, 2020). In addition to sanitary measures like social distancing, the closure of schools, restaurants and bars, and the suspension of contact occupations, the imposed 'intelligent lockdown' asked people to stay at home as much as possible and only to go out if there was a good reason to do so: going to work in crucial

jobs, shopping for groceries, or giving informal social care. Individuals affected by the coronavirus, those having been in close proximity of people infected by it, or those showing symptoms, were asked to stay at home anyway. The ‘intelligent lockdown’ differed from full lockdowns in other countries where people were unable to go out freely, for example France, where a special form needed to be filled in to go out. The ‘intelligent lockdown’ appealed to the Dutch culture of individual responsibility, as it asked to carefully balance the necessity to go out with the risk of contributing to an immanent health crisis.

Initial reports by the Dutch public health institute RIVM (2022), later backed by scientific publications (de Haas, Faber & Hamersma, 2020), showed that the Dutch strongly abided by this imposed ‘intelligent lockdown’: public life came to a halt. 80 percent of the people reduced their outdoor activities. Grocery shopping was done less frequently, people exercised less, and visiting others became very rare (de Haas, Faber & Hamersma, 2020). Further analyses indicate that while these patterns were present among all age groups, they were more pronounced among the elderly, who were shown to be more at risk of adverse consequences of SARS-CoV-2 (see Jordan, Adab & Cheng, 2020). It is important to note that future intentions were also studied: people expressed the intentions to continue to adjust their behaviour, i.e., work more from home, walk and cycle more, and fly less (de Haas, Faber & Hamersma, 2020).

Studies on sexual behaviour also indicate that the lockdown had a negative effect (Hensel et al., 2020; Mercer et al.; Ko et al., 2020). For instance, in Australia, while 31.4 percent of the respondents of an online survey (oversampled among 18–29-year-olds) reported casual sex before the coronavirus crisis, 7.8 percent reported having casual sex during lockdown (Coombe et al., 2021). An online survey in the US also showed that several sexual activities decreased amidst the lockdown as well (Hensel et al., 2020). Of relevance for the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic is the expectation that not all groups (i.e., variation in household composition), and not all sexual behaviour (e.g., the authors looked at several sexual activities, including sexting, masturbation, and oral and vaginal intercourse) was equally influenced by the pandemic. E.g., the study by Hensel et al. (2020) shows that individuals experiencing

stress because of the pandemic, both in terms of medical and social consequences, report mixed changes in their sex life: whereas overall, sexual activities were reduced among those with greater perceived risks, not all activities were strained.

Less studied is the extent to which the pandemic affected values undergirding sexual behaviour. As is known, individuals’ behaviour depends, among other things, on people’s values, as they can facilitate or inhibit certain actions (Ajzen, 1991). In this, it is important to study the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic affected sexual attitudes, in particular opinions towards casual sex as such behaviour violates the ‘intelligent lockdown’. Existing research documents the importance of the context for such attitudes: Lottes and Alkula (2011, p. 87) report that the Netherlands shows all features that explain why the Dutch averagely justify casual sex more than populations of other European countries: “high economic development, good health indicators, high gender empowerment, low support for traditional gender roles, mostly Protestant religious affiliation, and low religiosity”. The argument underlying most of these contextual characteristics is modernisation theory (Inglehart, 1977), which explains a gradual shift from material to post-material values, including the individual autonomy over one’s own sexual life.

However, this reasoning departs from the assumption that justifying casual sex is a moral value that is socialised at a young age and remains stable over the lifespan. The magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic offers a unique opportunity to test the specific nature of the stability or volatility of justifying casual sex. We can assume that if the COVID-19 rules have been followed, and people might have seen reductions in their sexual behaviour, this will reflect in shifts in people’s values. The expectation in this exploratory study is that people are justifying casual sex – evidently risk behaviour for the spread of the novel coronavirus – less when the threat of the virus is at its highest, i.e., during the first wave of the coronavirus crisis. In addition, we can also expect that in these most dire times when the ‘intelligent lockdown’ was in effect, people who experience more insecurities because of the coronavirus, for instance because they consider their health to be poor, and people who express concern over the coronavirus, will be justifying casual sex less. We further

expect that the most common explanations for justifying casual sex, evolving from modernisation theory (e.g., a positive relation with postmaterial orientations, educational levels, and income, and an inverse relationship with age and religiosity), continue showing an influence on these opinions during the pandemic.

### 26.3 The Acceptance of Casual Sex in the Netherlands Over Time

The EVS has questioned orientations towards casual sex since the 1999 data collection as part of the “permissiveness” items. These items have been surveyed using the question “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between,” with “having casual sex” being one of the items in the list. The response scales ranged from ‘never’ (1) to ‘always’ (10). To map the pandemic effect on justifying casual sex on a longer trend, we compare the Dutch 1999 survey (n = 1003), the 2008 survey (n = 1554), and the 2017 web survey<sup>2</sup> (n = 2053). Subsequently, participants of the 2017 web survey have been reapproached in May 2020, and additional respondents were invited to participate, leading to 1614 respondents. This survey was fielded amidst the first wave of the pandemic, when the curve of infections was already in decline. Again, these respondents have been reapproached in October 2020 (n = 1468), after a summer with little restrictions, thereby at the onset of what became a second wave of the pandemic.


While comparative research shows that the Dutch are quite permissive towards casual sex compared to other European countries (Lottes & Alkula, 2011), descriptive statistics show that at no point in time, they exceed the scale average of 5.5 (on this scale from 1 to 10). In 1999, the first time this item was fielded in the EVS, the average scale score was 3.72 (sd = 3.04). It dropped slightly to 3.50 in 2008 (sd = 3.95). Permissiveness towards casual sex increased

<sup>2</sup> As documented by Luijkx et al. (2021), the EVS for the first time opened the opportunity for a web survey in its 2017 data collection. The Netherlands took this opportunity and fielded its survey face-to-face by I&O Research (n=686), and integrated its web survey as part of the LISS Panel (n=2053). In this chapter, we will use the web survey only.

to 5.21 (sd = 3.04) in the 2017 fieldwork. During the first wave of the coronavirus crisis, justifying casual sex decreased to 5.16 (sd = 2.94). The October 2020 survey shows an increase in justifying casual sex, i.e. to 5.49 (sd = 2.84). A Tukey test reveals that the opinions in October 2020 differ significantly from the ones in May 2020 and 2017.

Summarized, the EVS data show an increase in justifying casual sex that came to a halt in the first wave of the pandemic. In a more relaxed stage of the pandemic, albeit at the onset of the second wave, individual orientations towards casual sex became more relaxed again.

Figure 26.1 Justifying Casual Sex in the Netherlands, 1999-2020



## 26.4 The Correlates of Justifying Casual Sex Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic

In this part, the aim is to test the structuring of justifying casual sex before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect that the 2017 web survey data display how justifying casual sex is structured among the Dutch population (i.e., which groups are justifying casual sex more or less). Deviations in the 2020 data collections could display ‘intelligent lockdown’ effects. While both waves allow for more causal leverage, as they can be used as in a panel design, for the exploratory purpose of this contribution, we exploit the cross-sectional design of both waves.<sup>3</sup>

The variables we include are first of all the materialism-postmaterialism index, measuring individuals’ political priorities, with as options (a) maintaining order in the nation, (b) giving people more say in important government decisions, (c) fighting rising prices, and (d) protecting freedom of speech. Options (a) and (c) are materialist responses while responses (b) and (d) are postmaterialist options. Combined, it allows to distinguish materialist respondents (reference), mixed-materialist, mixed-postmaterialist, and postmaterialist respondents. Religiosity is measured using the item “How often do you pray outside religious services?” with the response categories ‘never’ (1) to ‘every day’ (7). We further include age,<sup>4</sup> with the youngest respondent being 16 and the oldest is 99; we divide age by 10 to obtain meaningful parameters. We further include socioeconomic status, from the idea that higher socioeconomic groups hold less traditional values. We look at education, distinguishing lower (reference), middle and higher educated respondents, and at income, which is measured in income deciles. Because we expect that single respondents are more accepting of casual sex, we include a dummy separating those that are partnered (reference) from the singles. Even though studies do not show gender differences in justifying casual sex in the Netherlands (Lottes & Alkula,

2011), we distinguish between men (reference) and women. Finally, we also look at proxies for COVID-19 risk exposure. First of all, self-assessed health is considered using the item “All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?” ranging from ‘very poor’ (1) to ‘very good’ (5). Second, a particular item only present in the 2020 waves is included that asks respondents “To what extent are you generally concerned about the COVID-19 pandemic?”, ranging from (1) ‘not at all’ to (5) ‘very much’.

The analyses demonstrate how strongly justifying casual sex is intertwined with modernisation theory. First of all, the materialism-postmaterialism index is positively and in a linear way associated with holding tolerant views towards casual sex. Related, religious respondents are justifying casual sex less than nonreligious respondents. Additionally relevant from the viewpoint of modernisation theory is that, in spite of the limitation of not being able to distinguish cohort-effects from lifecycle effects, we observe a negative age-effect: elderly respondents are justifying casual sex less than their younger counterparts. Socioeconomic status relates inconsistently with justifying casual sex. On the one hand, in both waves, the higher educated are justifying casual sex more than the lower and middle educated. On the other hand, income shows no effect whatsoever. Our findings reveal that characteristics of the life course are relevant in explaining orientations towards casual sex: singles are more likely to justify casual sex than those in a relationship. Confirming previous studies, in the Netherlands, no gender difference exists in justifying casual sex. Last but not least, health variables, highly relevant because of risk exposure to COVID-19, show mixed patterns. On the one hand, perceptions of health are unrelated to justifying casual sex. On the other hand, being concerned about the coronavirus crisis is negatively related to justifying casual sex amidst the pandemic: people who express concerns about COVID-19 justify casual sex significantly less than those with no concerns.

<sup>3</sup> The number of respondents is reduced in the multivariate analysis compared to the descriptives because of item nonresponse of the independent variables in the models (n for 2017 = 1355; n for 2020 = 1377).

<sup>4</sup> An ideal test of the modernisation theory implies estimating cohort effects. Because of the simplicity of the analysis, as well as because age was a risk of adverse health effects of the coronavirus, we prefer to estimate age over cohort effects.

Table 26.1 Justifying Casual Sex Regressed on Relevant Covariates

	2017	May 2020	
		Without COVID-19 item	With COVID-19 item
Intercept	6.81*** (0.49)	6.61*** (0.49)	7.51*** (0.55)
Postmaterialism (Ref: Material)			
- Mixed material	0.54* (0.22)	0.83*** (0.19)	0.81*** (0.19)
- Mixed postmaterial	0.88*** (0.22)	0.83*** (0.19)	0.81*** (0.19)
- Postmaterial	1.13*** (0.26)	1.48*** (0.31)	1.41** (0.31)
Praying	-0.38*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.03)
Age (in 10 years)	-0.38*** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.04)	-0.29*** (0.04)
Levels of education (Ref: Lower)			
- Middle education	0.31 (0.19)	0.30 (0.19)	0.31 (0.19)
- Higher education	1.06*** (0.22)	0.77*** (0.20)	0.77*** (0.19)
Reported income	0.06 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Single (Ref: Partnered)	0.56** (0.17)	0.79*** (0.18)	0.78*** (0.18)
Female (Ref: Male)	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.14)	0.01 (0.14)
Self-assessed health	0.01 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.162 (0.10)
Concerned about coronavirus crisis			-0.32*** (0.09)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.23	0.24
N	1355	1377	1377

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Weighted data.

## 26.5 Conclusion

Research on human behaviour amidst the pandemic has shown the coronavirus crisis to negatively affect people's sex life, including casual sex. As such, the government entered the bedroom, because in their sexual behaviour people responded to the government's request to reduce social contacts and practice social distance, as well as other relevant measures communicated as an 'intelligent lockdown'. This chapter has demonstrated that in terms of orientations, the nationwide lockdown not only influenced sexual behaviour but also affected justifying casual sex: the gradual upward trend in the justification of casual sex from 2008 onward was halted during the first wave of COVID-19. Evidently, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) explains that the link between values, attitudes, and actual behaviour, i.e. casual sex during the lockdown, is a rather complex one. Nevertheless, our findings support the hypothesis that justifying casual sex is more than just a moral value that is socialised at a young age and remains stable over the lifespan. Rather, the findings that singles justify casual sex more, and that people concerned about COVID-19 justify casual sex less, imply that current experiences influence orientations towards casual sex as well.

In addition to these experiential explanations to justifying casual sex, the analysis nevertheless gives overwhelming evidence that justifying casual sex aligns to a self-expression value, as such reflecting modernisation theory. The analysis shows that all indicators proxying postmaterialism (such as the Inglehart index, religiosity, and age) included in the regression model are significantly related with justifying casual sex. Moreover, these findings are relevant to understand the consequences of the pandemic on casual sex norms, because research has demonstrated that there was a materialist reflex in response to the crisis (Reeskens et al., 2021). This materialist reflex caused people justifying casual sex less.

This brings us to the limitations of this study. First and foremost, the full potential of the panel design has not been exploited to keep the exploratory approach of this chapter intact. Because the COVID-19 questionnaires of the EVS Netherlands were integrated in the LISS Panel, many respondents of the



original 2017 data collection were present too. This allows for refined panel regressions, because our study with average changes over time does not reveal whether some groups increased their justification of casual sex while others became more opposed to it. To give but one example: is it indeed the case that Dutch respondents who shifted towards postmaterial orientations became less accepting of casual sex? In addition, whereas we surprisingly do not see a health effect in justifying casual sex (which might be caused by the fact that abstinence might have an impact on people's perceived health), it might as well be that people who perceive an increase in their health over time might be justifying casual sex more, while those who saw their health deteriorate might be less accepting. Panel regression allows for a better test into the causal claims underlying these cross-sectional results.

Second, the EVS as a comparative and longitudinal research project with an emphasis on relevant moral, social, and political values, has not yet reached its full potential because of limitations in the sociodemographic variables surveyed. With an increase in non-traditional family forms (see, e.g., Popenou, 1988), the EVS does not allow for a refined analysis on for instance LGBTQI-respondents. Nevertheless, the literature documents that it is theoretically and empirically relevant to distinguish sexual behaviour of heterosexuals and homosexuals during the pandemic (Shilo & Mor, 2020; de Sousa et al., 2021). This leads to subsequent questions whether underlying norms about sexual behaviour in response of the pandemic also differ across both groups. In spite of these limitations, which hopefully are remedied in future surveys, thanks to Loek Halman's continuous efforts to keep the EVS relevant, we finally do have some more information about the nature of people's orientations towards casual sex.

## List of References

- Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50(2): 179-211.
- Christensen, H. T., & Gregg, C. F. (1970). Changing Sex Norms in America and Scandinavia. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 32(4): 616-627.
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. in D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (pp. 206-261). New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Coombe, J., Kong, F. Y. S., Bittleston, H., et al. (2021) Love During Lockdown: Findings From an Online Survey Examining the Impact of COVID-19 on the Sexual Health of People Living in Australia. *Sexually Transmitted Infections*, 97: 357-362.
- de Haas, M., Faber, R., & Hamersma, M. (2020). How COVID-19 and the Dutch 'Intelligent Lockdown' Change Activities, Work and Travel Behaviour: Evidence from Longitudinal Data in the Netherlands. *Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, 6: 100150.
- de Sousa, A. F. L., de Oliveira, L. B., Queiroz, A. A. F. L.N., de Carvalho, H. E. F., Schneider, G., Camargo, E. L. S., de Araújo, T. M. E., Brignol, S., Mendes, I. A. C., Fronteira, I., & McFarland, W. (2021). Casual Sex among Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) during the Period of Sheltering in Place to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 18(6): 3266.
- Harari, Y. N. (2020). The World after Coronavirus. *Financial Times* (March 20).
- Hensel, D. J., Rosenberg, M., Luetke, M., Fu, T.-C., & Herbenick, D. (2020). Changes in Solo and Partnered Sexual Behaviors during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Findings from a U.S. Probability Survey. *medRxiv* 2020.06.09.20125609.
- Hooghe, M., & Wilkenfeld, B. (2008). The Stability of Political Attitudes and Behaviors across Adolescence and Early Adulthood: A Comparison of Survey Data on Adolescents and Young Adults in Eight Countries. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 37(1): 155-167.
- Inglehart, R. (1977) *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1985). Aggregate Stability and Individual-Level Flux in Mass Belief Systems: The Level of Analysis Paradox. *American Political Science Review*, 79(1): 97-116.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jordan, R. E., Adab, P., & Cheng, K. K. (2020). COVID-19: Risk Factors for Severe Disease and Death. *BMJ*, 368: m1198.
- Ko, N.-Y., Lu, W.-H., Chen, Y.-L., Li, D.-J., Chang, Y.-P., Wu, C.-F., Wang, P.-W., & Yen, C.-F. (2020). Changes in Sex Life among People in Taiwan during the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Roles of Risk Perception, General Anxiety, and Demographic Characteristics. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 17(16): 5822.
- Lottes, I. L., & Alkula, T. (2011). An Investigation of Sexuality-Related Attitudinal Patterns and Characteristics Related to Those Patterns for 32 European Countries. *Sexuality Research and Social Policy*, 8(1): 77-92.
- Luijkx, R., Jónsdóttir, G. A., Gummer, T., Ståhli, M. E., Frederiksen, M., Ketola, K., Reeskens, T., Brislinger, E., Christmann, P., Gunnarsson, S. Þ., Hjaltason, Á. B., Joye, D., Lomazzi, V., Maineri, A. M., Milbert, P.,

- Ochsner, M., Pollien, A., Sapin, M., Solanes, I., Verhoeven, S., & Wolf, C. (2021). The European Values Study 2017: On the Way to the Future Using Mixed-Modes. *European Sociological Review*, 37(2): 330-346.
- Mannheim, K. (1952). The Problem of Generations. In K. Mannheim (Ed.): *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (pp. 276–321). London: Routledge.
  - Mercer, C.H., Clifton, S., Riddell, J., et al. (2022). Impacts of COVID-19 on Sexual Behaviour in Britain: Findings From a Large, Quasi-Representative Survey (Natsal-COVID). *Sexually Transmitted Infections*, doi: 10.1136/sextrans-2021-055210
  - Popenoe, D. (1988). *Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Societies*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
  - Reeskens, T., Muis, Q., Sieben, I., Vandecasteele, L., Luijckx, R., & Halman, L. (2021). Stability or Change of Public Opinion and Values During the Coronavirus Crisis? Exploring Dutch Longitudinal Panel Data. *European Societies*, 23(sup1): S153-S171.
  - Rijksoverheid (23.03.2020). Letterlijke tekst persconferentie minister-president Rutte, ministers Grapperhaus, De Jonge en Van Rijn over aangescherpte maatregelen coronavirus. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-tijdlijn/documenten/mediateksten/2020/03/23/persconferentie-minister-president-rutte-ministers-grapperhaus-de-jonge-en-van-rijn-over-aangescherpte-maatregelen-coronavirus>
  - RIVM (2022). Current information about COVID-19. <https://www.rivm.nl/en/coronavirus-covid-19/current-information>
  - Robinson, I., Ziss, K., Ganza, B., & Katz, S. (1991). Twenty Years of the Sexual Revolution, 1965-1985: An Update. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 53(1): 216-220.
  - Shilo, G., & Mor, Z. (2020). COVID-19 and the Changes in the Sexual Behavior of Men Who Have Sex With Men: Results of an Online Survey. *The Journal of Sexual Medicine*, 17(10): 1827-1834.
  - Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

# 27. CONDITIONALITY OF SOLIDARITY IN THE NETHERLANDS:

AN ANALYSIS OF THREE WAVES OF THE  
EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY

---

*Wim van Oorschot*

*Erwin Gielens*

*Femke Roosma*

## **Abstract**

*Since the introduction of the ‘solidarity items’ in the European Values Study in 1999 and their subsequent analyses, it is a well-known fact in the field of welfare attitudes research that people differentiate in their solidarity towards vulnerable groups in their societies. The EVS items show that in all European countries, people are more solidaristic with elderly people and with people who are sick and disabled, than with unemployed people; solidarity with migrants is weakest. Although this solidarity rank-order is evident, less is known about the degree to which people make a difference between vulnerable groups at all. People who make less of a difference between various groups are less conditional in their solidarity, than people who make stronger differences. This chapter focuses on analyzing the degree of Dutch people’s solidarity conditionality over time (across three waves of the EVS: 1999, 2008, 2017), and on understanding its socio-structural and cultural determinants. We find that, as expected, conditionality was highest in 2008, corroborating the general idea that public solidarity is under strain in economically more critical time periods. Additionally, conditionality is higher among people who are more vulnerable economically, with less trust in society and its institutions, and with a more rightist political stance.*

## 27.1 Introduction

As the all-time coordinator of the European Values Study (EVS), Loek Halman has been of immense importance for the development of international comparative studies on the values, ideologies, opinions and attitudes of (European) people regarding a range of social institutions and behaviours. As such, he had a substantial influence on the careers of numerous scholars in the field, opening research prospects for them that would not have been possible without the EVS data delivered with regular intervals and coordinated by Loek.

A case in point regards the ‘solidarity items’ that were introduced in the EVS wave 1999 and repeated in subsequent waves of 2008 and 2017. These items ask about two solidarity dimensions: a socio-spatial and a socio-economic dimension. It was especially the items regarding the socio-economic solidarity dimension that played a crucial role in opening up opportunities for the cross-national analyses of solidarity (van Oorschot, 2006). People were asked about their concern with the living conditions of four socio-economic vulnerable groups in their society: elderly people, sick or disabled people, unemployed people, and immigrants. The answers were interpreted as signalling the degree to which people are solidaristic towards various groups in society. That is, the more one is solidaristic towards a social group, the more one will say to be concerned about the group’s living conditions. In other words, differences in people’s answers to the four EVS survey-items were supposed to reflect differences in social solidarity towards the four groups.

This is an interesting perspective, since it reminds us of the observation that in modern welfare states, social protection for some groups is more extended and of better quality than that for other groups (Flora, 1986). Could there be a link between popular solidarity attitudes and how social policies allocate welfare rights among groups of citizens? Could these attitudes tell us something about how people think about the welfare deservingness of social groups?

In previous work (van Oorschot, 2000; 2006) it was suggested that people apply specific criteria to assess whether a person or group is seen as deserving of

welfare, by now known as the CARIN-criteria.<sup>1</sup> Usually, groups are seen as more deserving to the degree that they are considered not to be in Control of their neediness, they have a grateful Attitude, are able to, or already have Reciprocated, have an Identity closer to ‘us’, and are in Need. It was with these criteria in mind that we hypothesized that popular solidarity would be highest with elderly, closely followed by sick and disabled people, in turn followed by unemployed people, and that solidarity would be lowest with the group of migrants. Now, this rank order of solidarity, or welfare deservingness, was exactly what was found when analysing the EVS 1999 data (van Oorschot, 2006). The pattern turned out to be rather universal, since it showed in all countries included in the EVS 1999 wave, and it showed among all social categories as distinguished by age, gender, work status, religion, educational level and income level.<sup>2</sup>

These results, as published in van Oorschot (2006), have inspired other researchers to focus on popular welfare deservingness, thereby extending our knowledge by analyzing questions like: is the rank order really universal and dominant?; which of the criteria is usually most important?; do the criteria predict welfare deservingness with other than the four groups mentioned in the EVS survey?; do they apply in different domains of the allocation of social rights and care?; do they show up in qualitative research with in-depth interviews and forum groups, or in vignette studies with more elaborate sketches of vulnerable groups?; do welfare professionals and policymaker have the same deservingness opinions as the general population?; how is deservingness of vulnerable groups framed in the media?; how are deservingness opinions affected by national contexts?; how deserving are the rich?; is the allocation of welfare obligations also subjected to a deservingness heuristic?; what are the structural, cultural and psychological determinants of people’s deservingness attitudes?; do people’s general worldview affect their deservingness opinions, etc.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is Cees Boos, former assistant professor of social security at Tilburg University, who coined the acronym while editing our book on popular deservingness attitudes (van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens, 2017).

<sup>2</sup> On top of this, it was found to be stable in time, since in all countries participating in the EVS wave 2017 the rank order again showed up as predicted (Halman and Sieben, 2021). See also Figure 27.1 of this chapter.

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of studies on questions like these, and for related further literature references, see van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens (2017), *The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to*

## 27.2 Conditionality of Solidarity

However, and now we come to the focus of our chapter, the article of 2006, in which analysis of the EVS 1999 solidarity items were firstly reported, was not only on the solidarity rank order issue, but also on the issue of the conditionality of solidarity (van Oorschot, 2006). That is, not only about which differences people make between their solidarity with different groups, but also about the degree to which they make a difference between groups at all. This is an interesting issue, given that in comparative welfare state research a distinction is usually made between more universalistic approaches to welfare provision, where less distinction is made between various social risks and social groups (with the Scandinavian countries as examples), and more selectivist approaches, where the allocation of welfare is much more confined to specific groups of poor people only (exemplified by the Anglo-Saxon countries). People whose solidarity with various groups is not, or not so much differentiated, can be seen as being more ‘universalistic’ in their welfare attitudes, while people who do make distinctions are more ‘selectivist’. Seen like this, the EVS solidarity items can tell us something about the popularity of a universal vs. a selectivist welfare approach.

In the remainder of our chapter, we will follow the main approach of the Van Oorschot (2006)-article and analyse EVS data from the three waves 1999, 2008 and 2017 to answer the following research questions:

*RQ1: What is the level of solidarity conditionality in the Netherlands in the three EVS years?*

*RQ2: What are the structural and cultural characteristics that influence people’s degree of conditionality?*

Since popular solidarity conditionality is as yet an under-researched subject, there are not so many clues in the literature to argue for specific hypotheses. However, on the basis of what we found in a 1995 Dutch study (van Oorschot, 2000) and in the 2006 study with the EVS 1999 data (van Oorschot, 2006) we do have some suggestions.

welfare deservingness. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

The 2006 study found that national levels of conditionality at the time were higher in poorer countries of the EU. We therefore expect that conditionality in the Netherlands is at a higher level in 2008, the year of the financial crisis with a strong economic downturn surrounding it, than in the years 1999 and 2017. The basic understanding is that peoples’ solidarity is put under strain in times with greater economic uncertainty (Uunk and van Oorschot, 2017).

As for cultural determinants of solidarity conditionality we expect that conditionality will be higher among groups that are known to be more critical about welfare provision and the welfare state generally: like people who are more rightist, more non-egalitarian, have a more negative welfare sentiment, have less trust in government and fellow citizens, and are more negative about migrants in their society.

Regarding structural determinants, we might expect that conditionality follows the general pattern of the determinants of welfare support, being that people in a more vulnerable social position are more supportive, c.q. less conditional, than people who are in a better situation. This would then imply that conditionality is lower among unemployed people, elderly people, people with lower income, and with a lower educational level. On the other hand, however, it could also be that such groups are more conditional in case they would see provision of welfare among groups in society as a zero-sum game. That is, if more unconditional provision would be seen as limiting the degree of provision for them. So, we do not specify a concrete hypothesis regarding the structural determinants, but see what the analyses points out.

## 27.3 Data and methods

Our data sources are the 1999, 2008 and 2017 rounds of the European Values Study (EVS), from which we select the data on the Netherlands. The dataset has a valid N of 3724 cases across three waves, with 25% missing values (mostly due to declining to disclose income).

Our dependent variable is constructed from respondents’ answers to the fol-

lowing solidarity question:

*‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of:*

*- elderly people in your country*

*- unemployed people in your country*

*- immigrants in your country*

*- sick and disabled people in your country’*

*(1=not at all, 2= not so much, 3= to a certain extent, 4=much, 5=very much)*

The degree of conditionality is measured by the sum of absolute differences between respondents’ answer to the four items above. People who are concerned with the living conditions of all four groups equally, have a zero score on conditionality. If people’s solidarity differs for the groups concerned, their conditionality score is some figure above zero. The higher the score, the more conditional people are, that is, the more they differentiate their solidarity among the needy groups. Or in other words, people with higher scores are more ‘selectivist’ in their approach to welfare provision, while those with lower scores are more ‘universalistic’. The conditionality variable thus constructed has a range of 0 to 16.

Our independent variables are as follows: Gender is a dummy variable (0=male, 1=female); age is measured in years passed since birth; level of education is measured by the highest level of education reached (8 categories); household income is measured by a self-rating in the deciles categories of a net household income scale; political stance is measured through self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale; religion is indicated by denomination (Catholic, Protestant/Evangelical, other (Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist), none), and frequency of church attendance; work status distinguishes between employed, retired, housewife, unemployed, other. Egalitarianism is measured by people’s opinion on whether incomes should be made more equal or whether we need larger income differences as incentives. Work ethic is measured by a summative scale of five items that tap people’s attitudes towards the importance of work for their personal lives and for society: to develop talents you need to have a job, its humiliating to receive money without having to work for it, people who don’t work turn lazy, work is a duty towards society, work should come first even if it means less spare

time (alpha reliability=.71). Welfare sentiment is measured by two separate items: whether individuals should be more responsible for providing for themselves, or that the state should take more responsibility (1-10 scale) and whether unemployed people should have to take any job or should be able to refuse a job they do not want (1-10 scale). Interpersonal trust is measured as respondents’ answers to the question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ (no-yes). Institutional trust is measured by a summative scale measuring people’s confidence in the (welfare) state institutions of ‘the police’, ‘the social security system’, ‘the health care system’, ‘parliament’, ‘the civil service’ ‘the justice system’ (alpha reliability=.79). Attitudes towards immigrants are measured by a measure of feelings towards immigrants combining answers to the questions whether people would not like to have immigrants as neighbours (mentioned/not mentioned) and whether they agree that in scarce times employers should give priority to nationals over immigrants (agree, disagree or neither). The resulting three-point scale attributes one point for agreement with each question.


## 27.4 Results

Before we answer our first research question on the basis of figure 27.1, we would like to direct attention to the fact that, as figure 27.1 also shows, the popular deservingness of the vulnerable groups of elderly, sick and disabled, unemployed and immigrants in all three years shows the by now well-known order: deservingness of elderly is highest, followed by that of disabled and sick people, then followed by unemployed, and immigrants are seen as the least deserving group. Where we earlier concluded that this rank order seems to have a rather universal nature because it showed up in all countries of the ESS wave 1999, and among all social categories of citizens (Van Oorschot, 2006), we here see that it also seems to be universal over time.

Now, as to our first research question, regarding the levels of conditionality in the three EVS years, the answer is shown in Figure 27.1. We find that the level of solidarity conditionality is higher in 2008 (4.54) compared to 1999 (4.14) and 2017 (4.20), with both mean differences being significant at  $p < .01$ , which con-

firmly our hypothesis 1. We interpret this finding as showing that in the economic and fiscal crisis surrounding the banking crisis of 2008 (fall of Lehman Brothers) the public became less universalistic, or more conditional, in their solidarity towards others. The effect is temporary, cancelling out in the restoration period that followed: the mean level of solidarity conditionality does not differ significantly between 1999 and 2017.

Figure 27.1 Mean solidarity conditionality between timepoints



The answer to our second research question regarding the structural and cultural correlates of people's conditionality is revealed in Table 27.1. A general observation is that there is a close similarity in the (non-)effects of the various variables across the three survey years, suggesting that the determinant structure of conditionality, c.q. of being more selectivist or universalist, is stable over time.

Table 27.1 OLS regression of the conditionality of solidarity on structural and cultural indicators

	1999		2008		2017	
	Structural	Cultural	Structural	Cultural	Structural	Cultural
Intercept	4.179 ***	5.159 ***	4.544 ***	4.104 ***	2.967 ***	2.521 ***
Female	.013	-.074	.242	.403 *	.124	-.197
Age	.020 *	.024 **	.018 *	.015 +	.014 *	.027 ***
Educational level	-.478 ***	-.245 **	-.357 ***	-.164 *	-.286 ***	-.091
Household income (deciles)	.057	.049	-.092 +	-.044	-.068 *	-.018
Political l-r placement	.130 *	.017	.113 *	-.018	.320 ***	.111 **
Atheist	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Buddhist	-.092	.130	-3.272	-3.659 +		
Free church	-.190	.004	-.105	-.073		
Hindu	3.211	2.842	2.400	1.873	-.025	.098
Jewish	2.605 +	2.924 *	3.529	4.492		
Muslim	2.327 *	2.468 *	-.071	-.138	-.671	-.544
Other	-.646	-.511	.394	.627	-.361	-.646
Protestant	-.168	-.112	.562 +	.479	-.181	-.125
Roman Catholic	-.013	-.080	.174	.066	.363	.284
Church attendance	.004	-.006	.018	-.025	.032	-.007
Full time	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Part time	-.005	.070	.107	.123	.466 +	.445 +
Self-employed	.254	.234	-.209	-.258	.146	.367
Retired	.214	-.070	.341	.398	.193	-.023
Housewife	.277	.161	-.384	-.270	.494	.181
Student	-.026	.017	.862	1.212	.131	.833 *
Unemployed	-.714	-.060	.957	1.269	-.195	-.176
Egalitarianism		.037		.016		.014
Work ethic		.009		.129 ***		.069 **

Welfare gov. responsibility	.072		.057		.091	**
Welfare job taking requirement	-.205	***	-.181	***	-.109	***
Most people can be trusted	-.583	**	-.499	*	-.895	***
Institutional trust	-.094	*	-.055	+	-.073	**
Immigrant attitude	.876	***	.549	***	1.164	***
N	885	885	1148	1148	1691	1691
R-sq	.088	***	.161	***	.106	***
			.176	*	.102	***
					.224	***

Note: some religious groups (Buddhist, Free church, Jewish) are not represented in the 2017 wave

Note: total valid N = 3724, no sampling weights applied

\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

In all three years we see that conditionality is (somewhat) higher among elderly people, people with a lower educational level, people with a more rightist political stance, people who are more welfare critical generally, who have less trust in institutions and less trust in other people, and people who have a more negative attitude to immigrants. In all three survey years we see no effects of gender, degree of church attendance, work status and egalitarianism.

These findings tend to corroborate our expectations regarding the cultural determinants. People identifying with the political right, and with low social and institutional trust are likely to prefer higher levels of welfare conditionality. We find no direct effect of economic egalitarianism on welfare conditionality. This is rather surprising, since low conditionality can be seen as a cornerstone of a more egalitarian approach to welfare provision. Additional analyses show that the total effect of egalitarianism is cancelled out by the inclusion of more proximal predictors in the model, with the notable exception of the wave 2008, where egalitarianism has no effect at all on solidarity conditionality. These results point to the importance of analytically distinguishing between support

for economic redistribution ('social rights') and welfare conditionality ('social obligations').

As for the structural determinants, for which we did not specify specific hypotheses, we see that conditionality is higher among older people and people with a lower educational level, suggesting that they may see welfare provision more as a zero-sum game. We see no direct effects of income level and work status. The effects of religiosity should be interpreted with caution, as the sample sizes for some of these subgroups are very small.

## 27.5 Conclusion

Data from the three EVS waves of 1999, 2008 and 2017 show that the solidarity of the Dutch population was more conditional in 2008, than in 1999 and 2017. We suggested that this finding corroborates the general idea that public solidarity is under strain in economically more critical time periods. The data also show that, despite this difference in conditionality levels, the structure of determinants of solidarity is stable over time. A picture can be sketched of a more conditional, c.q. more selective person as somebody who is older, lower educated, rightist, more welfare critical generally, low-trusting, and with a more negative view on migrants. However, one should interpret these findings with the necessary care, since our data only cover a period of 18 years, and only one country, the Netherlands.

As regards the first, there does not seem to be a possibility to extend the time scale of analysis within the EVS framework, which we feel is a great pity. But, as regards the second, our analyses could be extended into a cross-national study rather easily by including not only the Netherlands, but all countries for which data for the three years is available. Such a cross-national analyses was beyond the scope of our contribution here, yet, it would be a very interesting endeavour since it would allow to learn about possible effects that differences in national contexts may have on people's solidarity conditionality. For sure, one interesting question would then be whether differences in the degree to which countries' welfare systems are closer to a universal or a selectivist approach are



reflected in people's attitudes. In other words, as always, we need new studies to further our understanding of society. For many years, the EVS has created a sound and fruitful context and data base for advancing such understanding.

## List of References

- Flora, P., Ed. (1986). *Growth to Limits. Growth to limits*. Berlin, de Gruyter
- Halman, L. and I. Sieben (2021) 'On solidarity in Europe: Evidence from the 2017 European Values Study', in: T. Laenen, B. Meuleman, A. Otto, F. Roosma and W. van Lancker 'Leading social policy from the front: Essays in honour of Wim van Oorschot'. *Liber Amicorum for Wim van Oorschot*. Acco, Leuven
- Uunk, W. and Van Oorschot, W. (2017) 'How welfare reform influences public opinion regarding welfare deservingness: Evidence from Dutch time-series data, 1975-2006'. In: van Oorschot, W., Roosma, F., Meuleman, B. & Reeskens, T. (Eds.) (2017), *The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp 149-166
- Van Oorschot, W. (2000) 'Who should get what, and why' in: *Policy and Politics*, vol. 28, nr. 1, pp. 33-49
- Van Oorschot, W. (2006) 'Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states' in: *Journal of European Social Policy*, vol. 16, nr. 1, 23-42
- Van Oorschot, W., Roosma, F., Meuleman, B. & Reeskens, T. (Eds.) (2017), *The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

VALUES INSIGHTS  
FROM NATIONAL  
CASE STUDIES

---

# 28. THE NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM REVISITED

---

*Susanne Wallman Lundåsen*

## **Abstract**

*The Nordic countries have been labeled exceptions with very high shares of the population who agree that most people can be trusted. However, data suggest that the Nordic countries, to a varying degree, are facing challenges that may have decreased the levels of trust in most people. The Nordic countries have experienced increasing levels of income inequality, coinciding with high rates of south-to-north migration flows in the form of labor migrants and refugees. This chapter describes the development of social trust in the Nordic countries using data from the European Values Study. Contrary to theoretical expectations for the detrimental impact of increasing levels of diversity and income inequality, the levels of social trust increased in the Nordic countries during the investigated time period. Likely explanations for this development are the increasing shares of the population with high levels of education and well-functioning government institutions.*

## 28.1 Introduction

Many social phenomena depend explicitly or implicitly on trust between strangers, such as payment of taxes or business transactions (Wollebæk et al., 2012). Several studies have shown that societies with high levels of social trust, that is, trust in people in general, tend to be associated with many positive aspects, such as citizens with more prodemocratic and prosocial values, higher levels of economic development, better public health, a higher quality of life and lower crime rates (Kawachi et al., 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Woolcock, 2001). Generalized trust (i.e., trust in people in general) has historically been very high and stable in the Nordic countries, to the extent that the concept of ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ was launched by Delhey and Newton (2005). Delhey and Newton (2005, pp. 320–321) stated:

The Nordic countries are exceptional cases. Norway, Sweden and Denmark have the highest levels of trust of any of our 60 nations. Finland and Iceland are not far behind. All five countries are Protestant, rich, and ethnically homogeneous, and have high good government scores.

In one of his academic contributions, Loek Halman (with Pettersson, 2001) has pointed to the role of religion for social trust; Putnam’s seminal study (2000) further highlights to the importance of engagement in civil society. However, these explanations have been challenged by an institutional explanation that underscores the importance of the quality of government institutions and the importance of an impartial and just public administration for social trust (Erlingsson & Lundåsen, 2021; Rothstein, 2013). The Nordic countries all have a long-standing tradition of public administrations that are relatively free from corruption and guided by principles of fairness and impartiality, which can contribute to explaining the countries’ high levels of social trust (Rothstein, 2013).

However, data suggest that the Nordic countries, to a varying degree, are facing challenges that may have decreased levels of trust in most people. The Nordic countries have experienced increasing levels of income inequality, coinciding with high rates of south-to-north migration flows in the form of labor

migrants and refugees. On one hand, many of the Nordic countries (with the exception of Iceland) weathered the economic crises of 2007–2008 better than many countries (Fellman, 2019). On the other hand, these countries have also experienced rapid shifts in their populations. Against this backdrop, in this chapter we describe the trends of social trust in the Nordic countries. To do so, we use data from the European Values Study (EVS).

## 28.2 Possible Threats to Social Trust in Nordic Countries

Although Delhey and Newton (2005) stated that the Nordic countries were homogeneous, this may be less true today. For example, in 2009, 11% of Sweden’s population was first-generation immigrants, but in 2020, the percentage was around 20%. Over the past decade, migrants to Sweden have mostly come from countries that are considered culturally more distant, and today, the largest migrant group is no longer people originating from Finland but from Syria (Statistics Sweden, 2021).

Perceptions of the shifting balance between groups (majority-minority) are likely to spur negative reactions if the minority is perceived as a threat to one’s own group’s position in society (Craig et al., 2018). The perception that the outgroup makes up an increasing part of the population may induce outgroup derogation (Craig et al., 2018). For example, since 2010, the political parties that represent a radical right position have gained seats in the parliaments of the Nordic countries (Widfeldt, 2018).

In line, studies have pointed to a negative association between ethnic diversity and social trust (Alesina & LaFerrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Following an article by Putnam (2007) that presented U.S. data supporting a negative relationship between diversity and trust, this topic has been thoroughly investigated empirically in several Western contexts (Dinesen et al., 2020; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014; Wallman Lundåsen & Wollebæk, 2013). Scholars have posited different theories to explain the relationship between diversity and trust. One explanation points to humans’ innate tendency to prefer others they perceive as similar, and when the surrounding context becomes more diverse, fewer

others are considered similar. Scholars argue that this leads to a sense of anomie and a tendency to withdraw from social life, resulting in decreased trust in others (Laurence et al., 2019; Putnam, 2007). According to this argument, trust is reduced in all groups, toward others who are similar as well as others who are different (Laurence et al., 2019; Putnam, 2007). Other explanations hinge on diversity heightening the levels of conflict over economic resources or cultural conflicts between groups in society (Hainmuller & Hopkins, 2014).

A different line of argument originates from the several studies that have underscored the importance of the quality of government institutions for trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016). Previous studies have also shown that social trust is higher in countries with efficient and impartial government institutions (see for example, Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016). Fair and trustworthy public institutions can provide citizens with cues and signals that indicate trustworthy behaviour that is the norm, and behaviour that breaks with these norms will be sanctioned (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016). When public institutions are efficient, well-functioning, and impartial, they are assumed to make daily life less risky for ordinary citizens (Erlingsson & Lundåsen, 2021). When institutions are corrupt or inefficient, citizens need to rely more on their own resources to cope, thus making trusting others more perilous. If the quality of government institutions is low, free-riding behaviour among citizens is expected to be widespread (Rothstein, 2013). Given the overall high quality of government institutions in the Nordic countries, citizens are likely to perceive they have been treated in a fair and just way during contacts with government institutions (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016).


However, although the overall quality of government institutions is high, during periods of increasing immigration, the welfare systems of the Nordic countries may also become a source of conflict in terms of deservingness and create debates about whether immigrants should be included within these systems (Kumlin et al., 2017; Larsen, 2013). Experimental studies have shown that there is a deservingness gap between natives and immigrants, where immigrants are seen as less deserving of welfare benefits, even in scenarios where they have worked and paid taxes (Reeskens & van der Meer, 2019).

From the international perspective, the Nordic countries display relatively low levels of economic inequality, and equality is argued to have a positive impact on social trust (Uslaner, 2002). Theoretically, inequality is assumed to negatively impact trust in several different ways. One is similar to the explanation of the impact of diversity; a social psychological explanation that draws on the assumption that individuals dislike differences and inherently prefer those who are similar (Alesina & LaFerra, 2002). Therefore, inequality would reduce the probability that people would make contact with those who are dissimilar in terms of economic or social status, resulting in less cross-group interaction and thus, decreasing levels of social trust. Another causal mechanism driven by inequality is suggested to work through perceptions of fairness. High inequality may undermine individuals' sense of being part of a shared community with common values and interests (Uslaner, 2002). However, there are indications of increasing gaps between rich and poor neighbourhoods in urban areas in for example Sweden (Malmökommissionen, 2013). In sum, trends such as rising levels of diversity through immigration and increases in income inequality may have a dampening impact on the high levels of social trust within the Nordic countries. On one hand, the Nordic countries share a historical legacy of government institutions that are guided by the rule of law and relatively low levels of income inequality, and on the other hand, changes have occurred, such as increasing diversity and rising inequality, that could potentially undermine trust.

### **28.3 Social Trust in the Nordic Countries**

The data from the fifth wave of the EVS show that the share of the population who believe that most people can be trusted remains high in the Nordic countries compared with most other European countries (see Figure 28.1). In the figure, the darker the colour, the higher the share of the population who agree with the statement that most people can be trusted. Only the Netherlands and Switzerland display levels of social trust similar to those of the Nordic countries, thus confirming Delhey and Newton's (2005) previous findings.


Figure 28.1 Share of the population agreeing that most people can be trusted, 2017-2020



Source: European Values Study (2021)

When the levels of trust in the most recent (2017-2020) round of the EVS are compared with the levels of trust at the end of the 1980s, the Nordic countries have higher levels of social trust (Figure 28.2). This development counters the often-dominant American discourse pointing to a general decline in social trust and an increase in the sense of anomie (Putnam, 2000).

Figure 28.2 Most people can be trusted, Nordic countries over time




Source: European Values Study/World Values Survey, longitudinal data set 1981-2008 and integrated data set 2017-2020.

Note: The Norway 1999-2004 data extrapolated from a linear trend because of missing data.

Contrary to theoretical expectations for the detrimental impact of increasing levels of diversity and income inequality (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2014; Uslaner, 2002), the levels of social trust have increased in the Nordic countries. How can this increase be understood? Previous scholars have argued that the expansion of education levels within the population of the Nordic countries from the 1980s until the 2010s has contributed to the increased share of the population who trust most others (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2014; Wollebæk & Segard, 2011). Older cohorts with lower levels of education and lower levels of trust are gradually being replaced by younger cohorts with higher levels of education and higher trust within the population (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2014).<sup>1</sup> As the data show, the levels of trust are generally higher in the Nordic countries (Figure 28.3) among those with the highest levels of education.

<sup>1</sup> When investigating Western democracies and social trust, most studies have consistently found a positive relationship between higher education levels (see, e.g., Huang et al., 2011). However, it is hard to identify whether this is because groups with high levels of trust select into academic education to a greater extent or whether education *per se* is conducive to social trust (Oskarsson et al., 2017).

Figure 28.3 Levels of education and trust by country



Source: European Values Study 2021, integrated dataset


Moreover, studies have pointed to increasing levels of quality of government institutions as an important explanation for the trends in social trust in the Nordic countries (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2014), and that the experience from high-quality institutions tends to outweigh other experiences (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016).

However, in-depth studies of Danish data have also revealed increasing polarization between groups in terms of social trust (Fredriksen & Toubøl, 2019). Although the average levels of social trust have increased in Denmark, there is an increasing gap between those with lower levels of education who have low-skilled jobs and those with tertiary education and high-skilled jobs (Fredriksen & Toubøl, 2019). In Sweden, studies have found a similar and increasing gap in the levels of trust between respondents who are unemployed and employed, those who have high and low levels of education, and those with excellent and poor self-rated health (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2020).

Furthermore, studies have found that those who distrust others often are clus-

tered in highly diverse and low-income urban neighbourhoods (Dinesen et al., 2020; Ivarsflaten & Strømsnes, 2013; Trägårdh et al, 2013; Wallman Lundåsen & Wollebæk, 2013; Wollebæk et al, 2012). Figure 28.4 shows that there are considerable differences across neighbourhoods within the metropolitan areas of Malmö and Stockholm in Sweden. In the Fosie, Rosengård, and Rågsved districts, the majority of the population are first- or second-generation immigrants. These districts have levels of social trust that fall far below the national level average and are closer to the levels of trust in many other European countries. However, well-off and more ethnically homogeneous districts in Stockholm, such as Södermalm, have levels of social trust above the national average.

Figure 28.4 Share of natives and social trust across districts, metropolitan areas of Malmö and Stockholm.



Source: Trustbarometer 2020; Statistics Sweden. Figures for natives in districts based on neighbourhoods with respondents.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Trustbarometer 2020 is a large-scale survey directed to random samples of residents within 49 mu-

A question often posed in the public debate is whether these diverse neighbourhoods represent a possible future as populations are becoming more diverse, and due to trends of urbanization, to an increasing extent live in these metropolitan areas. Possibly, these types of neighbourhoods receive more attention in the Nordic countries than they would in other instances as they are considered areas of distrust within generally trusting societies. The data from the EVS and other surveys indicate, however, that the average levels of social trust remain high, and are even rising. Social trust, measured as trust in people in general, in the Nordic countries appears to be resistant to some social transformations.

## 28.4 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we showed that despite a public discourse that often laments a crisis of trust, the levels of social trust within the Nordic countries have been rising since the first waves of the EVS. The majority of the population within the Nordic countries believe that most people can be trusted, although some of the Nordic countries have experienced periods of economic downturn and a sharp rise in levels of diversity. During the fifth round of the EVS, a larger share of the populations within the Nordic countries than during the first and second rounds believed that most people can be trusted. Likely explanations for this development are the expansion of higher education among younger cohorts and the high quality of government institutions.

As shown, however, there is considerable variation within countries, such as Sweden, where the most diverse neighbourhoods in metropolitan areas have averagely low levels of trust that are similar to those of the central and eastern parts of Europe. However, these urban clusters of lower trust have a limited impact on the overall levels of social trust. Social trust continues to be purported to be the Nordic gold.

nicipalities and administered by Statistics Sweden on behalf of Marie Cederschiöld University College (PI: Professor Lars Trägårdh). In total the Trustbarometer 2020 contains 13,667 respondents. The survey is principally funded by Länsförsäkringars forskningsfond and is hosted at Marie Cederschiöld University College. The author is grateful for generous access to the data set.

## List of References

- Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trusts others? *Journal of Public Economics*, 85(2), 207–234.
- Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. University of California Press.
- Craig, M. A., Rucker, J. M., & Richeson, J. (2018). The pitfalls and promise of increasing racial diversity: Threat, contact, and race relations in the 21st century. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 27(3), 188–193.
- Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: Global pattern or Nordic exceptionalism? *European Sociological Review*, 21(4), 311–327.
- Dinesen, P. T., Schaeffer, M., & Sønderskov, K. M. (2020). Ethnic diversity and social trust: A narrative and meta-analytical review. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23, 441–465.
- Erlingsson, G. Ó., & Lundåsen, S. W. (2021). When state-level institutions cannot tell the whole story: An inquiry into municipal variations in quality of government. *Governance*, 34(1), 5–23.
- European Values Study. (2020). *European Values Study longitudinal data file 1981–2008 (EVS 1981–2008)*. ZA4804 Data File Version 3.1.0 [Data set]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13486>
- European Values Study/World Values Survey. (2021). *Joint EVS/WVS 2017–2021 data set (Joint EVS/WVS)*. ZA7505 Data File Version 1.1.0 [Data set]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13670>
- Fellman, S. (2019). *Economic development in the Nordic countries*. <https://nordics.info/en/show/artikel/economic-development-in-the-nordic-countries/#:~:text=When%20the%20international%20financial%20crises%20hit%20the%20world,a%20decade%20of%20slow%20growth%20succeeded%20the%20crises>
- Frederiksen, M., & Toubøl, J. (2019). Polarisering af danskernes tillid til hinanden [Polarization of Danes' trust in each other]. In M. Frederiksen (Ed.), *Usikker Modernitet: Danskernes værdier fra 1981 til 2017* (pp. 393–428). Hans Reitzels Forlag.
- Hainmueller, J., & Hopkins, D. J. (2014). Public attitudes toward immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17, 225–249.
- Halman, L., & Pettersson, T. (2001). Religion and social capital in contemporary Europe: Results from the 1999/2000 European Values Study. *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion*, 12, 65–94.
- Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (2020). Minskar mångkulturella samhällen den sociala tilliten? [Does diverse societies decrease social trust?]. In U. Andersson, A., Carlander, & P. Öhberg (Eds.), *Regntunga skyar* (pp. 27–40). Göteborgs universitet; SOM-institutet.
- Huang, J., van den Brink, H. M., & Groot, W. (2011). College education and social trust: An evidence-based study on the causal mechanisms. *Social Indicators Research*, 104(2), 287–310.
- Ivarsflaten, E., & Strømsnes, K. (2013). Inequality, diversity and social trust in Norwegian communities. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 23(3), 322–342.



- Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B. P., Lochner, K., & Prothrow-Stith, D. (1997). Social capital, income inequality, and mortality. *American Journal of Public Health, 87*(9), 1491–1498.
- Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112*(4), 1251–1288.
- Kumlin, S., Wollebæk, D., Fladmoe, A., & Steen-Johnsen, K. (2017). Leap of faith or judgment of deservingness? Generalized trust, trust in immigrants and support for the welfare state. In W. van Oorschot, F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), *The social legitimacy of targeted welfare* (pp. 281–296). Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Larsen, C. A. (2013). *The rise and fall of social cohesion: The construction and de-construction of social trust in the US, UK, Sweden and Denmark*. Oxford University Press.
- Laurence, J., Schmid, K., & Hewstone, M. (2019). Ethnic diversity, ethnic threat, and social cohesion: (Re)-evaluating the role of perceived out-group threat and prejudice in the relationship between community ethnic diversity and intra-community cohesion. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45*(3), 395–418.
- Malmökommissionen. (2013). *Malmö's väg mot en hållbar framtid* [The road towards a sustainable future for Malmö]. Slutrapport.
- Oskarsson, S., Thisted Dinesen, P., Dawes, C. T., Johannesson, M., & Magnusson, P. (2017). Education and social trust: Testing a causal hypothesis using the discordant twin design. *Political Psychology, 38*(3), 515–531.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, R. D. (2007). *E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century*, The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies, 30*(2), 137–174.
- Reeskens, T., & van der Meer, T. (2019). The inevitable deservingness gap: A study into the insurmountable immigrant penalty in perceived welfare deservingness. *Journal of European Social Policy, 29*(2), 166–181.
- Rothstein, B. (2013). Corruption and social trust: Why the fish rots from the head down. *Social Research, 80*(4), 1009–1032.
- Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. *World Politics, 58*, 41.
- Statistics Sweden. (2021). *Utrikes födda i Sverige* [Foreign born in Sweden]. <https://scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/utrikes-fodda/>
- Sønderskov, K. M., & Dinesen, P. T. (2016). Trusting the state, trusting each other? The effect of institutional trust on social trust. *Political Behavior, 38*(1), 179–202.
- Trustbarometer (2020). Trustbarometer 2020 [Data set]. <https://www.esh.se/forskning/forskningsprojekt/2018-11-08-tillitsbarometern.html>
- Trägårdh, L., Wallman Lundåsen, S., Wollebæk, D., & Svedberg, L. (2013). *Den svala svenska tilliten. Förutsättningar och utmaningar* [The cool Swedish trust. Preconditions and challenges]. SNS Förlag.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge University Press.
- van der Meer, T., & Tolsma, J. (2014). Ethnic diversity and its effects on social cohesion. *Annual Review of Sociology, 40*, 459–478.
- Wallman Lundåsen, S., & Wollebæk, D. (2013). Diversity and community trust in Swedish local communities. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 23*(3), 299–321.
- Widfeldt, A. (2018). The radical right in the Nordic countries. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of the radical right*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.27>
- Wollebæk, D., & Seggaard, S. B. (Eds.). (2011). *Sosial kapital i Norge* [Social capital in Norway]. Cappelen Damm.
- Wollebæk, D., Wallman Lundåsen, S., & Trägårdh, L. (2012). Three forms of interpersonal trust: Evidence from Swedish municipalities. *Scandinavian Political Studies, 35*(4), 319–346.
- Woolcock, M. (2001). The place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes. *Canadian Journal of Policy Research, 2*(1), 11–17.

# 29. DANISH VALUES:

HOW SPECIAL ARE THEY?

---

*Morten Frederiksen*

*Peter Gundelach*

## **Abstract**

*In this country study, we ask how special Danish values are in a European context. In 2016, the Danish Ministry of Culture published the so-called Denmark Canon, which contains ten values ‘that have shaped our country’. Based on the EVS studies, we have scrutinized the empirical confirmation of three of the values: gender equality, trust and hygge. In relation to gender equality, Danes are more positive than the European average, but Norway and Sweden have a significantly higher preference for this value. Recent data suggest that interpersonal trust is a special national value in the sense that there is a particularly high prevalence of this value among Danes. However, the level of trust has increased within a relatively short time span, which shows that it is not a deep-rooted Danish phenomenon. Finally, although hygge may be a special Danish (and Norwegian) word, the activities related to hygge appear to be similar in many countries and equally prevalent. Therefore, in spite of the government’s statement, there are no indication that these values are special values in among the Danes compared to other Europeans and we conclude that what is named a special national value depends on which actors construct the values and for what purposes.*

## 29.1 Introduction

Scandinavians tend to believe that their values are special compared to non-Scandinavians countries, and that they are largely uniform throughout Scandinavia. In 1994, Loek Halman published the piece ‘Scandinavian values: How special are they?’ which investigated and challenged this perception. Halman contended that “as far as values are concerned Scandinavian values are heterogeneous.” Halman based his analysis on data from the European Values Study data, tapping into what Simonsen (2018) calls informal national values. In contrast, formal values are constructions of national values expressed in elite narratives such as those conveyed through national branding, tourism literature, geography and history textbooks, government and company documents, etc. In this chapter, we conduct a case study of Denmark which analyses differences and similarities between formal and informal national values and compare these to national values in other European countries. The purpose of the chapter is to answer the following question: How special are Danish values, and are they really shared among Danes?

First, we examine the notion of national values. Second, we consider what ‘special values’ means in the context of national values. Finally, we compare a key formal narrative of Danish national values – a semi-governmental document called ‘The Denmark Canon’ – with informal national values among Danes and other Europeans. We conclude our paper with a reflection on how special Danish values are.

## 29.2 What Is a National Value?

At the individual level, a value is defined as a desirable moral entity, and in survey research, it is measured as a response to one or several questions that are operationalisations of a theoretically defined value (van Deth & Scarborough, 1994, Schwartz, 1995). Using survey data, the identification of prevailing national values is based on an aggregation of informal, individual values. From a theoretical perspective, national values are discursively constructed, and homogeneous national values do not exist in an essential sense. Instead,

collective statements seeking to articulate formal national values are part of discursive struggles between various actors seeking to enhance their political and cultural positions and interests (Siim & Meret, 2016). It has been argued that the EVS was formed as part of such discursive struggles over formal national values and that the study was originally intended to fortify a social discourse of concern for the lack of social cohesion and support for traditional social values (Ester, Halman & de Moor, 1993; Kropp, 2017).

Formal national values matter to governments, and in several cases, governments have encouraged values education that aligns with specific articulations of formal values (Jones, 2009), such as human rights or democracy (Osler & Starkey, 2001). In some cases, governments even propose lists of core, formal national values. For instance, a 1991 Canadian commission stated the values that it deemed to form the bedrock of Canadian identity (Spicer, 1991); in 2016, the Danish government produced a so-called Denmark Canon of ten national values intended to be ‘a formative project [...] to raise awareness about the historical and cultural social values’.<sup>1</sup> National values, however, are not only a question of defining value characteristics, but also of characteristics that set a nation apart from other nations.

## 29.3 What Does ‘Special National Values’ Mean?

In the context of informal national values, Halman (1994) argues that European countries do not differ in the sense that some emphasise values, which others do not. Instead, Halman proposes that national values differ in the degrees of value preferences across countries, rather than in types of values (Halman, 1994, pp. 60–61). The characteristics of a nation’s values are measured as values highly preferred by the country’s population. Therefore, for Scandinavian values to be special, the prevalence of value preferences should be relatively similar among Scandinavian populations compared to other European countries. In his paper, Halman (1994) demonstrates that this is not the case.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.danmarkskanon.dk>

Theories of national identity offer a different understanding of national values. In his seminal paper, Barth (1969, p. 15) famously states, “the ethnic boundary ... defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.” Members of ethnic groups (in this case nations) may disagree about what belonging means, but they agree that there is a we-them boundary between people in the ethnic group and other ethnic groups (Simonsen, 2016). In this manner, the nation is constructed as unique in relation to other nations, and the demarcation between the nation and other nations is socially constructed and maintained through social institutions and public discourses. Within this line of thinking, a special national value may be anything that people choose to define as characteristic of a nation. Therefore, the special national values ascribed to the boundary may be based on prevalent informal values within the population but may also reflect elite narratives involving formal national values.

In the following sections, we investigate how special Danish national values are. Specifically, we examine the relationship between a key articulation of formal national values (the Denmark Canon) and the informal value preferences for those values within the Danish population (EVS surveys data) to discern the level of correspondence. Furthermore, we use the EVS data to compare the value preferences in Denmark to those in other countries to evaluate the claim that these are special national values in Denmark. First, however, we must provide a short presentation of the Denmark Canon.

#### 29.4 The Denmark Canon

In December 2016, the Danish Ministry of Culture published the Denmark Canon, which includes ten values ‘that have shaped our country’. A canon is normally understood as an authoritative reading list of significant texts. However, in this case, it lists values in order to ‘raise awareness about the historical and cultural social values, traditions and events that have particularly shaped society and people in Denmark’.

The selection of the ten values included in the canon was based on a process that involved the Danish population. Individual people, organisations and

companies were encouraged to submit suggestions of ‘genuine Danish values’ to a special government website. The suggestions were curated by six experts who made a list of 20 values. Based on the list, the population was encouraged to select the top ten values in the canon. The ten values were presented in a comprehensive campaign, which included a website, media productions and a series of debates, making the Denmark Canon a strong articulation of formal national Danish values.

The canon lists the following ten values:<sup>2</sup>

- *Civil values*
- *Freedom (includes freedom of thought and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, right to assemble and freedom from discrimination)*
- *Equality for the law*
- *Democracy*
- *Gender equality*
- *Social and cultural values*
- *Trust*
- *Associations and voluntary work*
- *Liberality and tolerance*
- *Christian heritage*
- *Culture-specific values*
- *The Danish language*
- *Hygge*

A quick glance at the list suggests that the civil values represent formal values which are internationally recognised and codified in international policy documents, such as human rights declarations. For these to be considered special Danish values, a particularly high value prevalence among the population is required compared to other countries. The social and cultural values on the list comprise less universally accepted formal values. For instance, a Christian heritage or tolerant values are, for different reasons, not formal in some European countries while being dominant values in others. Finally, the culture-specific

<sup>2</sup> The classification and order of the values in this chapter differs from the order at the canon’s website.

values in the canon are unique to the Danes and are therefore not formal national values in other countries.

## 29.5 Comparing Formal and Informal National Values in Denmark

In the following, we compare informal national values measured by the EVS studies (high prevalence of a given value relative to other countries) with the Danish government's formal national values presentation in the Denmark Canon. Due to limited space, we have restricted the comparison to three selected values from the canon: gender equality, trust and *hygge*. In each of these cases, we briefly present the formal discourse and relate it to survey evidence.

### Gender equality

The Denmark Canon states that Danish society is based on equality between the genders and the value that men and women must have the same rights and opportunities. This is in accordance with the UN Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, as well as the Treaty of the European Union. In Denmark, the Canon argues, gender equality is an aspect of national politics which is supported by all political parties and expressed in a law on gender equality. However, formal gender values are more pro-gender equality in Norway and Sweden compared to Denmark (Borchorst & Siim, 2008).

Concerning the informal values and the value preference for gender equality in the population, the picture is less clear. Data from the European Values Study 2017 contains numerous items that measure the population's support for gender equality, cf. Table 29.1.

Table 29.1 Support for gender equality in European countries. Pct. 2017

	Very important in marriage to share house- hold chores	Disagree strongly: men's job to earn money, women's job to look after home	Disagree strongly: men are better political leaders	Disagree strongly: give men priority when jobs are scarce	Disagree strongly: university education more important for boys
Denmark	35	64	55	53	70
Norway	41	76	80	75	88
Sweden	57	70	73	73	81
All EVS countries	43	29	32	35	48

Note: Number of respondents 54.297-56.181. Missing answers not included. Data are weighted by weight that uses the marginal distribution of age, sex, educational attainment and region

Source: EVS 2017

The EVS data show a clear pattern. When asked about gender equality in relation to family, economy and politics, Danes are clearly in favour of gender equality much more than the European average. However, the Danes are less positive towards gender equality than Norwegian and Swedish people. This suggests a consistency between the formal Danish values in the canon and the informal value preferences among Danes: gender equality is valued to a high degree by Danes compared to the European average. However, there is no merit to the claim that this is a special Danish value, since Norway and Sweden have a significantly higher preference for this value.

### Trust

Trust is also a cornerstone of Danish culture, according to the Denmark Canon; Danish scholars have explained the high level of trust in Denmark by the existence of historically deep-rooted institutions that have existed for lengthy periods. The institutions and corresponding organisations offer solutions to col-

lective action problems (Svendsen, Svendsen & Graeff, 2012). It has even been claimed that the high social trust scores could be due to the region's long-distance trade practices since the Viking age (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2012). Trust is, in other words, a formal national value.

Survey evidence indicates that generalised trust is high in Denmark, but it contradicts the claim that trust is a deep-rooted value in Denmark. EVS 2017 suggests that 74% of the Danes (compared to the European average of 40%) answer yes to the following statement: 'In general, do you think that most people can be trusted?' These data also reveal that the high level of trust is a recent phenomenon. From an average European position, Denmark has gained a position at the forefront in generalized trust. Therefore, the high level of trust in Denmark is a relatively new phenomenon (Frederiksen and Toubøl, 2019), which challenges the theory of a historically deep-rooted cultural foundation of trust in Denmark. Instead, the contemporary level of trust in Denmark is dependent upon improvements in other factors such as education and institutional trust (Frederiksen, 2011; Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2014).

While the Danish state promotes formal values of trust as a unique cultural and political Danish phenomenon, the Danes' informal values do not entirely support this notion. High levels of interpersonal trust are not a deep-rooted Danish phenomenon. Rather, trust has increased within a relatively short time span, and trust is less permanently valued in the population than suggested by the formal expression of trust. However, the recent EVS results suggest that trust is a special national value in the sense that there is a particularly high prevalence of this value among Danes, compared to other European nations.

### **Hygge**

*Hygge*, the canon states, is 'a special way of being together in a relaxing, nice atmosphere'. *Hygge* is claimed to be Danish-specific; it reflects Danish values and encompasses a broad range of social phenomena, including communicative style and interpretations of symbols (Levisen, 2012, p. 113); the concept of *hygge* is said to be one of the most important tools used to bind the nation together

culturally (Pessel, 2018, p. 36). According to the canon, '*Hygge* has its own word and many people say that it can't be translated'.<sup>3</sup> *Hygge* is related to activities such as warmth, candlelight, eating candy and being with friends and family. The Oxford Dictionary defines *hygge* as 'a quality of coziness and comfortable conviviality that engenders a feeling of contentment or well-being'; there are books about *hygge* (e.g., Wiking, 2016; Søderberg, 2016; Brits, 2016) which celebrate the Danish way of living. It is a "social ethos of closeness warmth, relaxation, informality and egalitarian mutuality" (Jenkins, 2011, p. 253).

*Hygge*, as a formal national value, is commonly used by the tourist industry and has even been declared a soft power in international relations. For instance, Howell and Sundberg (2015) describe *hygge* as an example of presenting an affective atmosphere to foster the goals of small state geopolitics.

The idea that the word *hygge* cannot be translated into other languages, as well as the celebration of *hygge* in popular books and the national marketing of *hygge* make *hygge* a strong, formal national value.

Some people argue that *hygge* is difficult to measure, yet the Danish archive for survey data<sup>4</sup> shows that researchers have asked people whether they experience *hygge* in various situations, such as at sports games, through memberships in voluntary associations or when shopping. In international survey studies, concepts such as 'enjoyable' (European Social Survey, 2006) or 'pleasant' (International Social Science Programme, 2017) have been translated into *hygge* by Danish scholars.

While *hygge* is a specific Danish word, people in other nations are most likely performing the same activities that the Danes call *hygge*. It is not easy to find comparative survey evidence of *hygge*, but in the 2006 European Social Survey, respondents were asked the following question: 'how much of the time spent with your immediate family is enjoyable?' In Danish 'enjoyable' was translated

<sup>3</sup> *Hygge* also exists in Norwegian. The word *hyggja* exists in Old Norse language where it means to think or to guess (Wiktionary).

<sup>4</sup> <http://dda.dk/simple-search>

into ‘hyggelig’, in Norwegian also: *hyggelig*, in Dutch: *aangenaam*, in German: *angenehm*, and in Swedish: *trevlig*.<sup>5</sup>

Provided that these words refer to the same phenomenon, the ESS study indicated how much people engage in *hygge* activities and, perhaps, how much they value *hygge*. The percentage of people who answered ‘all of the time’ was 42% for all Europeans, 40% for the Danes, 38% for the Norwegians, 29% for the Dutch, 32% for the Germans and 39% for the Swedes. If we, perhaps somewhat boldly, accept that the ESS item is an operationalisation of *hygge*, we may conclude that even though the word *hygge* is a special Danish (and Norwegian) word, as a phenomenon it is by no means unique to the Danes; perhaps we might even ponder how the Danes have come to view it as inherently Danish.

## 29.6 Conclusions

The EVS studies of national values and various elite discourses of national values are supplementary means of studying the special national values in a given country. In the first case, special values are defined as (major) deviance scores from an average of a large number of countries. In the second case, what is special is anything that a discourse has defined as a method of drawing boundaries between nations. The identification of a special value most likely coincides in the two types of analysis. However, using Denmark as an example, this chapter has provided examples of variations between the two. Gender equality is generally recognised as core civil values and is promoted by many countries around the world, including Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, the Danes score lower than the other Scandinavians. Official Danish discourses promote trust as a cultural cornerstone, but the level of trust in Denmark was much lower than today even a few decades ago. Formal discourses claim that *hygge* is an integral and special part of being Danish. However, although *hygge* may be a special Danish word, the activities related to *hygge* appear to be similar in many countries and equally prevalent. The conclusion is that what is named a special national value depends on which actors construct the values and for

<sup>5</sup> [https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/search?q=questionnaires&fq=round\\_facet:%22ESS3%202006%22&start=&docstart=61](https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/search?q=questionnaires&fq=round_facet:%22ESS3%202006%22&start=&docstart=61)

what purposes. In this context, the EVS, not least thanks to Loek Halman’s relentless, decades-long efforts, stands out as a major source documenting the values of the Europeans.

## List of References

- Barth, Fredrik. 1969. “Introduction.” pp. 9–38 in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Borchorst, Anette, and Birte Siim. 2008. “Woman-Friendly Policies and State Feminism: Theorizing Scandinavian Gender Equality.” *Feminist Theory* 9(2):207–24.
- Brits, Louisa Thomsen. 2016. *The Book of Hygge: The Danish Art of Living Well*. Random House.
- Ester, Peter, Loek Halman, and Ruud de Moor. 1994. *The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Faulks, Keith. 2006. “Education for Citizenship in England’s Secondary Schools: A Critique of Current Principle and Practice.” *Journal of Education Policy* 21(1):59–74.
- Frederiksen, Morten. 2011. “Uddannet til tillid.” pp 200–220 in Peter Gundelach (ed.): *Små og store forandringer. Danskernes værdier siden 1981*. København: Hans Reitzels forlag.
- Frederiksen, Morten, and Jonas Toubøl. 2019. “Polarisering af danskernes tillid til hinanden.” pp. 393–428 in Morten Frederiksen (ed.) *Usikker modernitet. Danskernes værdier fra 1981 til 2017*. København: Hans Reitzels forlag.
- Halman, Loek. 1994. “Scandinavian Values: How Special Are They?” pp. 59–84 in Thorleif Pettersson and Ole Riis: *Scandinavian Values. Religion and Morality in the Nordic Countries*. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
- Howell, Jordan P., and Todd Sundberg. 2015. “Towards an Affective Geopolitics: Soft Power and the Danish Notion of ‘Hygge.’” *Environment, Space, Place* 7(2): 97–120.
- Jenkins, Richard. 2011. *Being Danish: Paradoxes of Identity in Everyday Life*. København: Museum Tusulanum Press.
- Kropp, Kristoffer. 2017. “The Cases of the European Values Study and the European Social Survey-European Constellations of Social Science Knowledge Production.” *Serendipities: Journal for the Sociology and History of the Social Sciences* 2(1):50–68.
- Levisen, Carsten. 2012. *Cultural Semantics and Social Cognition: A Case Study on the Danish Universe of Meaning*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Osler, Audrey, and Hugh Starkey. 2001. “Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: Inclusive or Exclusive?” *Oxford Review of Education* 27(2): 287–305.

- Schwartz, Shalom H. 2009. "Culture Matters: National Value Cultures, Sources, and Consequences." pp. 137–60 in Wyer, R. S., Chiu, C. Y., & Hong, Y. Y. (eds.): *Understanding culture. Theory, research, and application*. New York: Taylor & Francis Group.
- Siim, Birte, and Susi Meret. 2016. "Right-Wing Populism in Denmark: People, Nation and Welfare in the Construction of the 'Other.'" pp. 109–36 in G. Lazaridis, G. Campani, and A. Benveniste (eds.) *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Simonsen, Kristina Bakkær. 2016. "How the Host Nation's Boundary Drawing Affects Immigrants' Belonging." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(7):1153–76.
- Simonsen, Kristina Bakkær. 2018. "What It Means to (Not) Belong: A Case Study of How Boundary Perceptions Affect Second-Generation Immigrants' Attachments to the Nation." *Sociological Forum* 33(1):118–38.
- Søderberg, Marie Tourell. 2016. *Hygge: The Danish Art of Happiness*. Penguin UK.
- Sønderskov, Kim Mannemar, and Peter Thisted Dinesen. 2014. "Danish Exceptionalism: Explaining the Unique Increase in Social Trust over the Past 30 Years." *European Sociological Review* 30(6): 782-795.
- Spicer, Keith. 1991. *Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future. Report to the People and Government of Canada*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. 2016. "How Did Trade Norms Evolve in Scandinavia? Long-Distance Trade and Social Trust in the Viking Age." *Economic Systems* 40(2):198–205.
- Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, and Peter Graeff. 2012. "Explaining the Emergence of Social Trust: Denmark and Germany." *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 351–67.
- van Deth, Jan W., and Elinor Scarbrough. 1995. "The Concept of Values." pp. 21–47 in J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.): *The impact of values*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wiking, Meik. 2016. *The Little Book of Hygge: The Danish Way to Live Well*. Penguin UK.



# 30. TRADITIONAL AND POST-MATERIALIST VALUES ABOUT FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN GREECE

---

*Penny Panagiotopoulou*

*Aikaterini Gari*

*Anastassios Emvalotis*

## **Abstract**

*The present chapter focuses on defining the importance in life of family and of specific qualities for a successful marriage/partnership as related to the traditional value of women being fulfilled in their role as spouses and mothers, and also the post-materialist value of marriage being an outdated institution. These values were examined using data from the 2008 and 2019 waves of the European Values Study for Greece. The findings provide overwhelming support for the importance of family in one's life as well as the importance of faithfulness for a successful marriage or partnership. Adequate income and children were assessed as important for a successful marriage/partnership by fewer traditional participants in general and by even fewer non-traditional participants and post-materialists in 2019 as compared to those in 2008.*

### 30.1 Introduction

During the EVS 3<sup>rd</sup> wave (1999), family form, structure and values in European countries have been the core of long discussions among Loek Halman, Jim Georgas, and a team of PhD students including the authors of this chapter, in the frame of a broader collaboration between Tilburg University and the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. This chapter, in honour of Loek Hallman, has been founded on these fruitful interactions that encouraged the Greek EVS team to proceed with European family values and attitudes research until the EVS 5<sup>th</sup> wave (2017).

The family as the primary context for human development is responsible for the satisfaction of the biological, social and psychological needs of its members, thereby ensuring their survival. Regardless of its specific structure, which is formulated somewhat differently across cultures or over time, the family constitutes the main psychological group which the individual can count on. The family is also the basic connecting factor between the individual and the social environment. It may be nuclear or extended or single-parent or dual-career or reconstituted, and it may exist within the framework of the institution of marriage or not. It has been reported that a household may consist of more than one family nuclei, since according to the United Nations/European Commission for Europe (UN/ECE, 2015 as mentioned in Hantrais, Brannen, et al., 2020, p. 277), the nuclear family comprises a cohabitating couple “related as a marital, a registered, or a consensual union of partners of either opposite or same sex, or as parent and child.” Consequently, the family has undergone significant compositional and functional changes over time, which has resulted in quite different forms of living arrangements resembling what people consider ‘home’ (Georgas, Mylonas, et al., 2004).

Demographic changes such as declining marriage and fertility rates, rising divorce, and childless couples rates are a given. These changes also seem to be associated with values about the institution of marriage and children shifting away from traditional and materialist values towards more liberal and post-materialist ones (Gubernskaya, 2010; Yucel, 2015). According to post-materialism theory, individuals have increased their financial security, thereby their eco-

conomic dependency on normative constraints has waned (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Materialist and traditional values that presented the family and society as factors for the individuals’ progress have given way to post-materialist and secular-rational values. Individuals may pursue their self-actualization freed from premises that required obedience to the traditional meaning of gender roles and marriage (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). They also appreciate higher-order life goals more than economic security goals (Inglehart, 2008) and tend to set immaterial life-goals such as personal development and self-esteem above material security” (Uhlener and Thurik, 2007, p.162). In cultural contexts where living conditions are in turmoil, value change will point to conservatism and traditionalism (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). Post-materialist individuals view family, marriage and gender roles from a new perspective seeking in the context of family autonomy, psychological interdependence (Goodwin, 2009), and narcissistic love between spouses, which enhances trust to the self but restricts marital fertility (Beck-Gersheim, 2002).

In support of the liberalization of values comes the theory of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’, which relates the demographic changes with the more individualistic and egalitarian values. Self-actualization may be achieved through education and career before marriage and family, which may follow in a reformed version or not at all. However, this is inconsistent with the conservative value towards the stability of the institution of marriage and corresponding distinct gender social roles (Van de Kaa, 2000).

Greece seems to be lagging behind with regard to these social transformations. Greece is exiting an economic crisis the management of which has straddled the European and national levels as no other episode in the history of the Eurozone (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2017). The unemployment rates skyrocketed, and the massive national spending cuts on all public services were keenly felt by all Greek citizens. University students, who have made serious cutbacks to their everyday expenses, do not expect to find a good job even remotely related to their studies, which have also undergone radical reform. There is no optimism for future economic independence. Age was found to be positively related to the degree these consequences were experienced (Λουμάκου & Κανελλοπούλου, 2020).

Moreover, previous research on family has shown that an urban type of extended family has been configured (Georgas, Christakopoulou, et al., 1997). This type of family administers those values related to the function of the traditional extended family and the maintenance of tight kin relationships, but without the traditional parental hierarchical roles. In contrast to families in Western industrialized countries where rising educational and economic levels of the wife's social role is associated with her power in making family decisions (Biddlecom & Kramarow, 1998), within the ordinary conventional Greek family, the mother would gradually increase her status and her participation in family decision-making after acquiring children. It is also suggested that the father's power within the family has lessened and the mother's has increased although the two-spouse family roles seemed to remain traditional until the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century (Maratou-Aliprante, 1997).

The aim of this chapter is to identify: a) whether family for Greeks still stands as a major milestone in their life; b) whether and to what extent specific qualities that might define a successful marriage or partnership are supported by traditional participants who perceive women to be spouses and mothers; and c) whether and to what extent the same qualities that might define a successful marriage or partnership are endorsed by post-materialist participants who consider marriage as an outdated institution.

### 30.2 Data and Variables

The 2008 European Values Study consists of a representative stratified random sample of the Greek adult population of 18 years old and over comprising 1500 respondents surveyed via door-to-door interviews using the standardized 2008 EVS questionnaire; of the realized sample, 43.4% were men and 56.7% were women. The 2019 sample comprised 2694 respondents, of which 40.4% were men and 54.1% were women (5.5% were missing values); it was a web survey using the 2017 EVS Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing questionnaire. Data were obtained using the snowball technique, which resulted in 3894 cases. The 2019 sample for this study was adjusted to the 2008 percentages of sex and age in accordance with the rates development of these variables as depict-

ed in the Hellenic Statistical Authority Reports (2011).

For this study, specific questions were selected to be identical in the 2008 and 2019 EVS questionnaires: a) "Please indicate how important family is in your life" rated on a four-point scale from "Very important" to "Not important at all"; b) "How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children" rated on a four-point scale from "Agree strongly" to "Disagree strongly"; c) "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Marriage is an outdated institution" rated on a binary scale "Agree" or "Disagree"; and d) "For a successful marriage or partnership, please indicate how important is: "faithfulness", "adequate income", "good housing", "sharing household chores", "children" and "spending time with friends and for personal hobbies/activities", all rated on a three-point scale: "Very Important", "Rather Important", "Not Important at All".

The importance of family in life and the qualities considered important for a successful marriage/partnership were operationalized by (a) the question "what women really want is a home and children" which is considered to be a traditional value, (b) the question "marriage is an outdated institution" which is considered to be a post-materialist value and (c) the variable of age. In addition, ages were divided into six age groups namely 18-24 years of age, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and over 65.

Exploratory factor analyses applied for each wave separately on the indicators mentioned above on successful marriage qualities, did not result in a clear unifactorial solution; this indicates that more than one specific dimension exists. Therefore, crosstabulation analyses were carried out, for each year separately, on the importance of family, the values for a successful marriage associated with positive/negative view towards the traditional statement that "what women really want is home and children", and the post-materialist view that "marriage is an outdated institution".

### 30.3 Results


*Importance of family.* Crosstabulation analyses, for each wave separately, on the importance of family in life and respondents' gender, age group, the attitude towards the traditional women's role and the institution of marriage, shows that family was very important in life regardless of the respondents' gender, age, respondent's opinion on whether marriage is outdated, or whether women are fulfilled when married with children; for both the 2008 and 2019 waves, percentages ranged between 73% and 92%.

In particular, crosstabulation analysis resulted in extremely high percentages although statistically significant for both supporters of the institution of marriage (2008: 88.7%  $p < .000$  and 2019: 89.4%  $p < .000$ ), and also by the post-materialists who were less supportive (77.4% and 74%). The same pattern held true for respondents embracing the traditional view of women being fulfilled when married with children (2008: 88.7% and 2019: 89.4%), as well as those with lower acceptance of this traditional role (78.8% and 81.2%). As for age groups, the older the respondents the higher the percentage (91.5%), who evaluated family as being very important in life; the importance of family gradually decreases with age, with 73.2% of the youngest finding family very important. While in 2008, an almost equal number of men (86.4%) and women (86.1%) considered family to be very important in life, while in 2019 there seems to be a statistically significant higher percentage of women (89.3%) compared to men (80.4%) who find family important.

*Successful marriage qualities.* For a successful marriage or partnership, *faithfulness* was rated as a very important marital quality with overwhelming support regardless of any differences between those supporting the traditional role of women or not (see Figure 30.1). Specifically, faithfulness was rated as very important by the 92.1% ( $p < .05$ ) of the traditionals with regard to the role of women in 2008 than the non-traditionals; however, this statistically significant difference was not identified in 2019. *Children* was rated as a very important quality for a successful marriage/partnership by 91% of the traditional participants who embrace the traditional social role of women, compared to 78.8% of the non-traditionals in 2008; in 2019 the range of difference was greater while

the percentages evaluating *children* as very important were much lower (79.5% and 32%, respectively). *Adequate income* was assessed as very important by less traditional participants regarding the role of women in 2008 (71.2%  $p < .001$ ), than those who accepted this traditional role (75.8%); the reverse was found for 2019 with much lower percentages (the less traditional participants 67.1% but the traditionals 37.3%  $p < .000$ , respectively).

Figure 30.1 Percentages of traditional and non-traditional participants - supporters and non-supporters - of the traditional social role of women, in 2008 and 2019, for the qualities of a successful marriage




Note. Traditionals: in favor of the female social role that focuses on home and children  
Non-traditionals: against this female social role.

The findings regarding the importance of the above-mentioned qualities for a successful marriage/partnership did not change much irrespective of whether respondents were supporters of the institution of marriage or not (see Fig-

ure 30.2). Specifically, the materialist, conservative supporters of marriage overwhelmingly assessed faithfulness as extremely important, both in 2008 (89.9%) and 2019 (90.6%), although being more supportive of faithfulness when compared to the high percentages of the post-materialist opposers (82% and 75.3%, respectively for each year). *Children* was rated as a very important quality for a successful marriage/partnership by 81% of the conservative supporters of marriage, compared to 73.3% of the post-materialist opposers for 2008, while the range of difference was greater and the percentages a great deal lower in 2019 (56.9% and 31.9% respectively). As for *adequate income*, conservative participants with regard to marriage in 2008 and 2019 rated *adequate income* as important (63.3% and 44.5% respectively) being significantly more supportive of this marriage quality than the post-materialists (67.8% in 2008, but 38.1% in 2019).

Figure 30.2 Percentages of participants supporting and not supporting the institution of marriage, in 2008 and 2019, for the qualities for a successful marriage



### 30.4 Discussion

The family proves to be very important for the overwhelming majority of participants, regardless of gender, age, stronger or weaker supporters of the female traditional social role that “home and children is really what women want”, as well as those participants who accept at higher or lower levels the importance of the institution of marriage; in particular, those who hold more traditional views on women’s social role, those who hold conservatives views on the acceptance of the institution of marriage, and elders and women recognized the great importance of family. This finding is in line with the one reported by Halman, Sieben et al. (2012) that family is considered to be “very” and “quite important” by 98% of Europeans.

*Faithfulness* as an important quality for successful marriage/partnership was overwhelmingly supported by all groups of participants - the traditionals and non-traditionals with regard to the women’s social role as well as those accepting or rejecting the institution of marriage - conservatives and meta-materialists. This finding is consistent with the overwhelming acceptance of faithfulness for a successful marriage (about 85%) of Europeans (Halman, Sieben, et al., 2012).

Traditional participants in favor of the traditional social role of women as actualizing themselves only by being spouses and mothers seem to value the rest of the qualities for a successful marriage or partnership –*adequate income*, *good housing*, *sharing household chores*, *children* and *time for friend/hobbies* - in a similar way, both in 2008 and 2019, but with lower percentages, in comparison with the non traditionals; additionally, in 2019, the non-traditionals seemed to value less the qualities of *children* and *adequate income*. Also, the more conservative participants who accept the importance of marriage seemed to assess the qualities for a successful marriage or partnership in a similar way to the post-materialists, except for the qualities of *adequate income* and *children* that are seen as important for a successful marriage/partnership in 2019 by those with lower acceptance of marriage importance. These findings seem to agree with Jones and Brayfield (1997) regarding *children* as a quality for marriage, in which individuals with more egalitarian gender ideology are found to be less

likely to consider children as central to fulfilment and therefore have more egalitarian family values (Yucel, 2015). The underestimation of *adequate income* has also been ranked last in the Olson, Olson-Sigg et al. (2011) survey where financial management and spiritual beliefs were the least supported qualities in marriage.

Overall, it is not clear whether there is a shift towards post-materialist values regarding the qualities for a successful marriage/partnership. Apart from the absolute acceptance of faithfulness, findings about the qualities considered compatible with the traditional content of marriage/partnership, namely adequate income and children, seemed to find lower support by all groups of participants. Specifically, *adequate income* and *children* appeared to undergo some substantial re-evaluation by participants who do not agree with traditional values. It seems that, after ten years of economic crisis in Greece, participants do not turn to well-known, safe and conservative attitudes towards marriage/partnership. It has been indicated that regarding personal values in recession-hit Greece a decline was found in conservative values like tradition, conformity and security as well (Παυλόπουλος, 2014). The attribution of crisis to the old political system or the cognitive dissonance between low future expectations and high need of security, due to the lower and lower standard of living, has not seemed to lead Greeks towards the safety of traditionalism as might be expected in times of crisis (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). Whether this tendency towards re-evaluation is a random fluctuation or is here to stay, and perhaps constitutes the beginning of a greater devaluation of traditional values for the institution of marriage, has yet to be established using future data on the matter; the research results of this study are not sufficient to establish a clear picture, as more elaborated statistical work needs to be done associated also with the analysis of additional EVS demographic variables.

A few years ago traditional values about family function and marriage goal were prevalent in Greece. As Yucel (2015) very carefully points out, Greece may have not undergone a second demographic transition, since it lags behind in the formation of ideological changes.

## List of References

- Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). *Reinventing the family: In search of new lifestyles*. Blackwell. <https://www.wiley.com/enus/Reinventing+the+Family%3A+In+Search+of+New+Lifestyles-p-9780745622132>
- Biddlecom, A. E., & Kramarow, E. (1998). Household headship among married women: Roles of economic power, education and convention. *Journal of Family and Economic Issues*, 19, 367-382.
- Featherstone, K., & Papadimitriou, D. (2017). Greece: a crisis in two level governance. In D. Dinan, N. Nugent, & W. E. Paterson (Eds.), *Greece: A crisis in two level governance* (pp. 223-252). Palgrave, LSE Research Online. [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84157/1/Greece%20%20a%20crisis%20in%20two%20level%20governance\\_cover%20...Final%20pdf.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84157/1/Greece%20%20a%20crisis%20in%20two%20level%20governance_cover%20...Final%20pdf.pdf)
- Georgas, J., Christakopoulou, S., Poortinga, Y. H., Angleitner, A., Goodwin, R., & Charalambous, N. (1997). (1997). The relationship of family bonds to family structure and function across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 28(3), 303-320. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022197283006>
- Georgas, J., Mylonas, K., Gari, K., & Panagiotopoulou, P. (2004). Families and values in Europe. Στο W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *European Values at the End of the Millennium* (pp. 167-204). Brill.
- Goodwin, R. (2009). *Changing relations: Achieving intimacy in a time of social transition*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gubernskaya, Z. (2010). Changing attitudes toward marriage and children in six countries. *Sociological perspectives*, 53(2), 179-200.
- Halman, L., Sieben, L., & Van Zundert, M. (2012). *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Tradition at the turn of the century*, The Netherlands, Brill. <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/education-dissemination-publications/evs-publications/atlas-of-european-values-album/>
- Hantrais, L., Brannen, J., & Bennett, F. (2020). Family change, intergenerational relations and policy implications. *Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences*, 15(3), 275-290.
- Hellenic Statistical Authority Reports (2011). *Statistics. Population and Social Conditions. Population and housing census. Demographic characteristics*. <https://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SAM03/>
- Inglehart, R.F. (2008). Changing values among western publics from 1970 to 2006, *West European Politics*, 31(1), 130-146.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1), 19-51.
- Jones, R. K., & Brayfield, A. (1997). Life's greatest joy? European attitudes toward the centrality of children. *Social Forces*, 75(4), 1239-1269.
- Λουμάκου, Ε. Α., & Κανελλοπούλου, Λ. (2020). Η σχέση της οικονομικής κρίσης με την υποκειμενική ψυχολογική ευεξία των φοιτητών στα ελληνικά ΑΕΙ. [Economic Crisis and Psychological Subjective

Well-being in of University Students in Greece]. *Ψυχολογία*, 25(2), 127-141. <https://doi.org/10.12681/psy.hps.25592>

- Maratou-Aliprante, L. (1997). Η οικογένεια στην Αθήνα: Οικογενειακά πρότυπα και συζυγικές πρακτικές. [Family in Athens: Family Patterns and Marital Practices]. In E. Pouloupoulou, *Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών Ερευνών*, 92, 267-270.
- Olson, D. H., Olson-Sigg, A., & Larson, P. J. (2011). National survey of marital strengths. <http://www.prepare-enrich.com/research>
- Παυλόπουλος, Β. (2014). Κρίση αξιών ή οι αξίες της κρίσης: Σταθερότητα και μεταβολή προσωπικών και πολιτικών αξιών στην Ελλάδα της ύφεσης. [Value Crisis or Values of Crisis: Stability and Change of Personal and Political Values in Greece of Recession]. *Ψυχολογία*, 21(3), 334-353.
- Van de Kaa, D. J. (1987). Europe's Second Demographic Transition. *Population Bulletin*, 42, 1-57. PMID: 12268395.
- Uhlaner, L. and Thurik, R. (2007). "Postmaterialism influencing total entrepreneurial activity across nations", *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, 17(3), 161-185.
- Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. F. (2010). Agency, values, and well-being: A human development model. *Social Indicators Research*, 97, 43-63. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-009-9557-z>
- Yucel, D. (2015). What predicts egalitarian attitudes towards marriage and children: Evidence from the European Values Study. *Social Indicators Research*, 120, 213-228.

# 31. GENDER ROLE ATTITUDES IN THE MACEDONIAN SOCIO- CULTURAL CONTEXT

---

*Mihajlo Popovski*

*Antoanela Petkovska*

*Ilo Trajkovski*

*Konstantin Minoski*

## **Abstract**

*The paper presents results from a research of the gender role attitudes in Macedonian sociocultural context. The research relies on data collected as part of the last wave of the European Values Study (EVS) that was carried out by a national team of researchers from the Survey Research Centre, at the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje, between December 2018 and March 2019. For this survey, 1,117 citizens of Macedonia were interviewed in their homes. Gender role attitudes of the participants are determined on the basis of the degree to which they agree or disagree with a number of statements concerning the activities and the responsibilities that men and women should have in the family, the effects of women's employment, and what kind of activities are considered as more suited to men rather than to women. The frequency and intensity of the attitudes and their correlation to certain socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents were assessed. The results reveal that there are significant variations in the attitudes of Macedonians, yet, they generally point to a gradual replacement of traditional gender ideology to more modern ones.*



### 31.1 Introduction

Gender role attitudes include understanding and assessing the appropriateness of the behaviours of men and women in the private and public spheres of people's lives. A systematic study of gender role attitudes is done from various scientific perspectives (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Lomazzi et al. 2018; Eagly, 1987; Fortin, 2005; Jelen, 1988) and it is aimed at acquiring different types of knowledge of both theoretical and practical significance. Such reviews typically include (a) the identification and scientific verification of the dominant understandings of the characteristic and expected behaviours of women and men living in a particular sociocultural context, which can fit into the inequality-equality dimension; (b) establishing the ways these attitudes, coloured by prejudices and negative stereotypes especially in regard to the women, contribute to the division and unequal treatment of women and men; (c) the identification of the differences in the attitudes between different groups of people within the same society and the differences in the attitudes between societies; (d) monitoring changes in the attitudes that happen over time; up to (e) passing adequate legislation for equal treatment and validation of people regardless of their gender and coming up with various programmes and activities at individual, group, institutional and social level in order for the solutions to become norms of normal behaviour of people in their everyday lives.

Hence, a study on gender role attitudes is not only important from a theoretical point of view, but even more for creating conditions for equal rights of both women and men in all areas of life. This implies providing adequate and scientifically based responses to many questions dealing with gender inequality, especially in regard to the women's position in society. Here are some of those questions: Why are women more exposed to social life risks? Why is it more common for women to lose their jobs and more difficult to get one? Why are they blackmailed and paid less at their jobs? Why are they burdened by both privacy and pressure from the public? Why do they have less rights or opportunities to choose from? Why is it harder for them to gain access to political power? For that reason, the study of gender role attitudes is included in many international and national surveys that have been conducted annually and periodically ever since the 1970s.

These surveys usually use single items or short scales for gender role attitudes, where the content of some items remains unchanged across all survey waves. But in some surveys, the items are altered both in regard to the number and in regard to the content. However, the rarely used sets of items cover all the aspects of the gender roles and they do not always satisfy the strict psychometric criteria in order to be treated as homogeneous and consistent attitude scales (McHugh & Frieze, 1997).

In general, these surveys' results show that in course of time in many societies there is gradual decline in the traditional gender role attitudes that are based on the male breadwinner model, and consequently increase in the egalitarian attitudes towards the roles that women and men should have in the private and public spheres (Knight & Brinton, 2017; Cotter et al., 2011; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Mason & Lu, 1988; Crompton, 1999). The results have also shown that these changes in attitudes are not equally pronounced among all the groups in a society, and that the attitude differences are greater between societies than between groups within a society (Inglehart & Norris, 2003).

Adding to the existing research paradigms, in this case we present the results from the research of the gender role attitudes of the Macedonian citizens collected with the last wave of the European Values Study (EVS), that was carried out by a team of researchers from the Survey Research Centre, at the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje, between December 2018 and March 2019. On this occasion the research team would like to express its gratitude to Dr. Loek Halman who as a prominent member and past Chair of the EVS supported the Macedonian team to join the EVS family and to contribute adequately to the Project.

Present study has three goals. The first goal is to determine what the attitudes of the Macedonian citizens are in regard to the role of women and men in the private and public spheres. Secondly, we want to determine whether the attitudes towards the roles of women and men show clear division of the activities that are expected and considered typical for them in the private and public spheres. Third and final, we examine whether gender role attitudes are connected to certain demographic characteristics of the citizens. Answering those questions would contribute to better understand the direction towards which

the ongoing transitional social changes are leading the Macedonian society. The analysis will help to see how far the society has moved away from the traditional gender attitudes, if so.

## 31.2 Data and Methods

### Respondents

The Survey covered 1,117 citizens from Macedonia from eight statistical regions (Skopje, North-eastern, Eastern, South-Eastern, Vardar, Pelagonija, South-Western and Polog regions). The respondents' age ranges between 18 and 88 years ( $M = 43.8$ ) and 50.2 % are female and 49.4% are male. Most of them live in the urban areas (62.7 %), and less in the rural areas (37.3%). Most of them have secondary school education (48%). According to their ethnic background 70.1% are Macedonians, 23.5% are Albanians and the remaining 6.4% belong to the other ethnic groups. According to their religious background 69.1% are Christians, and 29.8% are Muslims. And according to their marital status 61.0% stated to be married and 27.5% to be single.<sup>1</sup>

### Instruments

The dependent variable, gender role attitudes, is measured using eight items in the last EVS questionnaire (for measurement reflections, see Walter, 2017). The first statement refers to the role assigned to women in the private and public spheres, i.e. "A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children." The following two statements refer to the conflict between the role of woman in the public and private spheres, namely "When a mother works for pay, the children suffer," and "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." The fourth statement refers to the difference (inequality) between the roles of men and women in the public and private spheres, and is formulated as "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family." The four subsequent statements inequality of women

<sup>1</sup> Other categories (divorced, widowed, and separated) were not included in the analysis.

and men in the public sphere, namely "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl", "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do", "On the whole, men make better business executives than women do," and lastly "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women." The answers to the first seven statements were given on a scale of 1 to 4, 1 being 'disagree strongly', 2 'disagree', 3 'agree', and 4 'agree strongly'. The answers to the eighth statement were on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being "disagree strongly", 2 'disagree', 3 'neither agree nor disagree', 4 'agree', and 5 'agree strongly'. The higher value means more inequality. The collected data was subjected to descriptive and correlational analyses in line with the research goals.

## 31.3 Results

The main descriptive statistics such as frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations are presented in Table 31.1. According to the number of respondents who agree with the statements (by merging the alternatives 'agree strongly' and 'agree') and those who do not agree with them (by merging the alternatives 'disagree strongly' and 'disagree') one could conclude that they rather disagreed than agreed with all the statements, except on the first statement.

In order to check whether there are significant variations in the degree of expressed agreement and disagreement with the statements depending on certain demographic features of the participants – sex, ethnic affiliation, religious denomination, marital status and place of residence – a t-test was applied to establish the significance of the differences between the arithmetic mean of the scores for each of the eight statements. In general, the t-test results show that there are significant differences in the responses to all eight statements.

*Sex.* There is difference between the men and the women in regard to the degree of expressed agreement or disagreement with six out of eight statements i.e. in regard to the statements 1 ( $M_m = 2.68, M_f = 2.57; t(1081) = 2.06, p < .05$ ), 4 ( $M_m = 2.50, M_f = 2.16; t(1088) = 5.99, p < .01$ ), 5 ( $M_m = 1.98, M_f = 1.69; t(1058) = 6.03, p < .01$ ), 6 ( $M_m = 0.42, M_f = 0.54; t(1052) = 8.44, p < .01$ ), 7 ( $M_m = 2.47, M_f = 2.00; t(1062) = 8.43,$

$p < .01$ ) and 8 ( $M_m = 2.76, M_f = 2.39; t(1098) = 4.76, p < .01$ ). The only statement on which both men and women agree (even though there are more men agreeing with it than women) is the statement number 1. Men agree with statement 4, while women disagree with it. The same goes for statement number 6. In regard to the statements 5, 7 and 8 both men and women disagree with them, but the disagreement is more pronounced with the women.

Table 31.1 Frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations of the gender roles items

Statements	Agree		Disagree		M	SD
	f	%	f	%		
1. A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children	603	56%	464	44%	2.62	0.87
2. When a mother works for pay, the children suffer	367	34%	720	66%	2.28	0.84
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	413	38%	670	62%	2.33	0.90
4. A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family	415	38%	680	62%	2.32	0.95
5. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl	161	15%	925	85%	1.83	0.81
6. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	416	39%	648	61%	2.31	0.93
7. On the whole, men make better business executives than women do	389	36%	688	64%	2.23	0.93
8. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women*	280	25%	609	55%	2.57	1.31

Source: EVS

\*The responses to the statement number 8 are on a scale of 1 to 5. 20% of the participants responded that they neither agree nor disagree with the statement.

*Ethnic affiliation.* In regard to their ethnic affiliation there are significant differences in the responses to all statements i.e. in the degree of stated agreement or disagreement between the respondents who are ethnic Macedonians and those who are ethnic Albanians [1 ( $M_m = 2.54, M_a = 2.81; t(990) = -4.19, p < .01$ ), 2 ( $M_m = 2.14, M_a = 2.67; t(357) = -7.75, p < .01$ ), 3 ( $M_m = 2.15, M_a = 2.83; t(375) = -10.07, p < .01$ ), 4 ( $M_m = 2.15, M_a = 2.76; t(376) = -8.49, p < .01$ ), 5 ( $M_m = 1.71, M_a = 2.12; t(328) = 6.02, p < .01$ ), 6 ( $M_m = 2.19, M_a = 2.64; t(361) = -6.25, p < .01$ ), 7 ( $M_m = 2.08, M_a = 2.61; t(365) = -7.30, p < .01$ ), 8 ( $M_m = 2.30, M_a = 3.25; t(395) = -10.04, p < .01$ )]. The Macedonians unlike the Albanians do not agree with all the statements, except with the statement number 1 that both the Macedonians and the Albanians agree with, but the agreement of the Macedonians is less pronounced. The respondents who are Albanians on the other hand agree with all the statements, except for number 5. The Macedonians also do not agree with that statement, but their disagreement is more pronounced.

*Religious denomination.* The comparison of the average scores of the responses to the statements by the respondents who are Christians and those who are Muslims shows that almost identical results are identified in regard to the agreement and the disagreement with statements, just like in the case of the ethnic affiliation, and in regard to all the statements (with the exception of the statements 1 and 5) the former group disagrees with the statements and the latter agrees. (98% of the respondents who are Christians are ethnic Macedonians, and 99% of Muslims are ethnic Albanians.). Similar tendencies in the existence of more traditional than egalitarian gender roles attitudes (especially in the private sphere) among Muslims, compared to the attitudes of members of other religious groups, have been identified in other social and cultural contexts (e.g. Page & Yip, 2016; Hussain, 2008; Abouchedid & Nasser, 2007). Having in mind that religion is often indicated as a factor that could be connected to gender role attitudes, there was additional examination using the Chi-square test of the link between the responses to the statement and the self-identification of the participants in regard to the religiousness by having them declare themselves as religious, non-religious or atheists. The test results show that such a connection exists with consistent accuracy in all the cases. Namely, the highest degree of disagreement with the statements was expressed by the persons who declared themselves as atheists, followed by the non-religious, and the least

disagreement was declared by the religious persons.

*Marital status.* There are also differences between the respondents who are married and those who are not [1 ( $M_m = 2.73, M_{nm} = 2.36; t(502) = 6.03, p < .01$ ), 2 ( $M_m = 2.39, M_{nm} = 2.01; t(599) = 6.82, p < .01$ ), 3 ( $M_m = 2.44, M_{nm} = 2.02; t(563) = 6.91, p < .01$ ), 4 ( $M_m = 2.45, M_{nm} = 1.96; t(598) = 7.78, p < .01$ ), 5 ( $M_m = 1.92, M_{nm} = 1.61; t(964) = 5.52, p < .01$ ), 6 ( $M_m = 2.39, M_{nm} = 2.11; t(943) = 4.49, p < .01$ ), 7 ( $M_m = 2.31, M_{nm} = 2.02; t(585) = 4.66, p < .01$ ), 8 ( $M_m = 2.76, M_{nm} = 2.15; t(676) = 7.32, p < .01$ )]. Both groups of respondents do not agree with all the statements, except for statement number 1 that the married respondents agree with and those who are single disagree. Regarding all other statements the respondents who are single disagree much more with the statements than those who are single.

*Place of residence.* Significant differences have been found also when comparing the average scores of the responses of the respondents who live in the rural areas and those who live in the urban areas [1 ( $M_r = 2.70, M_u = 2.58; t(1065) = 2.19, p < .05$ ), 2 ( $M_r = 2.38, M_u = 2.22; t(759) = 2.87, p < .01$ ), 3 ( $M_r = 2.44, M_u = 2.26; t(808) = 3.22, p < .01$ ), 4 ( $M_r = 2.55, M_u = 2.19; t(749) = 5.99, p < .01$ ), 5 ( $M_r = 2.00, M_u = 1.73; t(1084) = 5.33, p < .01$ ), 6 ( $M_r = 2.50, M_u = 2.20; t(812) = 5.04, p < .01$ ), 7 ( $M_r = 2.45, M_u = 2.10; t(780) = 5.88, p < .01$ ), 8 ( $M_r = 2.88, M_u = 2.39; t(768) = 5.94, p < .01$ )]. The t-test results also show that both groups agree with the first statement, but that agreement is greater among the respondents who live in the rural areas. In regard to the other statements the respondents who live in the rural areas, unlike those who live in the urban areas, agree also with the fourth and the sixth statement. In the cases when both groups disagreed with a statement (statements number 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8), the respondents living in urban areas expressed significantly higher disagreement.

*Education.* Looking into the relation of the responses to the statements with the level of education of the respondents, by calculating the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient we see that the more educated respondents are significantly more inclined to disagree with the statements than those with lower education [the correlation is between  $r_s = -.22$  (statement 2) and  $r_s = -.40$  (statement 4)]. Consequently, it means that the higher educated respondents showed more egalitarian attitudes.

### 31.4 Concluding Comments

Based on the responses to the statements on gender role attitudes in the Macedonian context, one could conclude that generally the attitudes of the Macedonian citizens on the adequacy of conduct of men and women are inclined to be more egalitarian than traditional. Namely, the results have shown that there is a gradual abandoning of the traditional gender ideology, even though among certain groups of citizens there are significant variations that deserve additional explorations.

The variations in the attitudes follow the general tendencies established in other surveys, in the sense that women, better educated individuals, persons who are not married and persons who are less religious have more egalitarian attitudes. Additionally, this research shows that ethnic Macedonians in comparison to ethnic Albanians, as well as the respondents who are Christians in comparison to the respondents who are Muslims, have more egalitarian attitudes.

Furthermore, it is important to state that beyond the objectives of present chapter, an additional comparative analysis was conducted across the countries that participated in this EVS wave, showing in general that there is significant difference across countries. A particularly interesting finding from this analysis is a high disagreement with the statement number 5 "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl." This means that at a more global level it is not acceptable to differentiate between men and women when it comes to their education, and the same goes also for the opportunities for personal development that could have multiple effects on their mutual acceptance and respect, and the improvement of the quality of their lives.

In reference to the EVS, one should also point out several critical remarks from a methodological aspect (in this case we shall mention only one) in regard to the nature of the items that are used to identify the gender role attitudes. Namely, in this survey, just like with other omnibus surveys, these are the items that are commonly used to measure the general gender role attitudes, and it is well known that based on them one cannot predict with certainty the people's behaviour in real situations that are gender saturated, and that could

encourage or inhibit equal treatment of women and men. When it comes to the success of behaviour prediction, as suggested by the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), it might be more effective to examine the particular gender role attitudes of people that significantly determine the intention to manifest very specific behaviour in a given situation.

## List of References

- Abouchedid, K., & Nasser, R.N. (2007). Effects of gender and religiosity among Christians and Muslims on “gendered” role attitudes towards ability and equality: The case of Lebanon. *Electronic Journal of Sociology*. ISSN: 1198 3655
- Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behaviour. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50, 179–211.
- Brooks, C., & Bolzendahl, C. (2004). The transformation of US gender role attitudes: Cohort replacement, social-structural change, and ideological learning. *Social Science Research*, 33, 106–133.
- Cotter, D., Hermsen, J. M., & Vanneman, R. (2011). The end of the gender revolution? Gender role attitudes from 1977 to 2008. *American Journal of Sociology*, 117(1), 259–289.
- Crompton, R. (1999). *Restructuring gender relations and employment: the decline of the male breadwinner*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eagly, A. H. (1987). *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Fortin (2005). Gender role attitudes and the labour market outcomes of women across OECD countries. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 21(3), 416–438
- Hussain, S. (2008). Counting Women with Faith: What Quantitative Data can reveal about Muslim Women in ‘Secular’ Britain. In K. Aune, S. Sharma, & C. Vincett (Eds.), *Women and religion in the west: challenging secularization* (pp. 165–182). Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2003). *Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jelen, T.G. (1988). The effects of gender role stereotypes on political attitudes. *The Social Science Journal*, 25(3), 353–365.
- Knight, C. R. & Brinton, M. C. (2017). One egalitarianism or several? Two decades of gender-role attitude change in Europe. *American Journal of Sociology*, 122(5), 1485–1532.
- Lomazzi, V., Israel, S., & Crespi, I. (2018). Gender equality in Europe and the effect of work-family balance policies on gender-role attitudes. *Social Sciences*, 8(1), 5.
- Mason, K.O., & Lu, Y.-H (1988). Attitudes toward women’s familial roles: Changes in the United States, 1977–1985. *Gender and Society*, 2(1), 39–57.
- McHugh, M. C., & Frieze, I. N. (1997). The measurement of gender-role attitudes. A review and commentary. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 21(1), 1–16
- Page, S., & Yip, AKT. (2016). Gender equality and religion: A multi-faith exploration of young adults’ narratives. *European Journal of Women’s Studies*, 1–17.
- Walter, J.G. (2018). The adequacy of measures of gender roles attitudes: A review of current measures in omnibus surveys. *Quality and Quantity*, 52, 829–848.

# 32. TRANSFORMATION OF VALUES IN CROATIA IN DEMOCRATIC TIMES

---

*Josip Baloban*

## **Abstract**

*The author outlines six theses to analyze the movement and transformation of values in the first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in Croatia. The country gained independence and became a democratic state following the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1990 and a defensive Homeland War (1990 – 1995). This chapter analyzes trust in institutions, which reveals the diversity and multifaceted nature of the young Croatian democratic society. In addition to addressing certain bioethical issues (abortion, artificial insemination/in vitro fertilization, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty), the author points to classical and traditional values of marriage and family, as well as alternative living arrangements such as single motherhood by choice, cohabitation, and same sex partnerships. Finally, the author draws attention to a decline in ecclesiality which has been evidenced in gradual and distanced ecclesiality over several decades. The chapter concludes by stating that moving forward, Croats find themselves at a turning point in the understanding and accepting, promoting, and living values, both those of the fundamental character and those of a specific Christian and (neo-)liberal character. The author argues that the Croatian society will align with the transformation of values in developed European countries; Croatia, too, will experience its (post)modernization.*

## 32.1 Introduction

The Republic of Croatia gained independence in the process of political turnaround in Central and East Europe in the period 1989/1990. Croatia is a post-communist state whose democratic development after 1990 was marked by a defensive war forced by Serbian aggression in the period from 1990 to 1995. In that period, through the Catholic Faculty of Theology at the University of Zagreb, Croatia joined the third wave of data collection of the European Values Study (EVS) in 1998.<sup>1</sup> Since that moment, the Croatian team had the pleasure and the honor of meeting, spending time and engaging in useful and pleasant discussions with Loek Halman, during the meetings of the EVS team on several occasions and at several locations – including Zagreb in 2010. Loek is regarded as a dedicated expert, adept organizer, and a wise leader; he consistently sought to include all of Europe (with both of its lungs) in the EVS, despite numerous differences between them. Loek considered these differences as enriching the EVS project. This article, outlining several theses in order to explore the results obtained by Croatian EVS researchers, is a token of appreciation and acknowledgement to him.

In terms of secularization (Wilson, 1966; Bruce, 2002), (post)modernization (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), individualization and subjectification (Luckmann, 1967; Giddens, 2003; Ester et al., 1994; Halman, 1996; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), and gradual and distanced ecclesiality (Baloban, J., 1982), it can be concluded that Croatia follows a general pattern to a large extent, but at a (much) slower pace in comparison to the developed world countries. Furthermore, each society, including Croatian, is much more complex than theoretical reflections and considerations,<sup>2</sup> since it bears certain specificities. The specificity of the contemporary Croatian society cannot be understood without considering the communist period (1945 – 1990) and the communist legacy after 1990, which certainly impact value systems. It is also important to keep in mind the defen-

<sup>1</sup> The EVS director Josip Baloban formed an interdisciplinary team. Together with theologians, the team included experts in methodology, sociologists, psychologists and political scientists from the University of Zagreb and scientific institutes.

<sup>2</sup> Arts & Halman address a certain transience and relativity of various theories when, for example, they assert that even Inglehart “derived theoretical ideas from institutionalism to enrich and modify (post) modernization theory” (Arts & Halman 2011, p. 83).

sive Homeland War (1990 – 1995), the arduous process of social and economic transformation and the EU accession (2013).

The first two decades of the 21st century have seen a compelling shift in values, both classical-traditional and new, often (neo)liberal values. This is evidenced in the work carried out by the Croatian EVS team, supported by a book which compares the Third, Fourth and Fifth EVS Waves in Croatia (Baloban, J., et al., 2019). Often classified as a Catholic European country (Polak & Schachinger, 2011), Croatia has displayed an interesting acceptance and practice of values in democratic times. This article identifies the transformation of values in Croatia in certain selected spheres of human life: both individual and private as well as societal.

## 32.2 Six Theses Undergirding Croatian Values Change

The acceptance and practice of values over the last twenty years in Croatia is outlined in six theses.

*Thesis 1: Trust in particular institutions reveals all the diversity and multifaceted nature of the young Croatian democratic society in the second and third decades of democracy (2000 – 2021). This is reflected in the fact that the armed forces, the police, the health care system, and the Church<sup>3</sup> enjoy a great deal of confidence, whereas political parties, the parliament, government and civil service, the press and the justice system do not enjoy much confidence (Baloban, et al., 2019).*

All institutions in a society – from family to public institutions – are constituted of people. These institutions are seen to operate better or worse on is in the EVS surveyed on a scale from *a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, to not at all*. Trust has a significant role in life of every society. Much like their European fellow citizens, Croatian citizens also highly regard family as a value, and consider it *very important* and *quite important*, notwithstanding all problems and difficulties that this fundamental societal institution has been facing. In EVS

<sup>3</sup> With reference to the Catholic Church as the most widely professed religious community in Croatia.

2017, Croatian respondents stated they trust family *completely* (78.4%), *somewhat* (17.5%), and a negligible faction *not at all* (0.5%). Such high percentages are not recorded when asked about the level of trust in people from various groups; neighbors and people they know personally. Only 14.0% of respondents trust their neighbors *completely*, 57.8% trust them *somewhat*. Respondents trust people they know personally *completely* in 24.3%, *somewhat* in 59.7%. Croats are more reserved with people of another nationality, only 9.0% trust them *completely*, 54.5% trust them *somewhat* and 27.3% *do not trust them very much*.

In all three recent waves two pentagons stand out. The first pentagon of the greatest confidence includes the armed forces (61%), the education system (51%), the police (46%), the health care system (43%) and the Church (38%); while the pentagon with the lowest confidence consists of political parties (4%), the parliament (8%), government and civil service (10%), the press (10%) and the justice system (15%).

Several facts should be highlighted with respect to trust in institutions from 1999 to 2017. *Firstly*, the observed period is characterized by a decline in confidence for all eighteen institutions, including the European Union and the United Nations. *Secondly*, the Church suffered the greatest erosion of confidence of 26%, followed by the parliament with a decline of 15% and the justice system with a decline of 20%, as well as the EU and the UN with a decline of about 20%. *Thirdly*, around twenty years ago in the first pentagon of confidence the armed forces, the Church and the education system stood out with approximately 65% confidence.

An explanation of such a decline of confidence in these institutions, and in particular the Church, may be as follows. The transition from a totalitarian communist to a democratic system gave the Church in Croatia the right to full public profession as a relevant societal factor (school catechism, Accords between the Holy See and the Republic of Croatia, media access). While it has managed to transition from a position of certain ghettoization during the communist period to free public engagement, it has failed to successfully reposition, i.e., to adequately position itself in the new order despite all external advantages provided by the new Croatian democratic society. Far too much

energy was wasted *ad intra*, and far too little energy was dedicated to pastoral strategy *ad extra*, i.e., towards the actual society and the world generally. After the historical turnaround (1990/1991) institutional stakeholders had failed to completely abandon the earlier communist mentality, lacking the willingness and determination to deal with all advantages and disadvantages of democracy and consequently failed to rethink and act. Moreover, at the beginning of 1990s, Croatia had sustained military aggression on the part of Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army and was forced to engage in the defensive Homeland war (1991 – 1995), which slowed down democratic processes to a great extent.

*Thesis 2: Following centuries of struggles for independent statehood, and after experience with an undemocratic regime in the communist period (1945 – 1990), Croats in the second and third decades of democracy (21st century) have been increasingly opting for, i.e., seeking authoritarianism (Nikodem, 2019), while simultaneously struggling with trust in institutions in the society and experiencing difficulties with respect for authority.*

All three recent EVS waves have indicated that there has been a continuous increase in authoritarian attitudes among Croats. This is notable with the EVS question to what extent people favor having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. In 1999 one in ten Croatian respondents (11.5%) considered this as *very good*, in 2008 this increased to one in four respondents (28.8%), and in 2017 it stood at one in three respondents (36.8%). It is particularly indicative that in the age distribution, young people (aged 18 to 29) are more advocating the *strong leader* model: in 1999 13.9% of young respondents favored a strong leader, in 2008 this was 32%, and in 2017 almost every other young person i.e., 47.3%.

It is important to analyze authoritarianism in Croatia in relation to trust in institutions to assert that Croatian citizens are dissatisfied with certain democratic institutions (for instance, politicians, members of parliament, and government *per se*), but display more satisfaction with institutions such as the armed forces, the health care system, the police, the education system and the Church, which are institutions with a certain institutional – hierarchical authority, but which serve the needs of all citizens more than it is the case with



other institutions. We observe that the increase in authoritarianism among Croatian respondents does not correlate with the decrease in the number of respondents which consider that obedience is a desirable quality for a child to have. Specifically, in the last ten years, support for this child rearing value has gone down from 37% to 27.2% in EVS 2017.

Thesis 3: *Solidarity and desolidarization in the society are not only Croatian issues, but they are also, in fact, a European and global phenomenon. The process of social stratification in the Croatian society, which is closely correlated with desolidarization thereof, has not deepened according to EVS 2017, but the Croatian society has not yet “emerged from the crisis of solidarity” (Balaban, et al., 2019).*

Where does Croatia stand with preferences regarding social distance, concern about the living conditions of various groups of people, with the Church, and with social issues? Up to now, the topics of solidarity and desolidarization have not occupied a prominent position in public discussions in Croatia, and scientific evidence on this topic is scarce.

With regards to social distance preferences, in all three recent waves of research we have identified comparative variations with a tendency of a slight fall (or decrease) in social distance in 2017. Social distance remains high towards drug addicts (70% would not prefer them as a neighbor) and heavy drinkers (60%); it has declined towards homosexuals (39%); it is the lowest towards people of different race (12%) and Jews (12%), while it has increased and returned to 21% towards immigrants/foreign workers. It is noteworthy that the extent to which respondents feel concerned about the living conditions of various categories of people reached the lowest point in 2008. According to EVS 2017, the extent of concern increased most for the elderly and the sick – up to 82%. The concern for Europeans and people in the region has also increased, while there was a slight uptick in the concern for the unemployed people. The issue of solidarity and desolidarization is very indicative on the question of the perception of the Church’s social engagement. In 1999, 44% of respondents considered that the Church had adequately responded to social issues; in 2008 this stood at

30%, and in 2017, 39% of respondents agreed.<sup>4</sup> The Croatian society has not yet emerged from the *crisis of solidarity* despite the fact that the process of desolidarization has not deepened further.

Thesis 4: *In EVS 2017, Croatian respondents did not take a consistent attitude towards certain bioethical issues (for instance abortion, artificial insemination/in vitro fertilization, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty); in fact they displayed a variety of attitudes (Matulić & Balabanić, 2019).*

Croats have a compelling and ambivalent attitude to the fundamental and the greatest value: human life from its very beginning (conception) to its end (death). Human life is a value above all other values – it is the absolute value. We address five life moments here, or five bioethical issues which have the most direct and far-reaching relation with this pivotal value. These are the issues of *abortion, artificial insemination/in vitro fertilization, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty*.

The topic and dilemma pertaining to abortion has been for decades *tearing the worlds apart* from marriage and family, all types of partnerships and unions, including free relationships – where a child is conceived but not desired – up to political orientations and ideological attitudes worldwide; in essence people of both religious belief and areligious worldview. Thus, abortion has become *de facto punto di riferimento* of a personal attitude, societal, political and media orientation. In EVS 2017 35.6% of Croatian respondents considered abortion *never justified* while 12% considered it *almost never justified*. Among those who approved of it, 14.3% considered it *always justified*, while 15.4% considered it *almost always justified*. One in five respondents (22.8%) remained *undecided*. In the post-modern world, human life is associated with artificial insemination/in-vitro fertilization. In Croatia, 69.4% of respondents support artificial insemination (44.2% consider it *always* justified and 27.2% consider it *almost always* justified). Nearly a third of respondents are divided on the issue, as 15.4% are undecided, while 8.3% consider it *never* and 6.8% *almost never* justified.

<sup>4</sup> Within EVS 1999, EVS 2008 and EVS 2017 the Croatian EVS team included the question: “Do churches adequately respond to social issues in the country?”

The three bioethical attitudes about the end of life are very differentiated by cause and justification of the respondents. These are *euthanasia* (which often involves decisions of an individual and somebody else), *suicide*, which is ultimately an individual decision which might be subjectively and objectively informed, and the *death penalty* which is rooted in the positive legislation of a country. Euthanasia is *never justified* for 35.8% and *almost never* justified for 12.2%, while *always* justified for 15% and *almost always* justified for 16.6% of respondents. The percentage of *undecided* respondents stands at 20.5%. With regards to suicide, Croatian citizens are far more radical and traditional since four fifths of the respondents (85.4%) do not approve of such an end to life (75.6% find it *never* justified and 9.8% consider it *almost never* justified). Suicide is *always* justified by 2.4%, and *almost always* justified by 1.6% of respondents. With reference to the death penalty – which does not exist in Croatia – respondents are less radical and less traditional since 64.3% do not approve of it (*never* justified 51.8% and *almost never* justified 12.5%). One in five respondents is in favor of the death penalty (21.9%), while 13.8% is undecided.

Thesis 5: *Marriage and family as classical and traditional values of the human-kind still enjoy great majority support of Croatian respondents, although they have been exposed to various challenges, including alternative forms of living, from cohabitation, single motherhood by choice to same sex partnerships (Aračić et al., 2019).*

Theoretical deliberation of Croats is inclined to historical-anthropological traditional behavior. They advocate the importance of family: in all three recent EVS waves, nearly 98% of respondents consider family *very important* and *quite important* in their lives. The majority (approx. 80 percent) do not consider the classical marriage (between a man and a woman) to be an outdated institution. Simultaneously, there has been a decline in the number of respondents who agree that “having children gives meaning to life”; more precisely there was a drop from 76.3% in 1999 to 63.8% in 2017. Divorce approval has grown, so that 26.4% found it justified in 2017, whereas 18.4% found it justified in 1999. Divorce statistics indicate there has been an even greater discrepancy between theory and practice; in 1999 one in six marriages ended in divorce, while in 2017 one in three marriages was dissolved.

Certainly, alternatives to the classical marriage and family have emerged in Croatia. These include single motherhood by choice (deliberate personal choice) (Halman et al., 2011),<sup>5</sup> cohabitation (partners living together before marriage), same sex partnerships and social sterility (Akrap & Čipin, 2006).<sup>6</sup> Similarly to Europe, alternatives to classical models of marriage and family have been facilitated by individualization and subjectification which are increasingly endorsed worldwide, and in particular liberalization and relativization of the society, human liberties and rights etc.<sup>7</sup> It is precisely such trends and the increasing emphasis on rights of the woman, parent and adult individual, while neglecting many/some fundamental rights of the child – a human being and person that is being developed and raised. This child is, as much as an adult, a unique and inviolable value both individually as well as locally and universally.

Thesis 6: *Decline in ecclesiality as the dominant religiosity in Croatia, evident in gradual and distanced ecclesiality – which started in the communist period after the Second World War – has steadily continued in the democratic times across all dimensions of Christian religiosity as a multidimensional phenomenon (Baloban et al., 2019).*

Over the last twenty years all dimensions of ecclesiality (confessional belonging, dimension of religious truths, ritual dimension, moral-ethical dimension, experiential dimension, and the dimension of confidence in the Church) have experienced a complex and differentiated decline, and thus contributed to a decline in ecclesiality and Christianity as well. The Catholic Faculty of Theology at the University of Zagreb conducted its first empirical research in democratic Croatia in 1997, two years after the end of the defensive Homeland War (1991-1995). The research established that 89.7% of respondents belonged to the

5 In the Atlas of European Values by Halman et al. (2011, p. 25), we can read: “However, there is also a small group of women who choose to raise a child alone. Predominantly, these women are in their thirties or forties, they are well-educated, have a job and are financially independent. They have desired to become a mother for a long time and have the financial resources, but have not met a man they want to share their life with.”

6 According to Wertheimer-Baletić (1999) social sterility is a state which occurs when an individual or a married couple chose not to have children, a choice not caused by physiological sterility.

7 Along with numerous positive impacts and certain progress throughout history, those are equally consequences of secularisation, and even more of secularism.

Roman Catholic Church and 2.9% belonged to the Serbian Orthodox Church. In terms of religiosity, 89.7% of respondents declared themselves as religious, while 8.2% considered themselves as non-religious and 2.0% as a convinced atheist (Valković, 1998). According to the EVS 2017 results, 80.3% of respondents identify as Roman Catholic, and 17.8% declare themselves not a religious person. There has also been a decline in the dimension of religious truths and in the ritual dimension. The moral-ethical dimension and the dimension of confidence in the Church stand out as particularly critical. Confidence in the Church plummeted from 64.3% in 1999 to 38% in 2017. The most remarkable and the most significant responses pertain to the question about the importance of religion in life. While religion was *important* for 77.2% of Croatian citizens in 1999, and *not at all important* for 20.7%, in 2017 63.9% found it *important*, and 34.7% found it irrelevant in life. Therefore, ecclesiality confirms that although declining, nominal Church belonging has remained relatively stable; that Croatian Catholics are selectively ritual-oriented, and morally and ethically they have been, to a great extent, distanced from their church. They adopt religious truths in line with their own subjective matrix, create their own private *Credo*, deviate from the faith of the official Church; Christians dispense from certain Commandments. The result is not only gradual and distanced ecclesiality, but also growing private and selective Christianity. On the one hand there is personal and institutional religiosity, and on the other there is distanced personal and institutional religiosity (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019).

### 32.3 In Lieu of a Conclusion

Moving forward, Croats find themselves at a turning point as regards understanding and accepting, promoting, and living values, both those of the fundamental character and those of a specific Christian and (neo)liberal character. Such values studied and researched from 1981 to 2017 within the EVS project are *de facto* heritage and facticity of the entire humankind. Furthermore, Christianity shares the fundamental values about human being, human life, and the nature (the environment) with the whole of the humankind, and in particular, with great religions of the world.

With regard to values, it is to be expected that the young democratic Croatian society will align with the transformation of values in the developed European countries. Further levels of trust in institutions will depend on whether citizens perceive institutions more as a control or as a civil service. Marriage and family as classical values in terms of factual acceptance will continue to be challenged. The decline in ecclesiality will only continue to deepen. In many aspects, Croatia will not remain an isolated island in Europe in the transformation of values. Croatia, too, will experience its (post)modernization.

### List of References

- Akrap, A., & Čipin, I. (2006). *Socijalitetni sterilitet u Hrvatskoj – Zašto smo neoženjeni ineuđane* [Social Sterility in Croatia – Why Do We Remain Single]. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti [Ministry of the Family, Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity].
- Aracić, P., Baloban, J., & Nikodem, K. (2019). Važnost braka i obitelji u hrvatskom društvu od 1999. do 2017. godine [The Importance of Marriage and Family in the Croatian Society from 1999 until 2017]. *Bogoslovska smotra*, 89(2), 331-353. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/223156>
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2011). Value Research and Transformation in Europe. In R. Polak (Ed.), *Zukunft. Werte. Europa: Die Europäische Wertestudie 1990-2010: Österreich im Vergleich* (pp. 79-100). Böhlau Verlag.
- Baloban, J. (1982). *Kirche in einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft. Analyse der gegenwärtigen pastoralen Situation in der Erzdiözese Zagreb (Nordkroatien) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der distanzierteren Kirchllichkeit*. Benziger Verlag.
- Baloban, J., Črpić, G. & Ježovita, J. (2019). *Vrednote u Hrvatskoj od 1999. do 2018. prema European Values Study* [Values in Croatia from 1999 to 2018 According to the European Values Study]. Hrvatsko katoličko sveučilište – Katolički bogoslovni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu – Kršćanska sadašnjost [Catholic University of Croatia – Catholic Faculty of Theology, University of Zagreb – “Kršćanska sadašnjost”].
- Baloban, J., Šimunović, J., & Ježovita, J. (2019). Kretanje crkvenosti u hrvatskom društvu od 1999. do 2017. godine. Analiza i kritički osvrt [The Shifts in Ecclesiality in the Croatian Society from 1999 until 2017. An Analysis and Critical Review]. *Bogoslovska smotra*, 89(2), 411-441. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/223161>
- Baloban, S., Kompes, M., & Migles, S. (2010). Kriza solidarnosti i desolidarizacija u hrvatskom društvu [The Crisis of Solidarity and Desolidarization in the Croatian Society]. *Bogoslovska smotra*, 89(2), 355-384. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/223157>
- Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences*. Sage.

- Bruce, S. (2002). *God is Dead. Secularisation in the West*. Blackwell Publishing.
- Ester, P., Halman, & L., De Moor, R. (1994). *The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America*. Tilburg University Press.
- Giddens, A. (2003). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford University Press.
- Halman, L. (1996). Individualism in Individualized Society? *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 37(3-4), 195-214.
- Halman, L., Sieben, I., & van Zundert, M. (2011). *Atlas of European Values. Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century*. Brill.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2008). Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006. *West European Politics*, 31(1-2), 130-146.
- Luckmann, T. (1967). *Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*. The Macmillan Company
- Matulić, T., & Balabanić, I. (2019). Izabrana bioetička pitanja hrvatskog društva prema rezultatima Europskog istraživanja vrednota 2017. [Selected Bioethical Questions in the Croatian Society According to the Results of the EVS 2017]. *Bogoslovska smotra*, 89(2), 385-409. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/223158>
- Nikodem, K. (2019). "Važno je imati moćnog vodu!" Analiza autoritarnosti u hrvatskom društvu od 1999. do 2018. godine [To Have a Strong Leader is Important! Analysis of Authoritarianism in the Croatian Society from 1999 until 2018]. *Društvena istraživanja*, 28(3), 391-410.
- Nikodem, K., & Zrinščak, S. (2019). Između distancirane crkvenosti i intenzivne osobne religioznosti. Religijske promjene u hrvatskom društvu od 1999. do 2018. godine [Between distanced ecclesiality and Intense Personal Religiosity. Religious Changes in the Croatian Society from 1999 until 2018]. *Društvena istraživanja*, 28(3), 371-390.
- Polak, R., & Schachinger, C. (2011). Stabil in Veränderung: Konfessionsnahe Religiosität in Europa. In R. Polak (Ed.), *Zukunft. Werte. Europa: Die Europäische Wertestudie 1990-2010: Österreich im Vergleich* (pp. 191-219). Böhlau Verlag.
- Valković, M. (1998.) Socioreligijsko istraživanje: Vjera i moral u Hrvatskoj. Djelomično izvješće [Socio-religious Study: Religion and Morality in Croatia. Partial Report]. *Bogoslovska smotra*, 68(4), 461-689. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/31583>
- Wertheimer-Baletić, A. (1999). *Stanovništvo i razvoj* [Population and Development]. Mate.
- Wilson, B. (1966). *Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment*. Watts.

# CONTRIBUTORS

---

**Koen Abts** is Research Manager at the Centre for Sociological Research (CeSO) at KU Leuven, and responsible for the building of the Belgian Online Probability Panel – an infrastructure by a consortium of all Belgian universities. His research focuses on the effect of resentment and cultural, economic and political attitudes as well as on populism and populist radical right.

**Peter Achterberg** is a Professor of Sociology at Tilburg University. He is the former neighbour of Loek Halman at the S-building. Peter teaches in courses in cultural sociology, politics and society and is involved in several other courses. His research is focused on cultural, religious and political changes in the West, with a central focus on institutional trust.

**Wil Arts** is a Professor Emeritus of General and Theoretical Sociology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and former chair of the Theory Group of the European Values Study. With Loek Halman, he co-edited several books and co-authored quite a few articles on comparative social research and changing value patterns in Europe. He has also extensively published in the fields of economic and theoretical sociology and on topics such as industrial relations, social inequality, and the welfare state.

**Josip Baloban** studied philosophy at the Catholic Faculty of Theology, University of Zagreb, graduated in theology, and received a PhD in theology in Munich. He is a Full Professor and he taught at the Catholic Faculty of Theology, University of Zagreb from 1981 to 2019 where he also served three terms as Dean. He has participated in national and international scientific projects since 1997. From 1998 to 2019 he was EVS National Programme Director for Croatia, where he, together with several theologians, formed an interdisciplinary team of experts in methodology, sociology, psychology and political science. He is a member of *Konferenz der deutschsprachigen Pastoraltheologen* and *Verein der mittel- und osteuropäischen Pastoraltheologen*. He writes and publishes scientific papers in Croatian, German and occasionally in English.

**Edurne Bartolomé Peral** is an Associate Professor at the University of Deusto, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, Department of International Relations and Humanities. She has been dedicating most part of her research and

publications to the study of political culture, political values and attitudes in comparative perspective, as well as political support and trust, and the application of experimental models. She is currently National Programme Director for Spain of the European Values Study.

**Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld** is a historian educated at the universities of Nijmegen (BA), Amsterdam (MA), and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (PhD; 1993). For research and teaching, he was affiliated with universities and research institutes in Belgium, the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. Since 1999, he has held the funded Chair for Regional History of Brabant at Tilburg University. In 2004, he was appointed Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology. Between 2012 and 2020, he taught the course on National and Regional Identities together with Loek Halman. His research and teaching revolve around (regional) history, heritage, memory, and identity.

**Giovanni Borghesan** is a junior researcher at the SWG research institute in Italy. He was part of the European Values Study Central team and assisted in the publication of the 5th EVS wave and of the longitudinal edition of the study. He took part in the SSHOC project cooperating in the construction of the multi-lingual ontology for religions.

**Pierre Bréchon** is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Sciences Po Grenoble (France), which he directed from 2002 to 2005, and he is a researcher at the PACTE social science laboratory (CNRS, Sciences Po Grenoble, University Grenoble-Alps). He works on the sociology of values and opinion, electoral and political behaviour, religious attitudes in France and Europe. With Frédéric Gonthier, he co-edited *European Values. Trends and Divides Over Thirty Years* (Brill, 2017). He is the National Programme Director of EVS for France and is a member of the EVS Theory Group.

**Michael J. Breen** is the former Dean of Arts at Mary Immaculate College (2008-2021) and currently Adjunct Professor in Sociology at the University of Limerick. He holds undergraduate degrees from University College Dublin and the University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome. He completed his M.S. and PhD at Syracuse University. He is Chair of the European Social Survey ERIC, a

landmark project on the ESF Research Roadmap. Professor Breen is the National Programme Director for Ireland of the European Values Study and former Chair of the Governing Authority of the EVS.

**Andries van den Broek** is a researcher at the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), and is a part-time folk punk musician. His fields of interest are high and low culture, the supposed generations and the balance between public and private responsibilities in pursuing the good life.

**Paul Dekker** is a Professor of Civil Society Studies at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University, and is semi-retired. His fields of interest are public opinion, social and political participation, and societal discontent. He is editor of *Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies* (Springer).

**Caroline Dewilde** is an Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. Her main research interests concern the dynamics of inequality and poverty at different levels of analysis, from the individual life course to the welfare state, from a cross-national perspective. She has published widely in a range of (inter)national journals and books across the social sciences. In 2011, Caroline received an ERC Starting Grant. In the HOWCOME-project, the interplay during recent decades between trends in economic and social inequalities and changing housing regimes (housing markets, housing policies, housing wealth) was analysed. Her latest work focuses on post-crisis trends in (housing) wealth.

**Javier Elzo Imaz** is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Deusto where he taught and researched for 30 years. Since 1985, with the determined support of EVS cofounders Jan Kerkhof and Ruud de Moor, he introduced EVS studies in Deusto, first applied to youth studies, then to the entire population, both in the Basque Country and throughout Spain, as well as in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. He is the former National Programme Director for Spain of the European Values Study (2000-2006) and he has participated in all EVS studies in Spain since 1985.

**Anastassios Emvalotis** is a Professor in the field of “Methodology of Research in Educational Sciences” at the Department of Primary Education of University of Ioannina. His research interests are focused on topics related to: development and application of methods and techniques for educational research, use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in educational research, micro-sociological approaches to everyday school life, relationship between science, technology and society. He participates in international, European and national projects. He has published research papers in magazines, books and conference proceedings.

**Yilmaz Esmer** is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul. He has been closely associated with the European Values Study and the World Values Surveys since 1990, and currently serves as the Vice Chair of the Scientific Advisory Board of WVS. He is also a member of the TRU research team based at Stellenbosch University (South Africa). His research interests include comparative values, political culture, democratisation, social change, voting behaviour and survey methodology. Most recently, he has completed a collaborative research project with Harvard University’s T. F. Chan School of Public Health on the impact of family planning programs in Istanbul.

**Georgy Fotev** is a Professor Emeritus at the New Bulgarian University. He is the author of many books and articles in the field of sociology. Among his main books are: *Values vs. Disorder*, *The Other Ethnos*, *Spheres of Values*, *European Values in Today’s Bulgarian Society* (editor), *European Values: The New Constellation* (editor), *Human Uncertainty*, *Meaning and Understanding*, *Sociology as Rigorous Science* and others. He is the head of the Centre for the Study of European Values at the New Bulgarian University and is the National Programme Director for the EVS.

**Morten Frederiksen** is a Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Work at Aalborg University. Morten does comparative research on values and culture in the context of welfare, social policy and social work. Currently he is heading the research project ‘Just Worlds’, which investigate cultural notions of social justice in China, USA and Scandinavia. Morten has published extensively on these topics in journal such as *Current Sociology*, *British Journal of Sociology*,

*VOLUNTAS*, and *Public Management Review*. Morten is National Programme Director of the European Values Study in Denmark.

**Aikaterini Gari** is a Professor of Social Psychology at the Department of Psychology, School of Philosophy of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (NKUA). She has been appointed National Programme Director for Greece of the European Value Study (2002-today) and Correspondence Member for Greece of the European Council for High Ability (2002-today). She has been elected member of the Executive Council (2014-2018) of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and Director of the Laboratory for Creativity Development of the NKUA (2017- today). She has published more than 60 papers in peer reviewed journals, books and congress proceedings in the topics of values and attitudes, social axioms, community well-being, contemporary families, children and adolescents of high ability and the gifted identification at school.

**John Gelissen** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology and Statistics at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. His research field is sociology and social science research methods. He specializes in the sociological and methodological study of (cross-national) differences in public opinion and behaviour in welfare, environmental issues, leisure, and quality of life.

**Erwin Gielens** is a PhD student at the Sociology department of Tilburg University. His research project investigates the public legitimacy of Universal Basic Income policy, using a mixed-methods approach. His broader research interests cover the legitimacy and development of the welfare state. Before becoming a junior colleague of Loek at the Department of Sociology, Erwin was a student in the Bachelor of Sociology and the Research Master Social and Behavioural Sciences at Tilburg University.

**Peter Gundelach** is a Professor Emeritus at the Department of Sociology at the University of Copenhagen. He has studied social movement in contemporary and historical perspectives, and most recently analysed the Danish refugee solidarity movement as well as a conservative religious movement. From 1997 to 2015, Peter was the Danish National Programme Director in the European

Values Studies. Peter has published several articles, monographs and edited volumes on values changes and in particular on national identities. In cooperation with other colleagues, he also has published on young people consumption of alcohol and on attitudes to climate change. Further, Peter has published a number of articles, textbooks and edited volumes on survey methodology.

**Katya Ivanova** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. Her research interests are in the field of family sociology, focusing on understanding what changing patterns in demographic behaviours (partnership formation/dissolution, fertility transitions) mean for social cohesion, individual well-being, and general perceptions of the meaning of family. She is an Associate Editor of *European Societies* and on the editorial board of *Journal of Marriage and Family*. Her work has been published in *American Sociological Review*, *Journal of Marriage and Family* and *European Sociological Review*.

**Gudbjorg Andrea Jonsdottir** is Director of the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland. Prior to that she was Research Director with Gallup in Iceland. Her main research areas are methodology and public opinion, in particular context and order effects in social surveys, wording of questions, mode effects and response rate. She is the National Programme Director of the EVS in Iceland and a member of the Executive Committee of EVS.

**Dominique Joye** is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Lausanne and has a strong interest in research on inequalities, social networks, and social resources, while underlining the strong relation between data production and data analysis. Past director of the Swiss data archive (1999-2006) and still collaborating with Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS), he was involved by representing Switzerland in international surveys like the European Social Survey (National Coordinator from 2002 to 2008), the European Value Survey (Swiss National Programme Director in 2007) and International Social Survey Programme (Swiss delegate since 2000). Elected at a time in the methodological board of these three international programs, he was chairing the Methodological Committee of the ISSP.

**Dénes Kiss** is a Lecturer at the Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj, with research activity in the field of sociology of religion, rural sociology and sociology of the non-governmental sector. In the field of sociology of religion his research focuses on the dynamics of the Romanian religious landscape, paying special attention to the emergence of new religious communities, and the religious characteristics of ethnic minorities. He is author of the book “*That’s all we have*”. *Religion and Churches in the Postcommunist Transylvania*, published in Hungarian. Between 2019-2021 he was research director of the Institute of Religious Studies in Cluj.

**Vera Lomazzi** is an Assistant Professor in Sociology at the Department of Human and Social Sciences at the University of Bergamo. She is Secretary of the Executive Committee of the European Values Study and board member of the European Survey Research Association. Her substantive research mainly focuses on social change and the cross-cultural study of gender equality. She has a specific interest in the quality of the instruments adopted by large cross-sectional survey programs and on their measurement equivalence. Her work has been published in highly ranked journals such as *Social Science Research*, *Survey Research Methods*, *Cross-cultural Research*, *European Sociological Review*, and *Quality & Quantity*.

**Ruud Luijkx** is the Chair of the Executive Committee and the Methodology Group of the European Values Study; Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University; Visiting Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Research at Trento University; Associate Member of Nuffield College in Oxford; member of the steering committee of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence of European Values at Tilburg University. His research interests are social inequality and mobility, and the methodology of survey research. He published among others in the *American Journal of Sociology*, the *European Sociological Review*, *European Societies*, *Political Psychology*, *Socio-Economic Review*, *Social Science Research*, and *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*.

**Ross Macmillan** is Chair in Sociology and Head of Department at the University of Limerick. His research interests include the social-psychological consequences, the role of values in macro-sociology, the impact of female political



empowerment on population health, and the socio-political consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. Recent publications appear in *Social Forces*, *Demography*, *Longitudinal and Life Course Studies*, and *Population Studies*.

**Angelica M. Maineri** is Data Manager at the Open Data Infrastructure for Social Science and Economic Innovation (ODISSEI) hosted at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. She spent five years as assistant of the Methodology Group of the European Values Study and member of the EVS Operational and Planning Group for the EVS 2017 survey, while pursuing a PhD at the Sociology Department at Tilburg University.

**Bart Meuleman** is a Professor of Sociology at the Centre for Sociological Research (CeSO) at KU Leuven. His research focuses on cross-national comparisons of value and attitude patterns, such as ethnic prejudice, egalitarianism, and support for the welfare state. He is Belgian National Coordinator for the European Social Survey and member of the Methodology Group of the European Values Study.

**Konstantin Minoski** holds a PhD in Sociological Sciences and is a Full Professor at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, at the Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Sociology. He is teaching courses on undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral studies in the fields of sociology of ethnic groups, sociological theories, and sociology of sports. His research interest is focused on interethnic relations, ethnic distance, ethnopolitical mobilisation, social changes in Macedonian society, youth sport and leisure, etc. His research results are presented, as author or co-author, on many national and international conferences, and symposia, and published in the conference proceedings, or scientific journals. He is a member of Macedonian national EVS team.

**Christof Van Mol** is an Assistant Professor in Sociology at Tilburg University. He teaches general sociological courses as well as specialized courses on international migration. His research mainly focuses on international migration, the internationalisation of higher education, and research methodologies. He published widely on these issues in journals like *Higher Education*, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Population, Space and Place*, and *Social Science Com-*

*puter Review*. His work has received several academic awards, including the 2016 Best Book Award in Sociology of Migration of the International Sociological Association and the 2020 ASHE CIHE Award for Significant Research on International Higher Education.

**Guy Moors** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology and Statistics at Tilburg University. He holds a PhD from the Free University of Brussels. His publications are in the field of social demography, survey methodology, cross-cultural comparative research, applied latent class analysis, and research on attitudes and values.

**Ruud Muffels** is an economist and a Professor Emeritus of labour market and social security. He held a chair at the Department of Sociology and at Tranzo, the scientific centre for care and wellbeing at Tilburg University where he is a guest professor. He is also a research fellow at IZA in Bonn and a Visiting Professor at the University of Leuven. His research focuses on issues such as income inequality, work careers, subjective well-being, labour market institutions and welfare states' performance. He is currently working on a reissue of the 1999 *Real Worlds*-book and on a volume on *Basic and Participation Income*.

**Quita Muis** is a PhD researcher at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University, connected to the European Values Study and the university's Impact Programme. For her dissertation, she investigates polarisation, particularly between educational groups. Her broader research interest includes (changes in) public opinion, polarisation, and identity.

**Wim van Oorschot** is a Professor Emeritus of Social Policy at KU Leuven. His main research interest regards popular welfare attitudes as the cultural context of welfare provision in European countries. For more than 20 years he has been a close colleague of Loek at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. He cooperated with him in developing the 'solidarity items' of the European Values Study and in analysing people's perceptions of the causes of poverty.

**Penny Panagiotopoulou** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Education and Social Work at the University of Patras, where she has been since

2009. She received her PhD degree in psychology with an emphasis on cross cultural perspective of the self from the University of Athens. Her research interests lie in the broad areas of values, well-being, norms and meta-norms. Much of her work has been on social identity, social axioms, self-perception, social beliefs, and social knowledge of primary education students. She has publications in peer reviewed journals and chapter contributions in scientific books.

**Antoanela Petkovska** is a Full Professor at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, at the Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Sociology. Her professional interests include sociology of culture, sociology of art, sociology of youth, cultural anthropology, intercultural communication, gender and society, and European civilisation. Her major books and publications are: *Sociology of Macedonian Fine Arts*, *Sociological Aspects of Monumental Art in Macedonia after the Liberation*, *Essays in Sociology of Culture*, *The social function of art in contemporary Macedonian society*, *Some Tendencies of Contemporary Cultural Politics in the Republic of Macedonia*, *Innovation in the Humanistic and in the Social Sciences*, and more. She is a member and the actual National Programme Director of EVS Macedonia.

**Ioana Pop** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. She has an interdisciplinary theoretical focus, combining a comparative perspective with a life course perspective, as well as quantitative and qualitative methodology. Her research interests regard the social causes of disease, with a particular interest in mental health and wellbeing. She is currently working on topics such as detraditionalisation and mental health and mental health care utilisation, the crisis of meaning in cross-country perspective, as well as the psychedelic renaissance.

**Mihajlo Popovski** is a Full Professor in Social Psychology at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Psychology. The focus of his scientific interest regard several social-psychological phenomena, including attitudes, values, ethnic stereotypes, attributions, prosocial behaviour, conflicts and post-traumatic stress. He has presented the results of the research of these phenomena in many papers, prepared inde-

pendently or in co-authorship and published in scientific journals and collections of domestic and international scientific-professional gatherings. He is member of Macedonia national EVS research team since 2006.

**Alice Ramos** holds a PhD in Sociology and is a Research Fellow at the University of Lisbon. Her research interests include social values, prejudice and discrimination, attitudes towards immigration and the methodology of cross-national studies. She is National Coordinator of the European Social Survey-ERIC, Project Director and Vice-chair of the Methodological Group of the European Values Study, Principal Investigator of CLAVE – The development of values on children and early adolescents (project funded by the Science National Foundation) and Representative of Portugal in the ESS-SUSTAIN-2 (H2020-INFRADEV-2019-2). She coordinates the line of Data Production of the infrastructure PASSDA (Production and Archive of Social Science Data).

**Tim Reeskens** is an Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University, and he succeeded Loek Halman as the National Programme Director of the European Values Study Netherlands. Tim holds the Jean Monnet Chair on Identities and Cohesion in a Changing European Union, and he coordinates the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence of European Values at Tilburg University. Together with Loek Halman, Inge Sieben and Marga van Zundert, he published *the Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times* (Open Press TiU). His research appeared in *European Sociological Review*, *European Societies*, *Journal of European Social Policy*, and others.

**Ole Preben Riis** is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology of Religion at University of Agder (Norway), and on general sociology at Aalborg University (Denmark). He is a participant in several international survey studies, including the European Values Study and Religious and Moral Pluralism. His list of publications includes findings from the European Values Study, textbooks on sociology, practical methods, and mixed methods. Ole Riis is presently attached to the SocMap group at Aalborg University, which focuses on the social impact of locations.

**Femke Roosma** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. Her research focusses on (the legitimacy of) social policies and welfare states. She studies multiple dimensions of support for the welfare state, with a focus on perceived abuse and underuse of welfare, support for welfare obligations and sanctioning and tax attitudes. Her studies also focus on (support for) Universal Basic Income. In addition, she conducts research in the related field of deservingness theory, which aims to answer the question which social target groups are seen as deserving of benefits, and for what reasons.

**Gergely Rosta** is an Associate Professor in Sociology at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest. His main field of research is sociology of religion, especially religious change in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as youth and religion. He is co-author with Detlef Pollack of the monograph *Religion and Modernity* published in 2017 by Oxford University Press. Gergely is the Hungarian National Programme Director of the European Values Study and board member of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (ISSR).

**Inga Run Saemundsdottir** is a project manager at the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland. Her main research areas are environmental issues and health and wellbeing.

**Inge Sieben** is an Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, Tilburg University. Her research interests are comparative research on religion, morality and family values, and social stratification research, particularly in inequalities in educational opportunities. She is co-author of the *Atlas of European Values* and coordinator of the Erasmus+ KA201 project EVALUE, in which EVS data are used to develop teaching materials for secondary education. She published her work in *Work, Employment and Society*, *European Sociological Review*, *Acta Sociologica*, and *European Societies*.

**Maria Silvestre Cabrera** is a Professor in the Social and Human Sciences Faculty of University of Deusto (Bilbao, Spain). Maria is the Principle Researcher of DeustoSocialValues Research Team that represents Spain in the EVS. She is the former National Programme Director for Spain of the European Values

Study (2006-2020). She was Dean of the Political Science and Sociology Faculty (2004-2009), President of the Basque Association of Sociology (AVSP) and Vice-President of the Spanish Federation of Sociology (FES). Maria was the Director of the Basque Institute of Woman - Emakunde of the Basque Government (2009-2012). Currently, Maria coordinates the H2020 Project *Gearing-Roles*.

**Ingrid Storm** is a Birmingham Fellow in the Department of Social Policy, Sociology and Criminology at the University of Birmingham. Her main research interests are in religious change and the impact of religion on social behaviour. She currently works on a large EU-funded project on inequality and youth radicalisation, and previously completed a three-year British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship researching the relationship between financial insecurity and religion in Europe. Ingrid has a PhD from the University of Manchester, an MSc in Social Research Methods and Statistics from the University of Manchester and an MA in Anthropology from Binghamton University (USA).

**Ilo Trajkovski** is a Full professor at Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Sociology, Skopje. He is teaching and publishing in the areas of sociology of politics, citizenship, civil society, human rights and contemporary sociological theory. As a visiting professor and researcher, he has done study visits to sociological institutions in the USA (ASU in Tempe and the New School for Social Research in New York), the UK (LSE), Bulgaria (St. Clement of Ohrid University), Poland (Jagiellonian University), and France (Université de Strasbourg). He was the first National Programme Director of EVS Macedonia, and member of the national research team since 2006.

**Gudny Bergthora Tryggvadottir** is a project manager at the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland. Her main research areas are related to welfare and health, evaluation of intervention programmes in nursing, and assessment of public services to people with disabilities.

**Jorge Vala** holds a PhD in Social Psychology from the University of Louvain (1984). He was a senior researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS)/ULisboa, institution where he is currently Emeritus Researcher. His research focus on socio-cognitive processes. His present projects articulate these processes

with the study of racism and prejudice, migration issues, political attitudes and social justice. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the European Association of Social Psychology and the National Coordinator for the ESS, the EVS, and the ISSP. He was also Director of the Portuguese Infrastructure PASSDA. He served as Director of the ICS-UIsboa. Jorge Vala received the J.P. Codol Award from the European Association of Social Psychology.

**David Voas** is a Professor at University College London, where he led the UCL Social Research Institute until 2020. He is a demographer and sociologist of religion. David was the European Values Study National Programme Director for Great Britain from 2008 to 2020 and served on the EVS Executive Committee for most of that period. He is co-director of British Religion in Numbers ([www.brin.ac.uk](http://www.brin.ac.uk)) and a member of the editorial boards of the *British Journal of Sociology* and the *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*.

**Bogdan Voicu** is a Research Professor at the Romanian Academy (Research Institute for Quality of Life) and a Professor of Sociology at Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu. He is part of the Romanian Group for studying Social Values (RomanianValues.ro) and President of the Romanian Quantitative Studies Association. Bogdan's main area of research is social change at both the individual- and the macro-level, with a current focus on how international migration changes social values, behaviours of civic participation, and life satisfaction.

**Susanne Wallman Lundåsen** is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Centre for Local Government Studies at Linköping University. Susanne has been the National Programme Director for EVS Sweden during 2009-2020. Her research focuses on social trust, civic engagement and volunteering. Her research has appeared in journals such as *Governance*, *Local Government Studies*, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, and others.

**Christof Wolf** is President of GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, and Professor of Sociology at Mannheim University. His substance-related research interests include aspects of social stratification, social determinants of health, and social networks. His methodological research focusses mainly on survey methods. He was responsible for the German General Social Survey

(ALLBUS, from 2008 to 2015), he was member of the national coordination team for the German part of the European Social Survey (2015 to 2019), and member of the Executive Committee of the European Values Study (2010 to 2020). He has been member of the German team of the International Social Survey Programme (since 2008) and has served as ISSP's Secretary (2015 to 2021).

# EUROPEAN VALUES SERIES

.....

The main purpose of the European Values Series is to publish scholarly work on European values. The Series is a leading platform for the comparative study of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. It primarily publishes values research that seeks to uncover patterns and trends in important life domains, such as politics, religion and morale, family and gender, migration, work, welfare etc., and that adopts a comparative perspective on values such as cross-national comparisons, a longitudinal perspective, comparisons across social groups. The Series is grounded in work from the social sciences, although contributions from other disciplines such as philosophy and history are welcome as well. In this way, the Series hopes to contribute to the academic and public debate on European values. To facilitate this, the European Values Series is published open access at Open Press Tiu, Tilburg University.

## Editors

Inge Sieben (Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, the Netherlands)

Vera Lomazzi (Department of Human and Social Sciences, University of Bergamo, Italy)

## Editorial Board

- Morten Frederiksen (Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg Universitet, Denmark)
- Frédéric Gonthier (Sciences Po Grenoble, School of Political Studies, Grenoble Alpes University, France)
- Michael Ochsner (FORS, University of Lausanne, Switzerland)
- Gergely Rosta (Institute of Sociology, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, Hungary)
- Natalia Soboleva (independent researcher)

## Volumes in the European Values Series

1. Loek Halman, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben and Marga van Zundert (2022). *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times*. With a preface by dr. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission.
2. Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens and Inge Sieben (Eds.) (2022). *Reflections on European Values. Honouring Loek Halman's Contribution to the European Values Study*. With a preface by prof. dr. Wim van de Donk, Rector Magnificus and President of the Tilburg University Executive Board.

# COLOPHON

REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN VALUES:  
HONOURING LOEK HALMAN'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY

European Values Series, volume 2

---

*Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben (Eds.)*

**European Values Series editors:** Inge Sieben and Vera Lomazzi

**Design:** DOORLORI / Lori Lenssinck

**Cover photography:** David Beneš / Unsplash

**Printing:** ADC Interfax, Den Bosch

**Publisher:** Open Press Tilburg University

**ISBN:** 9789403658773

**ISSN:** 2773-238X

**DOI:** 10.26116/09eq-y488

---

This book has been made available Open Access under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license (CC BY-NC-ND): This license allows users to copy and distribute the material in any medium or format in unadapted form only, for noncommercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.

Tilburg, 2022



European *Values* Study



This book on Reflections on European Values is a Liber Amicorum honouring Loek Halman's contribution to the European Values Study. For years, he has been a key figure in this longitudinal and cross-national research project on moral, social, and political values, dedicating his academic life to advancing the understanding of values in Europe. This Liber Amicorum is published at the occasion of Loek's retirement after a long career at the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. It brings together essays on the study of European values, written by his academic friends. The 32 chapters in this volume are structured in five themes that reflect Loek's scholarly interest. A first group of contributions presents theoretical and

methodological reflections on the European Values Study. Second, essays on the sociology of religion reflect Loek's interest in this topic. Third, comparative studies using the European Values Study are presented. The fourth part focuses on a case most well-known : the Netherlands. The fifth and final section further deepens the understanding of values in several specific countries in Europe. Upon his retirement, this book will serve as an inspiration for scholars who want to walk in Loek Halman's footsteps in continuing research on values in Europe."




*Reflections on European Values: honouring Loek Halman's Contribution to the European Values Study is the second volume in the European Values Series. The Series is a leading platform for the comparative study of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions, and contributes to the academic and public debate on European values.*

European *Values* Study 



**ISBN: 9789403658773**

**DOI: 10.26116/o9eq-y488**



9 789403 658773 >